Defence Procurement Minister Jeremy Quin has updated the House of Commons on the AJAX programme.

The Minister has announced the publication of the AJAX Health and Safety report.

You can read his statement in its entirety below.

“Madame Deputy Speaker, with permission, I would like to make a statement to update the House on Ajax.

Ajax is an important capability and a vital step-change in the way the British Army will operate on the future battlefield. It will provide Ground Mounted Reconnaissance, allowing the Army to understand the battlefield in all weathers, 24 hours a day. Part of our £41bn investment in Army equipment and support over the next 10 years, this modernisation is critical to address future threats. This is a vital investment and the Defence Secretary and I have been deeply concerned about progress on this troubled project which has been running for over 11 years since its commencement in March 2010.

That’s why we have been thoroughly focused on the project; why I insisted earlier this year that no declaration of IOC (Initial Operating Capability) would be made without Ministerial involvement; and why we asked the Permanent Secretary to commission a report from the MOD’s Director of Health, Safety and Environmental Protection into the health and safety concerns raised by noise and vibration.

I am today publishing that report and placing a copy in the library of the house. Over the last 35 years there have been some 13 formal reports on defence procurement: we know the foundations that can build success. Openness, good communication and collaboration within Defence and the ability to act as an informed and challenging customer are vital.

This Health and Safety Report has highlighted shortcomings that need to be addressed, not just in health and safety but more broadly. The Review finds serious failings in the processes followed. The result was that personnel worked on a vehicle that had the potential to cause harm.

The Review finds that the failure was complex and systemic. It finds that:

  • a culture exists of not treating safety as equally important as cost and time in the acquisition process; and
  • from a cultural perspective, the Army did not believe it was potentially causing harm to people, especially from vibration, as it was tacitly expected that soldiers can and should endure such issues.

As I informed the House on 18 October, we have contacted all personnel identified as having worked on Ajax. 40 declined to be assessed for hearing but, of the remainder, I am pleased to report that the vast majority have returned to duty with no health impact.

As of 9 December, 17 individuals remain under specialist outpatient care for their hearing, some of whom are again expected to return to duty with no health impact.11 individuals have had long term restrictions on noise exposure recommended, potentially requiring a limitation in their military duties. 7 of these had pre-existing hearing issues prior to working on Ajax. 4 did not. In addition, 4 individuals who worked on Ajax have been discharged on health grounds, in some cases for reasons wholly unrelated to hearing loss.

While we cannot yet establish a definitive causal link, it is possible that Ajax may have contributed to the current hearing loss in a small number of individuals. It remains the case that no individuals have had long term restrictions or been discharged as a result of vibration. However, assessment for both hand-transmitted and whole-body vibration take time and require a specialist assessment and these continue.

Madame Deputy Speaker, I will now set out the key points from the Review. General Dynamics UK is responsible for the design and build of the Ajax vehicles. The vehicles they delivered for use in the trials had levels of noise and vibration that were higher than usually expected in tracked vehicles and have been proven to be above the statutory limit. This exposed our personnel to potential harm. This exposure was not prevented by the MOD due to a series of failures to act when concerns were raised by expert advisers and by soldiers operating the vehicles. For example:

  • An MOD Safety Notice in December 2018 that said design upgrades were required to reduce vibration. This was not acted upon.
  • MOD safety cases and safety management used GDUK calculations that were not independently assured, despite experts at the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory advising that the calculations should not be relied upon.
  • A report from the Defence Safety Authority in May 2020 identifying some of these issues and entitled “Serious Safety Concerns on Ajax” that was retracted and not pursued, either by the DSA or by the project team in DE&S.
  • Multiple warnings from Dstl and from the Armoured Trials and Development Unit that were running the trials were not actioned, even when the ATDU Commanding Officer questioned the approach as having the potential to expose soldiers to a known hazard which he stated was not a defendable position.

Overall, the report makes 20 recommendations. The MOD accepts all of those relating specifically to armoured vehicle procurements, the regulation of safety for land equipment and the broader approach to safety in Defence. Recommendation 9 relates to avoiding the concurrent running of the demonstration and manufacture stages in future projects. This recommendation needs to be considered carefully to ensure we capture the safety imperatives while not preventing sensible spiral development or for example the parallel construction of classes of warship. I will update the House on this alongside Recommendations 12 and 14 that also need consideration on how to best implement them, building on existing work on Approvals and SROs.

Madame Deputy Speaker, I would also like to update the House on the Project more broadly.

We have a robust firm price contract for the delivery of 589 vehicles at a cost of £5.5Bn. We are ensuring we protect our commercial position under the contract and will not accept a vehicle that is not fit for purpose. It remains impossible to share with this House 100% confidence that this programme will succeed or, if it does, the timing of achieving Full Operating Capability. However, we are working closely with General Dynamics on noise and vibration and they are showing great commitment to resolving these issues. This very advanced fighting vehicle project employs 4,100 in South Wales and across the UK. We all want it to succeed and deliver what the British Army requires. The Millbrook trials to baseline the vehicle’s characteristics have completed and we expect to receive conclusions shortly. In parallel, General Dynamics have been developing its own theories and trialling design modifications to address vibration. We expect to receive their analysis in the New Year, following which we will if appropriate undertake thorough testing of their proposed modifications to satisfy ourselves on their efficacy.

