The militaries of the West find themselves at a crossroads, much as they did when the first tanks and aircraft went to war seriously for the first time.

Ukraine’s recent decision to establish a dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces organisation, as decreed by President Volodymyr Zelensky, illustrates the changing face of warfare we’re all seeing in Ukraine – a change the USA and the UK cannot afford to overlook.

Ukraine’s integration of drones into the very fabric of its military, through creating specialised drone units and focusing on ramping up production and innovation, is something more nations are starting to pay attention to.


This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines


President Zelensky’s unmistakable commitment to this: “Drones – unmanned systems – have proven their effectiveness in battles on land, in the sky, and at sea.”

His observation underscores the significant role drones have played in helping the Ukrainian military fight back against Russian forces, particularly in altering the balance of power in the Black Sea by sinking Russian warships and in repelling ground assaults by obliterating Russian tanks.

The effectiveness of drones in combat has been remarkable. Drones have accounted for a substantial portion of enemy equipment losses. In one short period late last year, drones were responsible for a quarter of all damaged and destroyed Russian equipment. Specifically, FPV and Mavic-style drones, similar to consumer drones, accounted for 42 per cent of tanks and 47 per cent of armoured vehicle losses.

Over September and October last year, a staggering 428 units of Russian equipment were hit by drones, including 75 tanks, 88 APCs and 101 artillery pieces: enough equipment for an armoured brigade. In the previous four months, Ukrainian drone pilots have successfully targeted 1,882 enemy units, something enabled purely by the emergence of new technology.

Defence chief Admiral Sir Tony Radakin’s remarks during a recent defence exhibition hammered home the recognition amongst those in power that the British armed forces must adapt to a drone-based future. Advocating for a strategy that embraces drone-related technologies and puts them front and centre, he spoke of a future where drones play a predominant role on the battlefield.

“What do we need to change? What do we need to actually ditch? What do we need to reprioritise to bring in the extraordinary technology that’s on offer?”

Radakin’s call for action, based on Ukraine’s impressive utilisation of drones, shines a pretty powerful spotlight on the absence of a comparable capability within the UK’s forces: “If we’re providing literally hundreds of one-way attack drones to Ukraine, then when we look at our own army, where are our one-way attack drone regiments?”, Radakin asked.

Moreover, Radakin criticised the entrenched bureaucracy within the Ministry of Defence and armed forces in general, holding it up as a prime example of why it seems to take this country a long time to build upon change and learn lessons on the battlefield.

The lessons from Ukraine necessitate a fundamental rethink of military strategy and organisation; the United Kingdom must create its own ‘Unmanned Systems Forces’, and it must do so quickly.

The UK’s longstanding commitment to training Ukrainian troops on “how to fight” has been a testament to global security and stability. For the better part of a decade, British expertise has played a pivotal role in enhancing the combat readiness of Ukrainian forces, imparting critical skills and tactics suited for contemporary battlefields. However, in a rather unexpected turn of events, Ukrainian troops now reciprocate this educational exchange by showing Britain and her allies “what to fight with”.

Ukraine’s use of drones and their significant impact on the battlefield offers a glimpse into the future of armed conflict – a future where uncrewed vehicles play a central role on land, in the air and on the waves.

The British armed forces must learn the lessons of Ukraine and put them to use as soon as possible or risk being left behind much as the horse was when the tank came into view over the horizon.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

49 COMMENTS

  1. The history of the last hundred years offers examples of overnight transformation in all aspects of defence through technological and, sometimes, unconventional tactics exploiting opportunities arising from potential, transforming practice. Towards the end of the Cold War one paper on this known but widely ignored unwelcome factor in military planning suggested ‘Is the Red Army Obsolete?’ Such was the entrenched thinking of those days the article and its author were swiftly ‘cancelled’. Today we have the answer to that upstart question at hand. We may have a toy cupboard full of junk.

