Why the British army is so unprepared to send troops to Ukraine.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that Britain is “ready and willing to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by putting our own troops on the ground if necessary”.
While reports suggest these would be “peacekeeping” forces, the reality is that true peacekeepers must be impartial. British troops placed to support Ukraine could certainly be seen as “partial”. And the positioning of British forces in Ukraine would fit the Russian narrative that casts Nato as the aggressor.
This article is the opinion of the author, Kenton White, University of Reading, and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.
Ukraine is not a member of Nato, but the goal of Nato membership is enshrined in its constitution. British forces involved in any sort of fighting in Ukraine would not enable article 5, which states that each member will regard an attack on any other member as an attack on themselves and assist it, to be invoked.
Additionally, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth said last week that European troops deployed to Ukraine should not be covered under article 5.
The weakness with Starmer’s idea is that Britain does not have the wherewithal to provide enough troops, supplies and weapons to act as a real deterrent. This isn’t too dissimilar from the state of British forces when faced with war in Europe more than a century ago.
In 1914 Lord Kitchener, then secretary of state for war, speaking of the cabinet’s decision to go to war in Europe, thundered, “Did they remember, when they went headlong into a war like this, that they were without an army, and without any preparation to equip one?”
Small numbers would be nothing more than a “speed-bump” against a large attack, as the British Expeditionary Force was in 1914 and again in 1940. Poor preparation, small numbers and limited equipment meant their deployment was more an indication of Britain’s support, rather than real capability to fight a long war against a peer enemy.
Britain is again in this position. Years of spending cuts have removed the ability of British forces to prosecute a war against a peer adversary for an extended time. The number of troops has fallen from 100,000 full-time trained personnel in 2000, to approximately 70,000 today.
Britain also does not have the capacity to manufacture at the levels required for a modern war. Much will be needed for immediate capital investment, such as manufacturing capacity for arms and ammunition. Longer-term investment will be required for arms production, as will the reinstatement of supporting infrastructure, such as airfields and storage facilities abandoned after the end of the cold war, both within Britain and across Europe.
There is no solution to the immediate problem except increasing the money available for defence. But Britain, and many other Nato members, have been unwilling to increase spending on defence, even though the current capabilities have been run down to such an extent that European nations cannot field a capable force.
Defence spending
US president Donald Trump has called for Nato countries to up their defence spending to 5% of GDP from the current Nato target of 2%. This would be very difficult to achieve in Britain’s current financial situation without spending cuts elsewhere.
While it has been reported that defence chiefs are pushing for a rise to 2.65% of GDP, Starmer indicated he would resist pressure to increase spending above 2.5%.
The last time the UK spent more than 5% of its GDP on defence was in the height of the cold war. The current international situation has already begun to shift into two distinct blocs similar to the east-west split between 1945 and 1991. However, the bipolar balance of the cold war has been replaced with an increasing instability, as displayed by Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine.
Replacing lost capacity is almost always more expensive than maintaining it. Had the governments of past decades maintained the capabilities of the armed forces, the overall cost would most likely have been lower than the amount the nation will now have to invest to obtain the same level of defence.
Each defence review since 1957 has led to cuts to the defence budget in real terms. Reductions in the military budget continue because, previously, nothing presented a sufficient sub-nuclear threat to the nation deemed significant enough to reverse them. Those cuts are now so deep that the nation is on the edge of being unable to defend itself, let alone project military power abroad in any significant capacity.
The prime minister wrote: “We have got to show we are truly serious about our own defence and bearing our own burden.” This assertion is quickly undermined by the indication that he won’t increase spending anytime soon.
None of the western members of Nato have shown any willingness to significantly increase their defence spending. Great Britain expects to spend £56.4 billion for 2024-25, amounting to approximately 2.3% of GDP. But this includes £0.65 billion in pensions and benefits, and £0.22 billion in “arms-length bodies” that do not contribute to the defence establishment in any practical terms.
Britain and Nato have had clear warning since 2014 to correct the deficiencies of their defences. All have chosen to ignore the developing threat from Russia. The impression is that not only are we hoping for the best, but we are planning for the best too.
