Second Type 26 Frigate begins to take shape on the Clyde

Fair points, but I am in the t45 replacement should be t26 mk2 group And not sure why a fleet escort needs a 127mm gun, when a ship in the littorals probably can.

so for me T26 has TLAM and will never be close to shore whilst T31 shouldn’t be an escort in the true sense and is likely to operate closure to shore, it is also generally Under armed so the 127mm would address that. I am also a big fan of more multi role ships rather than single classes of ship.

i guess we have different views n the same topic, which is no bad thing at all.

I’m not. I think letting design skills atrophy is a terrible idea, as evidenced by the difficulty the USN has had bringing in a new ship after generations of AB’s (and eventually had to get the Italians to make a ship for them). That is not a skill the UK should ever loose, and trying to shoehorn a AAW role into what will by then be a 20+ year old hull is definitely not worth loosing it over.

I already pointed out that the 5inch gun has Kingfisher, which has use on a City class, but not on an Inspiration. Secondly: If a war brakes out other tasking away from the Warzone will still need covering: Should a Type 26 be sent to that, away from the combat zone, or a Type 31? I don’t think any admiral in their right mind would want to send a City class to cover escorting traffic in the gulf while a war is going on in the SCS. Given the small number of Type 31 that raises the legitimate question if any would even be in the conflict zone. Meanwhile the T-26 will be a much more useful asset and prioritized so it’ll be in theatre, and not all of them will be needed to be fleet escorts.

Putting a 5inch on the Type 31 will not address the under armed issue, the 57mm with programmable ammo compliments the T-31’s armament far better than the 5inch.

*Edit* And yes, having different opinions certainly is a good thing.

Do you know if Kingfisher is something MoD/RN have confirmed an interest in or is it just a BAES concept ? It seems to me to be of great potential given the vid we saw on the other thread, I think courtesy of GHF.

Great potential, they’d be fools not to be interested in my opinion, but whether they have or not is beyond my sight.

I have no idea if the RN are bought in or not either DM. All I’ve seen so far is its a BAES self funded development. But if it delivers what it promises, then it would make a lot of sense for layered ASW ops by T26 and T83.

Yep!

Interesting comments, thanks you two.

Of course the Americans got the Italians to provide a platform for…

Should we have been less hidebound in our macro management it would have been their cousins providing the platform for a true commonwealth platform across almost the 5 eyes nations.

Opportunity lost by mis-management by Govt and inflated cost to our own programme.

Type 26 is specialised as an ASW ship turning it into an AAW or even AAW/ASW one is not simple or cheap. You could end up spending as much on adapting an existing design as going for a purpose designed one. That’s why Type 83 will almost certainly be a new design.

Hi David, You said it the T26 is a ASW ship, so why the hell is she going to escort a carrier group? A carrier and her group makes lots of noise, a ASW frigate is quiet. Much of the cost for a dedicated ASW frigate is to make them quiet and difficult for an enemy sub to detect. When you have a carrier, RFA ships and their escorts stomping around all the investment into the silance of a T26 is for nothing. What the carriers need is a cheap escort frigate with ASW capability. Strangly enough if the T31 had a towed array they could do the job. What the T26 needs is an escort destroyer to operate in high levels of air threat as an anti sub flottilla. Somehow we seem to have the right ships in build doing the wrong job T26’s belong with SSNs hunting and killing enemy subs.

ASW escorts are a vital part of the RN’s carrier group. That’s partly why the UK is investing so much money into it: to make sure the carrier group gets the best.

The thing is, the ASW and AAW ships won’t be glued to the carrier’s side at all times. They’ll be detached to sanitise waters further afield, support the carrier’s own ASW/AEW assets or work with SSNs and other assets. They’ll mostly work at distance, with occasional trips to the carrier’s side for replenishment, press photos, or other purposes.

I can imagine we’ll see T31 with the group at some point. T31 offers some good capabilities and would augment what’s already on offer. It’s also the perfect vessel to act as ‘plane guard’. If it receives a tail (a light array is being trialled at the moment by the RN’s autonomous submarine programme), we’ll receive a welcome ASW boost.

Didn’t the RN also used to operate, as part of that wider ship dispersal, with a “Goalkeeper” Frigate escort that would stick like glue to the carrier?

Yes, that has happened. I believe HNLMS Evertsen effectively took on the role during CSG21.

