A senior member of the US Naval Institute has advised that the US Navy should reconsider the Type 26 Frigate.
The United States Naval Institute is a private, non-profit, professional military association that in its own words seeks to offer independent, nonpartisan forums for debate of national defence and security issues.
Dr. Friedman is the author of The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, available from the Naval Institute Press.
Friedman points out that the key barrier to the US purchasing the vessel design is that the ship is not yet in service:
“The Type 26 suggests that British thinking has become more like the classic U.S. view. (Ironically, changes to U.S. naval procurement since the early 1980s may have brought the U.S. Navy closer to the older British approach.) A ship’s weapon systems now account for much of its cost. Air-defense systems are particularly expensive. Squeezing those systems into smaller hulls saves very little money, and they may even be more expensive to maintain and operate.
BAE—not the Royal Navy—designed the Type 26, and the ship’s size may reflect a perception that the more flexible the ship, the better its export prospects. Thus, each of the three buyers has been able to select a different combat system within much the same overall configuration.
The Royal Navy version is armed with 48 Sea Ceptor point-defense missiles (smaller and lighter than Raytheon’s Evolved Seasparrow Missile [ESSM], but with about half the ESSM’s 27-nautical mile range). The Royal Navy’s version also has 16 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) cells that can accommodate Tomahawk missiles, the MBDA Missile De Croisière Naval, and Raytheon Standard Missiles with boosters, such as the active-radar SM-3. The Mk 41 system also can accommodate the new U.S. naval strike missile.”
He added:
“The Type 26 exemplifies the current meaning of “frigate.” It is a general-purpose surface combatant with a point- or limited area-air-defense system.”
You can read the full report by Friedman here.
Recently we reported that the hull of HMS Glasgow, the first Type 26 Frigate in build for the Royal Navy, is starting to look shipshape.
You can now stand inside T26 as thees come together and get a real sense of HMS GLASGOW as she takes shape @RoyalNavy @DefenceES @BAES_Maritime pic.twitter.com/Keg8juYnd0
— Christopher Gardner (@VAdmCGardner) April 17, 2019
Below is an image showing one of the internal compartments, click on the above tweet to see it in better quality.
The Type 26 represents the future backbone of the Royal Navy and eight of the class are planned, starting with HMS Glasgow. The UK Government say they are committed to eight of the type, this was outlined in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
The Type 26 programme currently employs more than 1,200 people in the UK supply chain, with a number of contracts already in place for the manufacture of major equipment for the first three ships. In total, there are already 33 UK and international companies working in the supply chain to deliver the Type 26 ships.
For once other navies are appreciating the strength of British warship design. The Type 26 is quickly becoming the equivalent of the Centurion MBT. The US policy of only considering existing ships is to my mind flawed, as it risks missing new tech and innovation. Happily, the British QE Class carriers are drawing a lot of interest too especially from India, and hopefully, it won’t stop there.
@ Maurice10 while I know it will never happen that the USA will buy a QE the US Navy has been all over the QE both in build, in sea trials and flight certification. There are questions being asked in high places how the UK can produce two very capable carriers for $10 Bn that together will deliver some 100 / 110 aircraft into a fight spread over a wider area than one $18 Bn (or whatever) US carrier can deliver 70 off one platform. When EMALS works.
The simple questions for the USA are a) why nuclear other than bragging rights, b) why 100,000 tons or more and c) why, when ‘more smaller’ worked so well in WWII (and invented the ‘Fleet Carrier’ design), are the US Navy demanding ‘fewer larger’?
Of course it doesn’t help that it is US Law from 2007 that the Navy must maintain a permanent fleet of 11 carriers. The assumption being 100,000 ton nuclear powered ships. In fact this was a change to a 2006 Law that demanded 12 carriers and this is still the US Navy’s ambition requiring a 3 year per ship scrap / buying cycle It is written in stone and anyone trying to change that to say 20 x 70,000 ton carriers may well be defeated by political egos.
Sometimes I get the impression the US DOD, tread very carefully with some procurement programmes. Those projects that push the boundaries tend to turn out horrendously expensive. This is due in part to building mostly in the States and in so doing; keeping to well-trusted practices. Hence, hugely expensive carriers that in the main, are pretty close to a design that is over fifty years old. When your ordering quoter is modest like the UK, it is possible to experiment with more cost-effective and simplified designs, that require fewer crew members thus lowering running costs? The US, on the other hand, need to purchase considerably more equipment, which in many ways must limit the pressure on design parameters? Even so, this impasse could result in the US fielding inferior new kit when compared with foreign forces? If China and Russia were to adopt, for example, a UK approach to leading-edge technology as seen on the QE Class and Type 26 but in greater numbers, the US may have to look at alternative ways of procurement and possibly buy more from overseas? Some US warships are class leading and innovative, so the instruments are there domestically.
Actually as far as the USN are concerned I’d say its more the reverse, that they have been pushing boundaries but without clear direction. The Zumwalt destroyer is clearly breaking the conventional mold. Even the Littoral Combat Ships are quite different to conventional naval vessels. The problem with both it seems is that no one actually thought through what the role of these ships might be, i.e. whether that role was actually relevant or required and whether the ships were the best fit for those roles.
The Ford class carrier actually is radically different to the preceding Nimitz class in terms of its new nuclear power plant and turbine/generator system, EMALS launch system, its Advanced Arresting Gear, new Dual-Band Radar, magnetic munitions elevator, and greater automation. But it seems to have had, or still be having, problems with most of these new systems, hence the ballooning costs.
