The Defence Committee have heavily criticised the Ministry of Defence, warning that they believe the MoD may not have sufficient technically qualified staff and capacity to manage effectively the multiple armoured vehicle procurement and upgrade programmes that are currently underway.

The report published today by the Defence Committee, titled ‘Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability’, is scathing.

“The recent history of the British Army’s armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) capability is deplorable. Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Army’s AFV fleets have been characterised by increasing obsolescence and decreasing numbers. In 1990 the UK had around 1,200 main battle tanks in its inventory, today has 227, and those that remain are in urgent need of modernisation.

Referring to the require for armoured vehicles, the report continues:

“In 2015 the Ministry of Defence outlined the requirement for a warfighting division that by 2025 could be deployed to assist NATO in the event of conflict on its Eastern borders. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 highlighted that NATO (and the UK) still face a potential threat from a challenging peer adversary state that retained considerable armoured forces which were being modernised at pace. The UK division was to draw on a number of capabilities but its core would have been two armoured infantry brigades and a new strike brigade, alongside 16 Air Assault brigade.

If the Integrated Review concludes that the Ministry of Defence and the British Army are to retain a heavy armoured capability it is clear that they must learn the hard lessons from recent history, and these are spelled out in the rest of this report. Furthermore, to support this capability the UK requires an industrial base. The current procurement and upgrade programmes have led to new investment in skills and production facilities. To sustain this regrowth in what was a decaying sector, the Ministry of Defence (and wider government) must provide greater certainty about future requirements and possible contracts. The proposal to develop a Land Industrial Strategy is a welcome step in this direction. In the course of this inquiry, it emerged that the Army will be unable to field its warfighting division as planned, reducing it by one Armoured Infantry brigade. This was apparently due to a lack of resources. In addition, the Army is deficient in important capabilities such as artillery and air defence.”

The report also states:

“This report reveals a woeful story of bureaucratic procrastination, military indecision, financial mismanagement and general ineptitude, which have continually bedevilled attempts to properly re-equip the British Army over the last two decades. Even on the MoD’s own current plans, (but subject to the Integrated Review) we are still some four years away from even being able to field a “warfighting division”, which, itself, would now be hopelessly under-equipped and denuded of even a third combat brigade.

As a result, were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary – a euphemism for Russia – in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whist our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more, with poor mechanical reliability, very heavily outgunned by more modern missile and artillery systems and chronically lacking in adequate air defence. They would have only a handful of long-delayed, new generation vehicles, gradually trickling into the inventory, to replace them.”

Additionally, the report warns:

“The lack of a credible short-range air defence system for our land forces, especially in light of the rapidly increasing threat from unmanned aerial vehicles, is of particular concern.”

You can read the full report here and the recommendations and conclusions here.

 

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

273 COMMENTS

    • Politicians are quite happy to send our boys to fight and die in outdated equipment if it means they can get reelected by diverting funding to headline winners. Scum of the worst order

      • Reading that Levi, its not just the politicians, the top of the army seem to have a lot to answer for too.

        Its a real shame that its got to this, there have been reports in the past but nothing seems to have been done and things were just allowed to carry on.

        Wish I had the answers, is the army ‘high heidyins’ mostly infantry boys ??? Maybe get a few more from the technical branches involved if that’s the case.

        • I think it just comes down to not having a clear threat to gear for. During the cold war the armed forces was focused on a specific theater and the USSR. On the last 3 decades that has rapidly changed multiple times, from UN missions (e.g. Bosnia etc) to proxy colonial wars iraq 1 / iraq 2) to counter insurgency (iraq 2 rebuild/ afgan) now to global Britain and being seen in the Asia Pacific, to who knows what next.

          With a limited budget and inability to have an armed forces that can realistically take on any threat, you can understand how the army has managed to get into the mess it is with its decisions on gear.

          Realistically there is no imminent military threat in 2021, and so the armed forces will continue to have to gear on political wims, as successive governments decide to join whatever war the US decides to start.

          I suspect the next decade will be focused on China, as the US no longer has much interest in Europe/Russia, and probably some Cold War style proxy wars.

          • Good points Steve, for me though, the problem is the people at the top (of any organisation) wanting to make ‘their’ mark and leave ‘their’ legacy. I agree that there has been a lack of direction for the forces and probably more so the army as the navy have ongoing tasks to keep them busy.

            Its seems the army for years have lurched from one thing to another (I’m speculating that each high heidyin has changed things to the way THEY want it rather than just going with what was already in place). It happens everywhere (cats and traps/no cats and traps etc) but its basically selfish, it would be good if somebody within the MOD in the civil service (and who would be there long after each of these generals is off working for BAE or whoever) could have more of a say.

          • I actually agree a lot with your above, however in some ways (and I’ve held this view throughout the ‘war on terror’) the Army should have always been primarily designed around the idea it would expect to face a conventional war scenario, and be flexible to respond to peacekeeping and insurgency operations via UOR funding. I think the issue has been the funding and general incompetence of the MoD and Army staff has forced them to also choose one OR the other, a critical flaw.

          • The problem with UOR is it takes time to get stuff ordered and delivered, during which troops are at risk. Made even worse by the MOD having to decide to dump gear after as it can’t afford to bring into core kit. The UOR gear should be stored so it can be used again should the unexpected happen.

          • This is true, but my thought is what happens if we have another counter insurgency war before the replacements are ready. Do we enter with insufficient vehicle numbers or worse go back to the Land rovers.

          • Problem 1: Storing equipment costs money and that would need to come out of the MOD operational budget. Problem 2: UOR equipment tends to be purchased in limited numbers and rotated between units during the campaign it was purchased for meaning they are usually utterly worn out when it comes to a time when they could be put into storage. Problem 3: The funding for UOR procurement comes from the Treasury and they are wise to the possibility that the MOD could use it as a mechanism to increase the defence budget by the back door. To that end if the armed forces want to keep an item purchased under a UOR they must refund the Treasury most of the cost of the initial purchase and find a funding stream to sustain it out of their own budget.

          • Deliberately relying on UOR vehicles for peace keeping and counter insurgency is criminal while soldiers are being killed in unsuitable equipment. The snatch land rover should have been phased out 20 years ago. The Australians developed the bushmaster around 20 years ago and could have been ordered by the UK back then.
            Boxer did extremely well in Afghanistan and also would have been available around 2011.
            This same MOD report has been published numerous times since 2010 but nothing has changed. How can you say back in 2015 that our equipment is obsolete, worn out out and unfit to fight an enemy then say it will be OK we will address it in 10 years.

          • The Snatch Land Rover was introduced to Northern Ireland in 1992 and was perfectly OK for that role. It had CAMAC composite armour to provide quite good protection from small arms fire and a measure of protection against IEDs.Op Banner ended in 2007, and it could/should have been phased out then – but was retained.

            Snatch was inappropriate for the greater threat posed in Afghanistan but was deployed initially until better UOR vehicles could be procured – and they were, fairly quickly.

            The army benefitted from much UOR procurement for Afghanistan (and Iraq) but a feeling emerged that these types of operation had supplanted high-intensity conflict against peers – I think this was one of the main reasons that upgrades for armoured vehicles did not secure quick endorsement or funding lines.

          • I’d agree with that

            And add to it that:-

            a) Russia hadn’t invaded anywhere recently; and

            b) We were having a love in with China.

            So there were not perceived threats for the heavy stuff to be used so it withered. As well as the programs being managed in an ultra incompetent manner which then made it a self fulfilling prophecy that nobody wanted to push the big green button other for fear of lifting the lid of the money pit.

          • Although I would say, I’m not sure anyone with a bit of geopolitical nouse thought for minute that:

            1) Russia would not likely go in any direction other than standard Russian foreign policy since….. well I would say the the end of the napoleonic wars.Which is to keep a belt of weak destabilised states that it controls between it and the European great powers ( generally this was alway Poland’s lot). To be fair to Russia it’s Foreign policy, which is dictated by paranoia about European powers has always been rewarded by being completely right and getting invaded.

            2) China was in any way doing anything other than dusting off the Mercantile handbook and had simply taken a lesion from the Soviet Union in not go head to head with the Western democracy’s, but to instead use neoliberalism against itself as steal all the west’s capital and strategic production. Since Mercantilism is simply War by another means the handshakes, smiles were tactics in offensive operations that included trade deals and foreign investment.

            The west was so enamoured of the so called end of history ( the end of the Cold War) it forgot a simple truth, the end of one conflict is simply a rest period to regroup before the next begins.

          • Quite.

            And we handily created a nice vacuum to expand their power projections into by taking the peace dividends that we did.

        • Having spent many a year working for the MOD and Police The issue tends to be the guy making the important decision will not be the guy who takes delivery. And didn’t read what he was getting. A MP may well be very clever but doesn’t understand what a AFV needs to do. Goes decades back Army procurement is a laughable. And never gets passed the new shiny idea. You learnt that working with the Army is very much like working with School kids but they are stronger and break it.

    • Hear hear. And the sad thing is, it’s all been going on under a Conservative government of one form or another. The Cameron years were truly, continuation Blair.

      • It is thanks to Blair and his Labour government that we have 2 shiny new aircraft carriers. The Conservatives have lost their focus on building strong defences.

      • The problem being the Conservatives aren’t very conservative. They really are the middle of the road party from the past decade – their conservativism is merely inertia – overweight, overindulged, overprivileged old men lacking principles.

        Cameron looked like Blair, Blair looked like Major and today Johnson looks a bit like the Clegg and Cameron. Few of them have any convictions and real beliefs and mostly just wanted the job of senior management.

        Though I may continue to give them my vote, why, because the other lot jump on board every passing fad and forget the lessons of history – they’re more interested in the Twitter sphere than South Yorkshire, and that’s why the red wall crumbled.

        In short – we have two parties who aren’t really fit to lead because they lack a vision for Britain that most of us can sign up to. Its quite depressing. I’m just hoping we can keep the US’ culture wars out.

    • The use of Snatch Land Rover in Iraq, long after it was clear to all it was inappropriate, was just the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. When will there be reform at UK MOD ?

      • Its hard to know who really is to blame for this. Is it the MOD for lacking insight into threats or is it governmental pressure to invest elsewhere.

        Each successive government likes to announce big shiny new kit and likes to be able to drop bombs on countries without risking lives to show they are doing something on the international stage. The army just doesn’t fit into either of them and even the whole British by birth campaign by boxer failed initially.

        Snatch was only replaced when pressure from the media made it impossible for action not to be taken. I suspect if there was another more interesting story at the time (interesting as in stupid stories like the royals) then they would still be in operation.

  1. Oh dear! That report doesn’t pull any punches. Surely in the attempt to upgrade CR2 there is a fully tested turret sat just waiting to be installed by Rhienmetall,all R&D done and proved to work.

        • From what I have read the problem with building your own Leopards is the licensing for all the subcontractors.So it ends up very expensive in the end. Do we really want to create a supply chain from scratch for a new tank?

        • Hi Paul,

          No expert on this subject by any means, but I did manage to find this article which may be of help?

          “On March 5, 2019 the first Request for Information (RfI) to industry was released by the Mobile Fires Platform (MFP) project team, the aim being to field a new fleet of 155mm self-propelled guns that will support the armoured infantry as well as future Strike Brigades, replacing the ageing AS90 155/39 mm SP tracked howitzer, in service with the British Army since the early 1990s. The aim is to increase the indirect fire capability delivering a much wider range of effects at a much greater range compared to what can be obtained with the AS90.

          https://www.edrmagazine.eu/bae-systems-proposal-for-british-army-mfp

          • Thx. It looks like by comparison the AS90 has a lower rate of fire and more limited ammunition types. And maybe wheels are preferred to tracks.

          • The issue with AS90 is the barrel, it is too short. AS90 should have been upgraded back in the late 90s under the Braveheart program. The gun is 39 calibres long, whereas systems like Pz2000 use a 52 calibre barrel. The Braveheart program would have given it a 52 calibre barrel. The 39 cal barrel using standard ammunition has range of around 25km, whereas the 52 cal barrel extends this to over 30kms.

            To compete with Russian/Chinese systems, you need between 50 and 70km ranges, using assisted shells.

          • It terrifies me really. If we got into a land battle with Russia before the US engaged I could see us losing the tens of thousands of soldiers and not putting a dent in their advance. If their area denial systems, S400 and coming S500, are as good as they claim, it could be a blood bath.

        • Odd really the AS90 Replace the M109 yet there still in use by USA and many other countries .Did we get our money s worth and were there any better than M109 ?

