Why the British army is so unprepared to send troops to Ukraine.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that Britain is “ready and willing to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by putting our own troops on the ground if necessary”.
While reports suggest these would be “peacekeeping” forces, the reality is that true peacekeepers must be impartial. British troops placed to support Ukraine could certainly be seen as “partial”. And the positioning of British forces in Ukraine would fit the Russian narrative that casts Nato as the aggressor.
This article is the opinion of the author, Kenton White, University of Reading, and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
Ukraine is not a member of Nato, but the goal of Nato membership is enshrined in its constitution. British forces involved in any sort of fighting in Ukraine would not enable article 5, which states that each member will regard an attack on any other member as an attack on themselves and assist it, to be invoked.
Additionally, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth said last week that European troops deployed to Ukraine should not be covered under article 5.
The weakness with Starmer’s idea is that Britain does not have the wherewithal to provide enough troops, supplies and weapons to act as a real deterrent. This isn’t too dissimilar from the state of British forces when faced with war in Europe more than a century ago.
In 1914 Lord Kitchener, then secretary of state for war, speaking of the cabinet’s decision to go to war in Europe, thundered, “Did they remember, when they went headlong into a war like this, that they were without an army, and without any preparation to equip one?”
Small numbers would be nothing more than a “speed-bump” against a large attack, as the British Expeditionary Force was in 1914 and again in 1940. Poor preparation, small numbers and limited equipment meant their deployment was more an indication of Britain’s support, rather than real capability to fight a long war against a peer enemy.
Britain is again in this position. Years of spending cuts have removed the ability of British forces to prosecute a war against a peer adversary for an extended time. The number of troops has fallen from 100,000 full-time trained personnel in 2000, to approximately 70,000 today.
Britain also does not have the capacity to manufacture at the levels required for a modern war. Much will be needed for immediate capital investment, such as manufacturing capacity for arms and ammunition. Longer-term investment will be required for arms production, as will the reinstatement of supporting infrastructure, such as airfields and storage facilities abandoned after the end of the cold war, both within Britain and across Europe.
There is no solution to the immediate problem except increasing the money available for defence. But Britain, and many other Nato members, have been unwilling to increase spending on defence, even though the current capabilities have been run down to such an extent that European nations cannot field a capable force.
Defence spending
US president Donald Trump has called for Nato countries to up their defence spending to 5% of GDP from the current Nato target of 2%. This would be very difficult to achieve in Britain’s current financial situation without spending cuts elsewhere.
While it has been reported that defence chiefs are pushing for a rise to 2.65% of GDP, Starmer indicated he would resist pressure to increase spending above 2.5%.
The last time the UK spent more than 5% of its GDP on defence was in the height of the cold war. The current international situation has already begun to shift into two distinct blocs similar to the east-west split between 1945 and 1991. However, the bipolar balance of the cold war has been replaced with an increasing instability, as displayed by Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine.
Replacing lost capacity is almost always more expensive than maintaining it. Had the governments of past decades maintained the capabilities of the armed forces, the overall cost would most likely have been lower than the amount the nation will now have to invest to obtain the same level of defence.
Each defence review since 1957 has led to cuts to the defence budget in real terms. Reductions in the military budget continue because, previously, nothing presented a sufficient sub-nuclear threat to the nation deemed significant enough to reverse them. Those cuts are now so deep that the nation is on the edge of being unable to defend itself, let alone project military power abroad in any significant capacity.
The prime minister wrote: “We have got to show we are truly serious about our own defence and bearing our own burden.” This assertion is quickly undermined by the indication that he won’t increase spending anytime soon.
None of the western members of Nato have shown any willingness to significantly increase their defence spending. Great Britain expects to spend £56.4 billion for 2024-25, amounting to approximately 2.3% of GDP. But this includes £0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies” that do not contribute to the defence establishment in any practical terms.
Britain and Nato have had clear warning since 2014 to correct the deficiencies of their defences. All have chosen to ignore the developing threat from Russia. The impression is that not only are we hoping for the best, but we are planning for the best too.
Lord Tedder, chief of the air staff after the second world war, wrote, “It is at the outset of war that time is the supreme factor.” Three years into the war in Ukraine, and it is clear that Nato missed the opportunity to strengthen its defences in the early stages. It now faces a significant increase in defence spending simply to make up the shortfall from previous decades.
Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of Reading. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Historical comment. Agree with the First World War commentary. I would strongly challenge the second world war analysis however. Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in ’31, it was the UK that requested to break the ‘ten-year rule’. the country was fully mobilised in ‘rearmament’ by 1934. In particular bringing the RN and RAF to fighting strength. Yes, more could be done with hindsight but in face of uncertainty, the correct decisions were taken to support expeditionary, defensive and latterly total war. Britain was far from under resourced with ‘limited equipment’ having the only fully mechanised army in the world in 1939 and the most credible Navy in terms of support infrastructure, numbers and training.
Modern comment. There is a significant difference between unpreparedness and under-preparedness. I would argue we are very much facing the latter. The disappointingly slow behemoth of our military industrial complex has been waking for a few years. We have been increasingly (and somewhat fortunately with current hindsight) building military alliances outwith of the core restrictions of NATO (thinking JEF, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, increasingly working with the Commonwealth, and most recently announcements with Norway etc). I suspect we are contributing to the conflict in Ukraine far more than is being reported with (likely) intelligence, SF, tactical and operational advisors, training and some Combat Support capabilities either in country or very nearby. We have proven an ability to train conscript infantry at scale and speed – which regardless of how many drones exist in the world – will always be the backbone of the British Army in order to take and hold ground. Yes, much much more to do, particularly with regard to slowburn equipment production that should have been developed and paid for years ago, and the obvious requisite increase in spending, but far from unprepared. Perhaps it is an academic’s trope, but I’m sure we can collectively assure the author, they are not the only person thinking about this.
I’d disagree with your WW2 analysis. The Army might have been “Fully Mechanised” in 1939, but that needs context. For starters the BEF (the 1940 version) only had 9 Divisions when the Germans crossed the border (of the 135 Divisions the Western Allies had). The BEF was mechanised in 1940, but that was mostly by the artifact of us only sending Mechanised Units, while Germany and France sent everything (British Yeomanry Units would deploy to Palestine on horseback in 1940, and British Colonial forces would continue to have mounted components into 1942). Britain did not field a single Armoured Division in the lead up to Dunkirk (1st Armoured did eventually deploy, under-strength to France, and had to be evacuated from the Atlantic ports separately). So no, even with the breaking of the ten year rule, and going into re-armament, the British Army had still not become a large well equipped force.
(Also not sure why you’re bringing the Navy into this, the comments are clearly about the Army, and if the Navy in WW2 was in a good place, then the Navy in WW1 dwarfed British advantages in 1939).
Otherwise not much I disagree with in your modern comments.
Fair challenge, my own inherent bias brings the Navy in – apologies for broadening unnecessarily. Another key aspect is that the ‘full mechanisation’ relied heavily on rail, which being 60 years before the Chunnel, in hindsight brings further redundancy to my comment! You’ll probably have the figures to memory or at least on hand but what was the comparative mechanisation of the Wehrmacht coming up against the BEF. I recall hearing about them stealing French civilian cars/vans to support the advance. I think many (including me until embarrassingly recently) have the image of an armoured beast striking through Belgium when in reality there were a lot more horses, carts and shoe leather involved.
Fully acknowledge/agree your points on armour vs mech. I don’t think the Army ever really intended to be a large force however. Or rather the governemnt didn’t ever want a large army, what the Army wanted was probably very different. Small professional career soldiers with the ability to surge and train conscripts had been the British way for a long time before ’39.
Its funny to think that the 9 x WW2 BEF divisions that Dern referenced was considered to be a small force then. Today we would struggle to deploy just one well-balanced, well-equipped, well-resourced division.
Okay but:
1st Infantry Division in 1940 consisted of 3 Brigades with 3 Light Infantry Battalions and and AT Coy each, supported by 3 Field Artillery Regiments and a AT Regiment, 2 Machine Gun Battalions and a Armoured Car Regiment. 1 Engineer Regiment, 1 Field Hospital and 1 Logistics Regiment.
Like, yes, we had 9 of them, plus the Corps enablers, and there was a lot more on the way, but today a BEF Infantry Division would hardly be considered well equipped, well balanced, or well resourced.
Ooof no I don’t have that percentage to hand, and tbh I don’t even know how I’d find it, but what I know I’ll share: The Wehrmacht had 140ish divisions with which they invaded France and the Low countries. Out of that 8ish (I’m saying ish because there are a few detached Regiments, especially the ones that would later grow into Waffen SS Divisions) Divisions where in the Panzergruppe Kleist, which where all definitely motorised, mechanised, or armoured. Additionally there where another 5 Panzer Divisions outside the Panzergruppe which would have been fully mechanised. But I don’t know if, for example the 62nd Infantry Division (which together with 5th and 7th Panzer Division formed the XV corps in May) was Motorised, Partially Motorised, or completely reliant on foot and rail.
I’d say being as generous as I can possibly be, the Wehrmacht had at most about 20ish fully motorised divisions (if we assume any division that was in a corps with an armoured division was mechanised), of which 10 where Panzer Divisions, plus a few detached SS Regiments which where mechanised. For the remaining 120 Divisions, no idea, I’m sure none of them where fully mechanised, but how many of them might have had a motorised regiment here, or trucks to tow their guns there… eh your guess is as good as mine.
I don’t blame the image of the armoured beast striking through Belgium, because it kind of was. As I said Germany had 10 Armoured Divisions (again Britain started the Battle of France with none, the Matilda II’s of the Arras Counter Attack where a single Independent Army Tank Brigade that could be attached to an Infantry Division as required), and of those 10, half where all grouped together in an all Mechanised force that spearheaded the operation. Yes there was a lot of Horse cart and Shoe Leather (and trains) that followed, but they where much more about securing, and pinning then manuvering. (Also why a lot of senior Wehrmacht Commander got very pissy with Panzer Officers like Rommel who raced off into the sun; the Infantry couldn’t keep up.)