Lord Tedder, chief of the air staff after the second world war, wrote, “It is at the outset of war that time is the supreme factor.” Three years into the war in Ukraine, and it is clear that Nato missed the opportunity to strengthen its defences in the early stages. It now faces a significant increase in defence spending simply to make up the shortfall from previous decades.
Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of Reading. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Historical comment. Agree with the First World War commentary. I would strongly challenge the second world war analysis however. Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in ’31, it was the UK that requested to break the ‘ten-year rule’. the country was fully mobilised in ‘rearmament’ by 1934. In particular bringing the RN and RAF to fighting strength. Yes, more could be done with hindsight but in face of uncertainty, the correct decisions were taken to support expeditionary, defensive and latterly total war. Britain was far from under resourced with ‘limited equipment’ having the only fully mechanised army in the world in 1939 and the most credible Navy in terms of support infrastructure, numbers and training.
Modern comment. There is a significant difference between unpreparedness and under-preparedness. I would argue we are very much facing the latter. The disappointingly slow behemoth of our military industrial complex has been waking for a few years. We have been increasingly (and somewhat fortunately with current hindsight) building military alliances outwith of the core restrictions of NATO (thinking JEF, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, increasingly working with the Commonwealth, and most recently announcements with Norway etc). I suspect we are contributing to the conflict in Ukraine far more than is being reported with (likely) intelligence, SF, tactical and operational advisors, training and some Combat Support capabilities either in country or very nearby. We have proven an ability to train conscript infantry at scale and speed – which regardless of how many drones exist in the world – will always be the backbone of the British Army in order to take and hold ground. Yes, much much more to do, particularly with regard to slowburn equipment production that should have been developed and paid for years ago, and the obvious requisite increase in spending, but far from unprepared. Perhaps it is an academic’s trope, but I’m sure we can collectively assure the author, they are not the only person thinking about this.
I’d disagree with your WW2 analysis. The Army might have been “Fully Mechanised” in 1939, but that needs context. For starters the BEF (the 1940 version) only had 9 Divisions when the Germans crossed the border (of the 135 Divisions the Western Allies had). The BEF was mechanised in 1940, but that was mostly by the artifact of us only sending Mechanised Units, while Germany and France sent everything (British Yeomanry Units would deploy to Palestine on horseback in 1940, and British Colonial forces would continue to have mounted components into 1942). Britain did not field a single Armoured Division in the lead up to Dunkirk (1st Armoured did eventually deploy, under-strength to France, and had to be evacuated from the Atlantic ports separately). So no, even with the breaking of the ten year rule, and going into re-armament, the British Army had still not become a large well equipped force.
(Also not sure why you’re bringing the Navy into this, the comments are clearly about the Army, and if the Navy in WW2 was in a good place, then the Navy in WW1 dwarfed British advantages in 1939).
Otherwise not much I disagree with in your modern comments.
Fair challenge, my own inherent bias brings the Navy in – apologies for broadening unnecessarily. Another key aspect is that the ‘full mechanisation’ relied heavily on rail, which being 60 years before the Chunnel, in hindsight brings further redundancy to my comment! You’ll probably have the figures to memory or at least on hand but what was the comparative mechanisation of the Wehrmacht coming up against the BEF. I recall hearing about them stealing French civilian cars/vans to support the advance. I think many (including me until embarrassingly recently) have the image of an armoured beast striking through Belgium when in reality there were a lot more horses, carts and shoe leather involved.
Fully acknowledge/agree your points on armour vs mech. I don’t think the Army ever really intended to be a large force however. Or rather the governemnt didn’t ever want a large army, what the Army wanted was probably very different. Small professional career soldiers with the ability to surge and train conscripts had been the British way for a long time before ’39.
Its funny to think that the 9 x WW2 BEF divisions that Dern referenced was considered to be a small force then. Today we would struggle to deploy just one well-balanced, well-equipped, well-resourced division.
Okay but:
1st Infantry Division in 1940 consisted of 3 Brigades with 3 Light Infantry Battalions and and AT Coy each, supported by 3 Field Artillery Regiments and a AT Regiment, 2 Machine Gun Battalions and a Armoured Car Regiment. 1 Engineer Regiment, 1 Field Hospital and 1 Logistics Regiment.