          • It would seem that we are not alone. The US, French and UK howitzers all seem to be much of a muchness when it comes to range. Dbs comment suggests it wouldn’t be a good idea to get into a situation where the Russkis and Chinese could lob their shells on us before we could hit them.

          • Artillery will still be King of the battlefield for the foreseeable future. Russia has a massive overmatch in numbers and reach. They have a shed load of both mobile rocket launchers, self propelled guns and heavy mortars. Whether it can be confirmed or not, Russia claim to have a lot of systems placed in reserve held in storage.

            The main reason they can outrange our guns that use similar calibre length gun tubes, is that they use a lighter projectile (lower explosive content). The lighter projectile can be punched further using rocket assistance

      • There are off the shelf Boxer IFV offerings. But they have 30mm cannons. The other question mark would be can a wheeled IVF keep up with a C2 on soft ground? I believe some Boxers from the Bundeswehr exercised with us on Salisbury plain a short time ago. Perhaps that was what we were finding out.

    • Now I’m no army buff*, but ‘have sympathy’ for a decent gun, 105mm say, or at least mortar on the Boxer as I’ve mentioned every time the ambulance version comes up ahead of ‘fires’. Granted, I suppose, if you’re not going to have a heavy option beyond the mooted ATGW (an expensive ’round’), you may be keen or unconcious enough to get out’r there fast in a heavily protected rolls-royce trauma option, but that’s’s just my sarcasm at work again.
      I love the Chally 2 and know we can be very proud of it, such that I’d like to have seen much deserved investment in it. But ‘tanks’ have an inevitability of starting off light and get heavier for obvious reasons (see ‘ambulance’ above). For a land force that is being espoused as fast & light, needing to get across the channel/NSea and to a front line hopefully still some distance off due to defence by heavy European land forces, starting with a unit that is already underpowered for the weight it’s gained is a somewhat knotty issue? Boxer, or it’s ilk could start you off on the fleet-of-foot again, knowing full well that, over time, it will also get fatter.
      * for discussion only!
      Regards
      G

      • There are a number of options for direct/indirect fire support for the strike brigades based on a Boxer vehicle. The first is direct fire, using the Cockerill C3105 turret, that mounts an autoloaded high pressure 105mm gun. This turret is currently being used by Turkey on their Tulpar IFV (wheeled light tank), Kaplan “medium tank of Indonesia, Singapore with their ST kinetics IFV and Korea have shown one of their K21 IFVs fitted with one. Cockerill/KMW have showcased a Boxer with the C3105 turret fitted – see link below.

        Boxer awaits firing trials with John Cockerill Defense C3105 turret (janes.com)

        The other option would be fitting a breech loading gun mortar like the AMOS that’s fitted to the Finnish Patria 8×8 IFVs or the lighter NEMO. These weapon systems can be used in both the direct and indirect role. They can also use precision guided shells.

        Neither of these systems can replace the primary role of a MBT which is killing other MBTs.

  2. This damming reportage reflects the fears expressed on this site over the last few years. Dumb programmes such as Warrior upgrades and CH”LEP demonstrate the problems perfectly. There are at least 320 CH2 hulls available for the Rhinemettal turret, and that project should press on without further delay. Ajax rollout appears to be at the speed of a two-legged dog, and Warrior is an all-around embarrassment. Let us hope that apart from huge sums for the RN, that the Army gets its fair share of the cake too in Tuesday’s announcement!

  3. This is a damning indictment of the MoD, the military and politicians alike where we appear to have taken our eye off the ball since 1990.

    Even from the perspective of an outsider the looming threat has been obvious and our lack of ability to field adequate forces would seem to be at crisis point. The worrying thing is that to rectify the situation will take years, not just to produce vehicles and weaponry but trained personnel, and things look even worse with the rumours of a much smaller army.

    Whilst I appreciate we are in the middle of a pandemic and the economy is knackered, we can’t afford not to modernise.

    • Two points to make here Beyond what has already been said.
      I suspect this is decades of putting off decisions in fear of making wrong ones on limited funds in light of potential future developments. In good British tradition instead of making devisions we form self serving committees to supposedly determine answers at great cost and delay while any conclusion they do make is then deemed already out of date by their new political masters then in power and as such nothing is ever resolved or ordered though committee members no doubt do well out of it. The Boxer is a great example of this process.

      As the result of the above nearly all the major British design and production base has been decimated over time and/or sold off to foreign rivals who will now stand to gain from any change to this long running incompetence. But too late I suspect to retain any serious British creative interest in future projects now that Bae has pretty much given up the ghost in all but pr and I suspect will only formalise that withdrawal in a few years. Meanwhile foreign competitors have generally had ongoing programmes to feed into their business so that they can plan ahead and export while taking over British companies to exploit as nut and bolt facilities to support their own exports drives and national profitability and influence. Hell even Bae has managed that in its Swedish interests. Of course the politicians will sell this process as investment that shows confidence in ‘Global Britain’. Depressing.

  4. To Coin a Phrase – ‘ No S**t Sherlock’ a truly worrying situation,one that has been highlighted on here multiple times.Can the Review Fix It ? Lets all hope so !.

    • Hi Paul,

      Simple answer to your question is No. The more nuanced answer is hinted at with the quotes above, where it talks about the need to rebuild the industrial base and that some progress has been made in this direction.

      Fixing the awful situation will take time and I fear that too many politicians, military and MoD staffers know too much about ancient Greece and not enough about engineering, industry and finance.

      This means there are at least three things we as a country need to put right in order to rebuild properly support the Army into the 21st century:

      1) Develop a proper well thought through strategy and role for the Army that will have at least some cross party support and last for more than a single parliament. Hopefully, the review will deliver the first part of that need, the second well perhaps we should look to Oz for an example of good practice with regards to the politics;

      2) Rebuild an industrial base capable of providing at least some of the equipment the Army needs and supporting the rest if needed. This is would initially be achieved with teaming arrangements with our allies some of which is already happening, so it is to be hoped that the review will continue to support this limited progress;

      3) Develop the skills and experience within the MoD procurement system capable of making the right decisions and critically damn well sticking too them and seeing projects through to delivery without constantly changing the requirements. If you need a tank then damn well build a tank that is capable of keeping up with 20 to 30 years of technology developments. Kit mounted on platforms tends to change every few years, but the platform can keep going e.g. ships, aircraft and vehicles (obviously not all vehicle platforms last 30 years, but hopefully you get my point).

      In short, put the right people in the right places with right authorities. Frontline people will need to be consulted and kept in the loop, but total focus on delivery would be a good place to start. I would also mandate that anyone going into a procurement post MUST complete a training course, say 6 weeks, unless they already have a relevant qualification…..

      Sorry rant over,

      CR

      • No Problem CR,all of this can surely be traced back to ‘Options For Change’ and the Hangover our Armed Forces have suffered ever since.I completely agree with your point (1) Define a Role for the Army,Equip it properly to Carry out that Role,then Stick with it without moving the Goalposts every few years ( our political system and electoral cycles don’t help in this regard).Point (3) again wholeheartedly agree,nothing much i can add there.Point (2) is the Hardest to solve,yes it would be great if we could make as much Kit for our Forces as we can,but we don’t possess the Mass to make the relatively small numbers of orders worthwhile,prices obviously go through the roof killing any chance of Exports.Having the Skills base and Industrial Capacity is very important ,but in reality Partial Production in the case of Ajax and Boxer is the best that can be hoped for.

        • Paul T, ‘Options for Change’ and the redundancies have been the excuse for all sorts since but its ancient history. There have been many governments and policy changes since then, there have been many 22 year careers since then, we need to start looking at the more recent decisions and what went wrong. More importantly we need to look at what can be ‘fixed’ now and learn from it rather than the army (in this instance) repeatedly making an arse of ordering equipment.

  5. i think a lot of this report highlights that the armour side of the army has been well neglected to the point of embarrassment, i know exactly what will be said as a get out of jail free card Afghanistan, because we did not deploy loads of armour there we ended up having to procure the likes of mastiff and jackal more because of the ied threat, so there for sorting out our armour took a back seat as it was not a priority, but since the end of afghan they have sat on hands, yes they developed better kit for the frontline soldier, but sadly forgot about how they would expect soldiers to fight without any sort of real backup,
    i remember helping to train the US how to clear trenches in Sennelager prior to op Granby deployment, they did not realise they could use there Bradley’s as a fire base while troops penetrated the trench and then clear them with grenades automatic fire and bayonets, they thought we British were stupid and nuts, because there way to clear a trench was get aircraft to drop ordnance from 20,000 feet and hope it hit.
    but lets see what happens in the report on the 16th even though it,s probably done just they will be sat with a pen crossing out and rewriting bit,s

  6. Deal with Cap Badge Mafia.

    Disband a group of Infantry Battalions ( Light Role )
    Put that headcount in time into new Artillery and Air Defence Regiments, and prioritise the Royal Artillery and ISTAR elements.

    Could we get away with 100 headcount ( for example, 1 Company/ Squadron ) reductions in units to create manpower for new formations? Is this doable without hitting current formation effectiveness?? Could more FP in autonomous systems make this workable or is that extra manouver Company irreplaceable ?? Dern, Airborne, Davey, Graham?

    Do not FFS reduce RS,RE,RA,REME, RLC, RAMC any further! ( See cap badge mafia comment )

    Put paid for new Warrior turrets on some Boxer.

    Maintain relearned UK skills on turrets, cannon by investing in more (Anthill site )

    Bring back in house with a new RARDE type facility. Has outsourcing ended up costing more through skills loss?

    Increase Boxer order to re equip what would have been Warrior battalions. ( Imperitive if WCSP is shelved)

    Continue Ajax as planned.

    Up gun Boxer, with Direct fire versions, ATGW, Brimstone, Spike, AA, Anti Drone, and such.
    These could also replace Stormer in 12 RA.

    Continue CH LEP, but can we use an existing turret possibly already R&Dd to avoid more screw ups down the road?

    Can what is left of the UOR fleets be found a useful role ( Foxhound and such ) rather than disposal ( Mastiff fleet )

    Reorg the planned 2 AI and 2 Strike into 3 Brigades. Each 1 Tank, 1 Recc, 2 Boxer formations. This is already a reduction from the 14 Inf/RAC Btns and Regs planned for A2020R to 12, but with savings put into firepower/ISTAR.

    Augment all with these unmanned ground systems we keep hearing about.

    Agree CROSS PARTY policy on defence, ring fenced, so every new government does not screw things up every 5 years. A long term plan is desperately required, as is total transparency to Parliament on the equipment plan.

    Pity the numerous officers and ministers from previous governments responsible for this shambles can not be held to account.

    Just some ideas off my head?

    Thoughts?

    • There is quite a lot of noise around ahead of the publication of this review, much of which mirrors what you say. Given direct quotes from Ben Wallace I’d be amazed if there wasn’t a complete overhaul of artillery and air defence for the army. Boxer order increase in favour of ditching the Warriors seems to mentioned a lot by apparent “sources” too. The Ch2 upgrades when mentioned all seem to say 150 to 170 so perhaps no smoke without fire on that rumour too.

    • Unfortunately I can not agree with much that you have said. As important as firepower and ISTAR is, infantry will always be needed. Especially light infantry at the moment. As for a reduction in unit strength, most battalions are already a company short and any effective fighting force requires at least 3 manivour units. Or as was discovered in Afghanistan, more. As for the mixing of both strike and armour brigades this would remove any benefit of both and leave us with the worst of both in one.

      • No worries Harry.

        As I hinted not sure on the reduction in companies either, which is why I asked.
        Was to generate bodies for more CS/CSS units.

        On Brigades, isn’t it a moot point though as in the field they form all arms battlegroups? And Strike wss a screen for cuts and a joke anyway.

        From what I’m hearing with loss of Warrior mixing Boxer with our Tanks in the brigade ORBAT seems inevitable.

        • It does indeed, but this seems to be marriage out of need more then use. Strike certainly would be a useful tool, even in support of armoured infantry brigades. Unfortunately however, as per, the military have half assed funded it meaning in its current concept its just a waste of resources.

        • As for forming all arms battlgroup the wheeled units would act as independent manoeuvre formations to protect the flanks and screen the front. Where as the bulk of the punch would come from armoured inf in warrior supported by tanks.