  2. Ukraine are supposed to build with Allies help and UK 1 million drones this year.That is several times the number of UK armed forces troops, that is just for comparison.
    The difference to a bullet is this are guided fires with a couple Km range.
    In 10 years time this devices will have more range, the AI in its cameras might be able to check faces, enter buildings.

    • If we’re providing literally hundreds of one-way attack drones to Ukraine, as CDS said, what good is that when both participants are churning them out in the hundreds of thousands every month?

      However, the range is already far beyond a couple of km. It’s about 10 times that. And I don’t think it’ll take ten years before AI will be able to direct drones to look through windows. If the war continues, I’d predict two years at the most.

      • Depends upon the type of drone most of those hundreds and thousands are very simply usually commercially orientated drones for cheapness. However there are various levels above that of increasingly complex and larger drones with many very much of military hardened spec. Horses for courses, so simply quoting sheer numbers isn’t the full story supplying parts is probably a vital ingredient too especially as Chinese parts may need to take a less direct route. We don’t really have enough information and detail to make a true assessment of our impact on the drone conflict.

        As an aside I suspect developing and supplying technology to enable them to better resist counter measures for their drones would likely actually be of more benefit than supplying large numbers of very basic drones but perhaps that’s for the Ukranians to decide.

    • biggest limiter on range with small fpv style drones is radio horizon, but this can be fixed with radio repeaters stuck on other drones

  3. I was surprised during the conflicts in the Sandbox that the West wasn’t using drones to deny and control ground around patrol bases. There is a considerable amount of dead ground and cover around those mud walled compounds. But it never happened. FWIW I never understood why outlying compounds didn’t receive masts with cameras to provide better all round situation awareness. It would have given Terry pause if he knew his night time activities were possibly being observed via thermal imaging.

    Drones will become another force multiplier at the platoon level joining the belt fed machine gun, 60mm mortar, 40mm grenade systems, Charlie-G, and ATGM as an option.
    For 40 years plus now young men have spent a portion of their downtime with a joypad in hand and those skill will transfer to the field. But I don’t think it will replace the infantry man as systems arise to counter drones. Robots will probably carry the first local anti-drone systems into the field to follow fire teams in very built up areas like those we see in the Far East or Brazil for example. The question will not be whether technology will provide them with the necessary intelligence or mechanisms but the required battery longevity.

    • Lots of legacy thinking around unfortunately, also this technology is disruptive in that it enters a lot of other people turfs. So expect a lot of people professionally not want to think about it.

    • First, in 2011 we absolutely did have masts with cameras on most outlying CPs. We knew where the blind spots from the cameras were and they were either designated as VPs that were checked more thoroughly, covered by sangers or part of the wider STAP plan.

      We wouldn’t have had the battery charging infrastructure in place in every PB to operate drones at scale. it was struggle enough to maintain batteries for radios and ECM. Even with solar charging matts that arrived.

      Also, drones of the scale that could have been used around an outlying CP wouldn’t have had sufficient persistence to maintain a constant watch. They would’ve had to cover gaps in other parts of the overall STAP, or been used to pre-recce a route (or better as a diversion)

      What was excellent were the balloon based base ISTAR. That was a game changer for me as a commander between deploying in 08/09 and 2011.

      • Yes, I was going to suggest this, but hesitated in case I got told off if it was only for the MoBs and not “outlying bases.”

        Cortez Base ISTAR and the PTDS Aerostats. I hope 5 RA has not gone on and binned them.

      • I never spoke about drones being used for surveillance. Note I purely spoke in terms of them being a weapon. Lack of endurance is why I spoke about mast mounted cameras. I shall check later about camera coverage at FPB. I don’t think it was as comprehensive as you think. As you said it was difficult enough keeping batteries charged as it was out there never mind cameras and the slewing mounts. As with most things the UK did out there the whole venture was criminally underfunded.