(Worth noting though that in those days there where ships and docks that meant that a train could leave london, be driven straight onto a ferry, and then when the Ferry came alongside in France be driven straight off the Ferry and onto the French rail network! (There still is one of these in Uganda).
While I don’t think the British Army was ever thought of as a force that could go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht on it’s own, I think everyone saw the beast that the British Army had grown into in 1914, and correctly saw that it would have to do the same again if required (By the end of the War the British and Commonwealth Forces where fielding 58 Divisions, and that was down from the high point in 1944).
Outstanding! Cheers!
I understood that most Wehrmacht infantry divisions relied on horses to pull there artillery
@Simon yes, but the question was “How much is “most”?”
Well done Dern. Agree. You clearly read your history.
It’s often over estimated how mechanised the WW2 Wehrmacht actually was. The majority of transportation was still done by horse and rail and only spearhead panzer formations were really mechanised. Agree with your estimate, somewhere around 20ish divisions. Crazily the Wehrmacht became much more mechanised after the fall of France and the Lowlands from captured trucks and vehicles from the defeated French, BEF and Dutch/ Belgian armies.
What about the mechanised French Divisions – when they are considered how would that sway the numbers. I understood the spec. of the French tanks stood up well against the earlier Panzers- just not sure of their numbers, tactics & usage- (Lets not to upset De Gaulle’s family too much with your critique:) ).
@Grizzler hrrrrggkkkk urch the French.
Okay so… the French several different kinds of Mechanised units, the DIM, the DLM and the DCR (And the DCL kind of). Between those three types they had about 13 mechanised divisions at the start of the war.
The DIM where motorised Infantry Divisions, so no tanks, but large numbers of Trucks. The DLM and DCR where armoured Divisions KIND OF. The DLM (The Light Mechanised Division) was effectively a Cavalry Division with armoured Cars and Tanks instead of horses (literally. It consisted of a Regiment of light scout cars, a regiment of heavier scout cars, a regiment of “combat cars” (aka Tanks) and a Regiment of “Dragoons” (Cavalry soldiers on trucks who could fight as infantry, oh and some Mechanised Horse Artillery). The cavalry did it’s own thing developing tanks, and so broke them down into three categories AMD (Discovery AFV’s) AMR (Recce AFV’s) and AMC’s (Combat AFVs) for the three types of units the DLM had. The AMC’s included the really good French Tanks, like the AMC 35 and the S35 which probably is where the “French Tanks stood up well against Panzers” thing comes from.
The DCRs (Division of Cuirassiers of the Reserve) was the real French “Armoured” Division, but unlike German (and later British) armoured Divisions (or even the DLMs) these where not “combined Arms formations.” They instead where big groupings of Tanks (typically 4 regiments of B1s and H35’s which both where not very good tanks) that where held in reserve and could be sent to the front where needed to provide extra punch to an infantry formation.
There where also the DLC’s (Light Cavalry Divisions) which where half mechanised (so they had 2 Brigades, 1 was on armoured cars and mechanised dragoons, the other was horse mounted), some of them ended up being turned into DLM’s later in the war, and there where a lot of independent tank battalions with R35’s, FT-17’s and R-40’s that could be attached to infantry divisions.
Unfortunately all the DIM’s and DLM’s (and a lot of the DLC’s) where in the French First Army Group, specifically most of them where in the 1st and 7th Army’s, which where the forces north of the BEF, and so got cut off when the Wehrmacht broke through the 9th Army (or had to march so far and so fast that most of their vehicles broke down and had to be abandoned as with many of the units in the 7th army).
The DCR’s where eventually released but they where too little too late, and also the B1’s and H35’s where not great tanks, nor where the R-35’s and the FT-17’s where literally ww1 vintage. There was a lack of radios, the tank doctrine wasn’t great, commanders where overburdened in most of the Infantry tanks… yeah the list of problems the French army was having was pretty long. (That being said when the French army got to fight on it’s terms the Wehrmacht apparently really didn’t like what Methodical Battle inflicted on them).
TLDR:
France had some good tanks, and was about as mechanised as Germany and Britain, but it also had a lot of bad tanks, and most of it’s good tanks never really had a chance to fight the Wehrmacht.
In reality the failure of France in 1940 was classic example of a nation falling to political defeat. France could have kept fighting instead it surrendered..because in general its leaders did not want to fight for the third republic.
It’s a classic example of why military might fails without political will.
I would go further, Britain from 1935 was seriously rearming in terms of naval and RAF but also in tank design for the Army, Chamberlain was buying time with diplomacy but we had already got into a war footing. It was this change in 1935 that brought us the the spitfire and carriers for the Navy, both of which were huge assets in beating the Germans. If we had blindly kept the levels off spend up to 1935, we would have had loads of useless battleships and legions of biplanes, instead the 1935 reboot allowed for new thinking and it gave us the weopons we needed, so the perception we were very ill prepared by 1939 is incorrect. Where we went wrong in the BEF was tactics not equipment, our tanks were decent against German/czech tanks.
Reminder: The BEF didn’t have a single armoured Division when it withdrew to Dunkirk, it had an Armoured Brigade with two Tank Regiments in it, “Our Tanks where decent against German/Czech tanks” is all well and good to say, but acting like there wasn’t an equipment problem when the only British Armoured Division wasn’t deployed with the BEF due to lack of equipment is a bit much.
And what of the magnificent Royal Artillery of 1918? Almost all had been scrapped with no long range medium guns to match the French and German 155s. 4.7″ howizters really dont measure up.
But we did have 26 TA divisions with a field force of @340000 to add to the regular army. Even though modern weapons require longer and better training, increasing the reserves to allow total forces to be double, even treble the current 70,000 ought to be achievable. However well trained and equipped ( they’re not,yet) 70000 is too small a force to make much of a contribution anywhere, especially the vast areas on the Ukraine Russia border.
Sending British troops to keep the peace between two sides who have far larger experienced and fully equipped forces is a foolish idea.
We shouldn’t interpret the Ukraine war as an imminent threat to the UK. Rather it is a timely reminder, especially to politicians who like to ignore the problem, that our defence forces are too small to deliver credible conventional deterrence. A well planned longer term expansion will be far better than a panicked over reaction.Germanys commitment of €100b to upgrade the Wehrmacht has delivered very little. The German army is actually slightly smaller than 3 years ago.
Correction: The TA had *IN THEORY* 26 divisions. But there’s a reason why the BEF, even after nearly a year of War, still only had 9 Divisions, and not it wasn’t “They didn’t deploy TA Divisions,” of those 9 Divisions, 4 where TA. In fact there where 3 more TA Infantry Divisions in France, but they where placed on rear area Security details because they where judged not ready for combat operations and didn’t see action.
I apologise to everyone for bringing the Second World War into the focus of this article 😀
I agree with much, but not all, of the nuance you have provided. However, the ability to train infantry is one thing, the ability to equip them is another thing completely. Rifles, body armour, ammunition, vehicles would all be beyond us to manufacture in quantity at short notice (unless we’re sending them into battle in Nissan Qashqais. I hope that some secret contingency plans for such a scenario do exist; if not a secret reserve of weapons, at least some sort of legal insurance contract to have first dibs on manufacturing facilities / plant machinery in the US or elsewhere, that could essentially be requisitioned by HMG at short notice.
I also hope that when we do eventually replace the SA80, rather than being scrapped or sold, they are put into war storage in case we need to raise a large number of troops at short notice in the future. Easy enough to do with small volume objects like personal weapons and ammo; harder (but still possible) to do with vehicles.
We do however have the geographic advantage of any potential enemy having to get through the rest of Europe first, which would buy us some time. The regulars and reserves could play their part in expeditionary operations helping allies while the rest of us get our act together back home!
Carrickter, cheers. Any idea what they did with hundreds of thousands of SLRs? Were they pragmatically put away somewhere or just sent to be razor blades and plowshares?
Many were just scrapped, some sold to Sierra Leonne, and some sold for spare parts to other countries operating different versions of the rifle. I believe a small amount were deactivated and retained for ceremonial purposes. Here’s hoping some of that is porkies from HMG, and that in reality there is a bunker somewhere with thousands stored in case the s*** hits the fan. But that’s probably wishful thinking.
Carrickter, why would we keep any SLRs for ceremonial purposes? Ceremonial troops always use the in-service weapon.
As mentioned before we do not store equipment that has been superseded.
Carrickter, in my experience we have never kept any kit (vehicles, weapons, whatever) once it is formally declared Obsolete and superseded. Thus it would not be at all unusual to keep SA80 when it is replaced. We lack storage and the money to keep old kit.
On a seperate and quite different point, Daniele and I had some discussions a while back about whether Army Reserve units all even had sufficient vehicles to move themselves en masse in one lift.
Afternoon Graham, as you say, we have mulled this over before, we store very little these days and even most of the defence estate we used to have for storage has long been run down and sold off.
L1A1’s long gone, the only live examples you will find within the Army today are in the two official collections.
There used to be a dozen bicycle puncture repair outfits in Battery stores and no bicycles. There was a convenient fire at the Donnington Warehouse before major stock check, some mule shoes were discovered, don’t think used since Malay campaign.
Ironically vehicles is the easiest. You joke about Nissan Qashqais, but civilian 4×4’s being bought up, or even just requisitioned and given to light motorised brigades is 100% something we would (and do in fact see in places like, for example, Ukraine)
Hopefully not Qashqais as they’re not very good 4x4s. Specials like pick up trucks, land rovers, Toyota land cruisers and decent proper 4x4s would be fine as enablers for rapid cas evac, bringing up supplies to the frontline, reconnaissance, outflanking maneouvres etc etc.