Part of our analysis is also looking at the performance of the headset used in Ajax. While the noise profile on Ajax is noticeably different from other armoured vehicles, following tests on in-service headsets we took in November a precautionary measure to limit temporarily the amount of time personnel operate using them in other AFVs. Acoustic testing of our in-service headsets is now underway at test facilities in the UK and overseas. We are also testing other headsets to establish if they will meet our requirements and provide additional attenuation. Once this analysis is complete, we expect to be able to relax the temporary restrictions or implement appropriate mitigations. In the meantime, we remain able to maintain our operational commitments. The work on Ajax has also highlighted the significant number of personnel across Defence whose exposure to noise results in short or long-term restrictions to their military duties. I have, therefore, asked the MOD Permanent Secretary to look further at this issue to ensure we are doing all we can to prevent avoidable hearing loss in our people.

Madame Deputy Speaker, in conclusion, the Ajax Health and Safety report makes for very difficult reading. It lays bare a deep malaise which is cultural and results in systemic failures across our organisations.

I am grateful to David King and his team for their work and also grateful for the candour of many that contributed to this review. There are many working tirelessly to get Ajax back on track. We need to build on this candour and dedication and encourage all those involved in procurement programmes to speak up, to identify problems and make clear where those responsible are failing. A culture in which individuals may be discouraged from elevating problems through the chain of command, only solutions, may be admirable in other circumstances but rarely in procurement.

We need to support our people by resolving underlying cultural issues that risk making it harder to deliver the capabilities needed by our Armed Forces. To take this forward, we are commissioning a senior legal figure to look more deeply at Ajax and not just health and safety; to examine the cultural and process flaws that it has highlighted. We will leave no stone unturned to learn these lessons. I encourage people to participate in this further review and will ensure they have the space to do so. Of course, if the review uncovers evidence of gross misconduct, those concerned will be held to account but the primary purpose though is to ensure that we address significant cultural failings. The terms of reference will be agreed with the reviewer and I will make these available to the House.

In summary, while we should not forget that General Dynamics UK is responsible for delivering a safe and effective vehicle, it is clear from the report that the customs and practices of the Army, DE&S, Defence Digital and wider MOD resulted in a culture that prevented issues being addressed at an earlier point. We are committed to ensuring that measures are put in place to deliver what are very complex programmes in a way that minimises the risk to our people while delivering the capability needed by the Armed Forces.

I commend this statement to the House.”

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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125 COMMENTS

  1. 13 reviews of defence procurement in 35 years. After each of which the military and civilian parts of the MoD solemnly pledged to learn the lessons of those reports. Each of which almost without exception made the same points of failure and recommended the same or similar solutions. Thank god we will be 14th time lucky and this will be the last !

    • Yes, certainly agree that the MOD should shoulder it’s fair share of blame for this debacle.
      GD are not blameless in this affair either. In fact their QC organisation should have stopped a lot of these issues arising, or certainly raising the issues with the MOD for further testing/investigation.
      We seem to have an aversion to holding big contractors to account for shoddy workmanship! Something that really needs to change I believe.

      • I agree i’m not excusing any defence contractor but all these procurement disasters have only 1 thing in common. The MoD. With Ajax GD was the contractor with Nimrod Bae etc etc. Why do these companies seem to perform better when they’re not working for/with the MoD ? If we don’t change the way the MoD works both the civilian and uniform sides we will never solve this problem. Why the MoD doesn’t want to change the way they work.Which is reasonable to conclude after 13 reviews is another debate.

        • Around 40% of ‘The MoD’ is made up by the second lowest civil service (clerical) grade on about £20k pa) the next largest number is the lowest (civil service) clerical grade, at one point during the Cameron government emergency payments had to be made to these people to bring them up to legal minimum wage. So thats about 75% of the MoD. None of these people have any say or sway on contracts, projects, budgets or validation. The next 2 or 3 grades up have controls of pool car budgets, stationary and the various things needed to run a large office operation. Right at the top the MoD is run by retired and serving members of HM forces, and ultimately the Minister. When people slag off the MoD the image conjured up is one of dusty old civil servants getting in the way of change and being incompetent. Nothing that a good bit of outsourcing would not solve. But the problem is, at least in part, the nepatism involved when it comes to the military. The other big problem is the failure to manage contractors. When mass outsourcing started in government departments the big problem was weak contracts (lack of experience). Weak contracts and a certain williness to provide slack as it was deemed a top priority for the oursourcing to suceed whatever. From what I can gather contracts across the board are now much more comprehensive but what is needed now is the will and the strength to enforce them. Not always very easily given the close working relationships with the project manager at whatever firm is doing the work. The military by its very nature is a ‘can do’ organisation, it has to be. But complex projects do not fair well will forcing checkpoint results to fit expectations/requirements. Its all very well bringing your experience of getting service personnel to do/carry out dangerous/difficult/uncomfortale tasks to bear. Sometimes, however, an unreliable rifle/troop transport/helicopter is just that and masking this by making people put up and push through is wrong (in a project setting). And lastly these big projects are hugely political with big and small p’s. Perhaps the CEO of this contractor or that contractor is a close friend of x or y minister. Perhaps getting tough on an American or French firm might be embararsing for those countries making relationships frosty, who knows. What I do know is one of the warnings in the report was that purchasing an interim anti-ship missile might piss off the French.
          I do not work for the MoD.