I agree that some innovative US projects are leading edge, though they tend to be ill-disciplined in term of programme control and costs monitoring? The Zumwalt has cost so much that more conventional hulls may have been built to augment the fleet for the price of just one vessel. If however, the Zumwalt had been a shared programme with other countries some of those development oversights could possibly have been dealt with more effectively. The Ford Class in my mind hardly moves the needle in terms of manpower reduction and overall design parameters. The QE Class is years ahead in its approach, to manning, size and internal logistic controls that they have triggered some favorable comment from the US. The US would be capable of fielding more strike carriers using the QEC concept to augment the Fords? Currently, major US Naval projects might be landlocked inside the US industrial practices, that may be making some processes heavy going?
As mentioned in this documentary to the sinking of HMS Hood and Bismark three day’s later.
Bigger is not always better!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_jDaUSSPhc
US carrier is $13b each and while less then half the cost of the QE there are other factors to consider. Life time cost? Sorties per a day? etc
In regards to life time costs I am not certain so I will leave that for now. On sorties per a day the QE us mentioned as being able to sustain 420 sorties over a 5 day period with a surge capacity to 110 sorties a day while the Ford class is stated as being able to sustain 160 sorties a day over 30 days with a surge capacity to 270 sorties.
In statistical terms the Ford is 160% more expensive.
The Ford has 90% more sortie capability daily standard and 145% in surge
On the face of it you get more bang for your buck with the QE but what I am curious about is if the QE can sustain those sorties rates for 30 days like the Ford or if it is more limited due to lower crewing and reduce munitions and aircraft fuel available aboard ship? If the QE can sustain those numbers for 30 days as the Ford then its a winner hands down, But if it needs to be topped up every 5 days (In conflict situations where standard sortie or surge capcity is used to fullest) and the Ford can go for 30 days before resupply then it actually tips the scales back the other way as it puts more strain on the RFA.
All in all i’m thinking that they may actually be about even having different strengths and weaknesses. Ford will have the endurance but QE has a better sortie/cost ratio.
That is an excellent way to appraise the two designs and not a direction from which I have looked at the two designs.
On your first point about cost: The Ford has indeed gone through $13 Bn build and delivery costs and indeed counting as only in November last year it had a 2nd GE Main Thrust Bearing failure and at that date Bloomberg reported that none of Ford’s 11 “Advanced Weapons Elevators” (AWEs) were operational. And here one has to compare that with the exceptional performance of the QE’s automated weapon delivery systems in Westlant18 as acknowledged by the USMC teams on board.
But what has to be added somewhere is the $4.2 Bn R & D costs that were incurred before the keel was laid. And why I mentioned $18 Bn as the cost so far. Even in the USA they have two ‘cost’ formula that say:
1) CVN78 = $18 Bn (and CVN79 etc – £13 Bn)
2) CVN78 etc = $13 Bn + ($4.2 Bn / 10 ships) = £13.42 Bn per ship. The latter being the Boeing way of assessing profitability btw.
As to life costs this was questioned in 1998 by the US Congress and was assessed as an extra $8.2 Bn per carrier. In 2019 money that is $12.8 Bn per carrier (£9.9 Bn). Page 9 refers:
https://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98001.pdf
As to sortie rates given the Ford has had some 750 sorties in 2 years and the DoD’s Director of Testing & Evaluation concluded that “based on current reliability estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight operations expected during wartime.” So maybe it is unfair to include an unproven ship although one must compare that to the 500+ sorties off the QE in the weeks of Westlant18. I think the real comparison has to be with the Nimitz Class which is the benchmark for any carrier. And in that regard the QE has a far faster initial sortie rate but over a 24 hour period is some 10% less and this assumes a full battle scenario so ‘surge’ is assumed. Now as to endurance of those rates I would suggest that wear and tear on catapult and arrestor gears would be the limiting factor not how much aviation fuel is carried. None of which applies to QE (rightly or wrongly).
So while I accept a Nimitz is far more capable on a per ship basis (Ford being unproven) you have to look at the real costs to make a ‘bang for buck’ comparison. So to frame a calculation lets say a (proven) Ford costs $13.4 Bn and the through life costs are some $12.8 Bn extra = $26.2 Bn life costs. Using the data from the US Congress a QE would cost $5 Bn life costs on a like for like basis.
So while you make very valid points I am not sure a Ford or a Nimitz is 5 times more productive as a carrier in Dollar terms. However I doubt nuclear powered carriers are bought for their value for money. The US Navy attaches far more ‘value’ than delivery rates to having 12
shame the u.k always opts for designs that are slow to build
It would be wonderful if the US Navy also procured this excellent, world beating British design too.
Unfortunately, the US Defence industrial complex is way too influential to allow a foreign design to be adopted.
Equipped with US systems, (perhaps closely based on the Australian T26 spec), it would be an ideal unit for the USN.
Well hang on Bae have considerable US naval facilities of their own let alone connections with many others and support technology and all run as an independent US company. The better solutions to the US requirement are already foreign designs and arguably less ‘American’ in terms of being built that Bae could offer. So it seems to me that it would be a choice between the best of the foreign designs with the flexibility for fundamental US re configuring beyond the competition and the ability to give more US input, or a fundamentally inferior US design that is either outdated, a compromise or both. That choice would be more for numbers, costs, politics and patriotism than any real logic which to all intents and purposes this writer is stating. Equally Bae has a very good reputation in the US in naval as well as other fields/technologies there.