Like, yes, we had 9 of them, plus the Corps enablers, and there was a lot more on the way, but today a BEF Infantry Division would hardly be considered well equipped, well balanced, or well resourced.
Ooof no I don’t have that percentage to hand, and tbh I don’t even know how I’d find it, but what I know I’ll share: The Wehrmacht had 140ish divisions with which they invaded France and the Low countries. Out of that 8ish (I’m saying ish because there are a few detached Regiments, especially the ones that would later grow into Waffen SS Divisions) Divisions where in the Panzergruppe Kleist, which where all definitely motorised, mechanised, or armoured. Additionally there where another 5 Panzer Divisions outside the Panzergruppe which would have been fully mechanised. But I don’t know if, for example the 62nd Infantry Division (which together with 5th and 7th Panzer Division formed the XV corps in May) was Motorised, Partially Motorised, or completely reliant on foot and rail.
I’d say being as generous as I can possibly be, the Wehrmacht had at most about 20ish fully motorised divisions (if we assume any division that was in a corps with an armoured division was mechanised), of which 10 where Panzer Divisions, plus a few detached SS Regiments which where mechanised. For the remaining 120 Divisions, no idea, I’m sure none of them where fully mechanised, but how many of them might have had a motorised regiment here, or trucks to tow their guns there… eh your guess is as good as mine.
I don’t blame the image of the armoured beast striking through Belgium, because it kind of was. As I said Germany had 10 Armoured Divisions (again Britain started the Battle of France with none, the Matilda II’s of the Arras Counter Attack where a single Independent Army Tank Brigade that could be attached to an Infantry Division as required), and of those 10, half where all grouped together in an all Mechanised force that spearheaded the operation. Yes there was a lot of Horse cart and Shoe Leather (and trains) that followed, but they where much more about securing, and pinning then manuvering. (Also why a lot of senior Wehrmacht Commander got very pissy with Panzer Officers like Rommel who raced off into the sun; the Infantry couldn’t keep up.)
(Worth noting though that in those days there where ships and docks that meant that a train could leave london, be driven straight onto a ferry, and then when the Ferry came alongside in France be driven straight off the Ferry and onto the French rail network! (There still is one of these in Uganda).
While I don’t think the British Army was ever thought of as a force that could go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht on it’s own, I think everyone saw the beast that the British Army had grown into in 1914, and correctly saw that it would have to do the same again if required (By the end of the War the British and Commonwealth Forces where fielding 58 Divisions, and that was down from the high point in 1944).
Outstanding! Cheers!
I agree with much, but not all, of the nuance you have provided. However, the ability to train infantry is one thing, the ability to equip them is another thing completely. Rifles, body armour, ammunition, vehicles would all be beyond us to manufacture in quantity at short notice (unless we’re sending them into battle in Nissan Qashqais. I hope that some secret contingency plans for such a scenario do exist; if not a secret reserve of weapons, at least some sort of legal insurance contract to have first dibs on manufacturing facilities / plant machinery in the US or elsewhere, that could essentially be requisitioned by HMG at short notice.
I also hope that when we do eventually replace the SA80, rather than being scrapped or sold, they are put into war storage in case we need to raise a large number of troops at short notice in the future. Easy enough to do with small volume objects like personal weapons and ammo; harder (but still possible) to do with vehicles.
We do however have the geographic advantage of any potential enemy having to get through the rest of Europe first, which would buy us some time. The regulars and reserves could play their part in expeditionary operations helping allies while the rest of us get our act together back home!
Carrickter, cheers. Any idea what they did with hundreds of thousands of SLRs? Were they pragmatically put away somewhere or just sent to be razor blades and plowshares?
Many were just scrapped, some sold to Sierra Leonne, and some sold for spare parts to other countries operating different versions of the rifle. I believe a small amount were deactivated and retained for ceremonial purposes. Here’s hoping some of that is porkies from HMG, and that in reality there is a bunker somewhere with thousands stored in case the s*** hits the fan. But that’s probably wishful thinking.