          • I wasn’t/ wouldn’t criticise the Indians at the MoD. The problems are much further up the pay grades with the chiefs. Organisations rot from the head down and the MoD is no exception.

          • That rant wasn’t aimed at you. The MoD is a government dept. of long standing, thats a lot of bad habits to accrue.

          • David, in my opinion the problem is not so much procedures or policies but rather that scrupulous over-reliance on these reflects a culture characterised by fear ( of failure and punishment); this culture gives rise a reluctance to give and accept constructive criticism given in an open spirit; so problems are ignored rather than faced up to. To be honest its really the flip side of the British ‘stiff upper lip’. Its just a lot more prevalent at the centre of things…Whitehall.
            Bet you anything you like someone like Radakin will take constrictive criticism on the chin without taking offence, or going into a huff or initiating a vendetta ….and find the good in it. I’m hoping his approach will rub off on the MOD.

          • You may be right. I don’t know first hand how the MoD works but it ‘seems’ that no one is ever held to account for their decisions. Indeed the system of rapid turnover of staff in responsible positions is designed to make it as hard as possible to discover who is responsible for which decisions.

        • The Government made BAE use old comet airframes when BAE told them new ones should be built. Then the new precision wings did not fit due to hand built nature, Also interior measurements varied !

          • I’m well aware that there are many more informed folks on this site than me but hear me out and shoot me out of the water if I am wrong. As I understand it, the wings did fit (how did they fly otherwise?), as you say they needed customising for each fuselage which admittedly was not ideal. A lot of the criticism leveled at this aircraft has been unfounded and the hasty decision to scrap it was wasteful and down to posture politics by the incoming Cameron government.

            This is worth a read https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/761vw38.htm

  2. This report essentially boils down to …we know what’s wrong, we know what needs to be done but because it’s the MOD there is nothing we can do about it. Another £4 billion on the way to being wasted.

    • True Geoff, on it goes….

      Let’s see how much more money is thrown away down this latest money pit. What’s our Uncle Sam doing guys?

      If he’s developing a similar capability and Ajax can’t be fixed easily (without throwing even more money away), then ditch it and buy off the shelf.

      • I took encouragement from the statement that it’s a robust fixed price ( but not fixed cost) contract. GM have to deliver a product that meets legislative / contract standards for the price agreed. The added cost will be in prolonged investigation, review and assurance / acceptance steps for the fix together with incremental running costs for legacy platforms. I was actually encouraged by the statement sounds like there is open acknowledgement of the problems and issues and therefore it becomes easier to identify and agree solutions.

        • fixed price could be a bad thing, if its also not linked to numbers. If they decide to slash the numbers in half and deliver a viable product within the price, its still not good value for the tax payer.

          • The language used in the speech is very contractual. Give us what we ordered in the numbers we ordered for the price agreed or we will cancel ….but let’s resolve the issues.’

            ‘We have a robust firm price contract for the  delivery of 589 vehicles at a cost of £5.5Bn. We are ensuring we protect or commercial position under the contract …’

          • Too many vested interests. Top generals/policticans waiting for their non-exec jobs at GD, not wanting to impact the gravy boat

          • probably. Wouldn’t surprise me Steve. Why you need robust contract and contractor management procedures involving x-functional professional with explicit terms of references. Best practice I’ve applied / worked within is philosophy that its not that you have a right to intervene if something doesnt seem right, but that you are obligated to keep raising the issues until the concerns are dealt with (or formally accepted). Subtle but powerful cultural difference.

        • Is this not covered by the sale of goods act which requires goods to be of satisfactory quality, GD should also loose their ISO 9001 accreditation which would mean they can no longer bid for UK contracts !

          • Yep, the contracts and all its protections and obligations form a single spiders web of issues. You get paid to provide ‘this’ to ‘that’ standard and specification under these warranties etc.. Assuming the Contract called for vibration and noise attainment to comply with X standard or Y specification then MoD should be on solid ground. On ISO 9000, if it can be demonstrated that GD ignored or avoided assurance elements within their IMS to comply to Contract or Legislation then yes, the accreditation would come under scrutiny. I would suspect a 1 time lapse would lead to recommendations and correction notices…systemic failings and accreditation could / should be at risk. I can however imagine a grey zone of :

            GD: ‘we have a problem that may impact schedule’….

            MOD: ‘dont worry..we will live with it’.

            That would be an uncomfortable place for the MoD.

    • If i read that correctly, the good news is its a fixed price contract, so hopefully won’t cost the tax payer too much the negative is they seem to be focused on the ear protection rather than fixing the actual issue.

    • It is also huge Width=3.35m, Height=3.00m compared to CVR(T) W=2.2m, H=2.1m, thus large visual signature.
      It is also heavy (38-42 tonnes) so will break many small bridges and culverts.

      • Graham, with your background you should know that the requirements set by the MOD dictate what the contractor can do. The prime requirement for the AJAX vehicle is survivability which comes with a weight penalty.