        As I said,

        Drones will become another force multiplier at the platoon level joining the belt fed machine gun, 60mm mortar, 40mm grenade systems, Charlie-G, and ATGM as an option. For 40 years plus now young men have spent a portion of their downtime with a joypad in hand and those skill will transfer to the field. 

        We have all seen the video of drones chasing down their prey. Technologically there war no reason this couldn’t have happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. Cheaper than Javelin. Safer than mortars. Probably not as cheap back then, but certainly possible.

        • Stephanie, in 2011 My company manned a PB and 4 CPs. Every single CP had CORTEZ mast mounted cameras. The BG had two balloon based ISTAR cameras. Each of the other companies also had the same set up.

          But let’s discuss another aspect…. can you really deny ground if you can’t generate persistence? I don’t think you can. If I want to DENY terrain to the enemy without putting troops into it, I need to be able to OBSERVE it and call in fires. In a permissive AD environment like HERRICK, I’d pick base ISTAR and Mortars every day of the week and twice on Sundays.

          Now, if you want to discuss interdiction of insurgent supply lines – then I’m all on board with FPOV drones… in fact it’s what we were doing with Approximator (I mean Exactor) – we just had very poor results with it. Cross cuing a drone with Base ISTAR would’ve yielded excellent results (probably similar to what we used to do with Pred which was reliable, but we’d have more control over an organic asset.

          You couldn’t use base ISTAR in a contested AD environment; and that’s where greater use of organic, UAV ISTAR would be really useful. I’d be interested in how they actually develop the STAP plan – my synchronisation head is spinning thinking about time on task, fudge factor, transit time, crew fatigue, deconfliction etc etc.

          • Can you really deny ground if you can’t generate persistence?

            You don’t fire weapons continually do you?

            I am talking about using drones as weapons. I have said this to you twice now. It is you who have gone off talking about surveillance because I mentioned cameras on masts. Yes my new research does tell me cameras were increasingly common as the campaign progressed. I have no interest in balloons.

            Once more as I said,

            Drones will become another force multiplier at the platoon level joining the belt fed machine gun, 60mm mortar, 40mm grenade systems, Charlie-G, and ATGM as an option. For 40 years plus now young men have spent a portion of their downtime with a joypad in hand and those skill will transfer to the field. 

          • Ok, I think you are missing the point (and the experience you are talking to here).

            You CANNOT DENY ground unless you can observe it and call in a strike option OR seize it and prevent access by you being on it.

            I’m not saying that that strike option cannot be a drone. However I am saying that as a combat commander with three tours of combat under his belt, that if I’m doing the observed and strike option – a drone isn’t always going to be my first strike option.

            It’s not going to be my first option because unless I can keep a constant (ie persistent) coverage then it’s going to take time to get it up, find the target, fly to the target and engage.

            It also comes to a point where it is also potentially vulnerable to counter-UAV things like ECM.

            Then, what happens if I have a target density and I’m using UAVs that have to be independently targeted – how do I generate the mass to do that at the operator level?

            No, what I want to do is have assets like mortars which can be in action with rounds in the air in less than a minute and can deny an area and are jam-proof.

            I can then look to use my drones to pick off point targets, HVTs etc.

            Always have multiple strike options at your disposal and cue a minimum of two onto an HVT.

            So, I’m not dismissing what you are saying – I’m just using my experience in combat to explain to the wider audience how this all needs to mesh together.

            So why do I keep talking about surveillance? You can’t see them, you can’t kill them (not deliberately anyway)

          • If they are shooting at you you can ‘see’ them.

            There are reasons why opfor don’t stand in open ground within range of your weapons.

            If something, let us call it a drone, can fly to a location of interest, so an irrigation ditch, to see what is there and either return or blow up, then all similar locations withing the drone’s combat radius are no longer open to the enemy they are denied.

            Having the option to return the drone saves on money. Seeing what you are about to destroy or not reduces collateral damage. Such would be less expensive than ATGM. More precise than a 60mm or 40mm round. Require less rounds and be safer than a belt-fed machine gun. Easier to shoot than a DMR for an average soldier.