        • Hi Daniele, I’m OK with Boxer replacing Warrior, as long as they get the turrets and can still take sufficient dismounts. They have the same armour protection level, and they’re way newer and more suited to modern warfare (and combat loads).
          To me, the argument against mixing wheels and tracks in Strike is strong, because the tracks significantly impact the strategic/technical concept so significantly- that of a self-deployable and fast moving force. On the flip side, using wheels in a previously tracked role doesn’t seem as bad to me- there will be some terrain that will prove a challenge but I think in far fewer situations.
          I remember watching one of the those promotional shorts that armed forces sometimes put out about the forward deployed units in Lithuania, training to stop Russian armour in the forests. They were rendering routes impassable to tracked vehicles using felled tree trunks; apparently when put as a mat down at angles, they throw the tracks from the tanks. I only write that to point out that tracks are not always a strength- and they’re always a target of AT teams looking for an easy mobility kill. You can lose a number of wheels on a Boxer and still keep rolling, you only need to lose one track link to enemy fire or adverse conditions.
          I say can Warrior LEP, salute the force into retirement for a job well done, and buy up Boxer- see if we can’t get the unit price down a bit.

          • Afternoon Joe.

            I would prefer Warrior to continue as planned, but if it happens then I can live with it too, as long as we are not using the existing Boxer order. More must be ordered and the variants expanded with some firepower as suggested by pretty much all.

          • Using trees to form a anti-tank barricade is a short term measure at best. Both combat engineers and artillery can clear a path through these quite easily. You can also attach a dozer blade to the front of tank and it will push these aside.

            As a defence they are good for containing and slowing down an advance, especially if anti-tank mines are interspersed within the traps. You can also use these as a funnel for anti tank teams to create an ambush site. However, if you are facing up against an opponent who is artillery heavy. They will use a rolling barrage to smash through these defences on a broad front.

            Places like Estonia and Latvia which are heavily forested are ideal locations for this type of delaying tactics.

          • Hi Davey, absolutely- you’re quite right. I was just highlighting that tanks aren’t always the go-anywhere solution that can sometimes be implied, and can come with their own weaknesses compared to wheels.

      • Harry, if you read my posts you will know I am a firm believer in both tech and numbers. You are correct in regard to formation strengths at the moment, and for many years, so under strength and always borrowing a rifle Coy or two from another Bn, for sure. Without the right assets and numbers we cannot take ground, and more importantly we cannot ever hold ground. We have so many light role Bns for the simple fact that they are cheap to equip, and have no real strategic/tactical reasoning behind them, its all about them being so much cheaper, and no effective formation to slot them in.

        This may be hard to say, and for some to hear, certainly those of us from a combat arm, but in the current structure we cannot FFS lose any more enablers. We need to lose maybe 5 light role Bns, and those PIDs be used for both enablers (RLC/RS/RE/REME/ etc) and for the RA/RHA. We have such limited fighting power that as you are aware mate, we need to train as we fight, and the vast majority of light role Bns dont train within a formation, they train both for the sake of training and to cover less than warfighting tasks. Its hard to take it on the chin, but at the mo all 3 services are struggling and we need to re-think the whole way of organising our fighting formations. Me, personaly, I think all 3 services will be hammerd on the 16th, then the 22cnd, and I have to say I have real, genuine concern and worry. Cheers mate, sorry for the long post.

        • Perhaps the number of light role battalions is the reason behind the much leaked plan to cut overall army numbers?
          To me Boxer makes sense but it’s far too expensive. Ajax can’t carry enough dismounts to replace Warrior and is even more overpriced. But we have committed contracts for both so are now stuck with them.
          A force structured around 1 armoured brigade and 2 all wheeled strike brigades seems a reasonable ambition but unless Ajax is used to replace Warrior somehow, we would have too many tracked ifvs.
          I share your pessimism about what the review may bring.

    • Mate you know I agree with preetty much all of that, certainly leaving the enablers alone, reductions come from a few light role Bns as neccessary, 40mm CTA onto Boxer, increase ATGW, big reorg of the actual formations (into formed BGs etc)etc mate. The reduction of 1 x Coy/Sqn probaly not great though, as Im actually into increasing Support Coy with even more assets. If we reduce a few light role, we need to back fill Sp Coy with a full load of people and assets. Not so much an issue for an armoured formation (if we have any left, Boxer? to replace Warrior?) but certainly for the shitty Strike Bdes, as they need some serious kintecs applied, and an increase of Sp Coy, with 120 mm mortar/turreted 40mm/ATGW/Jav/AAD all on Boxers! We could go on for ever mate couldnt we, but im not going to wet my pants till the 22cnd! LOL.

      • Have you seen the Boxer fitted with the Cockerill 3105 turret? Comes with a “high” pressure 105 gun. But on their website they have also developed a turret that can handle a 120mm high pressure gun. Admittedly it is the smaller L44 calibre, but it could be useful for direct support?

        • Apparently waiting on firing trials. It would be interesting to know if there’s a potential customer in mind, or if its just speculative trials.

          https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/boxer-awaits-firing-trials-with-john-cockerill-defense-c3105-turret

          In any event 105mm, on wheels, tracks or both, seems to becoming a more interesting solution to a number of forces. One advantage of the Cockerill 105mm over the 120mm is higher elevation angle supporting an indirect fire option. Another is likely to be greater round carrying ability on any given platform. Given modern 105mm ammunition capabilities, the question is whether a 120mm provides a significant increase in capability over 105mm if not trying to take out opposing MBTs, which shouldn’t be tried anyway by a direct fire Boxer platform.

          • The Cockerill turret has seen combat on the Turkish/Syrian border when fitted to their Tulpar light tank. I haven’t seen any reports on how well they did, only videos of them crossing the border. The Philippines are also going to be using it on another IFV converted into a “light tank”!

            The 105 is a good gun, but it hasn’t the oomph to deal with an up to date MBT.

            However, our so called strike brigade needs a direct fire support vehicle and a 105 should be able to provide this. It just wont be able to go toe to toe with a MBT. For that we would need a Boxer equipped with a box load of Brimstones as a Striker replacement.

            It would be interesting to see if the 120 version could handle the US M829A3/4 rounds, as these can defeat the double stacked ERA used on T90s etc?

          • As you probably know, the US infantry seem to also be looking at 105mm for its Mobile Protected Firepower program.

            IMV we really do need the discipline to separate the tank-on-tank role from the mobile direct fires CV. What value all our recce and ISTAR assets if we don’t use them for NLOS indirect fires to counter opposing MBTs.

            Surface launch Brimstone seems to be the low hanging fruit. I’d also be looking at swarming low cost suicide drones, perhaps in concert with Brimstone, to saturate APS and overwhelm SHORAD.

          • Yes, I think missiles might be the way to go rather than guns. Both in the anti tank role and the anti drone role.
            Do helicopters have a role here? Brimstone has a range of 25miles when launched from a helicopter. Maybe put an armour piercing warhead on Martlet? Just a thought.

          • If Martlet could be fitted with either the Brimstone active radar or an up to date imaging infra red sensor, then it could be used as a fire and forget missile, thus making it much useful and flexible. Martlet’s main tactical issue is that you can only engage one target at a time due to its targeting system.

      • Yep, good points well made mate. I was wondering how new formations might be created without wholesale disbandments beyond what is feared.

        What is the current S Coy set up? My info is dated but I assume AT Platoon / Mortar Platoon / Sniper Platoon ( or are they attached to HQ Coy? / DF Platoon ( GPMG/.50s) and a platoon of CVRT in the AI Battalions.

  7. Well that report held nothing back, yet on this site we have been saying for years that the British Army in fact all of the servicies are underequipped and have limited peer to peer ability.
    I myself have said that we need three front line fighting divisions, one heavy based on a upgraded Challanger and two light based on Boxer.
    We have all argued about the need for mobile air defence systems and the need for range in our artillery units. I find it difficult to understand why the nation that invented the tank does not have the capability to build tanks any more. It seems to me that politicians make false ecconomies, by delaying investment now they increase cost and put people lives at risk tomorrow. By reducing capabilities they increase the possibility of war tomorrow, a bully does not attach someone who can and will fight back but pick on the weak. I just hope that the politicians sit up, take notice and do something about it as its not just the Army that has this issue, the RN is operating with frigates that are ten years past there expected life plan, They were built to operate for 18 years. The RAF has limited numbers and many of the Typhoons are the earlier versions. Yes the RN does have a new frigate fleet being built but they will not be ready for another 6-15 years by then the destroyers will be at the end of their life.

    • That is a pipe dream, you get a full* division if you are lucky.

      *by that i mean not including a SF/Para brigade in it.

  8. It’s becoming increasingly obvious that, despite extra money for Defence, the Navy’s obsession with expensive, obsolete carriers is having a ruinous effect on all three Services.

    • It’s not the carriers. The submarine force consumes far more resources, as do pensions, and the CASD. Add to that the shambolic nature of procurement and we get to where we are today.

      • Indeed. Over 25% of the current 10 year equipment plan is to be spent on submarines-£50b.
        Letting our sovereign armoured vehicle manufacturing all but disappear hasn’t helped. But we still spend poorly: if France can buy an apc for €1m, do we need to spend 5x as much on Boxer to do much the same job?

        • To a certain extent the French Armaments Industry, job creation scheme though it is, has got the postcard that if costs blow out too much then they will get the chop.

        • Need to be a bit careful with that €1m comparison. Jaguar and Griffon are fixed at that cost but the VBCI in French service is the Boxer equivalent, and today probably at Boxer pricing too, given what it cost almost a decade ago.

          Griffon is more like a Bushmaster at similar cost levels, the latter being a Multi-Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P) candidate for the UK.

          However one could certainly question the cost of Ajax versus the French Jaguar reconnaissance solution. We also don’t need to use Boxer for everything, the priority for using it as an ambulance being particularly questionable.

          • The priority for it being an ambulance isn’t that questionable actually. The only armoured ambulance the British Army currently has is the FV432, and that’s barely able to keep up with Challenger 2 and Warrior battlegroups. A new protected ambulance to deliver care in contested zones is desperately needed by the RAMC.

          • Well we’ll probably have to agree to differ, but I’d put more battle capable Boxer’s ahead of an ambulance variant in priority, the somewhat flippant observation being that the less capable the Boxers are the more we’ll need the ambulances.

            More seriously, I’d see the MRV-P platform as a solution, particularly as a more protected platform per Think Defence’s recent post on re-thinking MRV-P.

          • I’d point out that no matter how good your equipment is you’ll always have casualties and therefore the ability to evacuate casualties under fire, especially in a world where the rear-echelon is no longer safe, remains vital. Afghanistan showed how much effort the British Army is willing to put into making sure it’s blokes come home on stretchers instead of body bags.

        • How does the price of boxer compare to the French wheeled armour? And what’s the difference capability wise? Any one know

      • Yep.

        I recall the Submarine Cluster of DES gets around 30 billion of the 10 year budget, dwarfing that of other areas.
        That is for not just CASD, but SSN, AWE, and the SSE organisation that underpins it all.

    • The anti carrier view again.

      Dave, the TLB for the army is much bigger than that for the RN and RAF. That they and the DES people spent over a decade throwing away over a billion on things like FRES and onto WCSP and other fiascos is not the QEC fault.

      • I think you can argue the reverse with the T31 procurement model.

        RN wants to be the poster child of responsible transparent spending.

    • You are quite wrong Dave, I would argue that MBT’s are now of limited value to an island nation with no serious assets forward deployed in mainland Europe.

      In fact, the idea of only upgrading 150, means we will be unable of deploying an armoured division of 100 plus tanks, we would be lucky to deploy 40, at a stretch.

      So considering the only time they have been needed in 30 years is the two Gulf wars, (with the exception of a handful in the Balkans), then the Americans would simply say, don’t bother.

      When you go below critical mass, i.e 227, then just forget it, if you cannot mass enough tanks, then they simply cease to be viable for their intended purpose.

      Let’s not waste a huge amount of money upgrading a handful of tanks we are very unlikely to ever use operationally again.

      Certainly, it’s uncomfortable for the nation who invented the tank, to turn our backs on it, but we have to look to the future and times are changing guys.

      Let Germany and Poland develop MBT forces, they actually have a potential use for them.

      The money needs to be spent on deployable assets in the UK, focus on worldwide deployable firepower with as much of the kit air transportable as possible.

      Aircraft carrier capability sits at the very heart of deployable power.

      • That all makes sense to me John. I could understand having a larger tank force if we were still in Germany ready to fight the evil commies but we’re not. We might still have to reinforce of course and I’m sure tanks would be useful but we could probably spend our money on stuff that would be more useful across different options.

        I’m not anti-tank and to be fair, the ‘pongo stuff’ ain’t exactly my speciality but they don’t seem to feature in how the army has been operating.

        Edit to add:- Happy to be schooled otherwise, always happy to learn.