The only thing therefore holding the right and logical choice back is a requirement to play safe and the perception that safer means excluding the T26 which will therefore leave them with an inferior, less flexible ship whatever the choice and that will likely need to be replaced all the earlier. And no guarantee that it will actually be an easier build by the time they play around with it either overfilling a pint pot.
So the Ozzie’s anti air missiles will have twice the range of sea ceptor?
I would imagine at the cost of having less cells/being deeper into the hull.
Unlikely. MoD typically doesn’t disclose max performance values of it’s equipment. So you have to take official figures with a pinch of salt.
Yes but the final quantity fitted may vary. It Depends how the Aussies and Canadians fit ESSM. On the Anzacs Sea Sparrow it is quad packed into the Mk 41 behind the funnels.
If they go for more Mk41s to go where the UK is fitting dedicated Sea Ceptor silos the deck penetration may be deeper or more likely they will build the deck one level higher to accommodate them( as the UK does on its VL systems on T23 and T45)
I would imagine in any real area of threat these would also go into combat with a type 45 so this is less of an issue.
I doubt it Peter, T26 is supposed to be able to operate alone so that it can more effectively carry out its ASW role.
I think the ESSM goes out to at least 50hm, Sea Ceptor is officially 25km plus but open source reports have suggested it is more like 50 – 60km. So it is in effect a medium range air defence missile.
According to Wikipedia ESSM is 3.66m long, 0.254m diameter with a total remaining weight of 241kg after subtracting the warhead weight. Sea Ceptor is 3.2m long, 0.166m diameter with a total weight of 99kg including the warhead (Wikipedia didn’t state warhead weight). Let’s even make a silly assumption in Sea Ceptor’s favour and say that it has a miracle zero-weight warhead that’s still 241kg of mass in ESSM to devote to fuel, engines etc vs only 99kg for Sea Ceptor. There is no defying the laws of physics, they are different beasts and with the extra mass much of it presumably fuel ESSM has more energy to get it to a target; ESSM is going to have a significantly greater range. Also range figures can be incredibly misleading anyway. The maximum range of a missile on a nice gravity-friendly parabolic trajectory aiming at a target obediently sitting in a fixed position somewhere over the horizon is going to be massively greater than the same missile twisting and turning on its way to an aggressively manoeuvring target. One never quite knows under what conditions rumours about range are subject to.
Admittedly CAMM gets some initial energy from the in-canister soft launch vs ESSM which has to do its initial vertical climb out of the silo using onboard fuel, and that initial vertical climb starting from full weight is energy-intensive, but even so I think any hope that CAMM has similar range/energy properties to ESSM if only we could see classified data is a forlorn hope. Aster 15 would seem to be the one to put up against ESSM.
CAMM has the advantage of soft launch and presumably cost. One thing that always bugs me about CAMM though is that whenever I see T26 renders they seem to show quite a sparse packing density. For T23 I understand why it was expedient to simply do a tube-for-tube replacement fit of CAMM but for the T26 new builds it seems to be squandering one of the advantages of soft launch to space them out so sparsely given that no need for venting should mean they can pack as tightly if not more tightly than quad-packing into Mk41 tubes. Just look at this graphic of the forward silo of T26 (which may or may not be accurate of course)…
https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/will-the-type-26-frigate-deliver-a-punch-commensurate-with-its-price-tag/
… and look how much space the 24-cell CAMM silo takes up vs the 24-cell Mk41 silo. If we used the Lockheed Martin stand-alone ExLS units (which have been qualified for CAMM) that amount of deck space shown for the 24-cell CAMM silo (to my eye about the same deck space as 16 x Mk41) could fit more like 64 CAMM tubes.
The ranges of the missiles might be quite a bit closer than 2:1.
ESSM has 1.44 x the diameter of Sea Ceptor and therefore about 2x area and drag of x section. It is also 10% longer so the wetted area drag will be higher on that count. ESSM is also faster , mach 4 rather than Sea Ceptor’s mach 3, so the power ( and hence fuel needed ) for a given range will be significantly higher. When you combine all these effects ESSM will need all that extra fuel. I reckon the boys and girls at MBDA have found a ‘sweet spot’ with CAMM.
The ESSM was based on a development of the Sea Sparrow semi-active guided missile, whilst the Sea Ceptor is based on the ASRAAM. The ASRAAM was originally designed as a within visual range IR homing missile. Its brief was to engage a target beyond the range of the enemy’s own IR homing with enough terminal energy to engage a highly manoeuvring target. The air launched Sparrow was designed to engage an aerial target using semi-active radar techniques at a beyond visual range, initially 25 to 50km. The idea being when launched it followed a ballistic path using mid-course updates from the parent aircraft, then would home in on the returned RF reflection when close to the aircraft. Therefore it needed a higher speed to get to the target quicker. The missile used a two stage rocket motor, using a high impulse to get it to mach 2 then a short duration sustainer motor to help it cruise. The targeted aircraft would have detected that it had been locked on and would try to manoeuvre away. Therefore the missile would require more reserve kinetic energy to ensure it could manoeuvre with the target, hence the two stage rocket.
The original VL Sea Sparrow did have a very short range as it did not use an additional rocket booster to get it out of the tube, but relied on the two same two stage engine. However, the launch technique changed from direct attack to a lofted attack. So after launch the missile would immediately climb then dive on the target. This gave it an increased range. It must be considered that the air launched Sparrow had a very poor engagement record in both Gulf wars. The Sea sparrow used the same avionics as the air launched version – not judging, but!