        • Ian, I certainly know that the requirements set by MoD affect the design. I am surprised that you say that the prime requirement for Ajax is survivability – British recce vehicles have classically operated covertly and stealthily and intend to not ever be spotted by the enemy. If compromised and sucked into a firefight they cannot do their recce job and they also reveal where in the battle space we have ‘eyes on’ and an acute interest in.

          I would have ranked low signature, agility, and excellent networked sensors and comms suite – ahead of survivability. At 38-42 tonnes, it is presumably far, far better protected than most IFVs which invariably operates in line of sight of the enemy – not making huge sense to me that your covert recce vehicle has better protection.

          Ajax will have some strategic and operational mobility limitations and its ability to traverse fragile terrain must be questioned.

    • The noise issue is not mechanically vehicle related as stated in the report. When the vehicle is driving by, it’s actually quite quiet.

      • Paragraph 62 of the report states

        Noise and vibration in the Ajax family of vehicles have both electrical and mechanical origins

        • Yup, the vibration is mechanical. The report states that the noise issue is related to the integration of the CIS equipment into the AJAX architecture and the questionable efficacy of the helmets.

          • Not quite. Para 62 refers to noise and vibration, as quoted, and and gives 3 origins sub-paras a), b), c) mainly mechanical. 64 d) Headset performance and integration relates to noise only, not vibration, but than is not the only origin of noise.

          • 62. Noise and vibration in the Ajax family of vehicles have both electrical and mechanical origins from the following broad sources:

            1. a. Track, suspension and running gear, in particular the tension and sprocket design/track interface.
            2. b. Engine and its mounting into the vehicle.
            3. c. Quality issues associated with, but not limited to, inconsistent routing of cabling, lack of bonding and weld quality; all of which can lead to potential electromagnetic compatibility issues with communication equipment. As witnessed during trials, insecure components and bolting within the vehicle can also lead to noise and vibration, and again this was noted by ATDU crews.
            4. d. Headset performance and integration (noise only). 

  4. My reading of this is that it is probably going to get cancelled and we will buy something off the shelf which is what we should have done in the first place.

    Interesting on the hearing thing. How many ex-soldiers have suffered hearing loss, ringing or buzzing ears from simply blanks in training going off too close even with the little yellow ear plugs? Nearly everyone I know has and that is without considering operational exposure to noise.

    • Noise is an issue for all services.
      The RN has been all over noise exposure and vibration exposure for decades. However its still an issue.
      The noise issue is one of the things that drove the RN to removing the gunner from 30mm mounts.
      Noise exposure per round on a 30mm was around 180 +db. With in ear protection, antiflash hood and over ear duffs, even laterly active ear duffs, the protection only got you to 120db attenuation. That’s still leaves the noise way above the exposure limit.
      Diesel downtakes on the upper deck, Helo ops, headset feedback, background fan and vent noise all add to the exposure level and issues in latter life.Gunners and maintainers now get annual tests to monitor hearing loss.

      Vibration log books have been in use for a while for sea boat crews to monitor their exposure to vibration.

      To late for me thought. I have lost most of the mid range hearing and struggle to hear people speak when there is any background noise. Even with my Pussers in ear hearing aids it’s still an issue. When hearing is lost that’s it… Gone… It never ever comes back.

      • Hi Gunbuster. Your last paragraph was very relevant to me. I, too, suffer from mid-range loss. I wear hearing aids but background noise (restaurants, crowded rooms, etc.) make it impossible to hold a conversation. I attribute this to my early days as a radio operator, and years of taking down high pitched morse signals.
        Another problem I had/have is skin cancers. I attributed this to 10 years out of my 24 years service spent in hot countries. I claimed off the MoD for this – and got almost £7k!

        You can still claim for various medical issues – I left the service almost 40 years ago but made the claim via Veterans UK this year.

        Cheers!

      • Thanks for that Gunbuster. I got ringing ears after a house clearing ex in the 80s. Ever since, if exposed to really load bangs, they just ring again. I reckon there are literally 10s of 1000s of us out there.

    • Would anything off the shelf fit protection requirements? If we drop those it would surely just make sense to keep Ajax and strip some of the armour back off.

      • I’ve seen a CAD model of an upgraded Scimitar with a new turret that includes the CTAS 40mm gun. There was talk of fitting the Bushmaster 30mm to the ones being given to the Latvians.

  5. I am surprised by the Report’s assertion (is there evidence?) that:

    • “a culture exists of not treating safety as equally important as cost and time in the acquisition process; and
    • from a cultural perspective, the Army did not believe it was potentially causing harm to people, especially from vibration, as it was tacitly expected that soldiers can and should endure such issues”.

    When I worked as a PM at Abbey Wood (Sep 2009-2011), Safety was treated as equally important (if not more important, as cost and time). Other factors considered were performance and environmental impact. I would not have got my equipment to trials or into service if there had been serious safety issues.

    When I was in the Army (REME, 1975-Sep 2009), Health and Safety was treated very seriously. I will not bore you with details but there was never an acceptance that soldiers could be injured or harmed on duty.

    It is a puzzle that MoD accepts that GDLUK is still claiming after all these years that they don’t know the root cause of the vibrations. Most of us interested ‘observors’ have a very good idea.