It would probably be very prudent, if not already for land rover to have designs in place for light armoured militarised versions of it’s discovery, range rover and defender series vehicles. The velar, Evoque are hairdressers cars
Ineos Grenadier would be great. That’s a properly tough vehicle
Ukraine was using Peugeot Hatchbacks in the rapid exploitation force role in Kharkiv, and you’d be surprised just how much off roading you can actually do with a normal car. In the end; mechanised mobility is mechanised mobility.
@ Dern one bit of learning I was reading that did come out of Ukraine that maybe the army should consider is that for basic mec infantry, the armoured box the arrive in is essentially irrelevant..it’s better to have all your infantry mec and mobile in a cheap APC than a few in a really special APC ( boxer)..clearly armoured infantry is slightly different and armoured infantry need a cannon ( again boxer).
Essentially what it’s proven is France was essentially correct…ensure your heavy brigades have armoured infantry with a cannon armed IFV and then buy many thousands of cheap APCs and protected vehicle to make sure every other infantry battalion is mec. It also proves that Boxer is a problem..it’s no good for the armoured infantry and to expensive for Mec infantry in the numbers needed.
Horray, of course we should keep ‘last years’ rifles. So basic and achievable but it seems the MOD loves flogging off stuff for the sake of tidiness. Since we ar on the subject of WW2 its worth remembering we had to buy old US Springfield rifles in 1940 to replenish stocks lost at Dunkirk.
There is a rumour that the goverment has a plan to increase defence spending to 3% and it will be announced soon. It will be over several years but seems like positive step in the right direction if true.
Yeh ive seen a paper with some stats on .. 3% by 2030 blah blah
Too little too late
We need it sorted today so we can equip for tomorrow
Couldn’t spend 3% today if you tried.
It would be rapidly wasted.
A jump to 2.5% now and a ramp by 0.1%/yr actually makes sense.
3% is massive as about 0.8% is DNE and other ‘stuff.’.
So 3% actually means 2.2% on conventional up from 1.5%(ish).
Whether it happens or just policitcal speak is anyone’s guess, but here’s hoping.
We could easily spend 3% next year. I don’t know why you think otherwise. Are you just parroting the claptrap spread by the Treasury? Of course some of it will be wasted, but probably far less than the penny-pinching, slow to go ordering that we are doing at the moment. The gapping, the firing and rehiring, the extra training and working slowly up to operational status. That costs us far more per item than consistent ordering and replenishment.
3% is about an extra £20bn pa. We all know that we need spending on so many things, and what stops industry expanding is inconsistency and Treasury rules.
I think It would be difficult spending 3% next year as that would imply we could purchase 20 Billion £££’s worth of stuff, off the shelf. We could certainly commit this amount to advanced ordering but we ain’t getting anymore T26’s or Typhoons next year. You can’t spend all that money on things that are not produced.
@Freddie “We could certainly commit this amount to advanced ordering ”
Exactly. Who says that expenditure next year has to give us equipment next year? There is no such implication. Even off the shelf purchases won’t always come the same year. So let’s say that to keep the Typhoon lines hot and running we order 24 T4 Typhoons. It might mean coughing up a billion next year just to get the ball rolling. Nobody expects the Typhoons that year, but if we are lucky they’ll come before there’s another big war. We could pay BAE, BMT and Babcock to get designs for the Type 83, something we don’t epect to see operation much before the end of next decade. You have to start the buying at some point.
Not sure about this one. It is possible to engage building of factories, prioritize production for military, ramp up production in all installed factories. Barracks have to be built, air strip as well, naval shipyard must be enlarged. The school system can prioritize profil for workers, technicians and engineers. This is all relevant in this path. This won’t give you overnight an army, but will create the conditions to have one.
In the short term rapidly warmed-over Bulldogs and Warriors can be made available for patroling purposes with Foxhound and Mastiff. Boxer and Ajax production rates would need to be increased using both German and UK production for the former and a likelihood of follow-on orders not to be ruled out. Deploying CH2 should not pose too many issues beyond those identified under Ukrainian control. I feel sure a deferment of OSD for Bulldog and Warrior is the best option for quickly deploying vehicles on the ground.
Agree. Getting to 2.5% has to be this year and 3% by 2027 with key equipment needed for an expanded defence force ordered now. SDSR has huge issues to resolve the government need to get a grip after 15 years of Tory corruption, bungling and fiasco
They are going to have to cut some form of government spending to get there. Overseas aid seems a big luxury to me and needs to be trimmed to just emergency aid (maybe 0.05% of GDP). Welfare budgets are bloated I would suggest increasing the retirement age to 75 immediately (but with the promise of a larger pension when people reach 75). I would suggest that we partially privatize the NHS as well as its productivity are woeful and restrict treatments to only major health issues and emergency treatment. I would also suggest we deport any foreign nationals not working and claiming benefits as well as those in prisons freeing up spaces in the prison system (this may require us to remove the human rights act and ECHR – some positives there in my opinion). Finally I would force the 9.3M not working into work but announcing cuts to zero of all benefits if they don’t accept jobs within 1 month. I would also re-evaluate all social housing so a condition of receiving social housing is that you have to work. To boost productivity we will have to incentivize companies, the self-employed, etc. to work harder and invest via tax cuts (corporation and business rates should be trimmed to below Ireland’s level and an increase in tax thresholds for working people – I would also have a flatter tax of 33% for everyone merging NI with income tax to simplify the system with a large personal allowance of £20K before tax is levied). Any illegals should be housed offshore in one of the remote Scottish islands (or one of the remote islands near the Falklands) with military internment camps for military age men – this will save billions on hotel costs for these illegals. This may again require us to remove ourselves from the dead choke hold of the ECHR and human rights act (superfluous and dangerous legislation that has caused way too many problems for the UK). I would have illegals funding their own lawyers as well (not from the public purse) and restrict asylum legal cases to one attempt only (to reduce the chances of lawyers gaming the system for their own financial profit as they do now). I would also use radioisotope geolocation methods to determine people’s countries of origin (the technology has now “come of age” and we can determine precisely where people have come from by analyzing isotopic ratios in their bodies – ergo throwing away their passports won’t work with this technology deployed).
The obvious way to fund a boost in UK defence, would be to cut the excess 66,000 civil service jobs, created during lockdown & now surplus to requirements, as the last Tory government was about to do. That way the UK can boost military numbers by 15,000. 2500 each for RAF & RN, 10.000 for the Army. That is needed for any Ukraine peacekeeping force. Also keep the last tranche 1 RAF Typhoon & upgrade them for less than ten million each, or we will not have enough Typhoon to deploy.
Let’s pay for Defence spending by cutting spending on Defence! That’s what you just argued for. Civil servants do the job far more cheaply than uniformed secondees and more cheaply still than the industry consultants who were brought in after Cameron’s ransacking of the civil service. Somone has to do the job, and the civil service is the cheapest way of getting it done.
Rubbish, Most of the excess were taken on for pandemic schemes that no longer exist. You can’t spend the same pound twice, so you have to make sure each pound is well spent.
Truly, you are clueless. You voted for brexit? Do you understand the costs that Brexit has heaped upon the Civil Service and private sector?
Why is this about Brexit? Excess civil service numbers are still a drain on the economy, regardless of whether we are in or out of the EU.
If it hadnt been for Brexit Ukraine might have fallen by now. Engage with Europe but remain independent unless of course people want to return there simply for the cultural experience; which i think a lot do.
There are now 5,521 quangos according to the Independent Newspaper, Starmer is said to have created a new one each week. Seems the Government is offloading responsibility away from Civil Service to expensive managerial structures whose CEO’s earn more than the prime minister.
I think he’s talking about the civil service more generally, and not MOD civilian staff.
Except 66,000 isn’t the Civil Service more generally. There are around 62,000 civil servants in MOD and around half a million in the country as a whole. Cutting MOD civil servants to pay for defence was a Sunak talking point as was the idea there are excess civil servants who had been hired to deal with Covid. Absolute nonsense, but cleary swallowed hook, line and sinker by some people.
All the politicians trot out the efficiencies line because they don’t want to spend more money, and that “plan” has been an abject failure since long before I was born. They still keep trotting it out. So you’ll hear we shouldn’t spend more money until we spend what we have properly. Unfortunately Defence expenditure is inherently risky and some projects will always fail or come in over budget — always. So the efficiency first, more money later argument is the same as saying never anymore money.
Sorry, you are right, I misread John’s original message.
Absolutely John. these are the very first things needed.
use the foreign aid budget , since it is a bit of a emergency .
I watched Question time on the BBC last night, Ben Wallace was excellent but listening to for CGS Nick Carter was just laughable, yes he sounded plausible with all the right soundbites but when he started going on about the Army’s lack of MBT’s I just lost the will to live.
It’s worth a watch on iPlayer.
I thought he was the General who cancelled Warrior upgrades, extra CR3 and just about anything else for his Strike idea. The way he was talking anyone
would think he’s hoping to get recalled as a candidate to replace the present CDS !
I’m quite happily waiting to hear what Mrs M & M (Moore & Mandelli) have to say about it.
He WAS!!!!!!!
Comedy Gold – calling himself out….
I’ve explained that sorry saga enough times here, and the damage to the CS CSS area. We had 6 deployable brigades, 7 including 3 Cdo, till Strike came along and neutered 3 Divisions 3 Armoured Brigades and the 2 in 1 Division that had a full set of CS CSS.
And now he wants Tanks.
Another journalist gave him an easy ride as usual.
Yes that man burned the CS and CCS as well as gutting the actual deployable brigades..quite amazing really.
