At Nato’s 75th anniversary summit there has been, as you’d expect, a lot of attention on Russia’s war against Ukraine. It’s undoubtedly the most significant immediate challenge to Nato with wider implications for the rest of the globe.

Yet beyond the headlines of the war in Ukraine, an even more significant challenge is looming.

There’s no doubt the world is seeing the reconfiguration of the existing international order. China and Russia appear to be gathering together in an alliance which will be pitted directly against the collective West. The latest manifestation of this shift was the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on July 3-4 in Astana, Kazakhstan.


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The SCO has its origins in the “Shanghai Five” mechanism, established by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1996. This morphed five years later into the SCO, with the addition of Uzbekistan.

India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus was admitted at the Astana summit last week. Afghanistan and Mongolia have observer status in the SCO. Nato member Turkey is one of 14 so-called dialogue partners across Asia, the Middle East and the south Caucasus.

There are clear signs that China and Russia have ambitions to turn the SCO into a more formidable counterweight to the west. Rather than focusing on the range of some 25 documents and declarations adopted at the summit, most of which are – at best – statements of intent, the two key leaders’ speeches and press statements tell a better story of why the SCO should be taken more seriously.

Russian president Vladimir Putin used his opening comments at a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the SCO sidelines to proclaim the success of their alliance. He said: “Russia-China relations, our comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation, are going through the best period in their history”.

In turn, Xi gave Putin his strong backing, noting that Russia and China “should keep upholding the original aspiration of lasting friendship … and make tireless efforts to safeguard our legitimate rights and interests and safeguard the basic norms governing international relations”.

In his address at the SCO summit, Putin expressed his belief that a “multipolar world has become a reality”. He further claimed that “the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Brics (the trading bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are the main pillars of this new world order”, adding: “These associations are powerful drivers of global development processes and the establishment of genuine multipolarity.”

This was echoed in Xi’s statement that “under the new circumstances of the new era, the vision of our organisation is widely popular, and that SCO member states have friends across the world.”

Xi went on to say that the SCO needs “to have a complete set of measures under the security cooperation mechanisms, because more lines of defence will give us more protection.”

Challenging the west

This is perhaps the clearest indication yet that Russian and Chinese views on the SCO as a future counterweight to Nato are beginning to converge.

There are also other (not so) subtle signs that Russia and China are using different tools to strengthen their relative position vis-à-vis the west. The strategy appears to be to try to weaken Nato and drive a wedge between the US and European members. There are already moves afoot to promote relations with Nato’s more Russia- and China-friendly member states, such as Hungary and Slovakia.

Xi and Putin both emphasised the idea of Eurasia in their official statements. For both of them, this means reducing the role of the US in the region.

For Putin, the main pathway is “a new system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees of collective security in Eurasia”. The long-term plan is “to gradually phase out the military presence of external powers in the Eurasian region”. For Xi, the route is more an economic one, focused on strengthening trade and infrastructure connections between China and the EU. China will do this by promoting its belt and road initiative and its transport corridors – as he did during his official state visit to Kazakhstan on the eve of the SOC summit.

But whether Putin and Xi can succeed in turning the SCO into a credible security competitor to Nato is by no means clear. The SCO lacks the collective defence commitments of Nato’s Article 5. Its internal structures are weak, and the only institutionalised security task is fighting terrorism, assigned to the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO RATS).

The key concern for the SCO here remains Afghanistan, something also highlighted in remarks delivered at the SCO summit by the UN secretary general António Guterres, who urged leaders that “the central goal of our multilateral system must be peace”. He stressed that the SCO has both the influence and the duty to push for that goal.

The SCO is also plagued by internal discord between key members of the organisation. India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads over Kashmir. Similarly, India and China have a longstanding – and sometimes violent – quarrel over border issues. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi wasn’t even at the summit, preferring to send his foreign minister to deliver a thinly-veiled swipe at his two neighbours.

But it would be a mistake for the west to dismiss the SCO as insignificant. It’s much larger than Nato, both in terms of territory and population, as well as having a significant foothold in Europe via Russia and Belarus. And its countries account for 30% of global GDP.

As China and Russia become more closely aligned, their influence across Eurasia is certain to grow and expand – unless the west takes a page out of Moscow’s and Beijing’s playbook and actively seeks to divide them, rather than driving them ever closer together.The Conversation

Stefan Wolff, The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

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The author and editor of twenty-four books and almost one-hundred journal articles and book chapters, Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, England, UK.
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Frank62
Frank62 (@guest_836665)
1 month ago

China, Russia, India , Pakistan, all expanding their militaries, though Russia is feeding hers into the meat grinder carelessly.
China & Russia very beligerant.
So it’s direly urgent we expand ours after cutting beyond all reason.
India & Pakistan, India & China, even Russia & China may be fragile companions though.