Carrickter, why would we keep any SLRs for ceremonial purposes? Ceremonial troops always use the in-service weapon.
As mentioned before we do not store equipment that has been superseded.
Carrickter, in my experience we have never kept any kit (vehicles, weapons, whatever) once it is formally declared Obsolete and superseded. Thus it would not be at all unusual to keep SA80 when it is replaced. We lack storage and the money to keep old kit.
On a seperate and quite different point, Daniele and I had some discussions a while back about whether Army Reserve units all even had sufficient vehicles to move themselves en masse in one lift.
Ironically vehicles is the easiest. You joke about Nissan Qashqais, but civilian 4×4’s being bought up, or even just requisitioned and given to light motorised brigades is 100% something we would (and do in fact see in places like, for example, Ukraine)
There is a rumour that the goverment has a plan to increase defence spending to 3% and it will be announced soon. It will be over several years but seems like positive step in the right direction if true.
Yeh ive seen a paper with some stats on .. 3% by 2030 blah blah
Too little too late
We need it sorted today so we can equip for tomorrow
Couldn’t spend 3% today if you tried.
It would be rapidly wasted.
A jump to 2.5% now and a ramp by 0.1%/yr actually makes sense.
3% is massive as about 0.8% is DNE and other ‘stuff.’.
So 3% actually means 2.2% on conventional up from 1.5%(ish).
Whether it happens or just policitcal speak is anyone’s guess, but here’s hoping.
We could easily spend 3% next year. I don’t know why you think otherwise. Are you just parroting the claptrap spread by the Treasury? Of course some of it will be wasted, but probably far less than the penny-pinching, slow to go ordering that we are doing at the moment. The gapping, the firing and rehiring, the extra training and working slowly up to operational status. That costs us far more per item than consistent ordering and replenishment.
3% is about an extra £20bn pa. We all know that we need spending on so many things, and what stops industry expanding is inconsistency and Treasury rules.
Not sure about this one. It is possible to engage building of factories, prioritize production for military, ramp up production in all installed factories. Barracks have to be built, air strip as well, naval shipyard must be enlarged. The school system can prioritize profil for workers, technicians and engineers. This is all relevant in this path. This won’t give you overnight an army, but will create the conditions to have one.
In the short term rapidly warmed-over Bulldogs and Warriors can be made available for patroling purposes with Foxhound and Mastiff. Boxer and Ajax production rates would need to be increased using both German and UK production for the former and a likelihood of follow-on orders not to be ruled out. Deploying CH2 should not pose too many issues beyond those identified under Ukrainian control. I feel sure a deferment of OSD for Bulldog and Warrior is the best option for quickly deploying vehicles on the ground.
The obvious way to fund a boost in UK defence, would be to cut the excess 66,000 civil service jobs, created during lockdown & now surplus to requirements, as the last Tory government was about to do. That way the UK can boost military numbers by 15,000. 2500 each for RAF & RN, 10.000 for the Army. That is needed for any Ukraine peacekeeping force. Also keep the last tranche 1 RAF Typhoon & upgrade them for less than ten million each, or we will not have enough Typhoon to deploy.
Let’s pay for Defence spending by cutting spending on Defence! That’s what you just argued for. Civil servants do the job far more cheaply than uniformed secondees and more cheaply still than the industry consultants who were brought in after Cameron’s ransacking of the civil service. Somone has to do the job, and the civil service is the cheapest way of getting it done.
Rubbish, Most of the excess were taken on for pandemic schemes that no longer exist. You can’t spend the same pound twice, so you have to make sure each pound is well spent.
Truly, you are clueless. You voted for brexit? Do you understand the costs that Brexit has heaped upon the Civil Service and private sector?
I think he’s talking about the civil service more generally, and not MOD civilian staff.
use the foreign aid budget , since it is a bit of a emergency .
I watched Question time on the BBC last night, Ben Wallace was excellent but listening to for CGS Nick Carter was just laughable, yes he sounded plausible with all the right soundbites but when he started going on about the Army’s lack of MBT’s I just lost the will to live.
It’s worth a watch on iPlayer.