  6. A possible solution to the problem if all does not go to plan?

    “A Boxer armoured vehicle with an RT60 turret has been seen for the first time at the WFEL facility in Stockport, and the newly developed system has potential on many different levels.”

    https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/boxer-ifv-variant-rt60-turret-emerges/

    “The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain could ultimately involve buying in excess of 3,200 new heavy armoured platforms, with a price tag of over $11.5 billion over the next 15 years.”

    https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/across-europe-billions-being-funneled-into-new-armored-vehicle-programs/

  7. The truth is now out there, the Ajax is dead in all but name. A hammer blow to British military manufacturing. Now the hot question is, what will replace it, and can it still be assembled in the Ajax factory? Is the German Puma a possibility even if it means fewer vehicles? Such a decision could take at least three years to set up for sign-off and the first production tanks to be issued. One possibility could be a warmed-over Warrior to make up the Ajax procurement numbers?

    I fear a cancelation declaration has already been agreed upon, but the political ramifications will ultimately delay confirmation?

      • I still think the Puma or Lynx would be a wiser purchase, it appears to have been designed to cover future-proofing and offer greater NATO integration. I hate the idea of being so reliant on German armour, but considering CH3, Boxer, why not Puma /Lynx?

        Surely the CV-90 is too old to offer the flexibility required in the future?

        Rheinmetall could take over the Welsh factory from GD, if the government insisted, thus saving the Ajax jobs. The existing kit will have to soldier on to at least to 2026 /2027?

        • Puma is a IFV and I have not heard of a recce variant.

          Lynx does have a recce variant (it is heavy at 38 tonnes, and probably is as big as AJAX).

          CV90 was first produced in 1993, but the MkIV came out in 2018 (very new).

        • Looking at CV90, it seems to be bought by the right countries, and it was runner up.
          What advantages did Ajax offer that beat CV-90 in the competition?

          • One advantage with CV90 is size over any of the competition. Watching CVT’s in Germany recently those little beasts can hide in a rabbit hole! I can’t see Ajax or the others being so flexible in the recon role?

        • CV 90 is updated with hydo-gas suspension, sights systems ,active protection systems and could have the new bushmaster 50 mm cannon !

        • The Germans were having some problems integrating sensors etc with puma and they might not be combat ready till 2029. Lynx or redback might be better?

          • We all fall victim to media hype, poor old Ajax has had its fair share. All projects have development problems or ‘issues’ even the Germans. On paper, Lynx looks a more likely candidate to replace Ajax?

      • BAE would prefer it to be made at their factory rather than a competitors. Mk IV is heavy at 37t but is good and Mk IIIb would be good too.

    • Maurice,for some reason you refer to Puma as a tank?
      Puma is an IFV not a recce vehicle. Warrior is an IFV not a recce vehicle and is nearly 40 years old and its modernisation programme has been canned.

      • Come on Graham, stop being so pedantic, ‘Tank’ can be used as a descriptive term. ‘Warmed over’ could still apply to Warrior even though the upgrade was canned. There are a number of protective/reactive systems available to give troops additional safety, until the budget allows for more Lynx vehicles.

  9. The root cause of this debacle goes back to 2014 when the production contract was signed when NO TRIALS had been conducted on prototypes to ascertain if GDUK could supply gehicles to the required standard. This flew in the face of the initial demonstration contract which described clearly which trials should be conducted and passed successfully prior to any release for production. The reason for the signing was twofold: 1) It was political to bring good news to Wales. 2) The Army wished to ‘Ringfence’ the funding, afraid they would loose it to other projects. A train wreck since 2014!

  10. From 2010 to date, it has cost in the region of £2.1 billion to remove the British Army footprint from Germany.”

    2021 under new plans Germany will now become one of the Army’s “land regional hubs”, with hundreds of tanks and soldiers expected to return to the country.
    Although the right decision ultimately, and some of that money might have improved accommodation, its another example of poor planning (MP’s included).

    All these poor decisions ultimately eat in to the budget even more. Like upgrades to SA80 A3, ultimately the platforms are worn out and it be more cost effective to buy new L119A2 like the Ranger battalion will probably do (10,000).

    Its hard to pick out one success story from Army procurement over the years. At least one that developed internally and not just bought off the shelf.

    Assuming Ajax is back on track, then its appears recce heavy considering numbers of CH2 being upgraded and lack of Warrior upgrade.

    • The L85A3 upgrade is the only viable way of keeping the bulk of the service rifles operational for the next decade.

      HK are replacing the worn out Receivers and other parts with only the original TMH’s remaining, bit of a Triggers broom really….

      AR platforms are the way to go and are gradually taking over. SF and elite forces are progressively switching over to the fine Colt Canada products and the rest of the Army will follow suit in due course.

      • I’m would be surprised if they do go with the Colt version. It still is a traditional AR copy, in that it uses gas impingement for recocking. The HK416 is the better option as it uses a short stroke piston, so the bolt carrier doesn’t get gummed up with carbon.

        • True Davey, it would be my personal choice, the US take on the 416, the M27 is in my opinion the finest service rifle in the world.