The ESSM can no longer be considered a derivative of the Sea Sparrow, as it uses a different missile body, is also larger, with its aerodynamics modelled on the Standard missile. The additional dimensions do give it a larger engine. This is to blast it out of the tube and accelerate to Mach 4 whilst still using the lofted attack technique. It can still use direct attack techniques if the target is really close.
In some aspects the ESSM could be considered a better missile as its warhead and mass is greater, therefore it can impart greater kinetic energy to the target. Whereas, the Sea Ceptor may require two missiles to destroy the target, due to its smaller mass and warhead.
The other greater aspect of the ESSM over the SeaCeptor is its maximum speed. The ESSM can reach Mach 4 within 5 seconds compared to the SeaCeptor which reaches a published speed of around Mach 3 in less time. What is important to consider is the time taken to reach the target, as the greater the speed the further away from the ship the target can be engaged.
What is not published is how quickly this maximum speed bleeds off. As the rocket engine generally lasts less than 2 to 3 seconds, the missile must use its built up kinetic energy to not only reach the target but be able counter a evasion manoeuvres it does. Therefore, an airframe which suffers less drag will have more terminal kinetic energy. This may be why the Sea Ceptor has on paper a similar range to the ESSM, its simply less draggy so can conserve more energy!
So which is best? The USS Mason launched SM2 and ESSM to counter a anti-ship missile attack off Yemen. But it has not been reported if the missiles were successfully engaged or succumbed to passive countermeasures or simply crashed into the sea. I don’t believe there has been a successful published missile v missile engagement since HMS Gloucester’s use of its Sea Dart during the Gulf War.
Naval Institute Proceedings also has a paper advising the Hunter Class will carry 48 MK41 VLS. Also the Canadian class will have two versions, 3 AAW and the remainder ASW.
The Type 26 is to big and expensive for the U.S. requirement as well as not being in service.They would have to rewrite the specifications to consider it and they have their own budget issues.
The USA regularly rewrites specifications to buy home grown equipment over foreign stuff as in the airtanker buy. Where there is a will there is a way.
I do lots of work on USN vessels from Carriers, LPDs, DDG 51, supply vessels to patrol and MCMV vessels and the USN rewrite specs at the drop of a hat all of the time. I would not be at all supprised if they move the goal posts on this one.
They have been badly burned by LCS and Zumwlat and can ill afford to get the next new class build wrong. Currently every new build is late… Maintenance and refits are late and the whole Ship Repair and new build strategy for the USN is , as was eloquently put to me by a NAVSEA employee, a Monkey F***.
I agree which was my main point, they will go with the lowest risk and cost, I don’t think Type 26 falls into that category if they wanted the best then it wins easily.
Big and expensive yes but other factors to consider. If they buy one of the other frigates imagine in 10 – 15 years they decide to upgrade them, Want to fit lasers and other bits and peces to improve them but there is no room in the ship, Its either give up on the upgrade and have a ship that becomes less and less useful or you buy a new ship. In either case its costing you money because you have either spent money on a vessel that becomes less survivable in a future domain or you are replacing them early.
There is a reason Australia went with the Type 26. It was the biggest one out of the bunch with the most room for future upgrades set aside. With our Anzacs it was realized early on there was limited room for growth. We wanted 2 x 8 cell VLS on them but could only put 1 due to the room available and more importantly the top weight. Top weight has become such an issue the Anzacs dont even go out with the Phalanx CIWS anymore as it throws them off balance.
You dont just buy a ship for what you are putting in it that day, You buy it for what you will be putting in it in 10 – 15 -20+ years from then.
For the UK,Australia and Canada I agree your correct,this is their primary surface ship and I expect when the UK and Australia replace their air defence destroyers it will be a 26 derivative.The problem for the U.S. requirement is the 26 is not far short of a Burke in size and cost when they want a lower tier Frigate to add fleet numbers.The drive in the U.S. is to increase the fleet size quickly to counter the Chinese and for this they need lower costs and lower risk.In reality I think the 26 is low risk but its not in the water so who knows.
When you restrict your choices to only those that exist in the water you are by definition buying older and possibly fully matured designs. Not the best idea when you are looking for a weapon system for evolving threats as well as known threats let alone the most efficient build. Its especially difficult to justify when the US Military in every other purchase buys ‘off the drawing board’. This does cause issues as they are finding out with the USS Gerald R Ford but at least they are at the leading edge and they do after all have the budget to do that.
The Type 26 has rightfully been assessed by three Navies (two foreign) as exactly what they need for future and current threats both above and below the water. The fact it is flexible enough to install, operate and develop different combat, radar and other systems from different nations shows huge advantages for a potential buyer.
Regardless of its air defence or other capabilities the simple fact the T26 will be by some margin (using UK equipment) the best ASW asset available in itself should make it a ‘must have’ for the US Navy. I wonder if they are really looking for a ‘Jack of All Trades and Master of None’ like the Arleigh Burke destroyer has been. It does a lot well but other ships (like the T45 or T23) do their specialist tasking of Air Defence or ASW far better and manage other tasks acceptably well.
