The Ajax programme, which began in 2010, is intended to transform the Army’s surveillance and reconnaissance capability.

However, it has gone badly wrong, with no deployable vehicle delivered to date let alone providing Initial Operating Capability or Full Operating Capability dates, say the Public Accounts Committee in a report released today.

Committee chairwoman Meg Hillier said that the government “must fix or fail this programme, before more risk to our national security and more billions of taxpayers’ money wasted”, adding “these repeated failures are putting strain on older capabilities which are overdue for replacement and are directly threatening the safety of our service people and their ability to protect the nation and meet Nato commitments”.

The report states that the Department (the Ministry of Defence) has a £5.5 billion firm-price contract with General Dynamics Land Systems UK for the design, manufacture and initial in-service support of 589 Ajax armoured vehicles.

“The Department initially expected to bring Ajax into service in 2017 but subsequently missed a revised target of June 2021. By December 2021, the Department had paid General Dynamics £3.2 billion but received only 26 Ajax vehicles, none of which it can use. The programme remains in turmoil because the Department still does not know whether the noise and vibration problems—which since July 2020 it has known may have injured soldiers—are fixable. It does not expect to determine this until late 2022. The Department is not willing to set a new target for initial operating capability before the noise and vibration problems are resolved and it does not know when it will be able to introduce the full capability into service. There remains considerable uncertainty over how to resolve these safety issues and the programme is slipping further behind schedule as the Department and General Dynamics seek to agree a way forward. The slow progress and continued delays create significant risks to value for money, put at risk the Army’s plans for transformation and mean soldiers will have to use existing outdated vehicles for longer.

The Department’s management of the programme was flawed from the outset as the programme was over-specified and the Department and General Dynamics did not understand the scale of the technical challenge. We have seen similar failings again and again in the Department’s management of its equipment programmes. The Ajax programme also raises serious concerns about the Department’s processes and culture for testing whether new equipment is safe to use.

The Department needs to learn the lessons from the Ajax programme to ensure the litany of failures is never repeated and that our service personnel receive the equipment they need for operations and the nation’s defence. As a matter of the upmost urgency, the Department must establish whether noise and vibration issues can be addressed by modifications or whether they require a fundamental redesign of the vehicle. If the latter, the Department must decide whether the right course is to proceed with General Dynamics or if it should opt for an alternative. We expect an update on this when we next take evidence and a definitive decision, either one way or the other, by December 2022. After twelve years, enough is enough.”

The report also adds:

“As this Committee highlighted in its recent report on the MoD Equipment Plan 2021–31, the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine only reinforces the urgent need for the Department to reform, prioritise and effectively manage its expenditure to ensure the Armed Forces can secure all the equipment that they need in the quickest possible time.

The Department’s original in-service date, 2017, was revised to June 2021, which has also been missed. It will not set a new initial operating capability date until it has resolved the on-going noise and vibration problems, and has no confidence in achieving the full operating capability target of April 2025. Therefore, 12 years after letting the design contract, the Department has no realistic target dates for introducing the Ajax capability. We are also extremely concerned that the Department may accept compromises on the level of capability that will be achieved at these milestones.

Further, the Department is encountering difficulties on the enabling programmes needed to deliver the intended capability improvements and allow the Army to deploy Ajax on operations. In particular, delays to the Morpheus programme mean it will take longer before Ajax has the enhanced digital and communication systems which are so important to the way in which the Army plans to use the vehicles. The Department is seeking to develop a longer-term relationship with industry to enable upgrades throughout Ajax’s service life to keep pace with technological developments and future military threats.”

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

255 COMMENTS

  1. Time for us to move to the CV90 or a larger boxer force. whatever we do we must agree a proposer force structure and build around that and not historical cap badges etc… which will need to fit in.

    I believe the engines are the same as used on boxer so transfer them across to that program as well as the CTA40’s.

    write Off the remaining contract and try to recover what we can (probably nothing)

    it’s a real pity as this could have been great, but how can a vehicle program be 12 years late.. it’s not that difficult.

    clearly no one will be sanctioned for this so let’s just move forward and consign this project to history.

    If we need tracks ( I am not sure we do) A CV90 with CTA40 and room for4/6 dismounts is ideal, we should also buy some with the 120mm gun (XM360).

    • Whenever we run these programs we should always have two contenders. Bring X percent/vehicles to IOC and at that stage we select which is better, with penalty clauses still part of the contract for full operating capability to keep the winner honest.

      Yes there is a bit of regret spend but overall will encourage better quality. For the vehicles/ planes/ boats that do not make it we can sell them off to someone else (they be brand new) or keep in reserve. More expensive in the short term but likely to save massively long term.

      Competition is the only thing that holds companies to task.

      They don’t all have to be built in the U.K. to get to IOC but after that yes. Means all the issues you have with early models are ironed out or if not recoverable you have options to switch as manufacturers are in gear and you are not left in a situation like now with Ajax

      I also think bring back professional project manager that are there for the length of the contract just with increased oversight to make sure no bungs have been received to favour one of the other. People are more switched on to this, it is not the 70s any more.

      • With thinking like this you have no career in U.K. defence procurement a head of you. You are of course, completely right.

      • I was involved in assessing the bids for the replacement for the Cent BARV and I recall we had at least 7 or 8 contenders. We ended up with unquestionably the best option, a Leopard 1 variant.

        CR3 (originally called CR2 LEP) had a number of contenders that were down-selected to 2 (one proposal from BAE and one from Rheinmetall) – both companies were given MoD money and about 2 years to refine their proposals. We ended up with a blend of both of the best ideas and a JV company (a fusion of both companies) to build the tank. Ideal! The only problems being the long production time and the low numbers of units.

        Everything that could have gone wrong with Ajax (the programme and the vehicle), did go wrong – and I am not optimistic of success.

        You are wrong to think that there are a lot of bungs in defence contracting to procure kit for UK’s armed forces – it is very rare.

        • Bungs @ procurement and Civil service level, is very rare as its a sealed box compliancy system.

          but smozzing the General Army or service staff is very common, be it on smaller scales, you the case of whiskey, the Holiday villa/boat for a month, or the wife’s car.

          is very common

          • Johan, what is your background? No-one offered me any of these very ‘bargain basement’ inducements when I was at Abbey Wood.

        • I hope both time and numbers will be fixed asap. A clear lesson from Ukraine is we need more armour not less. However I expect the bean counter will look at the massive number of disabled Russian tanks and their vulnerability to NLAW, Javelin etc and claim the tank is done. When in reality the huge number of tanks destroyed were down to poor deployment without supporting troops.

          • A bean counter might have looked at the Falklands war and concluded that surface ships had had their day!

            Nothing in the battle space is invulnerable. You are right that the Russians lost tanks mainly down to poor deployment.

          • I am aware of this and met Carew Wilks a few time when I was serving. The MoD rules are very clear and very strict. There is a process that ensures a retiring officer cannot undertake a civilian job touching his previous field for at least 2 years. Wilks finished his army service in Oct 2013, worked for NIMR Automotive for 4 years, then was an advisor to BAE for 1 year and only went into the GDLS job in August 2018, nearly 5 years after being Director Land Equipment.
            So not a conflict of interest at all.
            He has not been given an easy ride by MoD or Parliament. He got an absolute grilling by the HCDC on 21 Jul 21 – and astonishingly admitted that noise and vibration has been a feature of Ajax since 2010 – he would not have won many plaudits from his GD boss for saying that – goes to show he is refreshingly honest. I would rather have him in that role than an obsequious company man.

      • Part of the Program was to deliver a prototype concept at contract award stage, and AJAX won over CV90 and others.
        then the Army wanted to make their can opener into a swiss army knife that could fly. just because so brass head got a case of scotch.

    • Ajax is of course a recce vehicle replacing Scimitar, so I presume you are talking about the recce variants of CV90 or Boxer.

      Force structures (I was once a Structures staff officer) are never built around preserving historic cap badges and I saw little evidence when I was serving (1975-2009) of successful attempts to preserve historical cap badges and little evidence since, although some consider the creation of the small Ranger battalions to be an attempt at this.

      I am not sure the Treasury or politicians will be so keen to accept the loss of £3.2bn – which rather accounts for extraordinary efforts to give GDUK so much time to fix the faults.

      Recce vehicles do not have to be tracked, indeed we have had small, wheeled armoured recce vehicles before (Ferret, Fox) but not large, wheeled armoured ones. Other nations have ordered large, wheeled recce vehicles (Norway has CV90 (Recce)); Australia has Boxer CRV).

      What recce work are your 4/6 dismounts doing?
      Why buy a 120mm gun equipped CV90? Is that to augment CR3?