As I noted, T31 would be perfect on the plane guard role, but it’s also worth noting that it would be a good asset for the goalkeeper role, largely due to the gun choice (the 40mm/57mm combo can put up quite a wall, and if they use 3P ammo…!).

I always thought a National yacht on the T31 hull would make a Fleet tender in wartime and for training.

Ron, don’t assume that the regular photo opportunities you see of all the escorts and carriers sailing in close formation is how it would be in a hot war in open ocean.

The AAW destroyers may be up to 10 nm from the carrier, while the ASW frigates may be out as far as 25 nm from the carrier. There might even be picket ships even further out.

Why the ASW assets are so far out becomes clear when you consider that heavy weight torpedoes are routinely estimated to have ranges of ~30 nm, so the ASW frigates want to hold subs well beyond that range.

However, with today’s quiet AIP and nuclear subs, its possible that one might slip past the ASW screen. Which is probably why the RN are using the designation T83 as the T45 replacement, for an AAW asset that will also have a significantly greater ASW capability than T45, whether organic or using USV/UUV/UAV platforms, perhaps in conjunction with the BAES Kingfisher concept using the 5″ gun.

Hi GHF, if the carrier escorts are so far out what is all the fuss about any carrier based 30/40/57mm potentially shooting up other vessels as you’re suggesting there’s a lot of space between vessels?

Quentin, I can’t speak to the concerns people have with 30/40/57mm on carriers because even if escorts are much closer to the carrier, there will still be plenty of places the escorts won’t be.

Do bear in mind that I said “up to” those distances. If a CSG is operating in more confined waters/pinch points then they may not have that much space.

T-31 with 57/40mm guns and double the SEA Ceptor’s would make excellent goalkeeper for the QE’s let the T-26’s sit 25miles out in front/side with the t-45s sat 5-15 miles out. put light tial on the 31 and she can act as plane guard and also cover the rear quadrant incase you get sub trying to sneak up behnd whilst carrier manouerving during flight ops

Perhaps Steve. Or we might see T32 as a more ASW focused light frigate, say something like the French FTI as part of the escort fleet. With T45/83, T26, T31/32 it probably also makes sense to leverage all those capabilities with CEC, something that hasn’t been worth doing up to now.

All that said, I doubt we’ll be operating a CSG in a crisis without additional escorts from NATO or regional partners, which would add significantly more capable high level escorts to the CSG than T31/32.

I think 26 would also operate within air cover provided by carriers. When LM pull their finger out ! On everything else agreed.

Hi Dave with the Hull concept of the 26s wouldn’t it be able too vary the task at hand such as when the Leanders showing my age here were built they were able too undertake all 3 threats Sub Surface, Surface,Air One Ship One task rather than having a half arsed Hull trying too do all 3 tasks ?

Hi mate, one of the reasons the RN went from your One ship One task arrangement to more of a multi purpose design, was that they couldn’t guarantee having the right escort in the right place so to speak.
We didn’t have enough (sound familiar?), and with a declining global role, it was far to manpower intensive/ expensive a way to proceed. Hence where we now are.

I know exactly what you’re talking about so showing my age as well. The first problem would be stability range. We know next to nothing about Type 83 but it will certainly need a very large radar mounted as far above sea level as possible. That much topweight will have a huge impact on hull size and shape. Trying to square that with an already existing hull would be a real head scratcher for the designers. You’d easily get to the point of limiting the size and height of the radar in order for it too be safely accommodated by the hull. You could easily end up with a class fatally compromised by trying to shoehorn it into a hull that was specified for a very different role.

More off topic but how about using the basic T31 hull and machinery as the basis for the National Yacht! That way we help cover the overall overheads of the T31 and T32. Great looking hull and could be even be used to open another yard in UK to Frigate construction.

I suspect very big vulnerable platforms will not be a priority after Moskva – T83 probably smaller, with associated unmanned surface platforms forming a flotilla with distributed capability for each T45 replacement. I.e. a partially crewed command vessel and 3-4 autonomous uncrewed weapons and sensor platforms operating as a swarm. Harder to kill with a single strike.

Doubt it. This reads very much like the “tank is dead” or the Jeune École, they keep coming up and keep being shown wrong because while you can threaten a big platform, nothing else can do it’s job. It’s the same reason the infantry soldier is still a thing, even though they’re vunlerable to everything down to a thrown brick: Nothing can do their job besides them.