I thought he was the General who cancelled Warrior upgrades, extra CR3 and just about anything else for his Strike idea. The way he was talking anyone
would think he’s hoping to get recalled as a candidate to replace the present CDS !
I’m quite happily waiting to hear what Mrs M & M (Moore & Mandelli) have to say about it.
He WAS!!!!!!!
Comedy Gold – calling himself out….
I’ve explained that sorry saga enough times here, and the damage to the CS CSS area. We had 6 deployable brigades, 7 including 3 Cdo, till Strike came along and neutered 3 Divisions 3 Armoured Brigades and the 2 in 1 Division that had a full set of CS CSS.
And now he wants Tanks.
Another journalist gave him an easy ride as usual.
Yes that man burned the CS and CCS as well as gutting the actual deployable brigades..quite amazing really.
Ben Wallace is a jingoistic idiot.
ABC, Carter presided over the Army 2020 restructuring work and its evolution into the Orbat shown in ‘Future Soldier’ (FS). The FS structure was published in booklet form sometime after the April 2021 Integrated Review (possibly in November) and reduced the RAC from 3 armoured regiments to 2 (that change has not happened yet but it is a matter of time). With only 2 armoured regts in the Orbat it is hardly surprising that translates to having only 148 tanks, although that postulates a tiny Attrition Reserve.
Carter cannot, with a straight face, complain about the small number of tanks once CR3 is fielded. Whatever other talents he undoubtedly had, he was a hopeless strategic planner and Portfolio Manager.
I also disagree that we are not prepared for War!
British Army and the armed forces in general is seen continously training at home and abroad for all types of battlefields
I think that we can put a good sized force straight into Ukraine…and adapt as “future soldier” has been created for exactly this reason
We have equipment, not quite enough but if the Ukrainian’s can fight with sweet FA then the “be the best” British Army whose been helping give some basic training should damn well be able to DO IT!
This “cant do” attitude is part of the problem…in fact its ‘institutional’
I think everyone agrees that we have great people who are highly trained and motivated, but in no way do we have the same sort of mass that the Ukranians had even at the start of the war. They had large amounts of legacy soviet equipment leftover from the dissolution of the USSR. Poorly maintained, if maintained at all, but at least most of it wasn’t scrapped or sold. The UK MOD has a very stingy storage policy, and sells or scraps virtually everything.
The Ukranians have also had huge amounts of donated equipment and funds to keep them in the field.
But I also agree that we need to be more optimistic about what we can achieve, it’s the political will / competency that is lacking.
We also work our equipment to death (which is a side effect of having highly trained personnel), even compared to ‘peer’ countries like France. So it wears out faster and we end up cannibalising units to keep others functional. Modern, digital, and especially western, equipment also needs more TLC than cold war era analogue technology / equipment. Obsolescence of niche parts (especially electronics) plays a big part in decisions about the economic viability of storage vs canabilisation etc.
John, What do you call a good size force for this Peacekeeping or Peace Support or Stabilisation operation in Ukraine, if it ever came Britain’s way?
This would be an enduring operation, not a ‘one-shot’ short duration operation.
We would be very pressed to send a brigade group of 6,000 on an enduring operation without massive recourse to the Army Reserve and/or RM. If the powers-that-be decided it had to be done by just the regular army, then we could only supply and roule a BG, plus a National Support Element, say about 1,000 – 1,500+ guys and girls. That also fits with the limited amount of armoured/mech equipment and troops we have, as light role troops would not be suitable.
Does Starmer know?
That there are 2 Batteries of 155mm left?
2 Regiments of Tanks.
4 Battalions of Warrior.
And can maintain a BG in Estonia by committing the 2 heavy Bdes we have, 12 and 20, from their supposed reserve role.
And he loftily suggests deploying to Ukraine, an act which would split our minimal forces even more?
Even using 1 Div assets is not sufficient as they lack CS CSS bar 16 and 7.
Last time Labour were in power, around 2006, there were 6 Regiments of 155mm, 6 Regiments of tanks, and 9 Warrior Battalions.
They need to stop this can do attitude and say no.
If Russia is a threat to NATO, then give the army an area, Estonia, or further north, and do not disperse it.