      • understood, and from my perspective we would be better off with the French Jaguar and putting the spare money into a new IFV with a decent cannon (CV90).

        Whether we need that volume of recce vehicles should also be up for debate, as for losing £3.2bn. It’s a massive loss but at some point you have to call these things and move on I am afraid.. Ajax is the Army’s Nimrod….

        • agree on the Nimrod MRA4 and who was the contractor on that program.

          if Ajax was delivered on time it may have been ok, but the desire on the Platform and the loss of Warrior, has changed the background on these types

          • I specialise in program turnarounds for a living and in 99% of cases failure is almost certainly due to poor sponsor behaviours and direction.

            I do think we need to ease of BAES as they are not a charity and for all we know they are doing everything right. Looking at Warrior this was indeed the case.

            Too much political interference and not enough support from government (its more than Money – commitment is key) also play a part.

            i would say that the Uk should look at our Scandinavian cousins as we spend more per annum (even removing subs) than all of them combined (Den, Fin, Swed & Nor) yet they arguably have better kit and more of it and seem to be able to support industrial capabilities with a relatively National requirement.

            we need to answer the question why they can do it and we can’t?

          • BAES is not the Prime for Ajax – GDUK is.

            Most of our procurement programmes go very well. It is just a relatively few that do not – and it is the expensive ones that get the Press attention.

        • The Ajax programme was about far more than replacing Scimitar. It was about replacing all CVR(T)s and the programme was originally meant to be for the supply of 1,010 vehicles – reduced by a parsimonious Treasury to 589 vehicles, so barely more than a half of what was required. So 589 vehicles is not a huge volume.
          The French Jaguar is a weird looking 6-wheel vehicle and is very cheap and has some reasonable armour and survivability features, fair speed etc, but I have not heard of sophisticated sensor and comms packages.

          I am sceptical about Ajax being continued to a successful outcome.

          There would be money left over which could be channeled into a CV90 procurement for the Infantry (instead of Boxer) – that’s a good idea. Boxer is merely a very expensive APC – seems like we would almost be going back to the days of the Saracen but for a couple of extra wheels!

          • You implied it with your reference to other nations using wheeled CRV’s & then referred to Norway with CV90 & Australia with Boxer. Most on here know it was just unintentional poor wording.

      • Apologies Graham I did not answer your last 2 points.

        Ajax is too big for a purely recce platform imo, better smaller solutions are available, what I am alluding to given the size of our force is that we have Smaller IFVs that can hold 4 dismounts and that these assets merge into one capability. All variants should have a CTA 40 on them unless there is a crane or similar in the way.

        at this point in time I am ambivalent to tracks or wheels, what I would say is that for me we still don’t have a modular force structure that allows for different tasking where we change vehicle type to suit topography.

        even the boxer order highlights this, where exactly is the mix that delivers a strategic or tactical effect. Currently it’s a very expensive set of support vehicles.

        • 600 boxer – we could have the full spectrum of capability for 1 Division, Add jaguar if specialist recce needed.
        • 600 Ajax properly specified could also provide the main combat force in a division
        • 600 vehicles to replace Warrior and CR2 replacement (assuming heavy)
        • 1200 foxhound/ HMT and uk version of the French Jaguar recce (which I think is benchmark for VFM) for light
        • Dagor for super light.

        all backed up of course by a fleet of logistics vehicles built around armoured cab HX’s or similar

        as for the 120mm gun, it is available on CV90 (and Ajax for that matter) as I do think there is some value in standardising on a single platform type and going for as many variants as required.

        Ajax and Boxer should now be specified to provide the full spectrum of capability for a single force. they are clearly not going to work well together as they are fundamentally incompatible (wheels and tracks that is) instead we have over specified recce and combat support fleets and no money seemingly left over for a decent IFV

        I still don’t see an organisation that can deliver and sustain a force at a divisional level (12k personnel) or what that knows how to do that.

        • Ajax is too big for a Recce platform? Where does this come from? Let’s look at this objectively shall we.
          Here are the phyical dimensions for Ajax:

          Ajax dimensions: 7mx3mx3m

          And here are the phyiscal dimensions for other (succesfull) Recce tanks in serivce with other Western Armies:

          🇺🇸Bradley M3 dimesnsions: 6.5mx3mx3m
          🇸🇪CV90: 6.5x3mx3m
          🇪🇦ASCOD Recce: 6.5x3mx2m
          🇲🇫Jaguar: 7mx3mx3m
          🇦🇺Boxer 8mx3mx2m (+Turret)

          • No worries, I honestly do wonder where this comes from because I hear it so often, and at first I believed it when someone said it to me, until I did the actual maths and compared like for like.

        • Hi Pacman, Thanks for the reply. I see that some have criticised your point about Ajax being too large for a recce vehicle, referencing other nations who have opted for a large recce vehicle. I think the Americans started the trend with the M3 Bradley CFV; they have long had a philosophy of ‘recce by fighting’ whereas we Brits have done ‘recce by stealth’ which requires a low-signature recce vehicle ie one with a small frontal area for reduced visual signature. If a recce vehicle is long but has a small frontal area, that would be OK.

          Additionally Ajax was bestowed a Strike role after the programme started – it is hard to find a good MoD definition of Strike, so I use my own and that includes the ability to destroy or disable at least light and medium armour at distance, so the vehicle must be big enough to mount a suitable weapon system and store sufficient ammo.

          You then talk about small IFVs, a totally different subject to recce vehicles. However, I see where you are coming from – if there is a need for a small IFV this could theoretically also be met by an Ajax variant – the ARES can carry a small number of dismounts (not an Infantry fire team (half section) but specialist recce or AD team etc) but is not a mini-IFV as it lacks a cannon, so it would not fit the role you describe. The problem with a mini-IFV is that you are providing a cannon-equipped vehicle that can take only a fire team, so you would need to buy twice as many as if you had bought an IFV that could carry an infantry section.

          Tracks or wheels for an armoured recce vehicle? – we have had both in British service – so I am ambivalent too – but recce must be highly agile across complex terrain, should cope with weak physical infrastructure (low-rated bridges, culverts etc) and should not be liable to bogging in.

          Force structure – we task org according to mission, enemy profile, terrain etc – but up to a point. If the deployed force does not have a certain type of vehicle then you cannot include it in a force mix.

          Interesting that you advocate wheeled armoured vehicles for logistics use – not sure we have the budget for that.

          My ideal mix for an armoured bde cbt team (ABCT) would include: medium-weight tracked armoured vehicles (not built by GDUK) to replace all CVR(T)s including Scimitar and Striker – probably CV90 based; CR3; upgraded (WCSP) Warrior IFVs; new Warrior variants to replace FV430s (eg ambulance, mortar); upgraded AS90s or replacements.

          It is sad if a modern day division is deemed to be 12k personnel – in my day it was at least 20k.

          • Hi Graham.

            thanks for response, couple of points to clarify on my part.

            1. I am definitely advocating an IFV atthe fire team level as with infantry accounting for 19k (max) of the current force I am looking at ways to maximise their lethality and having a Smaller IFV with CTA 40 (and an APS) will provide section fire and anti UAV capability.
            2. I have even thought of the usefulness of the weisel 2 with a trailer for 4 that it releases upon contact so it can provide flanking or covering fire as the dismounts offload and make contact.
            3. I also think the lessons of op Herrick need to be applied in that we should never send our troops out without adequate protection and firepower.
            4. the armoured logistics part is an HX with armoured cab , drops capability and perhaps an unmanned turret for those that need it. All logistics should be containerised and all logistics should be drops enabled.
            5. i also think a lot of capabilities can go on an armoured HX (like ceptor, 155mm, h8mars etc) and don’t necessarily need a boxer module given the price differential.
            6. I am coming to the conclusion the KF41 could be the golden bullet for our high end combat vehicle that can be up armoured to tank levels at a reasonable weight.

            ultimately everything I say is about getting the best equipment we can into our army’s hands n the quantity required. With such a small army smart solutions will be needed to force multiply and that means 2-4 person teams doing what 8-12 used to do (boxer RCH is a great example of this)

            division size is aligned with above and the fact the army is resistant to losing capability 8 divisions of 12.6k (including 21k aligned RAF). Commanders need to be able to control every asset in their division to make this work with all the technology at their disposal.