          My reasoning for a Colt Canada AR (L119A2) is based on its adoption by the Royal Marines, in Carbine and mid length rifle form.

          It’s being adopted in a large enough volume to almost be regarded as a standard firearm.

          It makes sense to carry on a steady rollout of the type across the rest of the Armed forces.

  11. Far from turning a corner this just seems to keep getting worse! The Army’s Nimrod is seems…..

    Least terrible decision could be to can Ajax and go with CV90 which has a proven track-record and been consistently upgraded. Warrior was always a weird decision given that the basic vehicle hulls are nearly 40 years old!

    Focus on buying off the shelf Boxers & CV90’s and put The Army in some sort of special measures with clear/direct ministerial overview to ensure the investment actually delivers something.

  12. Can someone explain to me, as I’m not clued up on the commercial side, just why the MoD had already signed a contract and spent 3 billion already of the budget when we were still at the trials vehicles stage?

    To my limited knowledge, the trials should identify issues? They are fixed, then you commit and spend??

    Shouldn’t the trials and competition to win the contract be at the same stage?

    • The contract was written so that the trials/demonstration and development ran concurrently: “Recommendation 9 relates to avoiding the concurrent running of the demonstration and manufacture stages in future projects.” 
      The aim was to speed up the procurement process to mitigate the length of time taken to arrive at contract award.

      • Ah! Yes of course.

        What a mess Ian. I recall you have the ATDU / RAC experience. Is there a positive end to this regards Ajax getting into service?

        • Yup, the Army (with a capital A) want AJAX and it’s capabilities now! As alluded to in the report, the in service Combat helmet bears some serious scrutiny in it’s effectiveness as a noise mitigating equipment and this apples to all UK AFV’s. My contacts in industry reckon that GD are developing engineering solutions to the vibration issue to be trialled and evaluated by the MOD.

          • Thanks. I knew you’d be positive and upbeat. It is refreshing, and gives me hope beyond reading of the endless moaning of the rest of us. While well intentioned and rightly so with this mess, they may lack the SMN to give greater insight beyond the usual recriminations!

            What about the weight issue regards manoeuvrability? Is there precedent for a vehicle this size in the role, or is the weight and size due to the ISTAR fit? CVRT Scimitar seems to me more a shoot and scoot, covert type.

          • Hi Daniele, a lot of the weight is because of the MOD mandated protection levels afforded by AJAX to the crew. Quite important I think? Size is commensurate with weight. As far a maneuverability is concerned, the platform will creep along on tickover or do 70+km cross country. It is virtually silent from the front at low speed on soft ground. The ISTAR assets mean that the vehicle doesn’t have to get so close to the enemy to gain meaningful data, deriving more protection from that standoff distance. When fitted with a mobile cam system it’s pretty hard to see at range.

            cheers
            Ian

        • Yes it does seem that the Ajax is the MoD’s F-35 project. Get it into production before R&D is finished and sort out the ‘minor’ problems later. Fortunately not as bad a situation as the DoD is in with hundreds of aircraft never going to make it to a proper standard.

    • Hi Albion, the AJAX platform, as a land ISTAR asset is very good, right up there with the best, if not the best. IOC is on hold, as per the report, but the HCR already have them in numbers. If the programme is canned? Then after the nuclear political fallout, the Army will probably have to wait another ten years for a new platform.

  15. Can’t let this Ajax problems drag on money 💰down the drain month after month dead line date most be given.For me go for Lynx or Puma we know there work ,but if so UK government to make sure our work force don’t miss out .Governments like Australia ,Canada so be it on ships.🙄

  16. I fear the Ajax programme will just go on and on because no one wants to admit it is a bad platform and we have already put so much in we cannot cancel now….

    This programme should be killed and something bought off the shelf….

    The costs will spiral, somehow the UK government will end up putting more and more cash into the programme and the manufacturer oddly will not pay for the corrections as the contract will be ‘renegotiated’…

    We have seen it all before.

    • Because it wasn’t.

      Ajax was chosen before Strike existed.

      The original plan of the Army was to update Challenger, Warrior, and replace CVRT with Ajax in the Armoured Cavalry Regiments, thus modernizing our 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades.

      Then the Army / MoD got shiny toy syndrome and decided actually we will spend money on wheels and Boxer, at the same time as the modernizing the other kit, leaving none done properly or sub optimal, like Boxer under armed at present.

      We should do one thing properly before rushing to the next.

      HMG also wanted cuts and could nicely spin 2 Strike and 2 Armoured Brigades as a step change from 3 Armoured. As DS Fallon actually said in Parliament.

      Those of us who follow the ORBAT know this was and is total guff.

      We end up in this mess.

      TLDR – Ajax was not designed for Strike.

      • Interesting Daniele, so am I right in thinking that Ajax might have effectively found itself without a seat and the music has stopped?

        Is there more to this than meets the eye I wonder, now the MOD seem to have fully moved to expeditionary warfare, do they see the Ajax as a lumbering heavy weight, that can’t easily be airlifted and they are looking for a reason to cancel the contract??

        ‘If’ that’s the case, we can expect Chally3 to meet the same fait down the road…

        Army (Ground based) procurement is turning into a laughing stock and the jokes on the Tax payer ( how much was wasted on Warrior upgrade alone?) and the troops that have to use ageing equipment that’s likely considerably older then them in most cases…..!