And basing it off the loss of the Moskva, a single incident where nobody has any sort of concrete information on what happened isn’t great either IMO.

There is a debate going on about whether a platform-centric approach is fit-for-purpose. Watch this space for the outcome, but it’s a real concern which the war in Ukraine has further illuminated. Weapons may not need to be delivered by bespoke platforms, but be better deployed from a variety of distributed and multi-domain modalities. Merchant ships could protect themselves for example, and not need escorts.

Yes, it’s been going on since at least the 1870’s, as I pointed out.
And again, yes lots of debate has been started by Ukraine, it’s all silly because it’s all based on incomplete data that’s mostly propaganda from both sides.

I don’t think dismissing this debate is very sensible. The ‘Horse and Tank’ moment was real. What is clear is that as platforms become more exquisite we can have fewer of them, that is how defence has evolved over the past 100 years. Do we really want to put all our eggs in a few very expensive baskets, or find distributed – and thus more survivable – means of deploying the precision guided weapons that actually do the damage?

Right now we build a few expensive platforms and can’t afford the weapons to fit them out. Isn’t one lesson from Ukraine that we need a lot of weapons rather than a few cool platforms to carry them? Most PGMs don’t need bespoke platforms. Brimstone on the back of a delivery truck supported by a few cheap drones for ISTAR is probably easier to conceal and more effective and survivable than a main battle tank. Could that argument not translate into the maritime domain too, indeed when weapons have engagement ranges of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of kms, are these domains so very different or are they not merging?

Before 1870 warships and merchant ships were very similar, one carried a battery of guns and the other cargo – that was about it. Both were fairly cheap to build and operate in numbers. They diverged because the new generation of rifled weapons needed a bespoke platform to get them into a firing position, and that platform needed to manoeuvre and protect itself at tactical ranges. Modern weapons have incredibly high precision and very long ranges, which no amount of tactical manoeuvre or protection can avoid or repel. Thus the art is hiding from and finding the enemy before they find you.

Bearing this in mind, should we not be looking at the operational-level for distributed and stealthy means of carrying a lot of long range PGMs (which do the tactical fighting) and ISTAR (which does the finding) to the fight and not a few fancy machines for manoeuvring around the oceans or battlefield at tactical ranges? Then our investment can be in the weapons themselves and the crews to operate them, rather than the platforms to carry them. We need a lot more weapons and creative ways of deploying them at range, not a lot more fancy ‘tactical’ weapon carrying platforms in my humble opinion.

It’s not a horse and the tank moment (Aside the fact that the obscelesence of the Horse IMO is overstated, it continued to have a role well into the 1940’s in the recce screen for all but the most mechanised armies).

I do not think there are any lessons that can be taken from Ukraine at the moment, one way or the other. There is no real analysis of what is happening on the ground, just images and numbers for popular consumption. But you’re again taking the wrong end of the stick: Looking at vulnerabilities not capabilities. Brimstone from the back of a truck is all well and good, but it doesn’t replace an MBT, it can’t do an MBT’s job. And until something that can take over an MBT’s job shows up (and it certainly isn’t more survivable than an MBT).
The exact same thing goes for surface combatants, people come up with the distributed lethality concept for surface combatants over and over again, but it runs straight into the fact that a swarm of small, optionally manned, surface craft can’t project power the way a ship can. So they need a mother ship, which then becomes an even more vulnerable version of a warship, so you need a warship…BUT with surface combatants it’s even more spurious because it’s based on the sinking of a single Falklands War vintage ship in very dubious circumstances, with tonnes of contradicting information, and a questionable crew.

(And no, before 1870 warships and merchant ships where not similar, Warship and merchant ship designs had divereged in the 1600’s. By the 1860’s? Compare Cutty Sark with HMS Warrior, the only thing they really have in common is they have sails).*edit* Or compare Cutty Sark with HMS Worchester here these designs have no more in common than the Ever Given has with HMS QE

A delivery maybe van is more survivable than a MBT because it can kill it from far outside the engagement range of the tank and does not stick out like a sore thumb when spotted by ISTAR drones.

As for the role of the MBT, to maneouvre to exploit weaknesses in the enemy defences and plunge deep into their rear. I see no evidence of that being effective against a determined defence with excellent ISTAR and armed with plenty of distributed infantry PGMs and drones.