          • Many thanks for the reply.
            Of course relatively few of our 19,000 Infantrymen are customarily mounted in an IFV – We only have 4 Warrior Battalions (armoured infantry) – thats just 2,928 soldiers. We also have 4 Bns of Mech Inf in wheeled Protected Mobility vehicles. I have no great view on an IFV for a 4-man fire team rather than for a section except that you would have to increase manpower to allow for a non-dismounting crew (driver and gunner) of a second vehicle.
            As Wiesel 2 is not an IFV, are you advocating one or more of them in a platoon as extra vehicles? Why not use the IFV cannons for supporting fire, as is usual?
            I was on Herrick and you correctly point out that not all troops outside the wire were in protected vehicles, especially CSS, so happy with the armoured cab.
            Not sure that all stores need to be containerised – you are not always dropping off a full load at a destination – and when you have dropped a container you have a fairly useless cargo vehicle for the return trip.
            KF41 looks good. Not convinced that all AFVs have to be at tank levels of protection though.
            Once infantry are dismounted, a 2-4 man team really cannot do what 10-12 used to do.
            You mention your 8 divisions of 12.6k again, but only 70% of the army is in the Field Force.

          • Hi Graham. Will try to cover the main points here

            1. A section will be 8 people spread across 2 vehicles that provide suppressing fire, logic is that the vehicles do the heavy lifting of stores, and fires in a smaller army. A platoon will have 16 dismounts + 12 drivers and a company 168, 196 or 252 personnel.
            2. I do think there is some merit in looking at smaller vehicles that are connected for the road trip and then disconnect on contact to allow more options (but accept this may be a rubbish idea)
            3. The division size is 4 Manoeuvre Bgdes (MEU size) and an HQ and has c.2.6k air and similar infantry.
            4. this means a transfer of 20k personnel from the RAF to the army.
            5. you rightly point out the need for a dedicated corps of vehicle crew and mechanics and this will be pivotal to the new construct and will be one of the larger corps.
            6. What is proving really challenging is that the army cannot do everything it is being asked under its current 82k size. If the MOD is determined to cut further then it will need to cut down on what it does.
            7. additionally more of the army will need to be in the field force, but if that force is rotated through a low, medium and ops cycle you can cover off the activities in the low readiness force periods (25% of the force at any given point)
            8. as for KF I don’t care what vehicle we actually choose as long as it’s great, armed to the teeth and we order loads that we build in the UK.
            9. possible mix for me is KF41, Boxer, JTLV/Foxhound/jaguar, Dagor, HX3/4, ineos grenadier to replace Land Rover.
          • Radical thinking on your part.
            If the army is struggling to do its stuff with 82,000 – it will be even worse when it is 73,000.

          • Maybe, but it seems to me a USMC MEU is about the size of ‘big unit’ we can deploy and keep the full spectrum of capability, and maintain some form of harmonisation balance.

            the UK is good at logistics and the MOD has 60k civilians now working for it.. so the boundaries between some capabilities are already blurred.

            I would go further and if we go tanks put that capability into the reserves as a) lots of training can be done in local simulators, b) kinetic training can be condensed into the relevant envelopes, c) it takes an age to generate so plenty of time to get the reserve mobilised and ready. The remaining reserve would take on support activities (so no inf reserve), but definitely a cyber reserve.

            the army we have needs to be far more deployable and far more ready for those deployments in terms of equipment, culture and organisation. For that we need a change of attitude and a move to equipment that releases people or creates a force multiplier.

          • I think that the army is very deployable, however it is alarming to hear that some HETs have been auctioned off.
            People make too much of ‘the difficulty’ in deploying heavy and medium armour. We first deployed tanks overseas in 1916 – we are quite used to doing it – we are used to putting tanks onto ferries and rail flats and HETs.

            Are you saying that tanks should go to the Reserve Army? That is a non-starter. We have a Reserve Army armoured regiment who provide BCRs to the 3 regular tank regiments. Thats as far as we need to go.

    • It is more than 30 years late, as this is the son of the future rapid effect system (FRES) program. FRES was a money pit, but the head of the program did alright.

      My next door neighbor was part of the Army team developing FRES. He ended up leaving the Army seriously pissed of with the whole affair. It was a comedy of errors. Where every two years the “committee” decided it needed revisiting with a change in direction. There were plenty of promising designs ranging from a direct CVR(T) replacement to something similar to Ajax. If only someone had the balls to say enough and commit to a design. We could have had something like Ajax in service 15 years ago!

      • I think we need to take a moment here and decide if cv90, or kf41 lynx can meet all our requirements. KF can go to 50t weight and has a 120mm gun (would the XM360 be even lighter / better).

        the Next question is can we build both tracked and wheeled versions of these or do we split between boxer for medium wheels, and one of these for our tracked armour. Given APS/ADS is it better to have a lighter medium vehicle with this than a heavier vehicle.

        lastly, are tracks a good idea given they got bogged down in Ukraine, perhaps wheels is good enough for our purpose and do away with expensive tank transporters…

        I would also consider a totally different approach of 2 smaller vehicles connected ( bronco /bvs) with far more armour than the currently have with the aim of them getting to point of contact linked but then the front part ( with a CTA40 on it – weisel 2 like) can provide covering and flanking ability whilst the rear compartment can dismount troops under its own steam.. Would one of these units towing a load of brimstone or loitering munitions be as effective as a tank, I don’t know, but given where we are with our fleet we can literally start afresh.

        As I say an awful lot to consider, the good news is there are plenty of great products out there, we just need to buy something that we will use a lot, because if we don’t we will just lose it as we have with the others

        we literally have to replace the whole army fleet within the next 15 years, which is c.30k vehicles, at which point we can start over again as 15 years is old enough. so there is enough here to create a factory in the uk that builds 300-500 armoured vehicles per annum, what type they are is very much up for discussion in my view.

        • What ever we get it should not be Ajax. It is a flawed platform. We need something off the shelf that we can put quickly into service. We should also commit to protecting all our tanks and AFV/IFV with active protection systems – an obvious leaning point from the Ukraine conflict.

  2. Does the MoD have a Plan B in case Ajax is unfixable within a reasonable time period?
    Has it identified possible alternatives and how long would it take and cost to add essential British Army requirements and then begin manufacturing?

    How confident is the MoD of getting General Dynamics to return the £3.5 billion paid thus far? How long would the undoubted legal battle take?

    Sounds like a continue/scrap decision will be made this year, but they needs plans in place for both outcomes. If they scrap then they may have to reconsider the Warrior sustainment/ upgrade programme to provide a stop-gap capability.

    • I would put money on plan B being to scrap the project and go home, with a vague statement about the capability being fulfilled by a future Boxer variant.

      I suspect if there was any chance that they would realistically scrap it, they would have already done so, just a question now how long it takes to get them into service and how compromised are they when they do enter.

      • Now that Scimitar has clocked up 50 years in service, I would hope for more than a vague promise of a Boxer recce variant if Ajax cannot be fixed.

        • I believe Latvia are making good use of the CVR(T) we recently gave them in 2014. I think they had a basic overhaul before being sent over.

    • It raises interesting questions, apparently the government have said, not a penny more until the problems are fixed.

      If we walk away, I would assume we walk away from £3.5 billion too?

      Perhaps resurrection of WSP would be a sensible idea, mixed with the Boxer variant with the full 30mm hunter killer box of tricks, like the Baltic States have ordered…

      We have to be very cautious about CV90, it would be ” can we make it three foot longer and can we make it fly”?

      Another 10 years and another £3.5 billion!

      If we go CV90, make it off the bloody shelf, please!

      Can any of the above options do the recon job too?

      If not, what can we buy off the shelf be that will do the job, I hear the USMC are buying a whizzy, floating amphibious recon job … Can’t we just buy that?

      • It’s anyone’s guess what would happen to the £3.5b, my guess as its a US company and policitical pressure will be put to bear if we try and walk away, and that the £3.5b won’t be recoverable, even if it is possible to do so.

        Who know if it is legally recoverable or not, i haven’t seen the contract and not a procurement lawyer anyway.

        • Plus the manufacturer is a big player. You cannot afford to be gun no with these big companies as you need their full cooperation on other things in the future. Unfortunately Harrods do not stock small tanks if they did…

        • Give them all to Ukraine. Not likely to last long enough for the effects of vibration & noise to be a factor.

          • That would be one way to battle test them and see if they are actually combat effective in 2022

      • This is all about and only about recce. If Ajax cannot be fixed we need an alternative recce vehicle, not an IFV.

        CV90 Recce and Boxer CRV are possibilities but there are others, however we do not need an amphib recce vehicle for the British Army.

        Agree it must be a developed product (with just minimal UK kit such as Bowman radios installed) – Scimitar is already 50 years old!

        • Another interesting angle argued by others before me, now with the imminent demise of our Warrior fleet (going over to Boxers), where would/does such a heavy Recce asset like Ajax fit in? A different perspective might be to ask, do we now need Ajax given that we soon won’t have any heavy tracked infantry – Boxer isn’t as capable as a tracked IFV. So, is it perhaps better to cut our losses and go down an all Wheeled force supporting C3?