        • Hi John, expeditionary warfare doesn’t always include airlift and to be honest, even if the AJAX weighed 15 tons we still don’t have the lift capacity to move a squadron in one go, think more along the lines of RoRo’s TUFT. If the MOD want to scrap AJAX they will, I don’t think an ulterior motive is needed. The Army has nothing, literally nothing with the ISTAR systems that AJAX offers so regardless of where it’s metaphorical seat is when the music stops, it should still be at the party.
          cheers

          • Positive vibes Ian, a very refreshing change on here mate!

            I really hope all it’s wizzy electronic sticky beak gadgets work as planned and it’s a tad quieter for the crew than a Mk1 Vickers tank!

            The main problem for me is I don’t really fully understand what it’s for, is it purely a recon asset?

          • That is what it was acquired for. ( Scout variant ) In 3 RAC Regiments with that role and would also furnish the Recc Platoons in Armoured Infantry Battalions and Recc Squadrons in RAC Armoured Regiments.

            Other variants of the 500 plus on order for other users too, like the RE, RA, and RAMC. We seem to only hear of the Scout turreted version.

            After Strike was born 2 of the then increased 4 Regiments worth were being called “Medium Armour” which I assume meant a more direct fire role, complimenting the 2 Recc roled Regiments. Thank God that did not last given how clueless politicians are. That little swindle of replacing Tanks with lesser vehicles actually started under Labour when the UK based Tank Regiments ( in 1, 4 and 12 Brigades ) had a squadron of Tanks cut from each and Scimitar squadrons put in their place. “Interim Medium Armoured Squadrons” I recall was the name used.

          • Daniele, I have probably said this before but I regarded the CVR(T) family as very accomplished in its day, with Scimitar being a fine little recce vehicle and Striker delivering ‘Strike’ (which I define as killing AFVs/Arty systems and strong points at long range) at a range of 4,000m – with 5 rounds on top and 5 more inside. The other variants were good too – a true, coherent and effective family, pretty reliable, with good transportability, easy to maintain and to be had at reasonable cost.

            Fast forward to now.

            Ajax is supposed to be for recce and strike – its too big & heavy for recce and insufficiently armed to do Strike (iaw my definition). Plus it is expensive, late, has performance and reliability problems and damages the crew. What a mess.

        • When it was with strike yes. With the armour in attendance not do much. As long as it works!

          They need to stick to a plan, and do it properly before jumping to the next.

          When Strike was revealed I and others wondered how it was correct that the Ajax Recc regiments planned ( 4, up from the original 3 ) were to go in the Strike Bdes, 2 regiments each. When Strike was supposed to be rapidly self deployable over thousands of miles. ( That numpty PM D Cameron even talked of strike sweeping through the M East. )

          The Boxer may be, but the firepower bit in Ajax cannot be. Where are the HETs in numbers for such a move for starters if a railway isn’t available.

          And of course Boxer/Ajax left the firepower divorced from the wacky races part, Boxer.

          Ajax is back where it belongs now but we are a brigade down and Warrior lost.

          I still try to keep faith in Ajax, as Ian’s comments above outline.

          • I’ll try join you in glass half full mode Daniele ….
            Ian’s comments to put a rare positive vibe on Ajax, i’m such an old pessimist these days!

            Alas, our certifiably insane procurement system makes it difficult at times mate….

          • “a rare positive vibe on Ajax”

            I don’t think the pun was deliberate, but it’s made me smile.

  18. Only good can come of this report in terms of learning sobering lessons and building relationships; it touched very many organisations. I disagree with the causes of ‘failure’ described in para 10.1. What is written there are reasons for the project failure – the reasons the design faults were not communicated and addressed. Its always a mistake to get carried away with the blame game. The root causes are in para 6.2; the design of the vehicle itself. Now we understand the root engineering issues can they be economically fixed by GD and if so how long till the corrected vehicle is in service? If they can’t or GD are unwilling to accept lower profit or perhaps even a loss to further their UK ambitions then we need to know asap so we can select another vehicle.

  20. A helpful report, highlighting some valid H&S issues, I’m sure. Hopefully something will be done about it.
    What it doesn’t seem to address is why there seems to be excessive mechanical vibration on UK vehicles unlike any other ASCOD family lines; why the headsets are causing so much noise/ why there is so much noise that our standard headsets aren’t sufficient; and I’m not sure it explains the limits in obstacle clearance that I’ve read about elsewhere either.
    Ultimately, the report fails to address the key issue- is Ajax fit for purpose? I understand that the Army want survivability. But they’re ordering a recce vehicle that’s bigger than our outgoing Warrior IFV, carries fewer troops, and has broadly the same armour protection on paper (same NATO standard for penetration of armour, maybe slightly better when it comes to mines and IEDs). I appreciate that it apparently has a very good sensor and comms suite, and I know that stuff can be bulky, but surely not 6 squaddies’ worth of bullk?!
    Admittedly, the report probably wasn’t supposed to address that, but maybe they should commission one.

    • The purpose of the review is given in para 4 and the terms of reference in Annex A. In short:
      a. validating the chronology and timeline of events
      b. assessing whether correct Health and Safety procedures were followed
      c. making recommendations.