        • Just feel the need to point out:
          Everyone seems to think that the only use for a tank is in Europe, against the Ruskies (ignoring the fact that we do have a tank force in Europe staring down the Russians, just it’s in Estonia now not Germany but hey ho). This is really not the case.
          Pretty much everywhere in the world you go a tank is always a good tool to have on your side. Just ask any squaddie who got supported by Leopards in Afghan. The issue isn’t that tanks aren’t useful in “operations other than war.” The issue is they are expensive and need a lot of support.
          It’s less “Boxer/MIV/AJAX/Whatever would be more useful” it’s generally “It’ll be cheaper and easier to get Boxer/etc there.”
          Lastly, it’s a bit silly for the nation that expects to be allowed to lead the ARRC to not have an armoured formation and ask it’s allies to do it for them. Long story short if we can’t play at the armoured table we loose our buy in.

          • Thanks Dern, interesting. I didn’t know we had tanks in Estonia and I do follow your logic on other stuff being cheaper and/or easier to support so getting used more.

            I’m not against tanks, I think they’re ‘cool’ to be honest but as very much a non expert looking in they just don’t seem to be used for much, I appreciate you taking the time to explain. What do you think would make them more ‘deployable’ or is the cost too prohibiting ????

          • Nothing sadly. At the end of the day it’s the basic maths that a 60+t vehicle, with an engine that has to produce 1,500hp on tracks will always be more expensive to ship, harder to keep running, and consume more fuel, spares, etc than a 30t vehicle with a 700hp engine on wheels.
            In terms of infrastructure? We could have some more tank transporters (we’re short of those for road moves), and practice moving tanks by rail more often, but in terms of deploying overseas we have enough sealift to move them, so I don’t think it’s a case of “we need to spend more money to make our tanks be able to get where we need them.” It’s more “We need to be willing to spend the money on fuel etc and not take the easy option when we deploy the army.”

          • You mentioned Leopards in Afghanistan, zee Jarmans obviously saw it differently, is that just a policy thing between different countries then.

          • The Germans didn’t see it differently, they never deployed Leopards to Afghan (in fact in general they didn’t want to deploy anything that might look war-y to Afghan, it being their first major international deployment of ground troops since 1945 they where very keen on making it not look like they where going to war).
            But the Canadians (who where about to scrap them) sent their Leopard 1’s to Afghan, and then rushed to borrow some Leopard 2’s off the Germans and sent them out to replace the older tanks.
            The Danes also sent their Leopard 2’s to Helmand to support the British effort there, and I’m pretty sure the Americans sent some Abrams to Afghan at some point.
            I think the lack of Challenger in Afghan was a combination of UKGov looking at the bill and having a stroke, and the fact that Danish tanks where already on the ground. Officially I believe the reason was “Afghanistan is a peacekeeping operation and tanks are not needed.” (Having spoken to guys who where deployed into Bosnia with Challenger 1’s they seem to think having the ability to point a 120mm at someone is very usefull when you are enforcing peace, apparently people think twice before kicking off).

          • Hahah, yeah but it bites us all in the arse once in a while.
            Apropos there is a story, probably not true but too good not to repeat that the Canadians where litterally driving some of their Leopard 1’s on to plinths to be defanged and turned into gate guardians. After all the age of the tank was over and they where all going to be replaced by lighter wheeled vehicles. Then someone came running up and shouted something like “STOP! Get these tanks back to the Motor Pool we need to get them ready to be sent to Afghanistan.”
            or since they where Canadian probably more something more like:
            “Oooh sorry, could you stop what you’re doing please eh? These tanks are going to have to shimmy over to Afghanistan eh.”
            As I said, probably not true but a funny story none the less.

          • Definitely missed the Chally’s ability to kick doors in (i.e. make some). However, my last tour was with the Canadians and we made full use of their Leopards.

          • Not sure on the Germans,it was the Canadians that had them there. All we sent was a couple of Trojans

          • If the upgrade takes it to 80 ton with new turret and active protection system it will damage roads and bridges as well as being problematic to deploy?

          • Andy, Dern is spot on, and just to add my twopenneth, as an organsiation the Army (military) has to be prepared to fight not just the war we think we know but the one we were sure we wont have to. Armour and Tanks give you options, reduce your options and a bad option might become feasible due to being the only one! And mate, once you get rid of a capibility how friggin hard would it be to reintroduce that capability once its gone. Cheers.

          • Hi mate, I get what you’re saying and for everyone who’s not a bean counter it makes sense to have every option you can. The bean counters have a responsibility too though and this is where the guys at the top of the army (in this case) have a responsibility to make the best of what they have. By the look of things, that hasn’t been happening.

            You can see how much of a hardship its been to reintroduce fixed wing aviation into the navy and that’s been with the help of a generous ally who was happy to take in our pilots so we didn’t have to start from absolute basics again.

            From what Dern has said, it doesn’t look like tanks are going to be a priority for an army that isn’t going to use them much which seems a bit fecked up to me but there you go. An ex infantry mate of mine used to moan about the lack of anti-air and was shall we say ‘slightly sceptical’ of the line that they wouldn’t need it as the RAF would sort out any air units. That’s still another area that seems sorely lacking in the army. I don’t know if the army is trying too hard to cover all the bases or if they could have done that without spunking billions on crap, I’ll leave that to you guys who know more about it.

            Thanks to you and Dern (and Jacko) for replying, when talking about ‘army stuff’ with my mate I’ve been a bit baffled how the army do things compared to the navy and while I’ve not doubted him I’ve been surprised. Not that I’m a big fan of how the navy do a lot of stuff either.

          • IMV we really should separate out roles a MBT performs and decide which are necessary versus desirable. For example, do we need anything more than a wheeled or tracked 105mm if we just need direct fire support for every task other than a tank-on-tank engagement?

            As soon as we start including the direct fire tank-on-tank role (instead of using asymmetric counters) we need state of the art armour and APS.
            The problem I see with this approach is that for example a new Leopard 2A7+ probably costs in excess of £20M today, based on what Qatar paid a while back. Germany recently upgraded some of their Leopards with Trophy APS and the cost of that alone, including integration and support, appears to be ~£4M per tank. Even with that, Rafael have acknowledged the challenges for APS countering APFSDS long rod penetrators, so APS is no defensive silver bullet. In short MBTs are getting too heavy and too expensive when we try to make them do everything.
            All that said, the UK has no mobile direct (or indirect fire) capability other than Challenger today. So until we have an option to take on that role, such as Boxer or Ajax platforms with a 105mm, or Boxer with 120mm mortar, we still need Challenger.

          • You just have to hope you never need to take on enemy armour then, if that’s the case you might as well save money by not buying Boxers with 105’s and just keep Challenger 2 without upgrading the gun beyond 120mm.

          • Not so much hope as choice not to take on MBTs. No reason everything else on the battlefield including AFVs wouldn’t be a viable target for 105mm though. Even then tomorrow’s battlefield is going to be all about prevailing in a competition of ISTAR, AI, cyber and fast decision taking. Whoever gets ahead in that is likely to dominate in the kinetic realm.

            I actually agree that in the short to medium term a Challenger with minor upgrades would fulfill the mobile protected firepower role, excluding direct engagement of MBTs. It also avoids the “wrong” choice of gun to upgrade to, i.e. “old” 120mm smooth bore or trying to guess which other new variant everyone else will move to.

            One reason to move to wheeled 105mm, rather than keep Challenger for ever more in this degraded role, would be self deployment at speed.

          • I don’t think you have the luxury to choose when and when not to engage MBT’s beyond choosing whether or not to be in a war in the first place.

          • Note though that I am not saying we shouldn’t engage MBTs, only that we shouldn’t be using other MBTs to do so, given we have so many different and apparently increasing numbers of ways to do so.

          • It dep[ends on who you believe regarding APFSDS (Fin) vs APS. The Trophy system will never defeat a Fin round, because it is basically a Claymore mine, but firing tungsten cubes instead of ball bearings. The frontal cross sectional area of the fin round is too small for the mass of tungsten to intercept. The only way it could affect the Fin round is if it managed a side shot, where there is a greater chance of the cubes striking the side of the rod.

            The only company that have said they have successfully intercepted a Fin round and published data to prove it, is the Israeli Military Industries (IMI) Iron Fist system. This fires an “effector” at the incoming threat and is either point detonated or detonated next to the threat. It uses the concussive blast wave to destroy the fusing system, sensor and generally crush the incoming missile’s body. However, on a number of occasions it has also intercepted a Fin round. It wont destroy the rod, but give it an almighty nudge to deflect its path. Thereby hopefully pushing it over and around the targeted vehicle.

            Russia have claimed their Afghanit system as fitted to the T14 can also do this, but they have yet to publish any data to prove it.

            IMI have stated that the success rate was 50/50, as the rod’s deflection was sometimes pushed down towards the target vehicle.

      • Have to say I agree with your take on MBT for the UK. With the lack of any other direct fire capability we probably have to keep Challenger for now, even if only for direct fire roles other than direct tank-on-tank engagement, where other asymmetric solutions should be used to counter the latter. Restricting its role would hopefully cap upgrade costs. But I question the MBT requirement for the long term, as long as we replace with other more relevant direct and indirect fire solutions in greater numbers.

        Something that is also glossed over is that we would probably not be able to viably deploy MBTs to the east if a hot war broke out with Russia, let alone at the speed necessary, because we won’t have the notice and peace period before hostilities break out to do so.

        Sailing Points or Albions within spitting distance of Kalingrad early in a conflict without dire consequences is extraordinarily optimistic, the same applies to easily targeted rail transit. Which means everything falls back on HETs which don’t exist in adequate numbers, may be required elsewhere given current contracts and use resources which should surely be applied to higher priority needs. Reinforcing Norway wouldn’t be much better, where Points or Albions loaded with armour would be vulnerable HVTs, which is also why we need a deep re-think on our amphibious capability to make it more flexible and resilient so we can reinforce.

  9. Pretty much says it all.

    Question is whether the internal politics of the Army, and the civil service and military bureaucracy (both equally as bad as each other) can actually do anything other than procrastinate, waste money and acheive little.

    I’m not sure the “1200 MBT” in 1990 is a good argument though, about 900 of them were obseolete and wouldnt get much further than the camp gate…

    • Very true, on paper the BAOR was a formidable force, 1,000 plus MBT’s, 50,000 troops, but, it was a hollowed out force, poorly supported and always underfunded.

      In order for BAOR to deploy onto the north German planes, battle ready, in fighting order, would have taken 6 months of warning with escalating tensions.

      A surprise attack would probably have meant three hundred tanks, at most, in position and combat ready, with rest waiting for parts in various states of disrepair…..

      So numbers aren’t everything.

  10. Even with the £16b increase, the budget is too low to fund all the capabilities politicians and military leaders want. Added to that, we pay over the odds for much of our equipment, either because we have let UK manufacturing capabilities disappear, so projects start from scratch, or because we overspec.
    Either increase the budget permanently or remove some capability entirely. If we don’t, we will be back in a funding crisis in 5 years time with yet more cuts.
    Some suggestions:
    * Reduce the Dreadnought fleet to 3 boats
    * PoW to be used as amhibious assault ship with Albion’s scrapped
    * Don’t repeat the Warrior fiasco with Ch2 upgrade. Keep it simple.
    * Revisit the Type 26 plan to get the price down from £1.3b. If not possible, consider more Type31 instead.
    * Do not allow Tempest to be too ambitious.- remember TSR2.

    • Peter S, the problem with reducing the Dreadnoughts to 3 wouldn’t become apparent until 10 to 15 years into the life cycle of the boats. 4 platforms really is the minimum that its feasible as the platforms age. Unless the UK were to move away from a CASD approach.

      For me a way of saving money would be to move away from the submarine launched ballistic missiles to spreading the nuclear armoury to cruise (with the option of S/M launched) and other options like putting the Trident in silos somewhere, other weapons that could be air launched… I’m not saying these would be ‘better’ than CASD on a dedicated platform but I reckon it would be a lot cheaper.

      • All true Andy.

        Trident in Silos though negates it’s survivability and going to Cruise instead of an SLBM is much the same.

        But as a submariner I know you know all this.

        I can imagine the local outcry wherever they built them if Silos where decided! Within Spadeadam I guess?

        • I’m not advocating it Daniele, S/M launched from ‘anywhere’ is a great option, probably the best but its not the cheapest. Then with silos there is the ‘NIMBY’ aspect to it which is understandable, aside from the security risks etc.

          On to a point that is very dear to me, I’m an EX submariner mate, no more hot bunking or duty watches for this suburbanite. 🙂

        • From a tactical point of view basing any nuclear tipped missiles in the UK is a non starter, as we haven’t got geography on our side, i.e. the East coast is too close to the west coast. Having the missiles based on a submarine is the best and only sensible option. As it means they are a lot harder to find to neutralise.