          • The demise of the Infantry’s Warrior fleet and its replacement by Boxer does not mean Ajax loses its raison d’etre – why would it? We still need armoured recce.

            We did not specify Ajax to be a heavy tracked vehicle solely because we had Infantry riding in tracked vehicles. Recce (even an infantry battalion’s close recce, let alone medium or fomamation recce) operates far ahead (and not with) of Infantry companies and platoons.

            You are right that Boxer is not as capable as a tracked IFV, which makes me wonder why WCSP was cancelled and we are now buying extra Boxers instead.

            Only the French have tanks working with wheeled armoured infantry – and I don’t think they have much relevant combat experience. I don’t think Boxer mounted Infantry can operate as effetively with CR3 as WCSP-mounted Infantry for several rather obvious reasons – and I bet it is more expensive to buy Boxer than to upgrade Warrior.

            We should have upgraded Warrior (WCSP) to make it probably the best IFV in the world, upgraded more CR2s to CR3 – and bought an off the shelf tracked recce vehicle (from anyone other than General Dynamics) instead of Ajax.

          • Hi Graham, it’s not really my area, so just really mulling the options WRT Ajax.
            Was Ajax not designed to be the Recce vehicle for our Amd Inf Bde? Since we no longer have them – now Mech Inf with Boxer, do we actually need Ajax itself? Totally agree we still need Recce vehicles, but as others have argued, would it not be better to align all and go with a wheeled version as opposed to tracked? If we were to still have tracked IFV making ‘heavy Bde’ then yes see the need to keep it, don’t believe the French have tracked Recce vehicles with their particular mix either, so who knows…..

          • Hi Deep, Ajax was supposed to be fielded in 2017. The Ajax recce vehicle would replace Scimitars in the formation recce regiments in 3 (UK) Div – being as that comprised three AI Bdes, that should be three armoured recce regiments with Ajax. Then you have the Ajax’s in the AI Battalion’s recce platoons and finally you have the Ajax’s in the recce troop in the tank regiments.

            With Warrior ‘withering on the vine’ then being replaced by an additional purchase of Boxer, things have changed. Such Boxers might not have a cannon so a Boxer Inf platoon may have to be augmented by 2 Ajax vehicles to provide firepower, ie. you would need 18 Ajax vehicles to provide cannon support to the 9 Boxer platoons in a single Boxer Inf bn. The battalion’s recce platoon could make do with Boxer CRV (Combat Recce Vehicle) or stick to Ajax as per the original plan

            Ajax would still be required in the recce troops of the tank regiments.

            It is a moot point whether the formation recce regiments (one per bde) should stay equipped with Ajax or switch to Boxer CRV.

            Not much clarity on this – but Ajax (or similar tracked vehicle) is still required in 3 Div.

          • Hi Graham, thx for the reply. The army have certainly got themselves into a mighty mess!!
            Personally, if we aren’t going with tracked AI, then don’t think we need Ajax and it’s variants, they are looking out of place/out on a limb with Boxer. Believe we should go with a wheeled Recce variant instead, along with all the tracked versions.
            I never really understood why we were going to upgrade a 35 yo IFV as opposed to buying a new one, especially as Warrior had served us well and put in some hard miles? Seems barking to me.
            Have to say that I’m not entirely convinced that Boxer is the right choice for us either. At its base level, it’s v big, expensive and heavy. None of the 630 odd Boxers we have ordered are of they ‘fighty’ variants, in fact they are really all support versions including the battle taxi. There are cheaper vehicles available (Patria et al’) which have the majority of versions we haven’t yet ordered already in use. Why do we need to buy such an expensive vehicle when something cheaper means we can have more! Obviously it’s rocket science in some quarters…..

          • Hi Deep, you seem to think that we specified Ajax as a tracked vehicle purely because the Armoured Infantry had a tracked IFV. Not so. An armoured recce vehicle is either Close Recce (ie at the vanguard of a manouevre unit such as an AI Bn or armoured regt) or it is Medium Recce (also called Formation Recce).

            Leaving aside the 344 non-turreted Ajax variants we have ordered 245 turreted ‘Ajax’ variants:
            198 Reconnaissance and Strike (Ajax)
            23 Joint Fire Control (Ajax)
            24 Ground Based Surveillance (Ajax)

            Of those 198 Recce/Strike, only 32 are with the four AI Bns in their Close Recce Platoon – when those battalions become Boxer than it makes sense for us to buy 32 fewer Ajax and buy 32 Boxer CRVs. I have seen an argument that if we buy non-turreted Boxer then a Boxer Inf Pl would get 2 Ajax for intimate fire support.

            I think there is a lot more Structures work to be done, but we might just cut the order for turreted Ajax by a relatively small amount as – unless the programme is canned obviously.

            As an engineer, I had no problem with re-lifing 35 y.o. Warrior with the WCSP programme – the army is running FV430s that are 60 years old and there are many M113s around the world of similar vintage! Given that the army has shrunk since the mid-80s we would have selected the least used WRs for the programme. It is a very poor decision to can WCSP and buy Boxer instead of upgrading WR- I can think of no advantages and numerous disadvantages. If the armoured/mech infantry don’t have 4 well armoured vehicles each with a stabilised cannon per platoon and the ability to keep up with CR3 (which will be very fast cross-country), we have lost capability – and possibly the next war! We gave up wheeled armoured battlefield taxis when we scrapped the Saracen!

          • Hi Graham, apologies for late reply, spent last night watching the football, rather wish I hadn’t bothered now, as that’s an evening of my life I won’t get back!!!
            Sorry, it’s probably my bad wording WRT Ajax. I know we didn’t specify Ajax as tracked just because we have tracked IFVs with our AI, but as a replacement for Scimitar predominantly within our AI BDS. But then of course the whole ‘Strike’ saga raised its head and things really went astray. Still not overly convinced Ajax is what’s needed if we are ditching tracked AI, but as you say, we need something.
            Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for having a strong well equipped army (despite being dark blue). Now that we have committed to upgrading C2 we should surely be looking at a mix of capability from heavy – light and equipping them accordingly, especially as most of the kit is reaching its sell by date. The army budget for the next few years is relatively large, let’s hope they get it right.

          • Hi Deep, Most Ajax are in formation recce regiments that operate way forward of the Infantry – so there is no linkage between what vehicles the infantry need and what the RAC need. The army has always had a mix of capability from heavy to light ie a range of vehicle types to deal with different terrain and different threat types – Infantry currently has the choice of Warrior or a variety of wheeled armoured vehicles or soft-skinned vehicles – for troop carriage. Recce can be done with Scimitar (armoured, tracked) or Foxhound (armoured, wheeled) or LandRover (soft-skinned).

            Ajax is Scimitar replacement so is armoured, tracked and cannon-equipped. Irrelevant what the Infantry miles and miles away has. If we ditch tracked AI it does not follow in any way that we ditch the Scimitar replacement. That would be like saying if we put nuclear propulsion in a future aircraft carrier, we should put it in a future frigate.

            I think Ajax is the wrong vehicle for recce – it has too big a signature, is too expensive, is too heavy to cross fragile built terrain (bridges & culverts), is late to service, is unsafe for crew, has poor transportability, ammunition is too expensive – and allegedly cannot reliaby fire the cannon or reverse properly.
            I think it is poor for strike – if that means you want to destroy or immobilise high value enemy assets at very long range.

            We do have a mix of vehicle types already. That is not the problem. It is complete chaos in the AFV procurements of the last 20 years.

          • Cheers Graham, always good to get a different perspective.
            Will be v interesting to see how the Army extricated from this mess! Just hope they get something that can do the job required, and enough of them.

          • Thanks Deep, I served in REME as an officer 1975-2009, then worked in Defence procurement followed by Defence Industry.

            I have never known the army in such a mess, equipment-wise, especially AFVs. It cannot be sorted quickly. I despair that CGS is not gripping this as a senior influencer (he does not make procurment decisions) – I knew General Mark when he was a brigadier commanding 16 AA Bde – in fact he wrote my annual report at Part 2 one year. With his light-role Infantry and SAS background, and minimal and distant time with armour (he did Gulf War 1 in 91 and was COS 19 Mech Bde in 99) he is not particularly armour-minded – that’s the problem.

            I think that Ajax will either be cancelled or accepted into service in the next 12-18 months with provisos, or only fully accepted into service after several years (if and when) it is fixed. CVR(T) will have to stagger on unless it is true that a Warrior recce version is being cobbled together from some redundant WR IFVs.