      Your key issue – is Ajax fit for purpose – I think is down to the SRO. The following extracts are from the SRO appointment letter.
      You have personal responsibility for the delivery of the Armoured Cavalry Programme and are to develop a robust plan to recover and reset it, then ensure its ongoing viability and delivery.
      You are also responsible for ensuring the ongoing viability of the programme and recommending its pause or termination if appropriate.
      You are to ensure the on-going viability of the programme.

      • Thanks, it would have been way too broad of a scope if the report was to look at HSE failings and the viability of the project overall.
        Although HSE can be seen as boring and fussy, it is important- especially for those wanting to make a career out of the armed forces. Don’t want to be stuck with permanent disabilities from a job that you find otherwise fulfilling. We owe our servicemen and women more than that.

    • Thanks Joe. There is always vibration on ‘A’ Vehicles, no matter who makes them – I spend a fair bit of time in FV430s back in the day – they vibrated when on the road, and the engine fairly screamed when on full throttle.
      Ajax is a world away from the original ASCOD Pizarro – Ajax is adapted from the ASCOD 2 Common Base Platform and is a far heavier beast with a more powerful engine and revised transmission and has a LM turret with a 40mm cannon.

      I am sure the hull is fundamentally different from the base ASCOD in many regards and that it is almost a different vehicle.

      GDUK claim to still be working on the reasons for the excessive vibration – they must have pretty poor engineers if they haven’t worked out the root causes after several years of the problem first manifesting itself. Many well-informed commentators have their own shrewd ideas of the main reasons for the faults.

      The US probably influenced the UK to opt for large recce vehicles during the TRACER programme at a time when they had the M3 Bradley CFV in service.
      It matters not one jot that Ajax carries fewer personnel than Warrior – the former is not an IFV, it is a recce (and strike) vehicle. I personally think that recce vehicles should be small, light and agile, commensurate with carrying the role equipment and crew in comfort, and with a degree of self-protection. Belatedly adding the strike role of course changes the requirement dramatically.

      Not sure about protection differences between WR and Ajax – but this should not be the most important feature of a recce vehicle. The sensor and comms suite is the most important feature of a recce vehicle, of course.

      Fit for Purpose? I guess the User is happy with the ‘Spec’ and has thought through how to move a 38-42 tonne vehicle around the world (strategic mobility) and within Theatre which may be in a country with poor roads, weak culverts and bridges (operational mobility), but it is not of course a usable vehicle currently and may never be.

      • Thanks for the detailed response Graham- I’ve never been in an armoured vehicle but have done time offshore. Both helicopters and crew boats have high levels of noise, although vibration is less of an issue on helicopters (if it’s vibrating too much, you definitely want to get out of it before it leaves the ground..!).
        It is troubling that GD still can’t work out the vibration, that to me sounds like poor project /issue management on the part of the combined GD/MOD team in prioritising dealing with issues as they arise.
        Apologies, I wasn’t clear in why I was referencing size and number of infantry carried against Warrior; I was trying to point out that it seems unecessarily large for its purpose- what can possibly be fitting in all the space that is normally taken up in a Warrior with squaddies?! Sensors and comms can’t take it all up, surely? Like you, I would expect that it could be a smaller vehicle and maintain the level of armour protection if they’ve only got the crew of 3/4.
        It also baffled me that they felt they couldn’t make a turretted IFV out of Ajax too, given the size- kind of the inverse argument to what I’ve just said in a way.
        Again, the protection was another way of pointing out that the added size wasn’t making the vehicle more survivable than Warrior, so why go so big?

  21. Babcock have a safety mantra except when a KPI is in danger of Failing. The old type CR2 track ropes with karabiner were supposed to be removed from use by an Army corrective action Board instruction. The Boss of Bovington ignored this and wanted staff to do a bogus dynamic risk inspection of this banned rope that should have been destroyed and use it ! Somehow I think their insurance company would not be impressed by this abuse of power. Note no member of management was willing to certify that the rope was safe to use ?

    • Not so easy to do I reckon, the order book for CV90 is rather big so we would go to the back of the queue and as mentioned above it would be years before we got them.

  23. My current job role prevents me commenting to much, but having spent time in the military, time working for and in DE&S plus as a defence supplier, the biggest issue is not the junior CS, but those in the middle and senior management who don’t wish to rock the boat, and just want an easy life. Making decisions has consequences, delaying decisions just pushes the issue down the road till they can move to a different role.

    Given the Safety Report, and the issues raised by ATDU how many members of the MOD Delivery tema have had an interview without coffee. Short answer will be the same as how many AJAX are in service: NONE !!!!!!!

  24. Shouldn’t the specifications for a Recon vehicle stipulate acceptable noise and other stealth like attributes as part of the contract. I would imagine such vehicles want to be as quiet possible so an enemy has less chance of detecting them.

    • I gather it’s actually reasonably quite from the outside. Not so good from the inside. The crew are basically inside a large metal box, somewhat like being inside an acoustic guitar. Also if the suspension isn’t working like it should, it’s like as you would find if your car had solid rubber wheels & no shock absorbers. The people on the outside won’t notice, but believe me, you will.

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