On the modern mostly urban or peri-urban battlefield exploitation maybe better effected by distributed infiltration by light infantry and UGVs with small high mobility vehicles and lots of drones, C-UAS and PGMs (infiltration can be as effective as armour in certain terrain, as was demonstrated by Japanese tactics in jungle warfare in WW2).

As far as power projection goes, why can’t swarms of smaller uncrewed or optionally crewed vessels project power? Fleets of small fishing vessels and yachts cruise the globe today, as did smaller vessels in times of yore.

Massive Drone Swarm Over Strait Decisive In Taiwan Conflict Wargames (thedrive.com)

No, that’s one role of the MBT, but the MBT is a direct fire support vehicle that provides immediate heavy caliber fire on targets, which is a role that nothing else can replace at the moment. And sorry, but your feeling on what “may” be the case doesn’t matter, because it only “might” be the case, there is no data to back it up. Plus, nothing you’ve mentioned can actually replace the role of the thank. Maybe when a UGV can carry a 120mm… but then it’ll just be a tank with the crew offloaded.

A delivery van is not more survivable than a tank, because it needs to reveal it’s position to fire, and once it does it won’t last in your ISTAR saturated view of the battlefield. Meanwhile a tank can. (Also you’re advocating posing as civilians, and I might suggest you check out what the Geneva convention has to say about that).

Because smaller vessels “in times of yore” (A vague statement if ever there was one) didn’t project power on their own. They required a vast network of supply depots all over the globe to keep them going (and ocean going fishing vessels aren’t that small either, typically displacing the same as small frigates, with some at the top end being larger than most modern cruisers). Again, this is exactly the problem the French discovered with the Juene Ecole; you don’t need a Battleship to sink a Battleship, when you can build a small torpedo boat to do it, but then you have to hope the battleship comes to you.

Lots of things can provide direct fire, however you are clearly very wedded to the past and not open to creative destruction so the best I can say is watch this space and we will see which future prevails 🙂

tbh tonnage isn’t what adds to the cost we saw that with the T31’s with the larger heavier hull winning. Larger hull affords space therefore flexibility in the design, you reduce the need for bespoke kit to fit a cramped space, more space to use automation thus reduce manpower and enhances maintainability as more space means components are easier to get to. The only real downside of the larger hull is pushing it through the water. On the 57mm swap this was mentioned in a Navy look out article thats worth a read,

I’ve read the Navy Lookout Article, but cheers anyway. I’m aware of the “Steel is cheap, air is free principle” my point was more that if the Italian Navy can afford to operate 2, we can operate 6.

I agree up arming the rivers is the last change of gun armament on the list, they are constabulary vessels and no drug runner is out gunning a 30mm so little point unless your removing the 30mm from service complete. For the rivers some form of retractable or temp hanger for a rotor if it’s on task would be good. Having a rotor for a lot of deployments should be standard as it’s the ultimate tool for constabulary work.

I do think we should be looking at the 40mm on our major warships, it would be a great standard to start to work up to.

As for main gun, I do agree the 57mm would seem to work for the T31, my only concern is around NGFS as at present we need to use either a ASW or AAW asset for that, which would seem a waste of a key escort. But that’s a marginal issue.

I do also worry there the RN is running a lot of different navel guns, this has a cost in logistics and training and there are long term ongoing cost savings on rationalising. It would be therefore probably in the long term wise to remove the MK 8 from the fleet. And moving to all Mk3 or Mk45 Main gun option and cutting the 4.5 inch and maybe a steady move the MK4 as a replacement for the CIW and 30mm mounts.

I think long term the 30mm should be removed and replaced by the Bofors 40mm, but I don’t think it should ever be replaced on the Rivers, instead when the B3’s or whatever replaces them comes into service put the 40mm on because by then, in theory, the 30mm should mostly be out of service or going (Although again, that particular gun has been in service since the 1950s (or 30’s if you don’t count the autoloader) so we’ve had plenty of time)

Yes agree, it’s as you say the rivers should be the last in line as removal would only be about taking the 30mm out of service and not a needed upgrade, so agree all in all likelihood it would be an end of service life of the rivers end of the 30mm type process.

30mm in service since the 50ts ?

BAe/Bofors 40mm L70.