            We will buy at least 500 Boxers and the politicos will try to claim some credit for ‘modernising’ the army. If the infantry carriers do not each come with a 30-40mm stabilised cannon, it will be a waste of a huge amount of money. The army will not get as many Boxers as it needs – the army never gets all the equipment it needs! The reason we have so many FV430s in service (after 60 years) was that MoD did not buy enough Warriors in the mid-80s, thanks to penny-pinching Treasury.

        • Do we not need an amphib recce vehicle? I would have thought the lessons of the Ukraine war would indicate crossing water ways is essential and that you can’t rely on building bridges.

          • In the past we have had vehs with some measure of amphibiosity – HMLC Stalwart, FV430 & Ferret Scout Car (it required quite a bit of prep with erecting a flotation screen).

            But I struggle to think of a modern recce vehicle with amphib capability.

            It would have an occasional use, I suppose. But erecting a flotation screen is time-consuming and you usually cannot fire any weapons with it up.

      • i think the opportunity is to cancel boxer, Ajax and CR3 and go all in on KF41, which seems to hit the size, weight, protection and future proof sweet spot.

        given it is rheinmetal we should be able to negotiate a mega contract for 2k vehicles to replace all our medium/ heavy at all once ( well over 10 years +)

        most f the parts from the above programs are reusable and we soldier on with warrior until we can get the first nits out the door.

        1 hull for everything medium/ heavy is a tempting proposition.

    • There has got to be a Plan B (and a Plan C, probably). But it may not be quick, simple and cheap.

      GD will not return the whole of the £3.5bn. They have been paid for work done according to a contract. MoD can make a case for Liquidated Damages but does not have a track record in so dlong.

      The WR upgrade programme was of course to regenerate the IFV fleet and had nothing to do with the armoured recce fleet. This WCSP programme could be resurrected but a conversion to the recce role would have to be added in which would require extra cost and time.

      • I think the warrior upgrade program wasn’t just cancelled because of cost. It had lots of its own issues and may well of turned into Ajax part 2. Warrior was built in separate batches that all have variations etc. A bit like nimrod mr4. You make turrets for them to find they don’t fit as vehicles are all different sizes with numerous fixes applied over there 40 year lifetime to individual vehicles at different times. Warrior is old.
        Sometimes new build is better. You go to a supplier and say I want it to this and that and they work out how to do it and give you a costing. Then if you need a change ask the supplier if it can be done. Ask don’t tell. Army seems to go with we tell you how to build it and what to put where even though we aren’t vehicle builders and projects go wrong.

        • I have not found a reason why Warrior upgrade programme was cancelled. But politicos described the project as running over three years late and £227 million over budget, which must have annoyed them. ATDU clocked up at least 95 successful battlefield days and said this put it in the top 20% of programmes for reliability.

          I have not heard the story about new turrets not fitting the legacy hulls – sounds unbelievable as new turret rings would be fitted anyway.

          In cancelling WCSP, the Government has written off £430m of public money and got nothing to show for it. They will now have to buy hundreds of brand new Boxer vehicles with 40mm cannons, which will cost far more (£6m each probably, instead of £3m for WR upgrade).

  3. Meg Hillier’s words are justifiably very strong – national security is indeed potentially threatened. £3.2bn spent and just 26 vehicles delivered, as I understand it, solely to be used for training. Five years late.

    As a past professional engineer I find it incredible that it will not be until late 2022 whether we will know whether the problems are fixable, when they were first identified several years ago. Then, if there is a fix possible, how long will it take to implement?

    This has to be the worst land equipment programme ever. Heads really do need to roll.

    The problems with this project are manifold and involved GDUK, DE&S specifically and MoD in general (including Requirements staff), DGDQA, Ministers – it was destined to fail.

    BAE should have been selected to build a vehicle (CV90 Recce) that worked from the outset.

        • It has previously been published that the 26 vehicles have faults and are not perpendicular (where they need to be) which is a major problem for something that needs to be rugged and strong.

    • Good Morning Graham. In simple contractual rules that more or less apply universally, there is an offer to purchase goods or services and acceptance by the supplier. Top of page one are terms of delivery especially time frame and ‘fit for pupose’. How can this debacle happen in Top Ten UK?? And why should GD be allowed to get away with anything in this instance just because they are a big influential American company?The only conclusion one must reach after a simple rational assessment of this whole affair is that it is OK to pay out 3,5 BILLION pounds, wait ten years, and get NOTHING!!??
      Or am I mistaken..?

      • Good afternoon Geoff,
        As a PM at Abbey Wood my project had staged payments. The Prime submitted request for payment at a milestone point, the DE&S commercial staff asked the PM if the requirement for that stage had been met, an internal meeting was convened, and if requirement had been met, payment was made.

        So if a payment was to be made on succesfully completing, for example, the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), a PDR meeting was called and the company would present, all the deliverables were scrutinised for presence and completeness and freedom from obvious errors or anomalies. At that stage you would have little idea if the vehicle was going to be a rip-roaring success or a disaster as it had not even been built yet. If the presentation was good, they answered all the questions well, and the documentation was good, they would get the payment. My point is that MoD cannot now claw back money paid from a signed-off milestone payment(s).

        DGDQA has been hollowed out and cannot now put MoD experts in the factory fulltime – or they would have spotted manufacturing flaws.

        Issues should have been flagged up loud and clear during User Trials on completed prototypes at ATDU – but it seems that no-one wanted to listen to CO ATDU.

        Much further down the road (ie now) you could conduct Factory Acceptance Testing on completed vehicles and only pay for those vehicles that ‘passed’ or ‘passed with provisos’ and were handed over.

        None of this is any good.

        • Hi Graham. Many thanks for that. The system in the building industry here in SA is similar. Progress payments are adjudicated by the Quantity Surveyor and either signed off or adjusted by him on a monthly basis. Towards the end of the project a draft final account is prepared and the Architect will snag the building. If there are snags or subsequent serious problems that the contractor cannot fix then provisions in the contract allow for, inter alia, client to call in another contractor to rectify and claim the cost of same from the contractor at fault and indeed claim damages notwithstanding amounts paid previously and certified-that is these sign offs can be reversed.
          Kind Regards

          • Thanks Geoff. I can understand the ire that causes some to say that GDUK must pay back £3.2bn to MoD, but they have done work in stages that has been signed off by PM and Commercial staff at DE&S – the best lawyer that MoD could hire would not get back money that MoD agreed to pay for work done to an agreed standard.
            Different story for any vehicles rejected by MoD as unsatisfactory.

  4. Off-topic, how many of the UK’s M270 MLRS does Ukraine need to make a significant difference? According to Wiki we have a total of 42.

    I’d be happy to see them all sent, as they’re based on Bradley’s and the last was manufactured nearly 20 years ago. But we would need a commitment to replace them with M142 HIMARS, or an equivalent, on a like for like basis.

    • Is anything we donate to the Ukraine going to be replaced ? ……I very much doubt it. The MOD seem more interested in cutting costs and cares less about atrophying of capabilities.

    • A US MLRS battery is 9 launchers; not sure how many in a British battery. I would have thought we should offer at least 2 batterys worth.

      Surely M142 HIMARS is not a true replacement for the RA? Can it fire ATACMs?

    • You know that M142 HIMARS is almost 30 years old. Plus it’s only able to carry one pod rather than the standard two for the M270, so that’s a 50% reduction in rockets.

      • I also know it’s still in production, there isn’t a replacement in production, and it only has one pod and wheels rather than tracks for better shoot and scoot survivability. Doesn’t matter if you have pods if you get destroyed before you can fire the extra rockets.

    • Errrr apparently when splashing $224 million having them upgraded from cabs to engine and fire control systems it was reported earlier this week. So if we send some over that will save us a few quid as less to upgrade.

    • The BA was going to update 44x M270’s with a number of enhancements and support the new GMLRS-ER and PrSM missiles, around mid-decade, per link below. I presume some of those enhancements, such as the new fire control system, would be transferable to HIMARS, if we are looking to expand our artillery capability with wheeled platforms for both tubes and rockets.

      It might make sense to pivot to wheels for our rocket artillery, depending on how many M270 systems we donate. Hard to argue that these M270 systems, primarily for use against a peer such as Russia, wouldn’t be of more use in Ukraine today, than a speculative future conflict against the same aggressor, by which time we would have HIMARS in place anyway.

      https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2021/03/mlrs-upgrade-agreement/

      • They definitely of more use in Ukraine defending a fellow European democracy from a aggressive autocracy. If Ukraine wins we might never need to worry about having to fight this said autocracy ourselves.

  5. Sorry, I’ve no faith in the powers that be, nothing will be done because they’ll be all doing there best to save face.