Ben Wallace is a jingoistic idiot.
ABC, Carter presided over the Army 2020 restructuring work and its evolution into the Orbat shown in ‘Future Soldier’ (FS). The FS structure was published in booklet form sometime after the April 2021 Integrated Review (possibly in November) and reduced the RAC from 3 armoured regiments to 2 (that change has not happened yet but it is a matter of time). With only 2 armoured regts in the Orbat it is hardly surprising that translates to having only 148 tanks, although that postulates a tiny Attrition Reserve.
Carter cannot, with a straight face, complain about the small number of tanks once CR3 is fielded. Whatever other talents he undoubtedly had, he was a hopeless strategic planner and Portfolio Manager.
seems to pretty much sum it up
I also disagree that we are not prepared for War!
British Army and the armed forces in general is seen continously training at home and abroad for all types of battlefields
I think that we can put a good sized force straight into Ukraine…and adapt as “future soldier” has been created for exactly this reason
We have equipment, not quite enough but if the Ukrainian’s can fight with sweet FA then the “be the best” British Army whose been helping give some basic training should damn well be able to DO IT!
This “cant do” attitude is part of the problem…in fact its ‘institutional’
I think everyone agrees that we have great people who are highly trained and motivated, but in no way do we have the same sort of mass that the Ukranians had even at the start of the war. They had large amounts of legacy soviet equipment leftover from the dissolution of the USSR. Poorly maintained, if maintained at all, but at least most of it wasn’t scrapped or sold. The UK MOD has a very stingy storage policy, and sells or scraps virtually everything.
The Ukranians have also had huge amounts of donated equipment and funds to keep them in the field.
But I also agree that we need to be more optimistic about what we can achieve, it’s the political will / competency that is lacking.
We also work our equipment to death (which is a side effect of having highly trained personnel), even compared to ‘peer’ countries like France. So it wears out faster and we end up cannibalising units to keep others functional. Modern, digital, and especially western, equipment also needs more TLC than cold war era analogue technology / equipment. Obsolescence of niche parts (especially electronics) plays a big part in decisions about the economic viability of storage vs canabilisation etc.
John, What do you call a good size force for this Peacekeeping or Peace Support or Stabilisation operation in Ukraine, if it ever came Britain’s way?
This would be an enduring operation, not a ‘one-shot’ short duration operation.
We would be very pressed to send a brigade group of 6,000 on an enduring operation without massive recourse to the Army Reserve and/or RM. If the powers-that-be decided it had to be done by just the regular army, then we could only supply and roule a BG, plus a National Support Element, say about 1,000 – 1,500+ guys and girls. That also fits with the limited amount of armoured/mech equipment and troops we have, as light role troops would not be suitable.
Does Starmer know?
That there are 2 Batteries of 155mm left?
2 Regiments of Tanks.
4 Battalions of Warrior.
And can maintain a BG in Estonia by committing the 2 heavy Bdes we have, 12 and 20, from their supposed reserve role.
And he loftily suggests deploying to Ukraine, an act which would split our minimal forces even more?
Even using 1 Div assets is not sufficient as they lack CS CSS bar 16 and 7.
Last time Labour were in power, around 2006, there were 6 Regiments of 155mm, 6 Regiments of tanks, and 9 Warrior Battalions.
They need to stop this can do attitude and say no.
If Russia is a threat to NATO, then give the army an area, Estonia, or further north, and do not disperse it.
Re reading that. To clarify, there are still 3 Tank Regiments, due to reduce to 2. The KRH did not convert thankfully, due to Ajax delayed.
DM, now that M777 is going back into production, perhaps some could find there way into British Army Artillery units?
I think unlikely.
Have they ever developed a tracked/whheled version of the M777? Why a big focus on CH155 when there’s a perfectly good UK gun already here? And why not a turreted navalised version?
*RCH155
In the early 2000s, BAE converted a 4.5 inch gun mount to 155mm. It only needed £10 million to complete the project. The RN wanted a longer barrel for more stand off range & that would have cost more. Meanwhile, all defence money was going to Afghanistan, so the 155 naval gun was abandoned.
It should not be either or for 155mm. M777 can be helicoptered in. You cannot do that with heavy wheeled/tracked SP 155mm. However, tracked/wheeled SP 155 is better for ground mobile operations. Best to have both.
So at least the Ajax debacle may have had an unforeseen benefit…
DM, credible summary as ever. Cheers. This is a really valid question; I do wonder how honest the MoD are being with the Cabinet. The ‘can do’ attitude is the MoD’s self-harm. We saw plenty of ‘good old bloke’ whitewashing when I was in Whitehall. Figures squeed, statistics left out to make the situation appear better, and double-tapping at-readdiness units into various commitments. It’s quite a worrying state of affairs. I think I have just enough faith remaining that Jonathon Powell and Lord Robertson are actually holding the Chiefs to account through the Review… hopefully there will be something meaningful on the horizon.
Thank you, NDG.
Respect.
Fingers crossed, but my faith in HMG re defence has never been lower.
Agree Daniele – i watched the British Army detachment in Romania ( commander ? ) the other night on the news and he was positively Gung Ho – yes Sir ,No Sir ,Three Bags Full Sir,we can do X,Y and Z.it’s about time someone stood up and said NO ! if you send us into the quagmire that is Ukraine we will have our Arseholes handed back to us on a Plate.
The problem is that we expect the colonels and Captains to have the integrity to say this in the media. But they simply can’t when the career hierarchy is so strict. Patrick Sanders probably pushed the limit as much as a senior officer could be critical before he retired. The sad thing is that us career officers are basically civil servants. You are obligated to stay on the party line.
It’s a scary though but I suspect starmers grasp of the actual capabilities of the armed forces will be what he’s told by the MOD and what seniors say to the people they care accountable to tends to be a load of bollox to be honest..because it’s those that say yes and don’t rock the boat are the ones that get promoted…
Starmer has no idea about defence , he is an expert in woke endophobic and welcome “refugees” policies
He doesn’t need to be expert in everything. The general consensus is that we are arguing for a 3-4% GDP expenditure. Surely it is far more beneficial for him to have a broad understanding of everything the government does, or at least an expert focus on the other 96/97? The expectation that minister must be expert in every part of their departments business, and that the cabinet must experts of understand everything is really unreasonable. It promotes bad behaviour regardless of which party has power.
I am hoping all the pro-Ukraine chaps here tape a kitchen knife to a broom handle and take off to the Ukraine as soon as they can!!!!
Remember to take the brush off first.
I hope the weather in Moscow is better than it is here in Britain.
No need I can just fundraise for all my equipment, just as i do for the Ukrainians😉
If I need to replace the handle when the damp rots it, then later the blade after I’ve snapped it in some Ivan’s spine, can I proudly say when the war is won I’ve carried the same broom through the whole war?
It really would help your case if you actually gave some substance to your one liners,and gave us YOUR answers to the problems!
Not going to happen though is it?
Question is. Could UK, France, Germany, Poland and Holland etc pull together a force. Remember, Russian forces have had massive losses.
It’s about tipp8ng the deter balance alongside Ukraine. ..not instead of Ukraine.
I think the JEF provides a credible enough framework for a ‘coalition of the willing’ that could operate within an existing Command Structure to form together forces outside of a NATO ‘Article 5’ activation, which is looking increasingly unlikely with US rhetoric at present. It is a really useful coupling of the more vulnerable nations with some actual players. Let those in the Baltic/East deal with conscription and mass, let those in Scandinavia develop and deploy technical expertise and advanced weapon systems. Let the Brits and Dutch hold the standing Commands and contribute the Enablers. Any further interested Europeans could essential ‘bolt’ onto this model. All while maintaining a UK nuclear umbrella. It’s a good enough ‘starter for ten’. Also keeps the inherent infighting between UK, France and Germany as the major political players far outside of the conversation of Command.
Would be nice to see Turkey or Poland contribute the heavy armour though… as I can’t see it coming from anywhere else.
Pete – absolutely no chance,TTK went to Paris on monday full of hope for a consensus on sending Boots on the ground to Ukraine and came back empty handed,it won’t happen,too many different interests and insecurities at play.
Germany is never going to actively do anything to really confront Russia…it’s simply a void in the heart of Europe and in reality one of the main drivers of why Europe is not really able to flex is military or geopolitical muscle…
In reality is also the hear of the EU so the EU is essentially a security and geostrategic void.
Macron and Starmer waxing in public aboit boots-on-the-ground was perhaps unwise. Sholtz was ‘irritated’ by it and maybe others were too, because it was cart before horse. The first thing our main Euro allies want is involvement in the peace negotiations, as Trump is coming at it from entirely the wrong angle, making peace on any terms the strategic objective, whereas the Europeans see reversing Russian gains and ensuring Ukraie”s future security as the priority.
In not opposing Trump’s direction, we are simply acting as handmaiden to whatever Russia-biased plan gets agreed.
The new German leader sound a lot more determinedly to distance Europe from thr USA militarily. Doesn’t mean that Germany will put troops into Ukraine but may be more likely.
Paul, the Russians have squashed any chance that NATO member nations will contribute peacekeeping forces. So they may be UN troops from the Third World.
The Russians have squashed any chance of Nato members only if Trump accepts the Russian position. Starmer needs to put Trump straight on why we are supporting Ukraine. Trumps’s accusation that the UK has done nothing to stop the war is out of order. Starmer needs to remind Trump that Ukraine is striving to free itself from same neighbour that gave them Stalin, collectivisation, Holodomor and millions of famine deaths.
This is where I think the use of the term peacekeepers forces is incorrect..the BAOR was not a peace keeping force and essentially any force put in Ukraine will not be peacekeepers they will be a deterrent force to help Ukraine defeat any further attack by Russia.