      • I don’t think revisiting a project, and altering a build already underway will ever have a hope of driving the cost down either. Just my two pence.

        • Hundred percent agree and I can’t help but think its personal ego/pride that has the biggest influence on this.

      • The gov paper on Trident successor explored all options but seems have been written solely to justify a decision already taken. All the costings are just guesswork.
        The least persuasive part is the need for 4 boats to keep one at sea. Dreadnought design won’t need refuelling unlike Vanguard so the long unavailability periods shouldn’t recur.
        With the CASD aim to have one at sea, a 3 boat fleet ought to work.
        We have committed so much to Dreadnought already that other options are really non starters. The US are replacing 14 ( originally 18) with 12 again in the expectation of avoiding the long refuelling gaps in the Ohio fleet.

        • While refuelling is part of the current cycle, its not the only thing that needs ‘fixed’ on boats. Submarines by their very nature spend a lot of their time in a hostile environment and things break. Sometimes a lot.

          If you only have 3 its not a massive leap to have one boat in RAMP/refit (call it what you will) and then you only have 2 boats, one will be at sea, the other going to sea next. I’m sure that’s all fine at the start but what if (as is happening now) towards the end of their life cycle they’re starting to struggle (I’ll not go into detail but believe me, they are and have a few more years yet to go) and you can’t put a working boat to sea to replace it, or one that you know will likely only last a few weeks. Do you send out the guys who have just come back ?? They’ll not thank you for it and will vote with their feet and leave. Most servicemen/women aren’t the robots that the generalissimos want them to be.

          We might have trimmed the fat before the US on this stuff and they’re paying catch up but if CASD is something that the country want to do then it has to be done properly. If not then explore the other options of a nuclear deterrent but if you’re going to do it then 4 really is the minimum number to ensure it.

          • I agree there is a risk with a 3 boat fleet that at some point you may have only 1 available. But for the deterrent to fail, any enemy would need to know and then take a huge and potentially suicidal risk. The deterrent is unlike any other weapon system in that if you actually use it, it has failed.
            On the manning front,aren’t the boats now double crewed?
            I’m not advocating this approach, just wondering how we might free up funds to address the shortcomings of conventional forces.
            Even with their enormous budget, the US is facing big problems in delivering affordable replacements for some pretty old equipment across all their service branches. Their recent record in ship procurement has been disastrous – LCS, Zumwalt, Ford class.

          • If anyone wants to know what boat is where they just need to talk to a Helensburgh taxi driver. There’s no great mystery and if there’s only 3 hulls….

            As for manning…. no, they’re not all “double crewed”. Like the rest of the forces, there are shortages. Submarine branches are quite small and its not like when you’re not at sea its ‘tabs out’, you’re generally getting ready to go again, get requalified or some other ‘work stuff’. Its a massive ballache as and when you get ‘pier head jumped’ onto another vessel to cover some fecker who can’t (or won’t) do his job. It happens though and what with the rampant increase in ‘mental health’ issues, more and more.

            If the UK don’t want to do CASD then fair enough but if it does…. it has to be CONTINUAL.Otherwise its just having the ability to do it… if we can be arsed…. and what’s the point. I’m not banging the drum for CASD, just saying that its C(ontinial)ASD or not and do something else.

          • RN website clear about double crewing as the normal operating approach. You suggest that in reality overall crew shortage means this isn’t always achieved. Then maybe a 3 boat fleet would be easier to man. In the same way, the army can’t recruit and retain its 82500 target, so makes a virtue of necessity by planning for fewer.Not going to happen anyway as boat 4 already named!

      • I think alternatives to the subs should have been given more consideration. We could have built 8 to 10 more astute subs for the cost of the dreadnoughts and equipped the with nuclear TLAMs, that would have given us significantly more flexibility for a variaty of scenarios.

        • I think that may well have been the case already. However, TLAM range is approx 25% of Trident range, makes a huge difference as to what targets you can attack and where you can launch from.
          In reality there is other alternative for us if we want a place at the big boys table.

        • I’m out the loop but it would be easy enough to check. 1 bomber was ‘gold’ crewed which was one slightly bigger crew instead of 2.

          Had a couple of conversations recentlywith boys on bombers, one was just back from a patrol and ended up getting skidded to do work up on another boat and the other was saying they were having to promote people to get them to stay and/or go to sea.

          Its not a good place at the moment.

  11. I don’t get why people comment on why the Conservative Party is the party of the forces and security. Yes, I know Labour pre-2010 didn’t do much better but Tories have been in power for 10 years and the armed forces are in a laughable state, to say the least.

    • They’re the least worst I suppose. Have a hard time believing today’s Labour Party of student politics would be any better on defence

      • We’ll have our prejudices to factor in but I’m not sure that Defence is high on either party’s priorities. They really only care about what happens ‘on their watch’ and how they’re perceived. The counter argument to yours is that the Tories only have to care about the NHS because if they didn’t they would lose a lot of votes.

        I’m really not convinced that “people get the government they deserve” is true anymore, our options are pretty much a ‘shit sandwich’ or a ‘turd on a roll’. I can’t say I’m fond of either but I know I’ll be getting one of them.*

        *Unless you live in Scotland and we don’t get a choice, its shite flavour tattie scones whether you like it or not.

        Apologies for the poor (or crap if you prefer) metaphors.

        • I don’t think the Tories care about the NHS. More tolerate it. Given the 1% pay rise insult to nurses.

          I like your ‘shit’ metaphors.

          • Don’t get sucked into the political spin Tom, if the Tories wanted to get rid of the NHS, then they had 18 years to do it in their 79 to 97 tenure, 11 years and counting this time round and it’s larger and better funded then it ever has been…

            So that’s patiently not correct.

            Labour made a right bloody mess of the NHS by building hospitals via PFI’s, deferring a ticking time home of debt for the NHS budget to absorb down the road…..

            As for the 1%, it will clearly be more, when the matter is fully addressed, but, they got a good pay rise prior to the pandemic, good pensions, job security and promotion prospects far better than most of the private sector…

            Labour just desperately grasp at anything they can howl in indignation about. Weak leadership and not really sure what they stand for, Labour still isn’t trusted by the majority of the population.

            I think they are looking at another 10 years on the opposition benches at least….

      • Was JC really Pro IRA? Or is that what the Mail told you. Maybe he was pro-non-violence, hey? Wanting peaceful solutions doesn’t make him a bad guy. I didn’t like him but spreading disinformation harms our democratic discourse.

        • Yes he was. Given that he condemed British Army “bombing” in Northern Ireland by name when asked to condem IRA bombing and repeatedly attended vigils for dead terrorists. Yup he was.
          Maybe stop trying to spread your own disinformation.

        • Mate lets not get into this but even your average crack head knew Corbyn was a pathetic Pro-any anarahcist/terrorist supporter, regardless of location or politics. He was pro peace for sure, at any price! And his price was at most right minded peoples cost. He was, and currently still is, a turd, simples! Here endeth the lesson! Cheers.

          • Corbyn was anything but pro-anarchist.
            How can he be when he is a Marxist almost the antithesis of anarchism, he was a primitive , genocidal social supremacist ideologue. He was also a pro leftist, islamic(when they fight against “capitalist”) terrorist groups.

    • Not to point out the obvious but after the last big recession in 2008 and the horrendous state of the UK finances at the time sadly 10 years of the Tories being tight pursed after it was inevitable.

      Considering the current even worse state of public finances today the fact the defence sector has received even a 1p increase in budget is borderline miraculous. If labour was in would defence have received an increase, I doubt it as Corbyn would have already blown the entire national over draft before covid arrived.

  12. Unfortunately the Army continues to think it needs uniquely British equipment and as such continues to waste billions in failed projects. AJAX being a prime example. As revolutionary as the CTA cannon is, it demonstrates how Britian doesn’t have the money to risk its entire armoured force on a single untested weapon. Made all the worse when a perfectly good 40mm was invented over half a century ago.

    • Spot on, although mate I have to say though the Ajax and family are outstanding vehicles, just being forced into the wrong shaped hole. As usual the Army is mostly responsible for its own problems.

      • The base vehicle shouldn’t be causing any issues, although rumours coming from HCR seem to paint a different pitcher. But the main problem with the entire program is the gun.

    • I think the expression you may be looking for is the British Army having champagne tastes on a beer budget, Ajax apparently being an example.

      I will say in defence of CTAS that the French (and Belgians by dint of buying French vehicles) are also going down this path, with the French also fitting it to naval platforms, so not uniquely British. However, clearly and despite the already long development cycle, CTA 40 was not ready for integration when decisions were made for Ajax and WCSP. However, unless there are compelling reasons to do so we shouldn’t throw out CTA 40 at this stage … and comparisons to 30mm ammunition costs don’t count.

      There’s clearly reasons cased telescope rounds have and continue to be pursued. The current US competition for the 6.8mm round includes such a candidate for example. A CTAS in an armoured vehicle does have advantages in terms of small footprint, weapon elevation, storage requirements/rounds carried in a given volume. Increased elevation for example might mean that instead of dedicated SHORAD vehicles, every CTA 40 armed vehicle might support counter UAS ability with up to 75 degree elevation, which seems a particularly relevant capability right about now.

      • You should look at the American 1996 defence department report into CTAS weapons. They spent over $200 million dollars since the 1950’s and ditched it. Some of the reasons were short barrel life, excessive recoil, expensive rounds and jamming problems. The recoil for CTA40 is listed as 20,000 lbs through short springs. This compares with 6,500 lbs for bushmaster 30 mm, turret wobble has been reported as an issue?

        • I have looked at the report. The report is a quarter of a century old and references much older developments and trials, with most taking place a decade+ before the report. Technology in general and materials science specifically have improved significantly over this period, so the 1996 report really isn’t relevant. Especially given the additional 1-2 decades of CTAI development since, not least with using plastic vs metal casing.

          If compelling reasons exist why CTA 40 is not viable, then by all means we shouldn’t use it. However, all I read are unsubstantiated rumours and apples to oranges comparisons. Comparisons should be to 40mm or even 50mm, not to 30mm because the larger calibre was specifically chosen to address the increasing protection of IFV/APCs. Putting a 30mm on a new IFV today makes no sense, unless we want to rip it out and replace with something larger in the next 1-2 decades with all the expense that would entail.

  13. If you look back on the pre-war years in the 1930’s we are making the same mistakes now as were made then. Our vehicles are out of date as they were at the start of WW2, and our tactics need an overhaul. We were unable to fight and win against German Blitzkrieg tactics then, and now we are struggling to take drone warfare and long range rocket artillery into account.

    I find the parallels striking.

      • I agree, but the fact remains that over open country and in good weather, a drone, or drones on mass will be able to defeat/degrade most armoured formations. It cannot be ignored. We must adapt quickly to changes that these threats represent.

  14. No s**t! The history of British Army vehicle procurement has been utterly deplorable for 30 years.

    The best worst case now is for 170 MBT’s to get an upgrade and extra Boxers that field a turret to at least partially replace Warrior with a 90% wheeled IFV solution. It’ll leave Ajax a bit out on a limb but it’s a mess entirely of their own making.

    Would love to see the review finally tackle the cap-badge mafia with a corps of infantry and significant cuts to light battalions to direct more resources into artillery and other enablers for a more balanced structure with a much higher proportion of the headcount actually in fully equipped brigades……but I won’t hold my breath.

    • Bravo CH.
      My view entirely!!
      Lets get some more all arms brigades, light if necessary, but with a full range of supports and more firepower.

      • Thanks! Whatever the nature of the brigade (armoured, mechanized/strike or light/air-assault) it should be imperative to make sure all are fully fleshed out with artillery, engineers, logistics etc to make them deployable and effective.

        Too many light battalions currently languishing in 1st division with no purpose for the sake of not upsetting the cap-badge obsessives.

        Getting 5 brigades out of the existing 82,000 target already seemed pretty poor to me. What was the rest of the army doing? Even once you add in public duties and stuff like base staff and training instructors it seemed odd to me.

        I remember meeting a guy who’d deployed to Afghanistan once who said it was common to refer to the mass of fellow soldiers who never went near active ops as the tracksuit army!

        • I agree in the main re 1 UK Division. Although I’d also add I was “educated” by Dern once here on its usefulness when I was spitting feathers about it. And fair dos, he was in it, I wasn’t.

          Of its battalions, I often try to work out possibilities, and even though there are roles like you mention, PD, Cyprus, Specialist Infantry, I count at least 7 ( if memory serves ) that in my fantasy fleets mind I target for re rolling as they seem surplus.