  6. I read on the BBC REPORT that an army spokesman said that he, “was cautiously optimistic the vehicle would enter service by 2030.” Having followed the discussions here and in the light of the Ukraine, our NATO commitment and promises the Finland and Sweden I am lost for words, except,
    “Baldrick do you have a cunning plan perhaps from the Professor of Cunning at Oxford University?”

    • 2030! Scimitar will be 60 years old then. That would be like the navy still having Batch 3 Leander class frigates in service in 2030.

      That is not good enough.

    • ”Cautiously optimistic”. Good spot. In another place I read that the MPs are not optimistic that Ajax faults can be corrected ‘within the terms of the existing contract’. Putting these together I interpret them to mean we can get Ajax good enough if the MOD is prepared to spend more money. It’s haggling time.

  7. What idiots decided this was better than the cv90 that was already proven and would have provided better interoperability with allies

    • The idiots that would have, if the CV90 was to be procured, said that it should be upgraded with underwater and short-range aerial abilities, and the capability to perform long-range strike as well as have armour to withstand an ATM… resulting in a vehicle that would be twice the weight and, god, why not make it two feet taller and three yards longer?

  8. Buy more Boxers. 1 APC/IFV/Recon chassis would save a fortune on training, support and logistics. Of course it’s not ideal for the last 2 roles but the Army is up to it’s neck in excrement and needs to save itself now !! Will anything be learn’t ? Will anyone lose their job ? Yes of course just like with Nimrod and every other procurement disaster ! 😠😠

    • Or the KF41/31 mentioned above..

      why can’t we have just new hull type with interchangeable wheels or tracks that is the trick that really opens up a single type inventory.

      • I have no idea what the engineering on that would be. I need an engineer to thell me if that would be practicable.

        • Could the Ajax turrets be transferred to a different vehicle? So at least something can be salvaged.

          • Not easily I think. The Lithuanians and Aussies have gone down the 30mm route. To the best of my knowledge no one else has ordered a 40mm for Boxer. For simplicities sake I think we’d be better off going with a 30mm gun.

          • CTA has already been put on a boxer and I am also sure the RT60 turret also accomadates (mr Drummond will be able to confirm)

            i would think we would be better off with the RT60 as it’s an industry standard

    • I believe the lessons learned are that we can keep repeating this behaviour because no one is ever held accountable, and that lessons do not in fact have to be learned at all.

      I don’t disagree with the sentiment on Boxers given where we are, but one fact that Ukraine makes very clear, regardless of whether a vehicle is tracked or wheeled, is that it is becoming very easy to find them, with very inexpensive assets. The main advantage of tracks, cross country work, put these vehicles out in open fields, where they are even easier to find, so I question the oft mooted tracked platform advantage in that light.

      These vehicles are also increasingly vulnerable, something that additional armour and APS is going to be challenged to meaningfully address on already large, heavy and expensive platforms. We are going to need to get very good at quickly eliminating the UAS threat to break the kill chain, whether its a surveillance platform for artillery, a loitering munition or armed UAV. This hopefully buys us time before pervasive 24/7 satellite surveillance by our adversaries becomes a thing.

      • Can’t argue with any of that. UAV’s are a game changer and they’re still in there infancy in development terms. Pretty sure every major country and defence company is working on answers to UAV’s. The rewards for the companies that find them will be enormous and deserved. On Boxer we just don’t have time to piss about looking for bespoke we’ve tried that and know where we’ve ended up.

        • We seem to already have the tools for SHORAD/VSHORAD kinetic defence with CT40 air burst rounds and Martlet coupled with appropriate sensors.

          EW and particularly energy weapons to at least disrupt if not destroy UAS platforms in swarm numbers would seem to be the next step. We aren’t going ahead with JLTV, but the hybrid version with its 115kW exportable power delivery spec serves as an example of how modest hybrid platforms may be part of the answer for UAS air defence with energy weapons. Not to overlook the overall tactical benefits a hybrid power train brings in fuel savings, lower thermal and audio signature, and low end torque.

          Perhaps a contributing reason for not pursuing JLTV at this time was to re-focus on hybrid solutions for the overall MRV-P program, something TD discussed https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/rethinking-the-multi-role-vehicle-protected-programme/.

          • So you expect 40mm to be used on Boxer or whatever replaces Warrior and Ajax ?

          • “The ABC can reveal the automatic cannon turrets for Australia’s new “Boxer” combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) are too heavy, and various other headaches with the massive program are emerging.
            Other concerns about the Australian Army’s largest project to date include the CRV fleet only being able to fire German-made ammunition and requiring bespoke European-produced tyres.”

          • Alex, that’s a bit of a vague criticism to base your comment “not a chance” on. I also wonder what the critique about the Australian turret being too heavy means, when we’re seeing calibres up to 155mm mounted on the Boxer chassis. For an in service example we have Lithuania that seems to be operating its Wolf IFV variant with stabilised 30mm cannon and Spike-LR ATGM without issues.

            Not sure what only having German made ammunition and European tyres for the Australian Boxers has to do with whether CT 40 is a good fit for Boxer?

          • Boxer is already an heavy vehicle with big hull height 2.40m.
            So there is need to be careful. I doubt something setup for Ajax could work in Boxer.
            I agree there is a need for a gun at least for anti drone work.

          • The same arguments for why it was pursued for WCSP and Ajax still seem to hold. Namely that it over-matches in range and firepower IFVs that are typically armed with 30mm. Its air defence air burst has a greater spread effect than smaller calibres too.

            The cased telescoped design means that more rounds can be carried in the same space as a conventional 40mm. So CT40 doesn’t give up number of carried rounds to achieve that firepower, especially as the greater firepower is likely to require lower use of rounds to achieve similar effects.

            The French don’t seem to have had issues integrating CT40 into Jaguar, so if there were/are any issues in the WCSP or Ajax turrets with CT40 then that would seem to be down to how the UK integrated the weapon.

          • Turret wobble, round cost and short barrel life are issues, would super 40 bushmaster not have been better as proven system ?

          • Turret wobble on which turret?

            Round cost is often brought up but we don’t know volume manufacturing cost for mass production. It will be more expensive than conventional rounds in mass production, but that’s the trade off for the benefits, which hinge around competition for space in modern armoured vehicles.

            The 40mm Bofors round is 535mm long versus CT40 at 255mm. That’s the penalty paid with a conventional 40mm round which affects how many can be stored. Then there is also the intrusion of the gun system into the turret, where CT40 is less than the 30mm and significantly less than the 40mm gun. One result is potential for a higher gun elevation for use in anti-air and built up areas. IIRC CT 40 in at least one of the UK turrets was capable of >+60 degrees elevation.

        • Agreed, but I’d also go hunting for the fools who wasted £3,500,000,000 of tax payers money. I would demote every last one… Never happen of course. So the lessons will not be learnt and us tax payers will see more of our money wasted soon enough…

          Cheers CR

          • They will already have been promoted several times since they signed off on this farce.

          • the main one, has constantly been promoted, Gen nick carters fingerprints are all over FRES and Ajax.

        • One main issue is and UK Gov has to play the game here,
          within the industry they know what needs to be carried out to the Ajax hull,
          the issue is that in order to do the required work, invades space allocated to its internal systems.
          so they need to redesign the internal kit to fit around the new hull design.
          G/D are trying to fix around the internal kit, which what is causing the delays,
          they have to allow G/D scope to fix once they cannot and they admit this its a Full refund on money paid. £3.5b to GD is beer money

      • Or another 3/4 Type 26 frigates, or 12 Type 31, or another batch of Typhoons, or enough off the shelf equivalent AFV’s to fulfill the need to re equip the Army. It rather reminds me of the first buy of Apache, where it had to be assembled by Westland, with a different engine and other equipment, and the overall programme cost was £3bn more than an off the shelf buy. Putting it another way, each of Westland’s 3000 employees could have had a £1m handout and the same number of aircraft would have been delivered.

        • Or 3200 French EBRC jaguar recce vehicles, or 1000 Merkavas with trophy..

          the mind boggles – at no point s £10m a good price for a recce vehicle when you can buy full fat tanks for far less.

          barking mad. And 12 years too late, so late in fact that they have come back in fashion for the new Cold War…

      • Or at least 2 more type 26 frigates. The point is its a absolute shit show. Waste of tax payers money. Some people responsible really should be prosecuted and sent to jail. I know I would if I’d just caused a £3 billion mistake.

    • Look at it another way – £5.5billion divided by 589 = just shy of £10 million per vehicle,you could probably get 2 modern MBT’s for that !.

      • I’d worked out the per unit price too. Staggeringly expensive. £10 million each. The most expensive MBT in service currently is the South Korean Black Panther. Its unit price is £10 million. I’d rather have 589 of those than any of the Ajax. Call them very heavy recce units if you like. They go recon an area and if they find any enemy can hulk smash them.