We all know how and why US Incorporated has a vice like grip on US defence money and we all know any new Frigate of whatever design will be built in the USA fitted out with as much US sourced kit as possible. Fair enough and I wish we had such a fierce defence of our shipbuilding and equipment industries but an Aussie T26 is about as near the US Navy’s specification as any other possibly more so given the Aussies are pretty pro USA when buying radars and combat systems and other assets. That makes it even more remarkable that a) they chose the T26 and b) the US Navy hasn’t even got it on any list. My argument with the rationale of only choosing between existing designs is it simply works against your best future options
They have been stung by the fiascos of the new carriers,destroyers and of course LCS so want a near off the shelf solution that is low risk.It would be great if they chose type 26 but it does not conform to the specification and cost target.We assume that they have endless supplies of money but they don’t, they are over budget on almost every project so this one will have a lot of focus on costs.
I understand that argument and it is very valid but as I mentioned above I rather wonder that by the time they finish with any of the existing designs to squeeze every pip from it, whether the reality will end up being safe at all. All alternatives will be a compromise to a greater or lesser degree and there will be substantial arguments I suspect over what goes into it. Taking advantage of the the T26 now could actually be safer by the time they come to build them than those alternatives, though I accept only cheaper if the other solutions end up being more difficult to re design than expected. Knowing the Americans I can just see that ‘expected’ becoming anything but as they see perceived ‘inferior’ navies have better equipment and try to adapt. Just reminds me of Intel’s ongoing problems trying to progress a very dated and increasingly limited chip platform to compete with new, more innovative, flexible and modern platforms that are rapidly over taking it technologically and in speed. Oh yeah and that latter is fundamentally based around British design too.
But time will tell I guess and the US has a habit of thinking about their ‘big’ ships like some 18/19th Century navy and its 1st raters and using the rest for numbers to look good on paper and doing basic donkey work while relying on the overall power projection and technology, not to mention image to make up for often considerable inherent inadequacies per unit. Having ships that in the end you have little confidence in strikes me as a very short sighted move on the basis you think you don’t really need them to do very much.
I have always thought the Spanish option would win out as its a mini Burke but the Norwegian incident has put a shadow on that.The 26 in the Australian variant would be ideal but I still think cost will win this competition bit like Type31.
i’m not convinced the t31 will happen
I very much follow your line of argument. I would also recommend this as the document from the US Naval Institute above isn’t the only one challenging what the US Navy are doing. And this is from the US Congressional Research Service from a week ago. Its a long read so grab a drink / coffee / tea:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44972.pdf
Buying ‘off the shelf’ products can cost less up front but will more than likely fail to deliver all or possibly none of your requirements. And changing a mature design adds exponential costs compared to an evolving original design. I used the phrase ‘mature designs’ earlier for which read ‘maxed out’.
Those who are making the point that the US Navy is saving money by buying a ‘mature design’ might want to explain why 5 bidders are now being paid $15 Mn to adapt their designs for a ship that will still cost some $1 Bn per hull. A T26 for the RN on just 8 hulls is £1 Bn per hull. Surely as these designs ‘exist’ then visit the ship, work out what needs changing and then ask for a Best Final Offer. Maybe I am missing something but isn’t the US Navy already getting into paying to modify what has already been designed?
The other factor not being noted is that the US Navy see these as ‘future guided missile frigates’ and not as specialist ASW / air defence ships so maybe the T26 is not the right hull but I still cannot see where the US Navy is saving long term big money by paying to have existing hulls modified to suit their specification (or maybe not) and still pay $1 Bn for a hull with limited flexibility for future development. And that is before the economies of scale for maintenance and spare parts of adding 20 US hulls to the 32 x RN, RAN and RCN hulls.
The last thing we want is us yards involved with T26, US versions will cost $2 billion + giving BAE the excuse to jack up the cost if ours. T26 is too high end for the USN. They would be better off buying more Burke’s.
I don’t think you understand if that US did buy the that would most likely bring down the cost of the ik buying the type 26
No Adam, we would not. US defence Contractors are atrocious and could be very deliver a design like T26 for much less than $2 billion, that would give BAE all the excuse it needed to jack up prices of ours.
Id hazard a guess that when negotiations are completed for ships 4-8 there would have to be some savings – if the price suddenly jumped up, a bit of fiscal judgement would have to be used – ie the MOD could always cancel the order and look for alternatives.
Nice to see the support but I wonder about this institute’s competence, or at least its attention to detail. A quote in the article from the report says the following about the RN T26…
“The Royal Navy’s version also has 16 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) cells that can accommodate Tomahawk missiles…”
I suppose that as a mathematician/physicist I should acknowledge that the statement above is technically correct, with 24 Mk41 the RN T26 will indeed have 16 Mk41 (plus another 8 in additional to that) but it seems a bit sloppy to have not kept up with the specs and not correctly say that the RN T26 is being built with 24 Mk41 each (at least I hope that’s still correct – nothing has changed at the last minute has it?) .
You are correct, T26 will have 24 Mk41.
That’s what I was thinking. I think it should still be 24 but I hear 16 quoted a fair bit.
Not from the UK MOD or Government you don’t. Only speculative remarks or wishfull thinking on various blogs.
Wasn’t there a lot of confusion a few years ago when the design was still evolving and a few renders and maybe even a model were kicking around for a brief time that showed 16 x Mk41 thus sparking speculation on the final count?
Everything I have seen recently shows 24 x Mk41 and I suspect that any mention now of 16 is someone falsely picking up the wrong figure from some older render or report when there was still a possibility of the final Mk41 count being 16.
Norman Friedman, Phd, is a renowned naval analyst, in fact.
One of the designs being considered by the US sank off the coast of Norway due to design flaws.
I also agree with comment the bigger could be cheaper to maintain, space means you can use off the shelf equipment rather than something designed to fit a limited space. I believe the hull only accounts for something like 8% of the cost.