Peace keepers in Ukraine would be pointless as Putin is going to try and end Ukraine as in independent sovereign nation if it’s possible to do so..
You are quite right, the role of NATO/E troops cannot be ‘peacekeeping’ or monitoring compliance with any ceasefire deal. We have seen how powerless light UN peacekeeping forces are too many times when the a tion hots up.
The reason to put Euro forces into Ukraine is to deter and if necessary engage Russian forces to ensure the sovereignty of what’s left of Ukraine. That requires a heavy armoured force within striking distance of the ceasefire line, with all the necessary force capability at Divisional level – Sky Sabre, GMLRS, LLAD/C-UAV, ISTAR and FPV drones, ATGW and so on.
They will need to be covered by adequate air power with enough air defence, interdiction, EW and support aircraft to do the job.
If we had to fight, we would be joined by the full Ukrainian armed forces, which total 800,000 regular troops and over 1 million reserves.
It is worrying that UK/France is talking about under 30,000 troops in total. There is a 600-700 ceasefire l8ne to guard, you’re not going to do that with 4 or 5 brigades.
The initial hints about deployment were equally alarming. We would disperse our force in penny packets.to ‘protect’ key facilities – nuclear power stations, airfields and cities and our air power would be based outside Ukraine. That is a totally different concept from deterring and meeting any further push for territory by Russian forces. It would be reminiscent of Iraq and Afghan where we put in hopelessly small numbers of troops for the size of the task. This is too serious a conflict for HMG and MOD to be doing a token flag-waving PR exercise.
If we have to put troops on the ground, it needs to be a serious force ready to do combat if called on.
I’d rather we had boots on the ground during the war than after it. At least we’d have clear goals and we’d know which side we were on. We wouldn’t have to sit in the middle of a million combatants wondering which side was going to roll over us and when.
We shouldn’t ever lose sight of the fact Russia has the capacity to reform and re-equip army groups fairly rapidly currently.
Their conscription and call ups of reservists have meant that despite massive loses in Ukraine they re-equip and reformed 1 an armoured corps and separate infantry division on the border of Estonia just 12 months after the original units were sent to Ukraine and decimated.
The UK needs to be careful not to become an Army focussed military- our national interest is in Naval and Air warfare not a large land army, the minute we need a large land army is the minute our EU allies and partners have utterly failed to face off against a Russian military they should easily be able to out muscle with far superior equipment, numbers and technology.
The EU is 500 million people with a GDP X8 times that of Russia- there really shouldn’t even be a contest
Putin however knows the EU is fractured, unorganised and ponderously slow to react- those are the greatest risks to an EU response or combining its militaries into a potent force that should be second only to the USA’s armed forces in terms of capabilities, reach, technological prowess and firepower.
Mr Bell, don’t worry that we will ever have a large land army. The last time it was large was well over 50 years ago, some might say 60-70 years ago. However our army exists to fight expeditionary operations – we do not leave all the army taskings to the Continentals. It may be small but its fight is in Europe (or elsewhere) not back at the UK base.
Yes- we still have to go to war with the army we have than with the army we ought to have!
It is one of the true tragedies and sad facts that when you are talking about an existential peer war the army you start with is sort of irrelevant, it’s the army’s you can construct and reconstruct that is the key to victory or defeat.
The peace time army really only has four core purposes
1) to act as a deterrent to your enemy actually starting a war.
2) to undertake any expeditionary activity and peacetime security
3) provide a core set of skills for building the actual armies that will fight the war
4) to ensure the nation does not suffer complete collapse before it can build a wartime army
If you look at every major war this nation has fought it essentially burnt through a number of armies and the peacetime army was long gone by the time the war ended.
A well written article – wish this was much more within the general public’s awareness.
The fact the Army is just 70,000 strong, the fact the RN has just 8 active frigates, 6 destroyers, 6 attack submarines and 2 carriers with limited air wings
the RAF has just 100 or so available typhoon aircraft and 35 or so F35Bs- not exactly a tactical airforce.
We have been crippled by incessant creeping cuts to our military with a reciprocal reduction in defence-industrial base.
To stop the rot and return muscle, mass and capacity will require targeted expenditure.
SDSR will have to take the armed forces budget up to 3% within the next 1-2 years.
Putin we all know is just going to repair, re-equip, rearm, train and then go again- we have 12-18 months max from the point the Ukraine war ends to prepare for his next military campaign and land grab- this time probably against a NATO country.
A crash rearmament programme is needed- but we wont get it, instead we will likely deploy around 10,000 UK troops to help form a ENATO peacekeeping force of just 30,000 to guard a Ukrainian frontier of nearly 900km frontline.
those 30,000 troops are NOT going to deter Russia, quite the opposite it will likely encourage and entice the chance to engage and destroy the “cream” of what Europe has to offer.
It is highly likely those 30,000 peacekeepers will be facing off against a Russian army (albeit poorly trained in the majority) but with a core of combat hardened and experienced soldiers. Russia is forecast to have a field army of around 1 million men/women within the next 12 months- equipment for those 1 million will be drawn from whatever stores they have left and donations or purchases from North Korea, China, Iran and some African states. So not exactly a high-quality army but the core will be reasonably experienced and they will have a significant numerical advantage over a much smaller Ukraine and ENATO peacekeeping force.
For me the biggest concern isn’t the small number of troops involved (30,000) its their complete lack of back up- what is going to be the rescue and full-back plan if this force is engaged, pushed back or suffers heavy losses?
To really deter Russia would require a European and ENATO force around 100,000 strong.
If he wanted something else (not that I think he does), I have a more generous time frame for his actions is typically 6-10 years:
2nd Chechen war 1999-2001 (major operations)
Georgian War 2008
Ukraine/euro maidan crisis 2014
Russo-Ukrainian war 2022
Hi Mr Bell you have to remember what the core would and and that’s arguably the single most experienced and successful army in the 21c and that’s the Ukrainian army…this is an army that has successfully driven the army of a nation 10 times its size into a grinding stalemate..that is very very impressive.
So ENATO would be providing the balance.. Ukraine would provide a battle hardened 250,000 strong army that would essentially take the hoard on faces to face .if Europe then sat say 10 heavy brigades behind that army to act as a mobile punch in the face. Then provided say 10 squadrons of 4.5 and 5 gen fighters to essentially maintain air dominance over Ukraine any Russia offensive would be a bloodbath on their part.
Ukraine would still provided the bulk of the on the ground fighting forces..
also you would essentially get Poland to hold kalingrade at risk…Russia attacks the rump ukrianne and ENATO forces..make it clear kalingrade gets removed. Play Russia at its own escalate to deescalate game.
You’re committing ENato to support Ukraine on the battlefield with boots on the ground and aircraft in the air…. This would be taking Europe very close to being at war with Russia, something that no one wants…
Europe is already very close to war with Russia, the only way we will prevent this is to set our very Clear red lines and convince Russia we will defend those red lines to destruction. Otherwise Russia will keep pushing and pushing until we inevitably end up in a war.
So what does a decent British peacetime army look like…
3 heavy armoured brigades ( 1 MBT reg, 1 armoured cav reg, 2 armoured infantry battalions, 1 mec battalion, 1 armoured fire reg, 1 long range fires, CSS)
3 mec brigades (4 mec battalions, 1 cav regiment, 1 mobile fires reg, CSS)
1 air mobile/light brigade ( 2 para battalions, 4 light infantry battalions , 1 light fires regiment, 1 cav regiment)
Special forces
So by regiments and battalions
3 type 56 MBT regiments should have a total of around 220-250 MBTs all with active armour
6 armoured infantry battalions need a tracked infantry fighting vehicle ( say an updated warrior) 400 IFVs with active armour
3 heavy mec battalions 200 boxers
12 mec infantry battalions, decent APC ( Stanag level 3- 4) 1000 vehicles , some form of direct fire vehicle in support
4 light infantry battalions, should have protected mobility vehicles ( air mobile)
3 armoured fires regiments ( 155mm tracked self propelled 65 vehicles)
3 mobile fires regiments ( 155mm wheeled, 65 vehicles)
3 long range fires regiments ( rocket artillery 65 vehicles
3 armoured cav regiments..Ajax
3 Cav regiments wheeled cav vehicles
1 air mobile fires regiment..mix of 105mm guns and 120mm mortars
also increase the lethality of each of the infantry battalion by provision of 120mm mortars at battalion level and 60mm mortars at company level.
css for 7 brigades…
That’s a decent size peacetime army.
Pictures paint a thousand words (as ever remove spaces)
https: //i.imgur.com/m1kLykz .png
Baisically my take on what, money minimal object, a peace time British Army should look like (some of the Corps and Divisional enablers still need the correct unit counters and names applying). Baisically: The British Army needs to be looking at putting a small Corps in the field, it already has a framework for it through ARRC. It needs to make 1 Division a deployable Mechanised Division with 3 Brigades, it needs to make 3 UK Division a deployable armoured division with 3 Brigades, it needs an Airmobile Rapid Reaction Division built around 11 and 16, with 19 Brigade split into two sensible light motorised brigades, and Corps fires (though having a Corps Artillery brigade would lessen the need for Divisional Deep Fires, so it balances out).
We couldn’t field a division let alone a corps! Also we have huge capability gaps in our force structure- The ship that was Article 5 and US support has long since sailed in case anyone was in any doubt. We live in a new dystopian world. If we don’t reindustrialise and rearm we will be forced into a obligated US, Chinese or Muslim vassal state
I’d say reading comprehension isn’t your strong suit, but I even included a pretty picture, so you’re so bad at this you can’t even make sense of something a five year old could do?
I’ll say this in few words for you:
Chart shows what we should aim for. Also shows what is missing.
Got it?
(Also, absolutely could field a division. It’s the “for enduring ops” bit we’d struggle with. But for a single campaign or a peer war where we’d not care about harmony guidelines and long term retention? Yes we absoultely could deploy a division).