            I understand your experienced. But I am talking about weaponry.

            As I said now for the third time,

            Drones will become another force multiplier at the platoon level joining the belt fed machine gun, 60mm mortar, 40mm grenade systems, Charlie-G, and ATGM as an option. For 40 years plus now young men have spent a portion of their downtime with a joypad in hand and those skill will transfer to the field. 

      • Interesting that BMW is trialing US company Aeromine’s silent and motionless wind energy harnessing system on the roof of BMW’s MINI manufacturing plant in Oxford, UK. They’re meant to complement the factory’s solar panels to produce clean energy, while taking up a lot less space. Work at night too of course. I wonder if and what potential that might have for military use.

        • would be interesting to see if you could make it survivable in an IDF environment… ie could it sustain splinter damage and blast etc.

  4. Definitely lessons to be learned in Ukraine and from the IDF. Radakin is not the guy we should be looking to take advice from on this or anything else. Unless you want a sinking ship.
    Will we learn from the IDF, not while this government is in power. So Ukraine it is. Have we the political will to set up a new unit dedicated to drones which are cheap to build and develop in house. We probably need kids with gaming skills to operate them. Some geeks to develop them. Not going to happen with this government. If it does it needs to be free from interference rivalry and crusty old senior officers with backward thinking.
    On a note of caution. Please remember the other thing Ukraine always asks for is more Artillery shells.
    The day of the longe range sniper is far from gone. What’s the betting the Royal Artillery get cut again in the SDR.

    • Can you explain the comment about Radakin and a sinking ship?

      I’m not sure the army would not get a drone unit up and running (Radakin suggested several!). Just what would they be forced to give up as an offset? – one of the only two armoured regiments or a 155mm artillery regiment?

      • The unit oft mentioned on the rumour circuit for the chop is 5 AAC, as most of its aviation assets are gone and PSNI is taking/ has taken much of its role.
        Either to form a third Air Defence Regiment, or another Drone outfit.
        The RA was testing one way attack drones back in July.
        Maybe personnel will be generated by internal ORBAT changes in existing Regiments to find the posts.

        • Only PSNI helicopters here now,and TBH since the gazelles have gone we rarely see any helicopters at all! They were always going in and out of Portadown police station.

          • You know what will happen mate. There’ll be an upsurge or something and they’ll be scratching heads that there are no heli assets and pull them off something elsewhere.
            I guess the security situation at the moment in NI means no need for an AAC presence.
            There are fixed wing police assets in the UK, contractor operated. I assume they come over when needed.

  5. Drones are not a new dimension to warfare, but rather an additional aspect to the three primary ones Air, Sea and Land. As such the idea of creating a new and separate service sole for their employment is ridicules idea. Each service should be left to develop drones and their ORBAT independently, so as to best compliment their current assets and objectives.

    • Agree.
      The British Army is reportedly forming a “new” UAV Group for the TUAS ( even though we have such a group already in the ISR Group of Field Army Troops, so I suggest usual MoD rebranding to look good and “new”
      And how would a seperate service work for the small and micro UAVs like Black Hornet, which are used at Section/Platoon level.

      • Indeed and they do certainly need more. However, people seem to think drones are some sought of wonder weapon that will revolutionise warfare like never before. When in reality they offer the same effects as has already existed for almost 100 years, but in just a more convenient package. Just like the patrons of tanks in the 20s and of missiles in the 50s, who wanted everything that came before to be done away with.

        • Their cheapness is another critical factor in a defence world where capable attack systems costs a small fortune. Our tiny army needs to leverage low cost yet effective attack weapons.

      • It also remains to be seen how useful drones are in peer on peer manoeuvre warfare?

        In a static trench based war with little depth and not a lot of rapid movement drones will appear disproportionately useful.

        WRT range – petrol engines drones using modellers controllers that are hardened are probably the interregnum.