It was hit by a giant oil tanker…
Yes, but a lot of the bulkheads were not fully welded so large gaps around frames allowed the water to flow through the ship, which then became unmanageable. Also, a large number of hatches were buckled which sowed the frames were not strong enough. So perhaps there is a fault with the design, but especially with the build and lack of quality checks.
Following the Norwegian incident, I would expect the RAN to be having a good look at their 3x F-100-derivative Destroyers as well. It would be interesting to track any corrective measures needed as the first ship HMAS Hobart, returns to Osbourne (SthAust) for routine maintenance.
That said, I am not aware of any formal report on the Norwegian incident that has been made public? Only heresay (not suggesting that is incorrect either).
They are different classes of ship and how long have the F100s been in commission.. If we extrapolate, the RN may need to have a good look at the Type 26 to make sure there are not inherent UK design faults in propulsion systems,
The preliminary report by the Norwegian accident investigation team stated that they had found bulkheads not fully seam welded and were only tack welded. They also found a number of doors where the frames was buckled so the water-tight doors could not be secured. There was some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aft most compartment, was also filling up with water, the report states that the crew definitely found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads.
Australia will definately be looking at any reports from Norway, as will just about everybody. While the Hobart class is based on the F100 (actually F104/105), it was built in Australia by ASC, not in Spain. While the question of design (seperate to workmanship) is a worry, items like suspect stuffing boxes etc could appear in the products of many nations. Other manufacturers could also have copied what they thought was a good (or cheaper) idea. For Norway to put out a prelimary report like they did means they think there is something to worry about & nothing that has come out since has changed that view.
Its been a while since a modern NATO class front line warship was lost (Falklands?). We all need to know why. Too many in the industry are saying the Norwegian frigate should not have sunk. Both the recent USN mishaps did not sink, despite being bad enough to cause significant casuallties including deaths. Did their navy bail too early or was the writing on the wall? This ship was only commisioned in 2009. Its hardly an outdated design (last of class was commisioned in 2011) & is the 4th of a 5 ship class. Any problems should have been well & truely sorted before this ship hit the water.
The USN should choose design from US,it seems the British is no longer a close ally to the rest of five eye nation’s as she ignores the warning from US to adapt 5G technology from Huwei despite the possibility of breaching national security. As an Australian I feel sad that we chose tgpe 26 as our future frigate cos I don’t think the Brits deserves our contract. This contract should go to the Japanese instead.
‘ as she ignores the warning from US’ – not a final decision. I don’t know why Australia should not buy an outstanding vessel on that basis anyway. You don’t say why it should go to Japan, either. What have they available that matches the T26 ?
First, I don’t agree with your assertion, and second, I think you have new frigates and submarines for Australia mixed up? Japanese frigates were not part of the bidding for the ANZAC Frigate replacement (it was FREMM, T26 and F-100). Japanese submarines were considered for the replacement of the RAN Collins Submarines, but that was awarded to the French for the joint development of a conventionally-powered version of their nuclear-powered Barracuda Submarine.
I refuse to be triggered Dan.
By law the US doesn’t usually buy things like aircraft, ships and tanks from abroad. To get round this they have to build under licence – like the Canberra in the 50’s, built as the B57.
I was always surprised that the T26 design was not considered for the US Navy’s frigate requirement, especially with all the development work of quietening the hull and machinery, regardless of the ship being “off the shelf”? Admittedly the T26 is not a lot smaller than an Arliegh Burke and I believe they were looking for a ship that fitted between the these and the LCS.
On another site, there is a proposal for a T26 lite instead of the T31. The rationale behind this is that it would significantly reduce costs but maintain a common standard for both logistics and training. Yes a few “gold” items would have to be removed such as the gas turbines etc to keep the costs down; but the ship would be outfitted as fitted for but not with, so all the bracketry, wiring etc would be in place. This would allow the ships to be turned into fully equipped T26s that could do ASW etc rather than just remain as a T21 like “show the flag gunboat”. The other main benefit is that the ship will have more legroom than the T31 contenders, so that it can carry more role modules, unmanned vehicles or personnel in emergencies.
The more I think about it, I really don’t see the benefits of continuing with the T31 over a T26 lite.
Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 was like a T26 lite but with the Iver Huitfeld hull. It does make you wonder what they were thinking when a stripped back T26 had already been ruled out, though I agree that it would be better than T31.
The T26 design seems to be notching up export success that the T31 can only dream-of. (Albeit the T26 wins will be built in country, whereas the hope is that T31 export wins will be built in the U.K. for export abroad – highly unlikely I suspect.)
The RN really should go back to the original plan of a mix of 8 expensive ASW T26’s and 5 cheaper general purpose T26’s.
The Type 45 replacement should also be built on the Type 26 platform, let’s get as many in the water as possible. It’s great to see British ship design doing well in the 21st century.
That is all very nice but it is too late, the FF(X) program has proceeded to the conceptualisation phase prior to down select of the winner and five contractors have been selected then paid $15million each by the USN to develop their concepts.
Type 26 doesn’t qualify anyway as the RFP required only concepts based on vessels already in service.
If Type 26 was allowed on now it could risk the whole program to legal challenge by the other five contractors!
According to articles I ‘ve read about the FFG(X) program (by the USNI) is that yes, the initial phase od conceptualization has been finalized. However, there is a later phase that will allow other designs to compete as well.
https://news.usni.org/2019/03/02/navy-issues-draft-rfp-ffgx-next-generation-frigate
The Type 26 still has a chance.