An expanded version of your earlier efforts, noted “money no object”
What would the establishment requirement be for such a force, given the several CS CSS formations that don’t actually exist that would need raising to realise it, beyond the combat arms.
Like the inclusion of Patria to mechanize as many Bns as possible.
I counted 24 extra units, 9 CSS, 6 Fires, 5 Air Defence and RPAS, 3 Infantry and 1 Cav. So anywhere from 8-10,000 extra headcount to enable that.
FFS mate, surely that is doable.
Yes, I didn’t count but there were quite a few I didn’t recognise. 😊
@Daniele, should be obvious, I tried to mark non existant units as ‘planned’.
Interesting thoughts around having a full air mobile division. You are correct it would be useful and cover all the smaller global developments so the core heavy brigades can be focused on European security, while not impacting on UKs global picture.
Would you beef up 11 brigade and make those battalions full size light role infantry and add full CS CSS or just keep them as the small security intervention battalions with no CS CSS ? Amid with 19 brigade split into 2 would you make those reserve formations again fully deployable on their own as is ?
Reserves is one of the areas I think we have wrong in the UK, I think the reserve formations should be set up to be able to be constituted into actual deployable formations..not just as feeder formations, I think that would make them more understandable and appealing to young people who may want to serve but not have a career in the forces. Maybe look at the Scandinavian models or even the U.S. national guard model. I think the national guard model could be useful as I think we need to do a hell of a lot more around civil defence and civil contingencies in this country and to be blunt having used it the MACA process is not fit for purpose.
So as I understand it, speaking to people in 11 Brigade, they’re being beefed up anyway back to full Light Infantry Strength. I’m not sure I fully follow the Conops, but my impression is that the idea is for them to deploy to say, a Baltic Country, and slot into Paramilitary or Reserve Units to provide them with specialist capabilities (Snipers, Mortars, Anti-Tank), the ability to call in fires, and a few more professional infantry units. It’s an interesting idea, that has merits and weaknesses (I’m unconvinced that they’d be calling in a lot of fires for example, and I’m not sure how people would in practice feel about subordinating a light infantry brigade to an Estonian Defence Leauge General), but at least they’d be using Estonian CSS if they where embedded in their formations.
I agree with Reserves, although I think a balance can be struck (If it’s not clear on my orbats I differentiate between Regular and Reserve by having Reserves be a lighter colour, so each Brigade has at least 1 Reserve Battalion to beef it up). Dividing 19 Brigade up is exactly that, to make them entirely deployable as stand alone formations, with a clear orbat. Frankly I think 11 and 16 would take heavy casualties in any Rapid Reaction to a Peer-Peer conflict so probably would get amalgamated, and then reinforced by the two AR Brigades to keep the Airmobile Division a useful formation. I also think that while an Airmobile Division would be a global response unit, I included it in the Corps (I left some units like ASOB and the Overseas Garrisons, off the orbat because the Garrisons wouldn’t feature and ASOB would probably only provide a few sub units (so a SOF Group as per the orbat)) because it would also have a role in a European response. Rough Conops would be: Something happens in Estonia. 6 Airmobile HQ deploys with lead elements of 16 and 11 and takes command of units present in Estonia as a Brigade Group. As the rest of 16 and 11 and Divisional enablers arrive the Brigade Group becomes a Division. Then 1 and 3 mobilise and the Estonia Armoured BG is transferred to them, 11 and 16 probably rotate out of the line for refit as the division is probably just a Brigade again at this point. 19 and 42, having to call up are the slowest to arrive in theatre, are used to make 6 a Division again.
Just an example of how it could go, obviously there are permutations of this, but I think it’s a good way to balance having a rapid reaction force and giving it longer term mass.
I think there should be a civil defence structure, but I don’t think it should be MoD based. It should be set up as a purely civilian organisation that is appealing to people who, in peace time, wouldn’t touch the military with a barge pole. Fuck off things like dress standards, if your house is flooded your not going to refuse help because the person offering it has pink-blue ombre hair and a nose piercing, and make it clear that it’s not a reserve formation for the Army so that someone who has moral objections to interventions and expeditionary warfare can’t say it’s all a ploy to get bodies into the military to be shipped off for rich peoples wars. At most you’d have a LO to the local Regional Brigade, to facilitate Recruitment if a Peer War breaks out (the Regional Brigades should also handle the Regular Reserve and be responsible for them) and to coordinate Civil Defence Corps and Reserve MACA work. Plus we both know that having Civil Defence double hatting as a 3rd Line Army Reserve means that when the shit hits the fan we’d loose our Civil Defence Forces at the same time as they’d be most needed with Cruise Missiles falling on civilian infrastructure.
Interesting re 11 Bde.
Where is the manpower coming for that, considering the RA in both fires and AD also needs expanding, as does CS CSS generally.
No idea. :/
That link doesn’t work on my android, but.I can visualise the ORBAT you have in mind. I think you are about spot-on, 10 manoeuvre brigades would be enough to deploy a capable forward division and rotate the brigades on the standard 6-month cycle. I really think we should adopt your ORBAT.as the 3% goal.
For 2.5%, I’d be hankering to bring 4 Inf bde up to regular deployable strength and starting to raise a sixth brigade, preferably armoured infantry but mechanised infantry if we must. But that is a pipe dream unless we can get the army establishment up to nearer 80,000.
If it doesn’t work it’s probably because you haven’t removed all the spaces I’ve inserted? Off the top of my head I think two strategically placed is enough to break the auto “hold for moderation” reaction.
Also for raising a third armoured brigade that doesn’t really need a huge headcount increase. The Infantry and RAC units exist, and some of the enablers exist. It would baisically require an extra RLC regiment, an extra med regiment, and an extra fires regiment. The big issue is the cost of IFV’s, APC’s and MBT’s to equip said brigade. (If you can get the orbat image to work notice how little of 1 Armoured Brigade is dashed “planned” units.)
In reality, not far off the position pre 2010.
Indeed , I’m not really over ambitious for the army with the list, just what a peacetime army would look like for the commitments we have now. Mainly because I think our core military strength should always be the navy and airforce, We are still an island and don’t need to fight of a land invasion, just have a really solid core army that can deploy with an ally or nation we want to support at a strength that helps tip the balance on deterrent to stop a conflict occurring ( most people really do forget once your in a peer war you did not choose to start you have lost no matter the outcome).
If the British army then had to deploy formations to stabilise Ukraine as a long term commitment it would need to be added on a 3 for 1 basis to that basic list. Unless we stopped commitments elsewhere at the same level. So essentially if we were asked to add a heavy brigade to a European armoured division based in Ukraine we would essentially need an extra armoured division.
As you know, in full agreement regards the primacy of the RN and the RAF.
Why is the army so unprepared to send troops to Ukriane? … perhaps because sending troops to the Donbas is not in the British national interest?
Today the army has been in steady rapid decline since the end of the cold war, earlier in fact since Thatcher atarted cutting forces after the Falkands war. Every government has cut further so today we have a tiny 70,000. Of that the great majority are support & traning personnel etc vital to enable a very small field force to deploy when needed. Our army hasn’t been this small since c1800. Our two biggest & best LPD amphibious ships that would be excellent to move troops & heavy gear to UKR are about to be scrapped without replacement in sight. They’d also be invaluable if we need to evacuate forces. To save money we’ve also run down much of the basic arms manufacturing we once had, so replacing or increasing kit & stocks would cost us more on the open market & if we need stuff, it’s probable that all our allies would need it also, creating quite a scramble for it.
Basically we’re already cut so far our forces are considerably too small for the most peaceful times. If we were to deploy say 6,000 troops to UKR, they’d need to be rotated every few months & yet we have a very small pool of combat troops, so that would be a real struggle. Get into serious combat & losses of men & material & we’d likely soon be unable to sustain what we need to do as the capacity was thrown away decades ago. The RAF & Navy are in no better condition.
Sadly I think until Ukraines allies are prepared to deploy forces to face down Putin & tip the balance to drive him either out of UKR or to the peace table in a suitably contrite, serious state of mind, this will just carry on until either UKR is ground down(being stabbed in the back by Trump doesn’t help) or Russia breaks under the expense of the war & the losses taken.
Thatcher? Um no.
In 1946 the BAOR was 4 Armoured Divisions and 7 Infantry Divisions.
In 1950 it consisted of 3 Armoured and 1 Infantry Division, 80,000 soldiers
In 1956 it was reduced to 2 Armoured and 2 Infantry Divisions, and cut to 60,000
In 1960 the 4 Divisions where disbanded and the BAOR became 7 Brigade Groups, cut to 55,000 soldiers
In 1970 the BAOR had become 3 Divisions.
In 1978 the trend was briefly reversed by the addition of a 4th Armoured Division
But by 1982 The BAOR was again 3 Armoured Divisions, with an Infantry Division stationed in the UK.
The continuous down-scaling predates Thatcher, we just seem to not pay attention to the force structure pre 1980.
It’s worth mapping the actual manpower of the British army against its BAOR position as it really does tell the story of what size army we need for a specific level of permanent commitment in central or Eastern Europe.
1950 364,000 for those 80,000 deployed BAOR forces ( which is probably way more than was needed for the commitment due to other imperial requirements).