        I suppose I’m saying that we need to be careful what we are taking from this – the wrong lesson is being sucked into reequipping to refight a version of WWI?

        • It so sure read so much about fast moving vehicals being susceptible to drone attack static well camouflaged less so. Read today from a Russian blogger how Russian units needing to set up new firing points sent small squads out to recon potential locations were eliminated by Ukranian drones. So I think drones effectiveness is widespread and only moving targets that have robust anti drone equipment retain an element of safety but from first person drone video you see the interference taking place but too little too late to prevent impact while others are hitting moving objects with such equipment that either isn’t working or ineffective. It’s always going to be measure and countermeasure however I feel, but cameras and software can be very effective in the terminal stage if gps et al can get it to within range without being countered.

        • Good point, but I don’t see our army likely to refight a version of WWI, just because the larger part of the Ukraine war is attritional and quite static.

          We need force multipliers like never before, given our very small army. Drones have a high force multiplication factor and are (or can be) cheap.

          Our first post-Cold War army had 120,000 men and 386 tanks, well down on Cold War levels. Our Future Soldier era army has 73,000 men and 148 tanks. Yet the Military Tasks have not reduced. Arguably they have increased.
          Attack drones can help round out our slender forces. I don’t see why you can’t use them (or use them capably) in manouevre warfare. A moving enemy tank is only a tad harder to hit.

  6. It will not be long before you see AI drones as a cover to kill FPV drones. AI without a person in the loop for living targets is one bad thing..but if you’re just killing drones then AI without a person in the loop is fine.

    infact you could see a time when drone superiority is a required part of any battlefield.

    • I agree. We’re happy to have auto CIWS on a ship to defeat incoming ordnance, so no reason why our land vehicles can’t have something similar. Most FPV drones can probably be taken down by a 12.7mm RWS, so a mini search radar or a special microphone system and an AI guided camera should be alright. I believe Kongsberg are marketing something like that and besides, I think every single vehicle we send near the front line should have a 12.7mm RWS from Foxhounds to Challys.

      • Australian company EOS produces a counter drone RWS known as Slinger. It is (relatively) lightweight at 400kg and can be vehicle mounted (including MBTs). It is fully stabilised and can be fired on the move. Slinger’s sensor unit features a 4D active beam steering ESA targeting radar combined with a Bushmaster 30mm canon firing a radio frequency proximity-fused, high explosive, fragmentation round. Supposedly it can take out manoeuvring drones beyond 800 metres with single shot precision. If so a typical 400 round magazine would offer a remarkably cost effective solution.

        EOS also have developed an integrated an layered system known as Titanis which combines both passive (RF detection) and active (AESA radar) sensors and EWS jammers. It’s command centre in a standard ISO shipping container (similar to Reaper UAVs) which can direct multiple kinetic (RWS) and directed energy systems and is capable of tracking and engaging drone swarms.

        • These are already in Ukraine. I gather as part of a NG system controlling multiple Slingers (I assume why EOS has had access to the NG proximity fused ammo well before public announcement of its existence). The 800m seems to be for 7.62/12.7 mm MG’s (there is video of this). ie direct hit. 30 x 133 proximity fused should be longer range. In 30mm it’s more likely to be closer to 150 rounds (coaxial MG will be higher).

          Someone in Europe has also placed a Slinger order, being handled by Germany’s Diehl Defence (who it appears is EOS’s European partner of choice). Not sure who for though – could be redirect for Ukraine or an actual European military. The amount of money being spent in mainland Europe is astounding (yes, starting from a very low base for many). Problem is industrial capacity has been allowed to atrophy (it’s not just a UK phenomenon). The engineering/design capacity is still somewhat there, but no point designing it if you can’t actually build it. The one thing we are not short of is bright people.

    • Recently saw a series of Ukranian drones hunting and Killing recon drones. You are right this is going to be a serious technological development barely touched so far. Ai will be a serious element of this relieving manpower to operate systems where human control will be far more vital. Drones that don’t destroy themselves in the process equally important they have already developed fire breathing thermobaric drones to clear trenches I wonder if that sort of innovation could be effective against other drones.