No. Too expensive. The Iver Huitfeldt class is a better fit; especially if the design could be changed to reflect the Absalon class’ hangars. They are after a sloop not a frigate. Cheaper. Good range.
It would have been a real expression of Anglo solidarity if the USN would considered and selected the T26 design but as noted above the design wasn’t in service, is too rich for the price point sought, and the same capabilities could have been acquired by an AB Lite design.
If I were to have to predict an outcome, the Fincantieri FREMM design would be my guess. Right on the mark price and capabilities wise and Fincantieri already produces the Freedom LCS variant at their Marinette shipyard in Wisconsin which would be left with no USN contracts as opposed to the others if not selected further reducing our defense shipbuilding base… JMHO
Cheers!
Yeah surely if they are considering the FREMM they are happy enough to with a foreign design, presumably as long as it is built in a US yard?
Isn’t this procurement programme because for the last 30 years the USN has not had to worry about ASW? but the landscape has changed fast and they realise they are deficient in ASW vessels and also the expertise in building them – hence the willingness to include foreign designs.
Type 26 will be the stand out ASW frigate, with excellent point defence AAW capability. It’s unfortunate the Treasury dragged their feet on the UK procurement – we definitely would’ve been shortlisted and most likely won.
A deal to be done on Mr Trumps visit perhaps. Type 26 for the USN and Brexit chlorinated chicken for the UK consumer?
That will go nicely with the EU authorised chlorine cleaned salads then ….
Maybe best to avoid Brexit as a subject on here?
lets get our own built first
It is often stated that the T26 has been excluded from consideration in the US competition but I don’t believe this is accurate, at least not for the reasons most assume. ChrisH posted a link to the US Congressional Research Service report on the FF(G)X program from April 19, 2019 that IMO confirms T26 is still a potential candidate.
Direct from the CRS source, its the first report linked here https://crsreports.congress.gov/search/#/?termsToSearch=Navy%20Frigate%20(FFG%5BX%5D)%20Program&orderBy=Relevance
From page 8 of the report (with some editing for brevity) there are two quotes that support the candidacy of T26;
“On February 16, 2018, the Navy awarded five FFG(X) conceptual design contracts with a value of $15.0 million each to Austal, Huntington Ingalls Industry/Ingalls Shipbuilding, Lockheed Martin, Fincantieri/Marinette Marine and General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works.”
and the very important qualifier,
“Being a recipient of a conceptual design contract is not a requirement for competing for the subsequent Detailed Design and Construction (DD&C) contract for the program.”
It even quotes an example of Atlas USA and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems having told USNI News they had submitted for the [DD&C] competition, and they are clearly not in the conceptual design contract phase.
On page 6 the CRS report states “… the Navy intends to build the FFG(X) to a modified version of an existing ship design—an approach called the parent-design approach.” This can be read two ways – “existing ship” design or existing “ship design”. Many seem to assume the former interpretation with a ship already in the water, but the latter interpretation of an existing design is consistent with T26 inclusion and consistent with short-circuiting a lengthy clean sheet design. The specifications shown in the image on page 5 of the report are close to a perfect match to T26, meaning there may be relatively few changes required to modify one of the three T26 based designs for UK, Australia and Canada in order to meet the US reqs.
It is also worth considering that the two LCS based designs for FF(G)X are hardly low risk or established designs. The hulls on both are being significantly lengthened and the propulsion systems are entirely different.
IMV, whatever gets chosen by the US needs a very strong, built in, ASW capability and the specifications for FF(G)X seem to support this to address a capability gap in the USN today.
While & agree the USN is badly lacking in ASW, I think the T26 is simply too much ship for the FFG(X) competition with its stated objectives in mind. If they were to run another competition for FFG(X)-Heavy, with a different budget, for another 10-20 ships – different story. A T26 goes to 8,000t full load with a 10% growth margin (ie absolute max of 8,800t). This is AB-f1 size & margins. Could you strip a T26 back enough to meet their budget & still be a T26 (at least one worth buying)? I would also note that max speed of the T26 may be a little slow for USN Aircraft Carrier task force?
I would suspect that 2 of the competitors will be putting up the designs used for the Australian competition (which was ASW orientated). The Spanish modified their design by about 30% (they are AAW normally & is the design they put up for Canada), & the Italians put up their ASW FREMM, but modified with 32 mk41, BAE 127mm gun etc.
If they want ASW, then Italian ASW FREMM, if they want AAW, then F100, if they want GP, then Arrowhead 140 or GP FREMM. Another option would be to build 10 ASW FREMM & 10 GP FREMM to reduce the overall cost of class down while building basically the same hull. All of these are 6,000t class front line frigates. If they are seriously considering FREMM & F100, I don’t get the LCS based designs being in the mix.
US originally had 50 or so OP-class frigates (4,200t). They have been replacing them with LCS, but they have not worked out as planned (34 delivered/ordered). FFG(X) is a recognition of that & they are supposed to slot inbetween LCS & AB destroyers.
The T26 may well be the more expensive option but I don’t agree that it is too much ship versus the FF(G)X spec. Especially because the FF(G)X RFI has significant capability requirement for ASW. Also 32x VLS cells with ESSM and SM2 isn’t really a light frigate spec, let alone everything else the USN want to fit. If the UK can consider an Iver Huitfeldt sized vessel for its very aggressively priced T31 competition, then the T26 displacement shouldn’t be an issue for FF(G)X, steel and air are cheap as they say.