1960 258,000 for those 55,000 deployed BAOR forces
1970 178,000 for 6 brigades ( although it was 3 divisions, each division only had 2 brigades)
1980 158,000 for 6 brigades deployed
You can probably state the case that we have the equivalent of 2 brigades deployed at preset for our 70,000 army..which does show the point that smaller armies are actually less efficient at generating deployable brigades and if we actually want to up our deployments in Eastern Europe we need a bigger army with permanent basing to make it efficient and effective and that the 70,000 army we have at present is insufficient for efficient generation of brigade level formations. If we are being very very serious about defending Europe then efficiency of effort needs to be considered…essentially lots of small armies are inefficient and a smaller number of large armies would be better able to defend Europe…maybe this is where we need Poland and Germany ( if they wake up ) to step it up and build 150,000 strong armies…
Because it would seem the most effective way to deliver significant impact in central or Easter Europe is to have some 150,000 armies as these are able to deliver 3 divisions on a permanent deployment basis.
hrrrrmmm I think the problem with that is that the British Army in the 50s-90’s generated a lot more permanent overseas deployments than just the 6 BAOR Brigades. A non-exhaustive list of permanently deployed UK Brigades in the 70s and 80s would include
-Berlin Field Force/Berlin Area Troops/Berlin Infantry Brigade
-Hong Kong Garrison
-48th Gurkha Brigade (Hong Kong/Brunei)
-Belize Garrison
– 4 Brigades deployed to Northern Ireland.
(And as for your other point, I think Poland and Germany are not far off 150,000 strong armies (Poland is 110,000 and Germany is somewhere between about 100-120,000)
@ Dern indeed I don’t think we should be heading back to 150,000, Poland, Germany need to do that and if Ukraine ever joined then so would Ukraine. Also a lot of the smaller nations that are directly threatened need to up their armies a lot. Personally I think the central and southern European field field army burden should be
Germany 2-3 deployed divisions
Poland. 2-3 deployed divisions
France 1 deployed divisions
Italy 1-2 deployed divisions
Uk 1 deployed brigade and a divisional HQ supporting:
Spain 1 deployed brigade
Netherlands and smaller nations 1 deployed brigade and divisional CS/CSS
Then if Ukraine joins and becomes the frontier 3 deployed division
That would essentially give a central and southern Eastern European army of 13 divisions, Russia could not fight that.
In the north I would have
1 Uk divisions
1 france 1 brigade and HQ for division
2 brigades from Denmark and other smaller nations
2-3 divisions Lithuanian, Lithuania Estonia
1-2 divisions Norway, Sweden and Finland
Marine division UK lead
Giving 10:divisions for the north
Roy, simple answer is that the army is too small in terms of both manpower and platforms, has much aged and unmodernised equipment (especiallly ‘heavy metal’), has equipment capability gaps, has insufficient stocks of ammunition and spare parts and too small an Attrition Reserve of equipment to replace destroyed and very seriously damaged equipment. Other than that…everything is fine!
Quite shocking for you to think that we only deploy our army if there is a ‘British interest’.
Replying to Jonathan’s post with his fantastic wish-list of divisions and brigades!
Two things. The overall concept of two theatres, North and South, doesn’t really provide the deterrence needed at the level of regional threat and encroachment. There are six areas where NATO/E needs credible forward forces deployed largely by the Northern and Eastern frontline states, backed up by strong Western European reinforcement and counter-attack forces.
For me, the frontline corps required are
(i) Scandinavia, bolstered by a joint Western European armoured infantry division in Finland
(ii) Baltic Republics, with 3 Westetn European bde groups embedded in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian divisions
(iii) North German Plain – the 4 Polish divisions (which we think are a big bulwark, until we look at the map and remember what a large eastern border they have with Kaliningrad and Belarus, let alone Ukraine and pol8cing the Suwalki gap)
(iv) Central Europe, basically the Carpathian Basin, with Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Northern Romania, bolstered by a Fraco- German division
(v) The Balkans, with Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, reinforced by an Italian-Spanish division
(vi) Turkiye, which has a large-ish army
Back that up with 3 forward NATO corps
(i) North German Plain – 2 British Divs, 1 German, 1 Ben/Neth/Den: 4 Divs
(ii) Central Europe – 2 French, 1 German Div: 3 divs
(iii) Southern Europe – 2 Italian, 2 Spanish/ Portuguese Divs: 4 Divs
With a Rapid Reaction Force further back comprising Armoured, Infantry, Airborne and Marine Infantry corps.
Much of that force exists, much doesn’t and would need to be raised.
2nd point – your force goals per country look a bit random! If you aim for 1 Bde per 3m population in Easte5n and Northen Europe, you’ll see that the force levels set out above are about right. They are generally short on divisional assets though, such as combat and transport helicopters, long range fires, air defence etc.
If we similarly say 1 bde per 5m population in Westetn Europe, you will see that most of th3 allies are there or not too far short, with the exception of three:
Germany – hypothetical quota 16.5 bdes, current 8.5, so barely 50%
France – hypothetical quota 13 bdes, current 6
from memory, so barely 50% – they have useful troop numbers, but so many are deployed in overseas territories
UK – hypothetical quota 13.5 bdes, current 4.5 [counting 4 Inf Bde as the 0.5, as it lacks any regular artillery, engineers or CSS Units], so bottom of the NATO table at about 33%.
It gives a fairly clear pointer as to what we in the UK need to tackle rather speedily!
Suwalki Gap is very difficult terrain for offensive so if Russians will try to connect with Kalliningrad then they most certainly do that through Lithuania and we in Poland are going to defend Baltics. If Putin attacks Poland then most likely he’s going to do that from Belarus in so-called Smolensk Gate, this is were we are going to concentrate our defense.
Very interesting Michal, thanks for info. Poland is making a very impressive contribution to NATO, it is the exemplar that the rest of uNATO Europe should follow.
You have got me poring over large-scale maps of Poland and Suwalki, I see the logic of defending from the Smolensk direction. Every day is a school day!
Perhaps we, and the rest of Europe, should boost defence spending to 5% or maybe more. We should build a European Treaty Organisation and build a solid defence for Europe second to none. This day was bound to come whereby we cannot 100% count on our allies and perhaps need to make absolutely sure we can defend ourselves. It might be an advantage in some ways as we can more quickly to autonomous solutions which are obviously cheaper and easier to produce.
Currently we have a peacetime military – just as we have had at the outbrek of every major conflict throughout history.
Perhaps we need to accept that and shift to a war footing or at least a cold war footing.
When you say ‘we’ are you referring to the UK or freeloaders like ROI?
The UK. That said we need to accept the ROI are incapable of defending themselves so we might need to station troops there as we would not want an enemy gaining a foothold.
The ROI have not worked out that most of the UK’s friends were once enemies. Perhaps if the ROI were to be invaded by the Russians they might suddenly see the UK as potential liberators and their attitude might change.
Of course, Ireland has a population about 1/13th of the UK, which kinda limits what forces they can muster and afford.
If they armed themselves pro rata to the UK, they would have:
– 2 infantry battalions
– 1 armoured regt
– 1 frigate
– 4 frontline Typhoons
– 1/2 a Poseidon P8
which is not a lot.
Of course it would be nice if they could do more, but the amount of power it would add is pretty negligible in the wider scheme of things.
Why would you send British army into harms way in Ukraine post war if you don’t bother funding them or give them what they need 🫠
Never going to hit 3% of GDP
We don’t hit 2% real defence spend is around 1.8% to 1.9% of GDP.
According to the PESA tables from the treasury. They forcast GDP for 2025 as £2784.2 Billion with defence spending being £66.2 Billion.
(100/2784.2)*66.2 = 2.38% of GDP is spent on defence.
If you take of Foreign military aid (£3.3 Billion), and Foreign economic aid (£6.5 Billion). Plus the quoted £0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies you get.
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22)) = 1.9945% of GDP spent on defence
Then you have the cost of Trident WHICH WAS NEVER INCLUDED IN THE DEFENCE BUDGET percentage of GDP until that git Osbourne. That’s anywhere between £3 Billion & £5 Billion a year.
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22+3)) = 1.887 %
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5+0.65+0.22+5)) = 1.814 %
So the real spend is around 1.8% to 1.9% of GDP. Great no wonder the Army has triple the amount of horses (roughly 500) compared to the number of main battle tanks (>200), It is 1914 all over again. Is two-tier Stalin planning on another charge of the light brigade in Crimea ?
OMG, it’s almost a horse isn’t the equivalent of a tank. Who’d have guessed!?
So are you going to be leading the charge on the horses then ?
I think what Dern is saying is that a horse does not cost 25 million dollars which is what a modern MBT will set you back..infact you can get 5000 horses for the price of an a new MBT so those 500 horses would buy you 1/10 of an Abrahams.
See that bit where I said a horse isn’t equivalent to a tank? Yeah re read that.
Umm you do realise the foreign aid budget does not sit in the MOD/defence budget…it sits with the foreign, commonwealth and development office and then around .5 billion sits with the home office..so you can stop removing that 6.5 billion from the defence budget.
As for the military aid to Ukraine that budge line comes straight from the treasury reserve and not the mod budget..so you can remove that as well. People tend to get confused because they stick it in the MOD accounts as a supplementary figure, but it’s not part of the UKs defence budget.
I do wish people would actually go into the parliamentary and department library and look things up…we do have open government so if you spend the time you can find these nuggets…
“The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. To date, the UK has pledged £12.8 billion in support to Ukraine since February 2022, of which £7.8 billion is for military assistance. This includes £3 billion for military assistance in 2024/25. Funding is met from the Treasury Reserve and will not come from the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) main departmental budget. Spending on Ukraine does, however, appear in MOD spending figures towards the end of the financial year as part of the MOD Supplementary Estimates. “
As for the nuclear deterrent..well if we are comparing like for like everyone else in the world includes it in defence spending..but then many nations also totally lie about defence spending
USA..inflates nits defence spending as it includes a lot of security service stuff that others don’t also includes all the free stuff it gives Israel
China basically just straight out lies about it and is actually spending 2-5 times what it says depending on who you trust..but then china has managed to convince most of the world it does not have a blue water navy…har har.