Re reading that. To clarify, there are still 3 Tank Regiments, due to reduce to 2. The KRH did not convert thankfully, due to Ajax delayed.
DM, now that M777 is going back into production, perhaps some could find there way into British Army Artillery units?
I think unlikely.
DM, credible summary as ever. Cheers. This is a really valid question; I do wonder how honest the MoD are being with the Cabinet. The ‘can do’ attitude is the MoD’s self-harm. We saw plenty of ‘good old bloke’ whitewashing when I was in Whitehall. Figures squeed, statistics left out to make the situation appear better, and double-tapping at-readdiness units into various commitments. It’s quite a worrying state of affairs. I think I have just enough faith remaining that Jonathon Powell and Lord Robertson are actually holding the Chiefs to account through the Review… hopefully there will be something meaningful on the horizon.
Thank you, NDG.
Respect.
Fingers crossed, but my faith in HMG re defence has never been lower.
Agree Daniele – i watched the British Army detachment in Romania ( commander ? ) the other night on the news and he was positively Gung Ho – yes Sir ,No Sir ,Three Bags Full Sir,we can do X,Y and Z.it’s about time someone stood up and said NO ! if you send us into the quagmire that is Ukraine we will have our Arseholes handed back to us on a Plate.
It’s a scary though but I suspect starmers grasp of the actual capabilities of the armed forces will be what he’s told by the MOD and what seniors say to the people they care accountable to tends to be a load of bollox to be honest..because it’s those that say yes and don’t rock the boat are the ones that get promoted…
I am hoping all the pro-Ukraine chaps here tape a kitchen knife to a broom handle and take off to the Ukraine as soon as they can!!!!
Remember to take the brush off first.
I hope the weather in Moscow is better than it is here in Britain.
No need I can just fundraise for all my equipment, just as i do for the Ukrainians😉
Question is. Could UK, France, Germany, Poland and Holland etc pull together a force. Remember, Russian forces have had massive losses.
It’s about tipp8ng the deter balance alongside Ukraine. ..not instead of Ukraine.
I think the JEF provides a credible enough framework for a ‘coalition of the willing’ that could operate within an existing Command Structure to form together forces outside of a NATO ‘Article 5’ activation, which is looking increasingly unlikely with US rhetoric at present. It is a really useful coupling of the more vulnerable nations with some actual players. Let those in the Baltic/East deal with conscription and mass, let those in Scandinavia develop and deploy technical expertise and advanced weapon systems. Let the Brits and Dutch hold the standing Commands and contribute the Enablers. Any further interested Europeans could essential ‘bolt’ onto this model. All while maintaining a UK nuclear umbrella. It’s a good enough ‘starter for ten’. Also keeps the inherent infighting between UK, France and Germany as the major political players far outside of the conversation of Command.
Would be nice to see Turkey or Poland contribute the heavy armour though… as I can’t see it coming from anywhere else.
Pete – absolutely no chance,TTK went to Paris on monday full of hope for a consensus on sending Boots on the ground to Ukraine and came back empty handed,it won’t happen,too many different interests and insecurities at play.
Germany is never going to actively do anything to really confront Russia…it’s simply a void in the heart of Europe and in reality one of the main drivers of why Europe is not really able to flex is military or geopolitical muscle…
In reality is also the hear of the EU so the EU is essentially a security and geostrategic void.
Paul, the Russians have squashed any chance that NATO member nations will contribute peacekeeping forces. So they may be UN troops from the Third World.
The Russians have squashed any chance of Nato members only if Trump accepts the Russian position. Starmer needs to put Trump straight on why we are supporting Ukraine. Trumps’s accusation that the UK has done nothing to stop the war is out of order. Starmer needs to remind Trump that Ukraine is striving to free itself from same neighbour that gave them Stalin, collectivisation, Holodomor and millions of famine deaths.
We shouldn’t ever lose sight of the fact Russia has the capacity to reform and re-equip army groups fairly rapidly currently.
Their conscription and call ups of reservists have meant that despite massive loses in Ukraine they re-equip and reformed 1 an armoured corps and separate infantry division on the border of Estonia just 12 months after the original units were sent to Ukraine and decimated.