People probably read too much into the “in excess of 26 knots” spec, the MoD are typically conservative on public specs. This is likely to be an end of life, fully growth margin utilized, dirty hull minimum and even then may be conservative. T23 seem to demonstrate this. The RR MT30 gas turbine also shares commonality with Freedom class LCS and Zumwalt, helping to meet USN goals for common equipment across the fleet.
I suspect originally the UK, followed by the Australians and Canadians, chose T26 because they didn’t want to compromise on the submarine hunter capability, in a world where a lot of countries already have, and others will in future, possess very quiet and capable submarines. Most of the FF(G)X candidates seem to compromise on this from the get go, trying to make a silk purse out of a sows ear. When the US gold plates so much in defence, it seems very short sighted to skimp on submarine defence.
By too much ship, I was not only refering to its size, though that is part of it. A T26 is an expensive design. The A140, like its parent was designed to be cheap & easy to build. I don’t know that you can build a fully functioning T26 for US$800 million, which is the price they are aiming at. I believe it’s possible for T26 to go to 64 vls (though I doubt all could be strike length). An expensive 8,000t warship with 64 vls is basically a destroyer. Part of the idea for FFG(x), was to take the load off the very expensive destroyers by building frigates again (LCS not up to the task). They already have 66 active destroyers with more on order & more building. The first of the Ab-f1 destroyers are now 30 years old. Replacing some of those with T26 may be a better idea (seperate from FFG(X)).
When it comes to ASW, the ASW Italian FREMM is probably the next best out there. I would be surprised if they can get it down to US$800 million, but otherwise it ticks all their boxes. If you are prepared to forgo top line ASW, then A140 but build 30, as I think you can build it under the $800 million.
A bigger hull like the type 26 can mean easier and less expensive out fitting/fitting out comapred to a difficult fit out of a tight hull. It’s not about steel being cheap.
Would the T26 be a good frigate for the USN yes, yet there is a problem. The issue is that the USN seem to have there Arleigh Burke class destroyers as Anti Air where the T26 is Anti Sub with an Anti Air capability. That is the difference it is also what the USN is lacking.
Any US Navy task group is weak in the Anti Sub capability, so if they decide to have a general purpose warship with a very good Anti Sub capability and a good Anti Air capability then they would look at the T26 or the Hunter variant. Maybe the RN can teach the US a thing or two about hunting subs, could be very useful.
A T26 would struggle to keep up with a USN Carrier task force. An Italian FREMM is rated at 30+ kts. Then again, a T26 can go to around 64 vls against FREMM 32 vls (hardly surprising – a T26 full load is much the same as a AB-f1 full load). Then again, a dinky 57mm gun up front on a T26 would look weird (not that it would look a whole lot better on a FREMM).
This would be a great day for the Type 26 Frigate if, and I stress “if” the US were to revisit and recommend this ship for it’s Navy. This is perhaps the best ASW/AAW ship world-wide that is being produced by Locheed Martin/British Aerospace Engineering (LM/BAE). To have a global fleet of up to perhaps 50-55 modern Type 26 Global Combat Frigates, or more, with several different versions of itself, including the USN, would be awesome! The fact that this hull has been selected by at least three US allies (Canada15/Australia 9 & the UK 8), makes it easier for the US to at least reconsider this Frigate as an option. The US could have it’s own version of this Frigate’s ASW/AAW Combat and Weapons Systems as the other 3 allies have done. Nothing wrong with that! Sadly, me thinks US politics will eventually play it’s part and the contract will go to another “in-service” and less capable ship.
Why not, the US can make a Trade deal, Type 26 frigate for either a San antonio class LPD in flight 2 version or one America class LHD or they can get some USCG National Security cutter in return.
A reply to my post here got me thinking, at what speed will a RN Carrier group operate at, I suspect 18knots cruising 25-26 knots flat out. If that is the case is the T26 a good frigate for the carrier group as when it is using its tail it will creep at say 5 knots so it does not have the speed to catch up or sprint ahead to sanitise an area. Is this problem also one of the reasons that the USN does not seem to have a good anti sub platform.
It seems that we might need to look at the T31 in a different way yet if that is the case then it will be a much more expensive ship than the permitted £250 million.
To be able to sprint ahead use it tail sanitise an area before the carrier group passes through it the ship will need a speed of 35 knots, even if it stays behind to make sure there is no sub following it will still need this speed advantage over the carrier group.
Due to the small numbers of hulls that the RN has it will also need to carry two helicopters to be able to triangulate and prosecute a potential threat wildcats with dipping sonar Merlin’s would be better.
The other option is to use Astute class subs but you will need two of these to escort the carrier group, one to stay close with the other on a long leash. However again it is the same problem, SSNs friend is silence you don’t get that by running around at 26 knots.
So what are we looking at well a Saudi style Freedom class frigate with a tail. It will have the speed 47 knots, equipped with 2 8 cell Mk41 launchers 8 for a SSM and the other 8 for 32 Sea Ceptors, a 76 mm gun, two twin Anti sub torpedo tubes and a helicopter with two MQ-8B drones with a stern ramp missions bay, a CIWS and a couple of 30mm and mini gatling guns. The cost for such a ship is in the $500 million range or £400 million, with UK extras such as the tail it will increase to £500 million.
Could this be the ideal T31? would five be enough? With two carrier groups at sea then no, a minimum of three would be needed for each carrier plus one for each group undergoing refit and repair that gives eight.
It will leave the T 26 to operate with the Astute’s in the GIUK gap as anti sub patrol.