      • “… you could probably get 2 modern MBT’s for that!”

        Not based on what Poland seems to have paid for the Abrams M1A2 SEP v3, which IIRC was ~$4.5B for 250 or ~$18M each. (Note: total purchase is circa $6B but includes a lot of extras.) It doesn’t seem like that includes APS though, which might add another ~$2M per tank.

        As bad as the Ajax project is, it seems Puma may take the biscuit at an estimated cost of €17M across a long and troubled development … and that’s an IFV from KMW and Rheinmetall, who you’d hope would know what they are doing.

        • Israel will sell a there latest tanks at $3.5-4.5m each. That’s the price they quote and a price they were offered to Columbia at.
          Hopefully from puma they learned from mistakes and have put the knowledge into the lynx.
          If a recce vehicle is started again I hope they go for sensors on a high pole and drone launchers. Even have a heavy and light version. If all vehicles are killed by anti tank weapons is the vehicle really needed to be so armoured.
          Armoured vehicles are so much more than they used to be. Gone are the days of a metal box with a couple of benches, a radio and a gun on top. If that’s what was wanted they could be cheaper but it’s not. A bench has turned into crash proof separate seats, radio has turned into cameras, data linked, image displays etc. The latest and greatest is what the British army needs. It doesn’t have strength in numbers so needs to get it strength by other means.

          • That offer of Merkava to Colombia was a decade ago, the Polish buy for Abrams was this April. There’s a decade of military inflation to add to that Merkerva price, although it would certainly be less expensive than Abrams.

      • n it’s what has already been handed over… another £2bn still outstanding subject to deliveries etc..

        we have bought all the engines ( same as boxer) CTA 40 guns and probably the C4ISTAR gear which is supposedly amazing… so a loft sunken costs, but nothings nothing that can’t be transferred to another hull,

        my guess is the MOD would need to walk away from £500-1000m if they pulled the plug now

        • Thx. Putting aside the project management issues, the thing I still don’t understand is whether, with the benefit of hindsight we can see that the ASCOD hull was never going to cope with what would be asked of it or whether GD and its acquisitions lacked the skills to do what we wanted.
          That is to say, if the project management had been better would we have realised sooner that we had made a mistake with ASCOD?

          • Ascod would probably been fine, if we had left it around the 28 ton range & only done minor off the shelf upgrades. Turning into a 42 ton monster with every new shiny digital bit of unproved hype, was & is, a recipe for disaster.

          • So are you are saying the additional weight is a function of the ambitious C4ISTAR (which is the unique advantage of the vehicle), rather than the CTA turret?

          • They took an OK vehicle & shoved everything they could think of into it. I think HM Treasury telling the Army it could have only one new toy, meant the Army (or certain individuals in it) said if we can only have one, then lets gold plate it with extra diamonds.

          • That sounds like a plausible account of how it went down. I have experienced similar in the world of education; ongoing spend is less than required and there are periodic big spend projects. When these happen people throw their every wish in knowing they will not see any more money for a long time.
            As other posters have pointed out there is a contrast with the way the T31 procurement was handled. It does look as though the RN and the MOD enjoy a better working relationship than do the Army and the MOD.

      • Most of that £3.2bn is for NRE – Non-Recurring Costs – such as buying and setting up factory, design, development, prototyping, trials etc.
        It should be for the entire programme ie all variants.

        • Thx. So if we switch horses now some of that would need to be spent again for, say.. CV90; Lynx; Boxer ….alternatives.
          Per PM’s post I’m guessing the only non negotiable requirements are the C4ISTAR gear and the tracks.

          • Ajax was a brand new vehicle so NRE was high. For vehicles that are already designed, built and in service with other armies, only the much, much smaller cost of modifying them for British use would be a factor.

  9. This underlines what I have been saying for years.

    It is NOT the job of the armed forces to design equipment via overly detailed requirements. Such an approach – which was apparently common in my time and seems still is – is fundementally flawed for the simple reason requirments become part of the contract but they have NOT been tested as part of the design process. This means it is entirely possible to put stuff in the requirements that interfere with or are incompatible with other elements of the system.

    In the case of Ajax, it seems that the armour requirements appear to be compromising the chasis by driving the weight up way beyond the orginal design envelope! Something of a fundemental issue! Add very very poor manufacturing quality control and we have a complete shambles.

    The army are NOT design engineers. They are experts in what they do. They should write their requirements in terms of what they need to be able to do and ask the engineers to design the best tools to the job, NOT trying to do the engineers job for them. By doing so they effectively give the contractors a get out of jail free card when it comes to court actions. “Please your honour, we only tried to do what the customer demanded we do, look its in the contract your Honour!”

    I also note that the Morpheus program is late so even if Ajax was on time the key digitisation element – the core capability that the army wants – is also late. So if we bought CV90 as a rececce vehicle what are the chances that it would have to be “fitted for not with” the all important digital systems that generate the core capability.

    Well done for wasting tax payers money – idiots!

    Damn I wasn’t to read this as Ajax always winds me up…

    CR

    • Yes, I will be avoiding this article after as it is the same old sorry story of failures and the same old rants. We are where we are. Makes me sad for the posters who try to remain positive on this.

    • The other problem of over specifying, is that you limit the suppliers ability to innovate. If you say this is what I want to do, what can you come up with, you will get multiple idea’s surfacing. There have been military contracts that have failed to garner any bidders because no one (or not enough for a competition) would respond. Eg Canada – Canadian Rangers rifle or original US IFV competition or even original T31 competition. If you specify a Toyota, you will end up with a Toyota, even if it wasn’t the best fit for what you wanted to achieve.

    • Hi peter,

      Some of the problems are reportedly very much down to GD, but the overly detailed requirments could well be the root cause of many of the problems and they are very definately the Army’s / MoD’s fault. Worse if the two sets of issues are interacting to cause the delays then apportioning blame and hence costs is going to be a nightmare – the lawyers will be laughing all the way to the bank, again!

      Cheers CR

  10. Given that most of the issues appear to be related to the vehicle’s structure, drive train etc, I wonder how much of the “Enhanced digital and communication system” would be transferrable to a Boxer derivative?

    • Assuming the program to deliver the system can get back on schedule I would suggest the technical issues could include electical power supply capacity (comms and digital gizmos can use a lot), space (racking for the gizmos and cable runs), cooling (more holes in the hull to get the heat out of the interior). That’s all before you add in the 15″ guns, Aster VLS, and photon torpedoes…

      Seriously though I used to run trials out of the back of an old landie and it doesn’t take long to fill up the space with electronic stuff… Nice and warm on winter trials, but summer…

      Cheers CR

  11. One for the experts in this field, would we be better off purchasing one of these instead of Ajax and wasting more time and money? They have a 120mm version available too.

    “Lynx KF41 – Experience the future of mechanized warfare The Lynx KF41 is more than just a new, highly advanced vehicle: it is the ultimate future-proof platform, blending unsurpassed protection with massive firepower and unbeatable mobility in a uniquely modular concept.

    The Lynx can be configured for various roles, as e.g.:

    Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
    Command & Control
    Armoured Reconnaissance
    Repair & Recovery
    Ambulance

    https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/vehicle_systems/armoured_tracked_vehicles/lynx/index.php

    Puma AIFV:

    “The hull is a new design rather than a derivative of an older system. Rheinmetall is responsible for the development and design of the chassis. The vehicle is operated by a crew of three (commander, gunner and driver) and carries up to eight equipped troops in the rear troop compartment.

    The vehicle is of modular construction which allows it to be fully air transportable on an A400M aircraft.

    Puma AIFV weapons

    The vehicle is armed with a remotely controlled weapon station, developed by Kraus-Maffei Wegmann, which is fitted with a dual-feed Mauser 30mm MK 30-2 cannon. Rheinmetall is responsible for the integration of the Mauser cannon and the ammunition handling system.

    The MK 30-2, which is in production for the Spanish Pizarro and Austrian Ulan IFV, has a rate of fire of 700 rounds a minute and a range of up to 3km.

    The cannon fires 30mm APFSDS-T (armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot – tracer) rounds with a muzzle velocity of 1,385m/sec.

    The rounds, developed by RWM Schweiz AG (formerly Oerlikon Contraves Pyrotec) and qualified in Switzerland for deployment in the Swiss and Austrian armed forces, have entered volume production. The round is not fitted with a depleted uranium penetrator and is non-toxic.

    The MK 30-2 cannon also fires the FAPIDS-T (frangible armour-piercing incendiary discarding sabot – tracer) round that is deployed against hard and soft targets.