Isreal. It’s actually a crime to mention Israel’s nuclear weapons even though everyone knows they have the full triad and as many warheads as the Uk and France combined…
But we are pretty open with our defence budget and it does not include foreign aid…
Jonathan I’ve read your first two paragraphs and i stopped there. Literally EVERYTHING you said in those two paragraphs is wrong.
“On July 30, 2024, HM Treasury published its Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) for 2024. ukpublicspending uses the PESA tables of public spending at the “sub-function” level as its major data source for UK public spending.”
THE FIGURES COME DIRECTLY FROM HM TREASURY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“United Kingdom Central Government
and Local Authority Spending
-5yr -1yr Fiscal Year 2025 ”
GDP: £2,784.2 billion
Defence = 66.2 = 2.38% of GDP
Military defence = 52.9
Civil defence = 0.0
Foreign military aid = 3.3
Foreign economic aid = 6.5
R&D Defence = 3.3
Defence n.e.c. = 0.2
Now you see those numbers, you have to add them all up together to get to 2.38% of GDP. Now if that money is coming from other budgets like you say. ITS DOESN’T MATTER as it doesn’t mean there is an extra £9.8 Billion in the defence budget. AS YOU HAVE TO ADD ALL THE NUMBERS TOGETHER to get to 2.38% of GDP. So if that money is coming from another budget it’s not counted.
(100/2784.2)*(66.2-(3.3+6.5)) = 2.025% of GDP is spent on defence. That includes the quoted “£0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies” from the article above.
I’m sorry if i seem a bit short with you but i am really annoyed with how much smoke is being blown up the public’s arse. We’ve had Boris, Rishi and now this idiot Stalin running around playing the billy big bollocks on the world stage. They are dragging us down a path to war. An incredibly brutal war were men are nothing but lambs going to the slaughter.
I’m not happy about that but I’m willing to do my part if it kicks off badly. I’ve even started rucking and lifting weights again at 46 in case things go badly and i get conscripted.
What I’m not happy about, in fact I’m bloody furious over. Is these absolute window lickers playing billy big bollocks on the world stage. Yet they’ve not done a god dam thing to prepare the military for war. In fact they keep claiming that they are upping spending and doing this that and the other. The reality is they are stuffing as much crap in to the defence budget as they can to make it look like we are spending much more than we actually are. While at the same time constantly making real terms cuts.
I would dispute your figures
The UK GDP for 2024 is 2,559,803 million pounds 2.3% of this would be 58.8 billion, actually MOD spend in that time was 56.9 billion pounds which is 2.23% of GDP. If you then add the aid budgets..which are not part of the MOD 56.9 billion pounds you would be at around 66.6 billion which would have been 2.6% of GDP..your essentially using a 2025 prediction of GDP against 2024 spending figures…that’s why your out.
But the overall thrust of his comment is spot on. HMG grandstanding, as usual, as we are P5 G7, while cutting or at best playing a smoke and mirrors shell game with the public as the military shrink.
Jon, Interesting that an increase from 2.3 to 2.5% is an increase of 8.7% ie £4.95bn extra per annum.
Not a fortune. The NHS got an extra £25.7bn in the last budget.
@graham it’s one of the reasons I don’t understand why they don’t just go to 2.5% it’s not a huge amount…
Jonathan.
Because, they are ideologically totally against spending on the military. Some say Labour, or the more extreme left side of it, are against the military itself.
Their priorities lie elsewhere, no matter what Kier Starmer grandstands.
@DM I’m not sure that’s entirely fair, Daniele, and it’s certainly not true for many of their voters or supporters. ‘Some say’ all sorts of things, not all of which are true. There are always weirdos at the extremes, just as on the right.
On a broader note, I think there is an an opportunity here – a necessity, even – to try to politically decouple the proper funding of robust defences from their (potential) use for purposes the left would fairly criticize, such as quasi-imperial wars of choice (which makes Blair’s Afghan and Iraq engagements all the more ironic/moronic). A shift to a model more like the French, with defence policy drawn out of the partisan sphere à la the Military Programming Act, would be a good move for the UK in the long-term, I think. We need to be clear that defence means defence, broadly interpreted in the worldwide support of our allies and interests where necessary, and clearly articulate such to the public. As for priorities lying elsewhere, I think its inevitable in a democracy such as ours that our politicians will spend all their time trying to keep the spinning plates from falling until after the next electoral reckoning. Politicians’ priorities lie with what the public say they want, which is not always the same as what they DO want, and certainly not always what they need. That is where we are so often lacking: in true leadership to set a course and take the country with them.
Do we need to think about the Swedish model of defence? Because, they were locked into the cold war but stood apart and were so porcupine that no one would touch them. What did they spend on defence? How did they secure intelligence that secured their borders?
It is obvious that 2.5% is not enough and our aspiration should be for much more; does that mean going back to a rounded out intelligence suite including X number of Kawasaki P1s? At least 5 wedgetails? Our own LEO systems? Back up to a decent frigate and destroyer force, GBAD for home defence, the list is endless.
However, the budget needs an aspiration that pollies can be held accountable for because at the moment, Bridget Phillipson is talking about spending money well and batting off the question of where defence spending should be, typical?
So, what capabilities would we miss if we parted from America and what capability a la Sweden would be we need?
Mate.
On the intelligence side, that I briefly alluded to on the other thread, it is far too comprehensive and detailed to list here.
Then you have the nuclear R&D area, DSTL and DARPA, RN USN liaison involving submarines and IUSS, the SF area, ETPS, and then there are certain bits involved in the operation of CASD. Though to note, we can still launch them.
DB, I would say Sweden locked theselves out of the Cold War. They were Neutral. They still were very prepared, primarily in a defensive way, in the event that their neutrality was not respected.
The next German chancellor is likely to be the CDUs Merz. He is on record as saying he sees a need for France and the UK to extend the nuclear umbrella to cover Germany. Meloni, Tusk and Macron meet with Trump this week before Starmer. I think Trump’s initiative on Ukraine is driving the emergence of a new core European sub group of NATO; Poland, Germany, Italy, France, the UK.
I think all these analysis miss the basic point that the uk has never post ww2 been able to directly take on russia/ussr. Even if the defence budget was doubled that would not change. Russia deployed 150k troops at the start of the war (pre mobilisation) whilst best the uk could do is maybe 20k. Ok Russia currently has 450k ish deployed but that is not sustainable for them in the long term, they are already struggling and western nations can mobilise also if needed.
However the uk would never be forced take on Russia alone, as there is the whole of Europe between us and them. Combine a number of nations together even without the US and that difference reduces significantly. European nations including the UK need to step up but it’s not as dire as some report.
The issue is that Sweden essentially jacked onto the wests wider geostrategic and geopolitical coat tails..essentially neutrals do this all the time..even the ones that have good defences. Now the western alliance has now essentially collapsed Europe needs to not only focus on local regional security but also the wider geopolitical picture and secure its access to raw materials and markets.
So we need regional security as in heavy divisions, airforce, GBAD, regional naval capabilities and nuclear umbrella…but we also need expeditionary capabilities so Europe needs to be able to send out Carrier battle groups..have gobal nodes of power, amphibious groups and airmobile forces as well as strategic air and sea lift. So we can affect the north and south Atlantic, Africa and Indian Occean as well as the high north and Antarctic.
A quick win in terms of efficiency would be to turn Britain’s entire armed forces into an expeditionary Marine Corps. They are, after all, almost exactly the same in manpower as the U.S. Marine Corps. The Royal Navy already provides part of our strategic air defence and our strategic deterrent. The Army Air Corps already provides close air support. Such a sweeping reorganisation of front line formations would provide an excellent argument for a total reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, regarding force size, as things currently stand, there should be no need for any officers of above two stars in rank.
Monro, who else has done this? No-one. This would only make sense if Britain had a wholly Marine/Commando outlook, but we don’t.
Its almost as if exporting our means of production, undermining the British people for 27 years and basing our economy on ever larger amounts of debt for 46 years was a bad idea. Who’d have thunk it.
I’ve argued on here many times for the UK to have maintained at least a residual capability in all the critical strategic areas to retain IP, manufacturing capability, and workforce skills. For example, small but continuous/production and development of things like submarines, MBTs, fighter jets etc., and not rely on the USA, Germany, France etc. Sadly this has not been the case and we will now have to pay to remedy this.
However, this is also now an opportunity. Why not get other countries (Commonwealth and European) who may benefit from UK military protection to actually contribute/pay for it. I see Germany are mumbling about paying the UK for nuclear deterrent coverage. Given that the USA is off the pitch and NATO therefore unreliable, why does the UK not expand its nuclear deterrent (subs, aircraft and land-launched missiles) but get others who benefit from it to pay for it?
Ditto for conventional deterrent?
If the primary objective is to prevent UK Defence capability further contracting whilst the threat it faces and the responsibilities it have been given have increased then it’s probably more productive to not get to tied up in arguments about hypothetical %s of future GDP.
It’s probably more productive to initially just force the treasury to sign off whatever is needed now just to stop the bleeding. A second order action would then be to find urgent funding to plug any critical gaps in UK defence such as GBAD. Once you’ve stopped the bleeding and mitigated critical vulnerabilities you can start arguing about future budgets and force structure.
My worry is that the British Armed Forces have been so hollowed out that promises of Jam tomorrow instead of Jam today will not prevent the gap between what is available and what is required from getting far worse.
We also need to give our politicians a good spanking to stop this from happening again.
I fully agree with this. Words without actions are a pathetic joke. The lessons of history have been repeatedly ignored. The primary role of government is the defence of the nation. 97.7% of government spending goes on other things. We really are led by donkeys. Time for a change.
One huge difference in 1914 and 1939 a lot easier to scale up . You could build a Humpy in a week you cannot do that with a Typhoon and pilot training time difference is measured in years