          Ideally you’d just expand the army and form additional CS CSS formations but it seems to be going the other way!

  15. I guess part of the problem is the Army has been equipped to fight an insurgency based conflict over the last 20 years, and less focus on peer on peer.

  16. Truth is we are trying to do too many things. Our ground forces (including the RMs & RAF Regt) are expected to do:
    Amphibious assault, air assault, SFs, Light role infantry, Strike / light mech & Armoured + now cyber. All of this with domestically produced equipment that have very small production runs. The CDS & MOD need to work out what the Army is for, what our allies require of us and what we do best then concentrate upon that. This idea that we can continue with this all domain mindset is for the birds.

    • Dont forget the RAF Regt also includes standing next to a gate, wearing a yellow lumie jacket, choppsing off about “going outside the wire once” in Afghan.

      • They stand next to gates?

        In my experience actually contributing to guarding a base is beneath them and so every other unit has to have a headcount delta to allow for those detached on guard duty which then detracts from doing their actual job.

        RAFRegt moving themselves all to Honington was a staggeringly bad idea in that they forgot they were about aircraft and became a liability when near one, and couldnt contribute to the day in day out tasks such as base guard (which nay have been an intent!). It also was daft as Honington became home to so much BA that retention fell through the floor.

        They seem to have grasped this but now of course all the bases have quickly filled that vacumn of space and accomodation and so getting back in isnt working.

  17. I don’t see how they can argue challenger 2 is out of date when plenty of countries still field thousands of T-72s , T-55s and M60s , M48s etc ….

    But yes we need modern equipment and more of it, but sometimes I think the ‘obsolete’ argument is a cynical way of justifying more cuts.

    • Because it’s being compared with M1A2D, Leop 2A7 and T14, fielded by our peers. Challenger has several big issues. There are Legacy ones such as the fact that the Gun isn’t a widely adopted type, so that while better munitions are being developed and produced for the Rheinmetall Gun, even sourcing production lines for Challengers gun is becoming difficult. Then there are new ones such as the fact that Challenger hasn’t had a new sensor package installed since TOGS.

      • Quite correct. There is also the issue that to take out the T14 you will probably need a 130mm gun with a long rod penetrator. The Challenger is limited in it rod length capping its potential. To fit the Rhinemetal 130mm would need a new Turret. It would need a sensor upgrade including a commanders night site. Also a system like Iron Fist should be added. Plus a new 1500bhp power pack would be advised. To update Challenger properly you would need to add the Black Knight upgrade to the new Rhinemetal turret and gun and install the MTU 15000bhp power pack.

        That would give you a modern MTB. Anything less and you will have an inferior capability.

        • To fit the Rheinmetall (not wanting to be a dick but as a german speaker I feel compelled to point out it’s spelled the German way not the UK way) 120mm you’d still need a new turret since the ammunition won’t work with the existing one.
          Honestly, IMO the CLEP project is at just the wrong time. 10 years earlier and we could easily have jumped on the 120mm L/55 bandwagon, now we risk either getting the L/55 just as everyone gets the RH-130, or we get the RH-130 and risk other NATO nations not adopting it, leaving us in the same position.
          I’d almost say “Wait and see what the Germans do and then follow suit.” But that could be another 10year wait and we don’t really have that luxury.

          • My apologies ‘Rheinmetall’ it is. Rheinmetall just showed off a turret with the 130 with a Challenger hull. As they now own 55% of BAE land systems I would think they will push hard to get the new turret and gun on Challenger asap. I think this is the best option we cannot delay any more – there has been too much of that alrady.

          • I agree. The only issue I see is if for example the German or American Army decide to go with a different caliber (eg 135mm or something), then we’re left with a dead end in terms of ammunition design and production again. It wouldn’t be the first time that happened.

          • P.S. I do not think the UK will go for the 120 we will try an future proof our investment and fit a T14 killer. I understand the French and Germans have a future tank programme and that will almost certainly go down the 130 path. That is if the programme is successful.

          • I’m not so sure. The Franco-German program for replacing their Leclercs and Leopard 2s calls for a gun with better penetrating power than the current Rh 120 L55. So either they increase the calibre which is very doubtful due to the length, or they increase the bore size. Both Giat and Rheinmetall have produced and tested larger guns, with the 140mm and 130mm, respectfully.

            The issue hasn’t come to a head yet, but like their effect with the 6th gen aircraft, politics may get in the way, due to work share arrangements. Whichever road they do take it is pretty much guaranteed that a larger MBT gun will be chosen. Though, Rheinmetall concluded that the 140mm gun was too big due to the cartridge size, which has a knock on effect on how many rounds are carried.

          • Right but the issue isn’t whether France, Germany, USA with a new caliber over 120mm (they will eventually), it’s that we want to have the gun, with the shell that everyone else chooses. That means precisely the same caliber, but also the same shell length etc.
            If we dive in before the others put in their orders for the new gun we may end up in the great position of having been the first to adopt the 130mmx1.3m caliber gun, and having to watch as everyone else eventually settles on 130mmx1.5m or 132mmx1.3m.
            Germany and America have the industrial mass to baisically make the rest of NATO go along with any caliber they choose, we no longer do. So trying to pick before them will always have an element of risk to it.

          • This is probably the main reason why we have joined their program as an interested observer. To see which gun and cartridge size they chose.

            The current Rh120 L55 used by Germany in their Leopard 2s, does not fire deleted uranium rounds due to political reasons, choosing instead tungsten as the rod material. The US Abrams due to the turret design limited to the 120 L44 gun. So to tie up the performance they use the M829 rounds. These use a higher pressure propellent than that used in the current DM53 cartridge that Germany uses. The Rh120 L55 is cleared to use the US M829 rounds, which gives an interesting proposition of the L55 gun firing the M829 rounds outperforming both the Abrams and Leopards respectively firing their M829 and DM53 rounds.

            As we currently use Charm which uses a depleted uranium rod, using the M829 series of Fin rounds won’t present us a problem. The marriage of the Rh120 L55 and the M829 rounds will offer a life extension to the gun. But will it be enough when compared to what the Rh130 L51 gun using the 1.3m cartridge can already deliver?

            I do see Germany winning this battle over the French and the main ground combat system (MGCS) using the Rheinmetall gun. A 200mm cartridge length difference may not seem much. But performance wise will be huge as you can pack more propellent in. However, you then have to be able to house and store that 1.5m round inside the turret bustle. Will that also means that the length of the round precludes storing spare ammo in the hull?

          • I hope we go for the Rh130 L51 and put it in the new Rheinmetall turret. I can only assume that the new turret will be able to store the 130 rounds. It certainly looks bigger at the back. I think it would be foolish to fit the 120 as it will become over-matched soon by Russian guns. Currently T14 carries a 125mm with a mussel velocity of 2000m/s, there is talk of a 140mm upgrade gun. We cannot afford to be messing around at 120mm…

            If we get the 130 perhaps we can get a DU round for it to. That should be able to mess up the T14.

          • I assume this is the Rheinmetall turret…
            if so that is a technology demonstrator turret. I doubt it is up to UK standards in terms of armour. Rheinmetall dies not have access to Dorchester which would need to be incorporated into the production turret.

          • So the problems keep coming! World class armour that nobody else has and no capability to build our own tanks. So in terms of protection that rules out any other replacement tank on those grounds alone.

          • Sorry I am not quite sure why Rheinmetall/BAE Land Systems could not build the new turret in their new UK factory. BAE would just need to keep certain aspects of Dorchester
            uK secret. The Germans were given access to Chobham as was the USA. The Americans put it into M1. The Germans use a laminate armour on their MTB but it is not known if it is British derived. However Dorchester is a upgraded standard of the original armour and it as fare as I can tell has not been shared.

            so I cannot see why a new turret cannot be built in the UK with Dorchester with the right compartmentalisation.

          • Yes thanks very interesting. The one part amo will be a step forward. The Challenger 2 has a cast front to the turret and welded aft part. However this is only the core as this is then covered in Dorchester and the outer cover of steel plates added to cover the whole thing. I would rather see a cast front, but the armour package should cover any weak spots.

            I note they are only talking about the 120 this would not give much of an improvement over the current L30. I would rather see the 130mm put in, but I suspect the new turret will have room to up-gun.

            It looks like they will be fitting Dorchester given the deliberate lack of information from the company. They may even fit a new version of the armour.

            The sights look good and new sights were also on the Black Knight offering. So we should get the new turret and add a hard kill system like Iron Fist.

            There is no mention of an auto-loadder….

          • Army doctrine is for a four man crew as they don’t think three can sustain ops over a 24hr period. So I would say no auto loader.

          • If they opt for the larger 130mm L51 gun using the smaller of the two proposed cartridge lengths, i.e. 1.3m instead of 1.5m. The turret will still need an autoloader due to the size and weight of the round. The current DM63 weighs 21.5kg, whereas the the 1.3m cartridge is about 30kg. This will be doable for a loader, but they will quickly get fatigued if conducting rapid firing.

            The DM63 APFSDS round is stated to have a RHA penetration value of between 850 and 950mm. The 130 gun according to Rheinmetall is said to have a 50% greater performance than the the 120 L55. So if that’s a penetration value, then on paper it should have 1275 to 1425mm against RHA. In reality it will be below or closer to the lower value.

            The main reason for the increase in penetration discounting the additional muzzle velocity, is that the rod length is around or over a meter long. Thus overmatching the spaced armour values.

            The Rheinmetall demonstrator vehicle based on the Chally chassis, is said to use the Leclerc’s belt fed autoloader, which is known for good reliability.

            It cannot be discounted how much effort is required to maintain a tank in good working order. Track maintenance being the main requirement. Reducing the crew size down to 3 will significantly hamper maintenance times. I don’t know how the French cope? If there was space to keep the loader, what job could they do? Perhaps they could be used for dedicated comm’s but also in enhancing situational awareness by using additional monitor screens etc.

          • Yes I had seen something about an ato-loadder. I agree the new amo is just too heavy for the human sustained fire. But as you say a fourth crewman is a good idea. Perhaps the new upgrade will reduce maintenance… Having the tank crew reduced by one would save money… The French appear to manage as do the Russians…

            We have the chance here to modernise Challenger… we should take it auto-loader and all.

            I also heard on the grape vine that Challenger may get a 1600bhp power pack.

            The problem is how many tanks will be upgraded. We may end up with a great tank but only a small number of them.

      • That I understand, but we are hardly likely to have to face T-14s alone, it is more likely our forces would be sent into combat where T-72s or its derivatives are most numerous, in that respect Challenger should still be good.

        • So effectively hope that if a conflict went hot with Russia the Russian schwerpunkt wouldn’t be in Estonia (where it likely will be).

          • You cannot sit back and let technical advances pass you by. That is what has got us into this mess. The T14 will not only drive change in Russia but in other countries too. You cannot say that other countries will not bring out their T14. China comes to mind – you can bet they are working on a T14, Also who is to say that the Russians will not bring out an export version. Perhaps they will give it to Syria…

            The point is that you need to be able to take down your potential enemies best. We cannot count on number so we have to build them to win not come second!

  18. I suggest people take a hop over to https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/
    Some excellent pieces on Warrior, Boxer and a whole host of other stuff.( including containers…)
    I have said it before the Warrior upgrade is a textbook example of how not to conduct a project and how to mismanage it completely.
    Boxer is not much better.
    And as for FRES…how to spend nearly 400 Mil on a vehicle without actually getting a vehicle.

  19. I often wonder how a country like Iran can field an army of 600,000+ with some 3000 tanks while being under international sanctions ….. and we struggle with maintaining 80,000 troops and 227 tanks …

        • Agreed. A mate of mine who is an expat living in California recently had a motorbike accident. Where he got T boned at a junction, luckily a police car was right behind him and recorded the whole event.

          The upshot was the ambulance bill to take him to hospital was over $1200, having X rays to check he’d broken his collar bone $5000, appointment with specialist for 30 minutes $500, over $100 on pain killers, 3 days in hospital $36,000. Then follow up treatment and physio after his cast came off was an additional $10,000. Thankfully the other person’s insurance coughed up the over $52,000 bill. They also paid for a new bike and clothing and some “out of work” expenses.

          He had to stump some of the money to begin with, as the other person’s insurance company was dragging its feet and the hospital wanted their money.

          I really struggle to see why the Americans berate our NHS, when they either have to fork out on expensive insurance or do without?