Last edited 1 month ago by Frank62
Andy reeves
Andy reeves (@guest_836806)
1 month ago
Reply to  Frank62

we could.put our investment up to ten percent of the GDP but without the capacity to build/manufacture or equipment it’s unlikely that our increase cannot be a fast one. one good method for the U.K to increase its military capabilities would be a first dibs agreement with America to purchase/lease with the option to buy any major pieces of hardware that they retire. a look at the amarg inventory shows that the forces could be boosted, by going for high quality second hand kit.

DB
DB (@guest_838238)
29 days ago
Reply to  Frank62

India and China are not companions; and as India becomes more assertive in the Indian Ocean, I don’t expect Chinese fishing boats to get away lightly with the behaviour demonstrated against the Phillipines.

maurice10
maurice10 (@guest_836693)
1 month ago

A sober warning to the new government that our two carriers need to be retained regardless of the temptation to sell one of them. The new future threats will be sea bound and time is running out to get our new ships into the fleet. The biggest worry is bullying free shipping lanes across the globe and that can only be countered by the West having a large combined effort.

Andy reeves
Andy reeves (@guest_836807)
1 month ago
Reply to  maurice10

if one of them was sold probably to the french, then a number of their ships should come out way a mistral with it’s deck treated in the same way as our carrier would cover the huge capability lost with the sale of ocean. a treated deck could give us the second carrier option. with say half a dozen f 35b embarked but id rather have the two carrier options that we have now

DJ
DJ (@guest_837226)
1 month ago
Reply to  Andy reeves

Mistral doesn’t have a ski jump. Without it, you need a lot more runway than a Mistral can provide

DB
DB (@guest_838241)
29 days ago
Reply to  DJ

Neither did Hermes, at first… and look at the Canberra (iinm).

sh
sh (@guest_837117)
1 month ago
Reply to  maurice10

Why on earth do we need carriers? Just like tanks, these are of no use to DEFEND the UK. And isn’t it funny that each time we need to keep shipping lanes open it is only the UK and the US in general who get involved? You won’t see a ship from the Nordic countries or Ireland. The UK needs to get back to basics – we are no longer, if we ever were, a major player and our money should be spent on the UK not swanning around in the Gulf or the Pacific

maurice10
maurice10 (@guest_837627)
30 days ago
Reply to  sh

sh, you are being too simplistic, the need for carriers has never been more important. If you want to buy food, white goods, fuel, cars in the future then the RN needs to be capable of acting globally along with other Western navies to ensure the rights of passage on the high seas. Adopting your view could quickly deny the West of vital trade and without free export and importation the lives we now enjoy could be much diminished. Shadowing and closely monitoring potential foe’s naval movements is essential and will act as a visual warning to anyone displaying unwanted… Read more »

sh
sh (@guest_837717)
30 days ago
Reply to  maurice10

I see your point but would argue that it seems to be just the UK and the US who act globally although this is not the main issue. Trade relies on a two way street so no exporting nation will refuse to serve another in the long term because it will hurt them both and the competition is fierce so the exporter will lose his market. So, the West will never be denied export or import long term. Short term yes but then other factors play. Take the Houthis versus Israel. The West got caught up a little bit mainly… Read more »

Micki
Micki (@guest_837525)
1 month ago
Reply to  maurice10

We Will see the 2025 defence review (as always defence cuts) if as I suspect they sell one of the Carriers Will be the end of Britain as a relevant military partner at least concerning to the Navy.

Tams
Tams (@guest_837532)
1 month ago
Reply to  maurice10

Where is this notion that we’re going to sell one of our carriers coming from?

Andy reeves
Andy reeves (@guest_836802)
1 month ago

maybe it’s time to put the real squeeze on the Chinese regime it’s economy is now in utter meltdown. a y china Russia alliance is a toxic mix unlike that of Hitler and Mussolini.

klonkie
klonkie (@guest_836937)
1 month ago
Reply to  Andy reeves

hear hear! 🙌

sh
sh (@guest_837118)
1 month ago
Reply to  Andy reeves

Why put a squeeze on? What earthly purpose would it serve? A bit like the russian sanctions- none