The UK needs to be careful not to become an Army focussed military- our national interest is in Naval and Air warfare not a large land army, the minute we need a large land army is the minute our EU allies and partners have utterly failed to face off against a Russian military they should easily be able to out muscle with far superior equipment, numbers and technology.
The EU is 500 million people with a GDP X8 times that of Russia- there really shouldn’t even be a contest
Putin however knows the EU is fractured, unorganised and ponderously slow to react- those are the greatest risks to an EU response or combining its militaries into a potent force that should be second only to the USA’s armed forces in terms of capabilities, reach, technological prowess and firepower.
Mr Bell, don’t worry that we will ever have a large land army. The last time it was large was well over 50 years ago, some might say 60-70 years ago. However our army exists to fight expeditionary operations – we do not leave all the army taskings to the Continentals. It may be small but its fight is in Europe (or elsewhere) not back at the UK base.
Yes- we still have to go to war with the army we have than with the army we ought to have!
It is one of the true tragedies and sad facts that when you are talking about an existential peer war the army you start with is sort of irrelevant, it’s the army’s you can construct and reconstruct that is the key to victory or defeat.
The peace time army really only has four core purposes
1) to act as a deterrent to your enemy actually starting a war.
2) to undertake any expeditionary activity and peacetime security
3) provide a core set of skills for building the actual armies that will fight the war
4) to ensure the nation does not suffer complete collapse before it can build a wartime army
If you look at every major war this nation has fought it essentially burnt through a number of armies and the peacetime army was long gone by the time the war ended.
A well written article – wish this was much more within the general public’s awareness.
The fact the Army is just 70,000 strong, the fact the RN has just 8 active frigates, 6 destroyers, 6 attack submarines and 2 carriers with limited air wings
the RAF has just 100 or so available typhoon aircraft and 35 or so F35Bs- not exactly a tactical airforce.
We have been crippled by incessant creeping cuts to our military with a reciprocal reduction in defence-industrial base.
To stop the rot and return muscle, mass and capacity will require targeted expenditure.
SDSR will have to take the armed forces budget up to 3% within the next 1-2 years.
Putin we all know is just going to repair, re-equip, rearm, train and then go again- we have 12-18 months max from the point the Ukraine war ends to prepare for his next military campaign and land grab- this time probably against a NATO country.
A crash rearmament programme is needed- but we wont get it, instead we will likely deploy around 10,000 UK troops to help form a ENATO peacekeeping force of just 30,000 to guard a Ukrainian frontier of nearly 900km frontline.
those 30,000 troops are NOT going to deter Russia, quite the opposite it will likely encourage and entice the chance to engage and destroy the “cream” of what Europe has to offer.
It is highly likely those 30,000 peacekeepers will be facing off against a Russian army (albeit poorly trained in the majority) but with a core of combat hardened and experienced soldiers. Russia is forecast to have a field army of around 1 million men/women within the next 12 months- equipment for those 1 million will be drawn from whatever stores they have left and donations or purchases from North Korea, China, Iran and some African states. So not exactly a high-quality army but the core will be reasonably experienced and they will have a significant numerical advantage over a much smaller Ukraine and ENATO peacekeeping force.
For me the biggest concern isn’t the small number of troops involved (30,000) its their complete lack of back up- what is going to be the rescue and full-back plan if this force is engaged, pushed back or suffers heavy losses?
To really deter Russia would require a European and ENATO force around 100,000 strong.