    • 1) Because Iran doesn’t field an Army of 600,000, that’s the total of all of Iran’s military forces including the Revolutionary Guard.
      2) Because Iran’s armoured force cosists largely of T-72’s and the rest is almost evenly divided between CVRT/Chieftain and domestic Iranian Tanks.
      3) Because they spend a lot less per soldier than the UK does both in terms of quality of life stuff and in terms of investment in training.
      4) They make sure the losses and budget cuts from international sanctions fall on other sectors.

      • Ok maybe I should have typed Armed Forces rather than army but According to my sources Irans, regular Army size is 398.000, Revolutionary guard size 190,000, airforce 37,000, navy 18,000 … still much more than UK has plus they have Ballistic missile programs and a national AA Missile defense network ….. so they are quite efficient at R&D and procurement.

        • Exactly. But you where comparing apples to oranges (though to be fair Her Majesties Armed Forces and the Iranian Armed Forces are baisically apples to oranges anyway).

    • How many of them work?

      How many of them were bought by the Shah?

      If their airforce is anything to go by it is either ancient, useless or fictional. Remember the joke 5th generation home grown plane they showed off. Clearly could not fly and only midgets could get into the cockpit. The ‘display lump’ totally blocked any view the pilot might have had.

      And then you have their carrier…..

      I’ll grant you their boat swarms are dangerous in confined waters and they do have numbers.

          • I would not be so dismissive, their ballistic missiles are accurate enough that was proven not so long ago. The fact they can quickly build hundreds of these reverse engineered T-90s shows that they are a very capable nation, can the UK do the same?

          • Can they build hundreds of reverse engineered (read the Russians gave them a big helping hand) T-90’s (a tank design that is now 30 years old) or do they just claim that they can?
            Remember the last tank they built domestically was the Zulfiqar and over 25 years they managed to produce about 300 of them. So, over how long will Iran be producing these 800 tanks? And do they actually intend on building them or is that number just for propaganda purposes, and what is the tank actually capable of.

            As pointed out the vast majority of their “already large fleet” are T-72s, M60s and Chieftains. If Britain had descided to keep it’s obsolete tanks in service, it definitely could match that.

            Could the UK do the same? Probably. Unlike Iran when we announce something like an Aircraft carrier we generally build it.

          • Yes but the point I am making here is Iran is still building tanks whereas the UK is not and will probably never do so ever again ….. that is both a concern and a shame.

          • You certainly don’t know that, even if Britain buys Leopard or some future tank it will still be domestically built, and at that point it’s no different than Iran, which only can build it’s tanks because they’re getting a lot of help from the Russians.

            But then it’s a very specific metric.
            Does the fact we can build aircraft carriers and they can’t feature into that at all?
            What about CASD?
            Or how about the NHS?
            Or *insert thing we do really well and they don’t here*
            That’s why it’s apples to oranges.

          • You mean if we buy foreign tanks, they ‘might’ be assembled, in the UK from foreign manufactured parts, this what is happening with Ajax. BTW I am not talking about the NHS here you are deflecting. I am talking about the UK’s ability to design, and build AFVs from raw material without much reliance on EU/US industry …. looks like that ability is gone unless some future government is willing to invest billions in a dedicated AFV plant, I just do not see that happening

          • I’m not deflecting, you asked why Iran can have a large mass army and we don’t, the NHS is part of the answer: we spend our money on different projects.
            If we wanted to cut back on making the UK a better place to live, cut back on CASD, cut back on Brecon courses, or cut back on *insert thing we do well and they don’t here* we could easily open a tank factory and order 800 tanks.
            And if you think that there’s no foreign parts in the Iranian tank assembled in Iran boy do I have a bridge to sell you.

  20. Minus:
    40 year old tech tank – rifled gun with impossible to get new ammunition, no Trophy like anti missile system.
    No proper anti tank missile(Javelin only short range)
    No AFV
    Old short range artillery
    Only Starstreak SAM
    No UAV’s

    Plus:
    New armored “truck” APC: Boxer
    New recon vehicle : Ajax —- misguided investment?
    AH-64 Apache

    • Partly however, Ajax and family of varients superb vehicles, but, being pushed into a wrong role, and Boxer, very very good, but again we have bought the bare minimum varients, ie the cheapest (even though they are still bloody expensive).

  21. Following the longstanding view about poor planning of army equipment, the long awaited defence review findings on the 16th will only confuse the overall direction that the army will need to take to become a viable combat force on the future battlefield. With the rumors of having an army of 70,000 soldiers, only shows up how stretched the army will be in the future.
    The army needs to reduce its NATO commitment to key areas of operation, this can be to concentrate on covering the High North and the associated waters to protect Europe’s northern flanks and communications links with the USA. The Baltic’s need to be covered by our European allies, who would be supported by the US Army in the future.
    The new structure:
    (1) arctic brigade that operates Ajax and BV series of vehicles (4th Infantry Brigade).
    (2) Form three Expeditionary Brigades that operate in 3rd (UK) Division – that operate with Centuro 2 and Boxer family of vehicle.(1st,7th, 20th brigades).
    (3) form one mechanised battle-group that will become part of a new CANZUK brigade (28th Infantry Brigade) perhaps that shows our support in the Far East better.
    Time will tell which direction the army will move towards, all subject to finances and government willingness to reduce its confused thinking on defence matters.

    • Barry, some good points. As an island nation we need an amphibious Bde and an air assault Bde for theatre entry, power projection and the ability to reinforce Norway (NATO). On top of that I’d emphasise SFs, training teams and a rapdly deployable Strike Division of three Bdes based on Boxer (with 155mm, MLRS, Light tank & 40mm IFV Boxers). More than that we can no longer do. Let the Germans, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians & Romanians (+ of course the Americans) worry about large scale armoured ops along NATO’s eastern land border. We should also have the ambition to build upon the Gurkha Btn Grp in Brunei so that we can field a Commonwealth Far East Bde Grp (alongside the Aussies and Kiwis).

      • Thank-you Rob for your reply to my views, the reason behind my points in regards to future land forces (Army), is that I feel that 3 Commando Bde will become a mothballed structure in the future, due to the Royal Marines (40, 45 commando’s) moving more towards specialised operations that’s more in line with UK special forces, the same applies to the parachute regiment. Both lot’s of forces can easily fit into an enlarged SF structure that would also incorporate RAF UCAV assets as well, I feel that this could lead to forming a Special Operations Command (8,000 personnel) that would handle all specialised operations in the future.
        Following on in regards to the army brigades. The arctic bde would have 1x Ajax regiment, 3x infantry bns, 1x anti-tank squadron (Brimstone) plus artillery, logistic, UAV’s (5,000 soldiers). The expeditionary bdes would have 1x armd cavalry regiment, 1x armd regiment (centuro), 1x air-assault bn, 3x mechanised infantry bns (boxer), 1x anti-tank squadron (Brimstone) plus artillery, logistic, UAV’s (6,500 soldiers). I know the brigades are scaled bigger than current structures, but I feel that it would add more meat to the bones of the forces involved. they will in turn be supported by the logistic bdes and the aviation bde as well. 
        Each artillery regiment would have 1x M777 bty to support (air-assault ops), 3x HIMARS batteries to support (mech infantry), by structuring the regiments with these assets, would move the artillery thinking in the direction of how the US marine corp are working towards their 2030 planning. In regards to the Far East the mechanised battle-group would be additional to the Gurkha bn that’s already based in the region, it would strengthen regional ties with the countries concerned and would build on the naval presence that government policy is moving towards in the future.. Who knows what future UK defence will be like, time will tell in the years to come.  

        • Well Barry we are basically in agreement although I wouldn’t be merging 3 Cmdo Bde & 16AA Bde. As I’ve said above, a significant ability for theatre entry across a beach, by parachute or helicopter is essential for an island nation such as ours. As for the Strike (basically Boxer) Bdes, I’d make sure we get significant artillery systems (Boxer, or Archer 155mm & Boxer mounted GMLRS), which is a massive weakness at the moment. Yes M777 could support Cmdo & Para Bdes. Also we need to get serious about air defence. Each Bde should have a large Battery of Ceptor missiles mounted on Boxer. I’d furthermore get the RAF Regt fielding Ceptor for airfield defence. Basic structures, in terms of Bdes, are easy to agree upon but it is enablers where we are weak. Artillery, air defence, combat engineering, logistics & signals all need to be improved in the ‘new’ force structure.

          • Thanks Rob for your views, I fully understand about your concerns about the state of the artillery/ air-defence, the army has been severely lacking for years. The trouble is the whole army fighting ability is crumbling before our eyes through years of confused planning and financial negligence, and the army is now paying the price.

            Field Regiments: (4)
            Command and Support Battery
            1x Field Artillery Battery – (8x M777 Howitzers)
            3x HIMARS Batteries – (12x HIMARS Systems placed on Man HX Trucks in each battery) – total 36x systems

            The future approach to field artillery is changing, especially seeing how the US Marine Corp is currently undergoing its 2030 review and will be reducing its M777 howitzer batteries in the process. The MOD could move towards the purchase of 90x M777 howitzers direct from the artillery stock of the US Marine Corp, it would work out to be far cheaper long-term and could replace the L118 Light Gun currently in service. HIMARS is becoming a very flexible battlefield asset, by investing in this artillery rocket system would modernise the army structure quickly with 244x HIMAR systems that could replace the MLRS and the AS90 self-propelled guns currently in service.
             
             Air-Defence Regiments: (2)
            Command and Support Battery
            A.D Battery – (12x Starstreak Systems)
            A.D Battery – (12x Starstreak Systems)
            A.D Battery – (12x Sky Sabre Systems)
            A.D Battery – (12x Centurion 20mm Phalanx CIWS)
             
            Air-Defence needs to be able to provide a flexible all-round 24hr air-denial ability to protect a future land force battlefield, especially when counteracting the lack of allied air support, due to strong enemy counter air operations.
             
            Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiments: (2)
            Command and Support Battery
            STA Battery – (3x Surveillance and Target Acquisition Systems)
            STA Battery – (3x Surveillance and Target Acquisition Systems)
            UAV Battery – (12x Watchkeeper WK450 UAV Systems) – includes six systems held in reserve
            UAV Battery – (12x Watchkeeper WK450 UAV Systems) – includes six systems held in reserve
             
            By merging the two regiments together, resources would be better provided to support future divisional land operations that would work in conjunction with other unmanned air and ground assets, in which altogether would generate a clearer understanding of tomorrows battlefield.  
            Lastly 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air-Assault Brigade, I feel are being left behind, they are only becoming figure heads for the units that come under them, the future battlefield will look much different due the risks that light forces will face in the future, by being more SF in make up will give them more flexibility. Time will tell, thanks again for your views. 

  22. There was an article 2 months ago stating the army intended to rationalise the their armoured fleet. Why is everyone surprised the bull dog as it became named was uprated with new armour for the troops to use in Iraq and now this is all coming to a head because of the much anticipated review. These vehicles are going and a good thing too as it won’t persuade the bean counters to hang on to them and save the cost of replacing them or not as the case maybe.

  23. Yes we urgently need to modernise. The challenger 2 It needs a new turret with 130mm gun or a new tank. We need more air defence. A national SAM system like MOST Western countries (ASTER 30 NT1), we need more Sky Sabre batteries. And we need a fully automated short range SAM system – no man in the loop tracking, a fire and forget system.

    We have got to stop messing around, get serious and get new systems in decent numbers.

    By the way is Sky Sabre in service? It was due to be active on the Falklands by the end of 2020. I note that the MOD have tried to dodge at least one freedom of information requests about the system. Is it actualy deployed?

  24. I have this vision of the Poles on Horseback charging German armour, whilst not yet at the same level you have to give the boys the right equipment or face a total lack of moral. If its ever the governments intention to put troops into a major conflict again they must give them the proper protection/survivability and firepower to respond. In truth if I was a tanky I’d not be happy.

  25. You’ve got to hand it to those canny Germans! While we’re worrying about our ability to deploy armour to the continent, they’re sitting at the heart of Europe, making the absolute most out of the peace and prosperity that NATO has delivered while spending very little themselves on defence yet still making a tidy profit selling tanks and armoured vehicles to their neighbours and all the while building gas pipelines directly to Russia to bypass other NATO allies, much to the annoyance of all, but with no apparent censure from anyone. 

  26. A colleague of mine once said there are 3 stages in decision making: what, so what and now what. From the leaks we have seen and this report I think both HMGov and MPs get the problem. When you are at the bottom and that’s where the army is with its equipment, there is only one way to go and that’s up. Ajax/ Ares is contracted. So is the first tranche of Boxers. The trend will be towards fewer vehicle types, pragmatism and UK jobs.If we abandon the Warrior fleet I think we might even see an off the shelf Boxer solution to the IFV gap if it can be proven to keep up with the tanks. Would the Australian one work for us? Most pundits think 150-170 C2 will be upgraded with a new turret. Am looking forward to seeing proposals for artillery – MAN vehicle platforms for both rockets and 155mm perhaps and CAMM for AA? Overall I’m optimistic about hardware budget.