I Was going too say ,20mm Gambo and 30mm Gcms were made available to the Fleet after Corprate replaced the 40/60s and 20mm 7alphas only reason higher rate of fire

If the Treasury asks they are Destroyers though 😉😉

Hi David , it’s been done ,before , through deck Cruisers ( Invincible class)

I know but what about the Japanese Navies ‘Aircraft Carriers’ sorry multi purpose Destroyers ! The only reassuring thing about our Politicians and Civil servants is that everyone else has the same problems or worse.

Displacement has nothing to do with whether something is a cruiser, there are plenty of Cruisers from the 1870’s-1920’s that fall in the 2-4,000t displacement range.

And messing about on the river

And yet Canada and Australia are doing it.

T26 is wider than T45 I believe so it shouldn’t be too much of an issue

The Type 45 has a 2% Beam advantage over the Type 26.In previous (many) discussions on here about using the T26 for a new AAW version the limiting factor is it’s D-L (Displacement – Length) ratio.Canada and Australia have gone down different routes in redesigning their respective versions of the T26,the Hunter class in particular has encountered major issues in regards to the fitment of the CEAFAR Radar and keeping within weight limits.The main advantage of using a fresh design for the next class of AAW Ship is it helps preserve our Naval Architecture and designing skills.

Canada and Australia are doing what exactly, building an ASW frigate with limited anti air capability just like the UK?

Hi James, I think the Canadian and Australian T26 will be the equal or better than T45.

ceafar and spy6 are among nest the best radars n the world, what exactly is limited about them please.

T45 is great, but let’s not kid ourselves here, it is the same capability as several other European nations navies and is essentially an under armed FREMM.

iver huitfeldt is IBM certified already and has a higher load out.

ASW s a capability that can be added and removed.
Frigate is a historical reference point that means nothing.

the original designation of T26 was global combat ship, which s more appropriate.

engines, computers etc get smaller and more powerful with each generation.

what point are you trying to make please?

The entire point of the T26 is a specialised ASW vessel and that is exactly what we are getting. We are also arming them with AA capability but they will be nowhere near as capable as the current T45’s. ASW capability as in a basic sonar or towed sonar array can be added in and removed, specific construction of a ship to be quiet or house a very specific sonar system no cannot be added or removed.

Whenever the T45 replacement is ready Sampson as it stands will not be fitted to that, it will be a much much better system than what we have now which will then move the game on years ahead of what the Australian and Canadian T26’s are capable of.

Manpower – as with much of the gov. procurement the attracting, recruitment and retention of sailors needs to be improved. Whilst it does seem to be a problem, with some better decision making, it’s one we could solve.
GP abilty – agreed. Every new ship we make MUST have at least the ability to defend itself in all 3 domains (air, surface, sub-surface) & then we can look at specialising them in being excellent (i.e. able to project power, defend other assets etc.) in one or more.

The new ships need less people than the types they are replacing so it should be fine however I do think we need to increase the size of the navy to improve working conditions

I would like a new hull as in general a lot of navy’s are built up and beyond the 10,000 ton mark and I think everything in the 2030s future is going to need space to be a drone mothership so space will be a bigger asset in the future ( it’s why I think the RN has got the mission bay concept for all its future escorts dead on).

My big concern is that we don’t have a track record of HMG starting the programmes in a timely way or the MOD/treasury messing around and ending up making it cost a ton more than can be affordable and numbers drop again. So I’m sort on the side of a general thought HMG will leave it a bit to long leading to a compromise of a new batch of 26s being AAW focused and having the T83 label on them. What would be ideal is if we got a batch three of the T26 as a AAW focused ship ( say 3) and then swapped to a 10,000ton + type 83 ( say 4 as escorts for the carriers) giving an extra AAW focused hull, but that’s just fantasy fleet never happen.

But then you open yourself too “Well we won’t need the Type 83’s because we have 3 AAW focused Type 26’s.”

Yep….let’s be honest is going to either a compromise ship or less hulls than we need and if the government really plays to its strength it will a compromise ship and less hulls….. so 3 AAW focus type 26s replacing the Type 45s may a potential outcome ( I do hope not, but now I think about it…yikes)

To be honest the Russian ship building programmes make the U.K. look like some kind of turbocharged wartime build programme. Since the Cold War they have managed a handful of 4000ton frigates and a couple of SSNs. It does not look like they have the shipyards or skills to make larger combatants and even there new building programmes are all dusted of Soviet projects with pedigrees going back 50-60 years….it would be like the RN launching new Type 12Is with more modern missiles and sensors.