If he wanted something else (not that I think he does), I have a more generous time frame for his actions is typically 6-10 years:
2nd Chechen war 1999-2001 (major operations)
Georgian War 2008
Ukraine/euro maidan crisis 2014
Russo-Ukrainian war 2022
So what does a decent British peacetime army look like…
3 heavy armoured brigades ( 1 MBT reg, 1 armoured cav reg, 2 armoured infantry battalions, 1 mec battalion, 1 armoured fire reg, 1 long range fires, CSS)
3 mec brigades (4 mec battalions, 1 cav regiment, 1 mobile fires reg, CSS)
1 air mobile/light brigade ( 2 para battalions, 4 light infantry battalions , 1 light fires regiment, 1 cav regiment)
Special forces
So by regiments and battalions
3 type 56 MBT regiments should have a total of around 220-250 MBTs all with active armour
6 armoured infantry battalions need a tracked infantry fighting vehicle ( say an updated warrior) 400 IFVs with active armour
3 heavy mec battalions 200 boxers
12 mec infantry battalions, decent APC ( Stanag level 3- 4) 1000 vehicles , some form of direct fire vehicle in support
4 light infantry battalions, should have protected mobility vehicles ( air mobile)
3 armoured fires regiments ( 155mm tracked self propelled 65 vehicles)
3 mobile fires regiments ( 155mm wheeled, 65 vehicles)
3 long range fires regiments ( rocket artillery 65 vehicles
3 armoured cav regiments..Ajax
3 Cav regiments wheeled cav vehicles
1 air mobile fires regiment..mix of 105mm guns and 120mm mortars
also increase the lethality of each of the infantry battalion by provision of 120mm mortars at battalion level and 60mm mortars at company level.
css for 7 brigades…
That’s a decent size peacetime army.
Pictures paint a thousand words (as ever remove spaces)
https: //i.imgur.com/m1kLykz .png
Baisically my take on what, money minimal object, a peace time British Army should look like (some of the Corps and Divisional enablers still need the correct unit counters and names applying). Baisically: The British Army needs to be looking at putting a small Corps in the field, it already has a framework for it through ARRC. It needs to make 1 Division a deployable Mechanised Division with 3 Brigades, it needs to make 3 UK Division a deployable armoured division with 3 Brigades, it needs an Airmobile Rapid Reaction Division built around 11 and 16, with 19 Brigade split into two sensible light motorised brigades, and Corps fires (though having a Corps Artillery brigade would lessen the need for Divisional Deep Fires, so it balances out).
We couldn’t field a division let alone a corps! Also we have huge capability gaps in our force structure- The ship that was Article 5 and US support has long since sailed in case anyone was in any doubt. We live in a new dystopian world. If we don’t reindustrialise and rearm we will be forced into a obligated US, Chinese or Muslim vassal state
Why is the army so unprepared to send troops to Ukriane? … perhaps because sending troops to the Donbas is not in the British national interest?
Today the army has been in steady rapid decline since the end of the cold war, earlier in fact since Thatcher atarted cutting forces after the Falkands war. Every government has cut further so today we have a tiny 70,000. Of that the great majority are support & traning personnel etc vital to enable a very small field force to deploy when needed. Our army hasn’t been this small since c1800. Our two biggest & best LPD amphibious ships that would be excellent to move troops & heavy gear to UKR are about to be scrapped without replacement in sight. They’d also be invaluable if we need to evacuate forces. To save money we’ve also run down much of the basic arms manufacturing we once had, so replacing or increasing kit & stocks would cost us more on the open market & if we need stuff, it’s probable that all our allies would need it also, creating quite a scramble for it.
Basically we’re already cut so far our forces are considerably too small for the most peaceful times. If we were to deploy say 6,000 troops to UKR, they’d need to be rotated every few months & yet we have a very small pool of combat troops, so that would be a real struggle. Get into serious combat & losses of men & material & we’d likely soon be unable to sustain what we need to do as the capacity was thrown away decades ago. The RAF & Navy are in no better condition.
Sadly I think until Ukraines allies are prepared to deploy forces to face down Putin & tip the balance to drive him either out of UKR or to the peace table in a suitably contrite, serious state of mind, this will just carry on until either UKR is ground down(being stabbed in the back by Trump doesn’t help) or Russia breaks under the expense of the war & the losses taken.
Perhaps we, and the rest of Europe, should boost defence spending to 5% or maybe more. We should build a European Treaty Organisation and build a solid defence for Europe second to none. This day was bound to come whereby we cannot 100% count on our allies and perhaps need to make absolutely sure we can defend ourselves. It might be an advantage in some ways as we can more quickly to autonomous solutions which are obviously cheaper and easier to produce.
Currently we have a peacetime military – just as we have had at the outbrek of every major conflict throughout history.
Perhaps we need to accept that and shift to a war footing or at least a cold war footing.