  7. Combat drones are not a game changer, they are just another example of a new weapon (chariots, pikes, gas, tanks, submarines, …) that initially had a dramatic impact, but for which defences and tactics were eventually developed that greatly reduced their effect. My concern is the UK’s almost complete lack of defence against hostile drone and missile attacks. E.g. A merchant ship transiting the English Channel could unexpectedly leash a hail of dozens, even hundreds of suicide drones and missiles on key targets around the UK (ranging from carriers berthed in Portsmouth, to GCHQ in Cheltenham, to the Houses of Parliament in London). We have no defences against this. The two Typhoon’s at Quick Reaction Alert at RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire would almost certainly arrive far too late, and even if in time the best they could do would be to shoot down a handful of the drones. Maybe the current defence review will address this glaring gap, but what will then be cut or cancelled to fund this given the government’s unwillingness to spend any more on defence until some undefined future date when 2.5% of GDP becomes “affordable”. Sadly history shows that enemies rarely wait patiently until you can afford to respond to their threats.

    • Yes the Germans used the tanks well in WW2 and we did not take them seriously. History might be repeating itself with drones. Only drones are cheap and disposable enough to deal with drones in quantity. Why we have not got every kid in the country building them in their Dad’s sheds i have no idea. On the other hand perhaps we have?

  8. We will learn that we need millions of them for every conceivable role including being far better than the ones the enemy are using because they will need to be destroyed in their millions.

  9. For the near term, I guess we need to gear up to
    a) A useful number of relatively simple, low-cost one-way kamikaze drones. They have the advantage over field artillery.of being able to hit moving targets

    b) A counter-drone capability to shoot down enemy drones and drone swarms. This looks more complex, as weapons choice depends on drone’s speed and altitude.

    Can’t waste an £80,000 Starstteak missile on.a £1,000 drone. A small calibre cannon is probably the best.answer. The old Bofors 40mm L60 had a range of.7,000 m, which.would take care of low-flying assailants. No doubt there are better 20mm and 30mm.guns on offer.

    But what do you.take a medium or high altitude drone out with without spending a shedload of money? With MALE uavs like our Predator costing.£1m a pop, we would need to find a far less expensive answer.

    Regards manning, this is a battlefield weapon.and should be the artillery. For the kamikaze one-way.drones,.as these would really only be required in a peer war, see this as as a voluntary reserve capability, with a regular battery.embodied for training and ops.

    For the medium altitude role, could the existing Watchkeepers handle this pro tem? I see they are said to be capable of firing Martlet, though no doubt this is a pretty expensive option, as with Starstreak. What other low-cost options are there?

    As Graham drives at, we haven’t any spare formations we can switch to drone duties. If the MOD and CDS want drone ‘battalions’ plural, they need to secure that 2.5% first and start rebuilding the army.

    I wouldn’t like to see 5 AAC switched to a drone role Danielle, we are dead short of helicopters after the Apaches were reduced from 67 to 50 and the 33 Gazelles withdrawn without replacement. The AAC could do with a buy of 15 Jupiter 2 in the light combat recon/utility role to replace the Gazelles, good enough to support out of area units, Rangers etc.

      • Hi mate.
        Yes, it may well be. We’ll have to watch this space, but I think it may happen as helis are expensive! And I really don’t see them ordering more.

        • Well, they have ordered 6 Jupiter’s for the light transport role, to replace the 8 Bell 212s and 412s. You are probably right though.that they won’t buy any more. We seem to be on a downward trajectory for replacement kit, well the army amd RAF anyway

          Humble apologies for misspelling your name!

  10. The UK should indeed learn from Ukraine but also from Russia. The Russian targeting of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure should make us think about how well protected our power grid is from drone, sabotage and cyber attacks. I hope the National Grid are paying attention!

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