    • Boxer would easily keep up with a C2 on any terrain. Maybe in deep snow it might struggle a bit more but I doubt it. Boxer has been trialled in Norway and they reported now issues with mobility. Finland went for an 8×8 so says it all.

    • Put some soft sand and powder snow in the way and an 8×8 vehicle gets beached quickly. Nothing beats the tactical mobility of tracks. Seen too many LAVS, Strikers and Fuchs beached on their bellies in places like Afghan, Iraq and Norway requiring a rescue by a tracked vehicle.

      • Very true, Wheeled technology is much better than it used to be, but tracked vehicles are still the most effective choice for that terrain type.

      • By default the Warrior upgrade defines the army’s aspirational requirement: a tracked IFV with a 40mm CT cannon. The Aussies have decided that tracked is more important than 40mm and have shortlisted 30mm tracked IFVs from S. Korea and Rheinmetall for their ‘Land’ program. We could look at the Rheinmetall offering. Alternatively we could develop an 40mm IFV variant of Boxer or Ajax and cobble up an interim solution in the meantime.
        My feeling is that if you have made the 40mm CTA a strategic decision and are going to have to wait for the final solution then you may as well get what you really want – tracks. Just keep some of the best of the Warriors going for a year or two.

        • As a base vehicle, Warrior is still very good. They are 35 to 40 years old, so today just a little bit tired. Armour wise they are no worse than an Ajax, certainly miles better than a BMP3. The CTAS 40mm brings a whole different set of options that were never available with the 30mm rarden, such as fixing on a target and shooting on the move, plus programmable HE.

          I do have a soft spot for Warrior, certainly more creature comforts than many IFVs.

  27. Wow. Well if we have no intention of fighting continental land battles any more then let’s stop kidding ourselves and build a proper defensive Army for the UK etc. Personally I think we have been focusing on the RN and RAF whilst we watch to see if Europe will properly equip itself to defend itself.

    Let’s make a decision now to completely modernise our defence industry and build 90% ourselves in such a way that we can rapidly scale up should the need arise. A lesson we have already learned about things like PPE.

    In my view you need to be able to go and fight anywhere in the world at short notice. If we need additional kit we should have the capability to produce it in weeks not years. That needs need to be part of the design concept.

  28. I’ve said many times on this forum that I’m principally a Navy man on the basis that this should be the UK’s military focus. However, without a well equipped, credible and large enough Army (to be clear I believe ‘large enough’ would be about double it’s current strength at least), we can not effectively achieve not only viable defence force (the most basic goal), but won’t be able to achieve our foreign and strategic aims.
    I believe the Army has been very badly served by bureaucratic generals, and perhaps the even more serious faults of the MoD. It is as many of us here know in an utterly dreadful state, both in terms of it’s size, and it’s equipment, and short of a serious shakeup and even more funding (one would have to follow the other in my view), it is doomed to irrelevance for the short to medium term.

  29. Look at the posts Guys it is no doubt very upsetting ,but you know it’s not about which service gets this or that .The problem has been PM,and MPs cutting money here and there ,and letting it get to this point and we cut to the bone and slept other countries built up ,so we are were we are because of these people.

  30. Just finished reading the whole report which seems fair and comprehensive. But why publish it now? Did it feed into the Integrated Review? If not, it’s too late to have any effect.
    One or two interesting points:
    * a real emphasis on the need for a Ground Industrial Strategy not least to sustain the skills to carry out upgrades
    * Serious doubts about the Ajax for reconnaissance role and the value for money of CTAS.
    And a surprise to me: Boxer is being delivered at the rate of one a week. So 10 years to get them all!

  31. Nobody should be surprised about this. For what ever reason this government and pass governments have made our Armed Forces smaller and smaller, Boris put extra money into the Armed forces but, they are going to make our Forces even smaller it’s a bloody disgrace.

    • When Boris became PM I was hopeful if anything he would build our forces back up.But it’s looking like you could call our Armed services a defence force.IF cuts go a head sadly he can not really call us Global Britain.Now we all know COVID has cost US dearly ,but other countries don’t seem to let it worry them USSR CHINA ect .Do our PM,MPs have some sort of Disease call cuts .The times I’ve put on posts wake up smell the coffee ,mybe I should go to number 10 and make him one a very strong one at that anyone care to join me ?.?

  32. The British army can no longer field a warfighting division, the RAF has been slashed below the bone, and the Navy has an appalling lack of escort vessels, submarines and support vessels. The nuclear deterrent used to be funded directly by the Treasury, but now has to funded from the Defence budget. Apparently more cuts to all services and capabilities in the IDR.
    The simple truth is that successive Governments have put forward grandiose ambitions for a first rate military but are barely funding a force capable of home defence. Without proper funding it’s time to restructure the entire force and resurrect the Joint Forces Command…one 4 star commander (no CDS, service chiefs, cold war NATO appointments above 2-3 star etc) comprising a Home Command (3 star) focused solely on defending the UK and an Overseas Command (3 star) to defend the Oversea territories (Falklands, Gibraltar etc) with a limited intervention capability built around the RN, and a restructured special forces command (SF, RM, the Parachute Regt restructured as air mobile / rapid deployment force, and a handful of Infantry battalions). All F-35’s being transferred to the new Overseas command. No Global Britain, no grandiose ambitions just a small effective defence force with a realistic vision.

    • That sounds realistic! I’m tired of the pretentious ‘world beating’ guff churned out by Bojo’s circus act. Let’s have a bit of realism and cut our ambitions according to the financial cloth available. Unless, of course, we can draw on the extra resources provided by our amazing new trade deals and the massive increase in trade with the EU. Global Britain indeed!

  33. And the ‘No shit Sherlock’ award goes to…..HMG and the Defence Procurement Agency. Bring back Snatch Land Rovers and load em up with a Starstreak system!

  34. Disgraceful! I don’t usually endorse capital punishment but this article makes me willing to make an exception.

  35. A lot of chickens coming home to roost now. Years of mismangement and neglect from FRES onwards. Moving into an era of rearmament the approach must not to be correct the past, but rather to build better and more rapidly for the future.

    • Thx. It seems the Lynx shares some suspension parts with Ajax. The issue is the army aspiration for a tracked IFV with a 40mm CT cannon. The Warrior upgrade was the only way to achieve that. If they want to hold out for a tracked 40mm IFV we are going to have to develop an Ajax variant. This will take time so there will have to be an interim solution. Many commentators think putting the 40mm turret on Boxer is a good compromise. But what if that results in a heavy vehicle a compromises traction on soft ground?

      • I agree, a turret on Boxer is a recce vehicle not one loaded up with dismounts and their kit.

        The option might be 40mm boxers and Ajax as recce/fire support and abandon the IFV and stick with Ares? and standard Boxer just as an APC.

        I dont know if an IFV variant (stretched?) of Ajax is possible – it was one originally but protection and systems have moved a long way from that starting point and stretching vehicles often encounters serious problems in itself.

    • It becoming quite popular!

      If we have a degree of commonality on the battlefield should war break out in Europe or elsewhere for that matter sometime in the future, spare parts as an example can be shared and we would not have to invest in that many tanks to make up a joint credible fighting force?

      “The 2A7+ MBT was unveiled during the Eurosatory 2010 exhibition in France and has been tested and qualified by the German Army. The MBT was deployed in Afghanistan by Canada under Nato command.

      Germany’s Federal Security Council approved a deal to sell up to 200 battle tanks to Saudi Arabia in July 2011. Qatar placed an order with KMW for 62 tanks in 2013. The first batch of tanks was delivered to the Qatar Armed Forces in 2015.

      KMW received an order to deliver 44 Leopard 2A7+ tanks to the Hungarian Defence Forces in December 2018, with deliveries scheduled between 2021 and 2025. Rheinmetall was contracted to manufacture the main armament and fire-control systems for the main battle tank.

      Denmark will receive 44 2A7 MBTs by 2022 while Germany will receive 104 upgraded 2A7 MBTs by 2023.”

      https://www.army-technology.com/projects/leopard-2-a7-main-battle-tank/

  36. I’m not going to get into the technical argument over the various possible options. Imo the root of problem is that various governments have asked the army (tbh all services) to be able to do too much (basically everything) with available manpower & funding. The government(s) have no idea of what is realistically achievable for the manpower/budget that is left – we can’t be all things to all men unless they fund/man it. Somebody has to be brave & explain it to them rather than kowtowing.
    I know of at least 1 young, high achieving & earmarked for further promotion, Lt. Col. who left the service because the programme that he was involved with was so protracted that they knew it was obsolete before it was in production let alone fielded (it still was though).

  37. Damn that report really doesn’t use any flowery language when it comes to pointing out how poorly served our armoured forces are and the fact that we seem to have been doing our procurement based on what is coming rather than what we are having now.

    The main point now is making the effort to actually fix the whole issue. I mean when it comes to the tank for instance do we take an existing tank or develop a successor for the Challenger 2? If so do we bring in another nation and share the costs with them? Same questions for the Warrior IFV.

  38. What I find interesting about this is the fact that the person primarily responsible for this sad state of affairs (FRES) has been promoted and is none other than the current CODS Nick Carter.

    Instead of promoting him and extending his tenure he should have been sacked for cause.

    until top brass actually pay for their mistakes and lack of success – this is likely to repeat.

  39. Not many people seem to point out that most Russian armoured vehicles and guns are either originally from or upgraded from the Soviet era – and so just as bad as British equipment!

    • I disagree Rob, CR2 and Warrior have had no major upgrades and so are far behind the Russian formations which are currently using T72B3 and BMP/BMD3 a vastly upgraded pair of vehicles to name just 2.

      • Agreed – but how many have been upgraded? OK, Wiki… but, T80 450 active, 3,000 in reserve, so far about 170 upgraded to T80-BVM, T72, 2,000 ACTIVE, 3,000 in reserve, about 1350 of those in service B3. And ‘vastly upgraded’ perhaps – but enough to equal Challeger? My questrion re Russians is always the same – how much can they do with the resources they possess? T-14 suggests they are cash strapped so can put on a good face. But depth?

      • Most of Stalin’s tanks were new, not 30+ old during most of which time they were badly neglected. Admit it would be nice (as in, necessary) to have a lot more than we have, but thinking in terms of never having to face Russia by ourselves…

      • Uncle Joe also fielded tanks with 85 and 122mm guns while the Wehrmacht had a mix of 50, 75 and 88mm guns on theirs.

  40. Its time to admit we no longer have the industrial base or the procurement nowse we once had and why not buy off the shelf from the US. At least our soldiers would have better than what we have now much sooner.

  41. Janes, 4 March 2021, “Boxer awaits firing trials with John Cockerill Defense C3105 turret”. So a Belgian 2 man C3105 turret with a high velocity 105mm gun with autoloader, has been fitted to a Boxer hull near Munich. Some of these for UK Strike Brigades would give them teeth.

      • Not really. They are direct fire guns with only secondary indirect fire. They are missing ammo options like AA, have a low rate of fire, no naval turret or below deck loading system etc. Many of its specialty anti-armour rounds would have limited naval use against modern ships. Common naval guns already exist in 57, 76, 100 & 127mm. High pressure tank guns in 105 have been around for decades, so there has been plenty of opportunity if it was a viable option.

    • FFS get these in Strike Brigades with other variants and put Ajax back in the Armoured Brigades…if any remain!

      • If Warrior is indeed abandoned it will be interesting to see how it is replaced. The Cockerell turret is one of several which have been put on Boxer IFV. For the UK the 40mm CTAS has to be favourite for commonality and this gun is a strategic direction.
        Have to say that the Ajax Ares family looks like starship enterprise. State of the art sensors and comms, the same as are fitted to C2 and Apache apparently. I believe the army has tested the Ares with Javelin.
        On Monday all will be revealed?

  42. What is the difference between IFV and APC, other than a manned turret with auto canon on IFV, is there a really difference?

    If Warrior upgrade is being cancelled, would Ares APC variant from Ajax fill that role with addition of unmanned turret with 30mm canon? E.g John Cockerill CPWS GEN2 turret. This is same caliber as the current armament of the Warrior, so what is the difference? In fact you can attach couple of anti tank missile, which is not an option on the Warrior.

    Since Ares can carry crew of 3 (commander, driver and gunner) plus 7 dismount, which is same as the Warrior. Is there a reason why this would not work?

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