    A new round, the 30mm air burst munition (ABM) by RWM Schweiz AG is undergoing qualification trials with the German Army for use on the Puma.
    The ABM round (173mm long, 30mm diameter) contains an electronic timer, an ejection charge and 135 cylinder-shaped tungsten alloy bars or projectiles. The electronic timer is programmed by inductive coupling through a device installed in the muzzle of the cannon.

    The timer initiates the ejection charge which releases and disperses the tungsten projectiles before impact with the target.

    Eurospike is offering the Spike-LR fire-and-forget anti-tank missile for the German Army requirement for a guided missile system to arm the Puma armoured vehicle.

    In December 2008, a contract was signed between PSM and the German Ministry of Defence for the integration of the Spike missile system on Puma vehicles.

    https://www.army-technology.com/projects/puma_tracked/

    Rheinmetall Active Defence System (ADS)
    “The Rheinmetall Active Defence System (ADS) for light to heavy vehicles combines performance and innovation. ADS is able to counteract various severe attacks thanks to the most precise interaction between individual high-tech components. Threats are detected, assessed and intercepted in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle before they reach their target.”

    https://www.ads-protection.org/news/

    • That’s my choice too. Though I’d opt for the smaller KF31 for recce work. Only about 30cm taller & longer than Ajax, same power, speed, weight etc. Designed from the off to have the armour the MoD want (rather than increasing base design by 12 tonnes) & has headroom for further growth.
      Boring myself now repeating it; bin Ajax. Salvage what we can. Take the working elements off Ajax (gun, cameras etc) & tell BAE (CV90) & Rheinmettal (KF31) they have 3 months to work up design. Pick a winner & get moving. Once in service, add all the whiz bangs you want through continuous improvements. ‘Good enough’ now, worry about ‘perfect’ later. And worry about getting any of the billions back from GD later. That’s a lawyer problem.

      • We really do need to get moving on this and as you quite rightly say, leave it to the lawyers to sort out the mess.

        • So if we go with KF41 I suggest we stop boxer and buy a wheeled and tracked version of the KF41 and just standardise the whole combat fleet Even better if there was an interchangeable system that allowed us to put tracks on a wheeled vehicle when needed.

          given where we are with boxer and CR3 and the fact it’s all rheinmetal we could use this to standardise the whole fleet n KF41 and order 2k units.

          at the end of the day we then get an industrial capability at scale and the best price possible and a whole range of vehicle options.

          perhaps we should view this as an opportunity to get this right nice and for all. If not we are going to have loads of different vehicles that don’t work well with each other and are a bugger to maintain.

          • Wheeled and tracked version? Not possible. Tracked = sprocket drive & steer through differential track speed. Wheeled = 8 wheel drive & steer by turning wheels.

          • Thanks Stu. I know nothing about mechanics so my next question may seem strange.

            starting with wheels can we not lock them them into place and change the tyres for something that acts like a cog for the tracks or alternatively can we not just add in a whole track side panel onto drives assuming electric drives for each tyre axle going forward as per HMT demo.

            understand this is not easy but is it doable if we are looking at having a power pack produce energy for electric wheel motors?

          • I suppose it’s ‘possible’ but not practical.
            Can’t simply replace wheel with drive sprocket as the teeth would wear too quickly. Even moving to electric power has issues. We also need a mechanism to tension the track when the wheels are moving up/down over terrain.
            It would require such a complicated addition to do it either mechanically or electrically, you lose all benefit gained from 1 vehicle type.
            That complexity increases cost, increases maintenance, increases weight, reduces reliability, we’re moving complex components outside of armour making it vulnerable. If individually armoured, adding yet more weight.
            We want to aim for it cross compatibility between platforms where practical (same gun, comms systems, engines, whole turrets (where possible), optics etc.) and as few platforms as poss. Afraid I think the hurdles between wheeled and tracked are too great though.

          • Thanks again, so last one, as I am determined to try and square the circle. Can we create a version of the KF41 with wheels perhaps taking everything learned from boxer

            what I really would like is the ability to have a single hull and configure for wheels or tracks.

            this would be really useful for us in so many ways, and offer so many benefits in scale, production, training, parts inventory etc…

            i would do away with boxer, challenger, Ajax, warrior, all other tracks and just build this platform and have a factory churning out 160 per year in the UK for at least the next 10 years.

            That would then leave us to decide on light, trucks (HX probably) and super light. Which should also be built in the same factory to keep everything get.

            rheinmetal are already a partner in most of these contracts it shouldn’t be too difficult to sort. And if it is then boxer for wheels and KF for tracks but wouldn’t it be great if we could just have 1 that we can manufacture here to scale.

          • Not sure what you mean by ‘learned from boxer’. If you’re referring to modularity, Lynx already has this by effectively replacing the roof & internal config.
            Tracked requires a certain ratio (more square) of length to width to create stable, manoeuvrable platform that won’t chew up its tracks. Likely cause a wobbly wheeled vehicle at speed (thereby losing the main benefit). Look how squared off a CV90, Warrior, Bradley etc is compared to Boxer, LAV, Patria etc.
            I think you’re overestimating the benefits of having one platform and benefits of scale. The platform you have in mind would be horrifically over engineered & complicated it wouldn’t surprise me if the cost per unit was 4 or 5 times that of boxer or Lynx. Then maintenance on such a bit of kit would be twice Boxer & Lynx. I can’t see how the army would EVER recoup these costs from an ‘economy or scale’, training costs, spares etc.

          • I’m a big fan of the Swedish Hagglunds SEP, have been for years, though I’ve never seen it brought up on here. If the future is electric (or more precisely, hybrid diesel-electric), then this looks like a cracking piece of automotive engineering to me. Lower running costs, quieter, greater crew comfort, etc. That comes in tracked or 8 x 8 wheeled versions.

            https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Splitterskyddad_EnhetsPlattform

            After years of testing both types with funding from the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, it was cancelled in 2008 by the Swedish Gov’t ‘through lack of an international partner’. That must mean the UK, as it was dropped from even consideration for FRES in 2007.

            What do you think, Stu? With a bit of forward planning and if our Gov’t took over the development tab from Sweden, we could have a new indiginous CVR(T) series, replacing Bulldog, Warrior, Ajax and plans for more Boxer over the 600 ordered.

            I don’t understand this love affair with Rheinmetall. Going with them for everything is no more healthy for our economy (and R&D etc) than letting Lockheed control all our warplane production. I just figure some of the Army top brass are over-impressed by the way the doors shut on their Mercs, Beemers and Black Audis. German engineering? They are not exempt: Boxer’s in big trouble in Aus now.

          • Thanks for that – I hadn’t come across SEP before. Interesting concept.
            Dual engine & gen set adds redundancy & electric drive motors have their advantages. I couldn’t see an 8×8 picture, only a 6×6 but they appear to have different hulls (i.e. not quite as interchangeable as Pacman27 proposed) but you’re right the commonality in drive train would allow for some economies of scale. I would worry about the track on that version slipping though as we’re reliant purely on friction between road wheel and belt but maybe that’s a non-issue, IDK.

            The US are looking at Hybrid for their Bradley replacement as (in addition to efficiency) it’ll allow short range quiet movement, plus the increasing requirement for power in the future means more attention needs to be paid to power generation. As I understand it though, they’re still intending a sprocket to drive the tracks. BAE & Rheinmettal are bidding.

            I agree that with forward planning 16 years ago, SEP (or an evolution thereof) could have been a contender. Perhaps if BAE had continued SEP on their own dime, they might have found some customers or been able to leverage the tech into other products. As you rightly say, hybrid drive is the future & increasing power demands from future systems would have paired perfectly with the tech.

            Re Rheinmettal – I’m not in love with them & I don’t think that many people are (though some may be!). They do have good marketing though 😄. For myself, it’s a reflection of the situation we find ourselves in. Had the UK begun a programme, developed a platform & deployed it, we wouldn’t have these forums lamenting the failures of Ajax.

            I could happily debate all day about how we got to a point where we don’t have a UK product to field – IMO as with most things in life, there is no “one answer” & it’s a combination of a hundred things; nationalising BAE (had cultural impact we still see in the organisation today), encouraging mergers of UK Defence contractors into one behemoth (reduces competition), ineffective project management, a bloated Civil Service, end of the Cold War, ineffective politicians, reductions in defence spending, public apathy toward defence, no consequences for failing etc. etc.

            As it is, CVR(T) is rolling on for 50(?) years old & we have to replace it. The only way to do that in the timescales we have now, with minimal risk of failing (again!) and with the ability to upgrade it in the future, is to buy a relatively new design off the shelf & adapt it quickly for our needs. I suppose this was the original idea behind ASCOD but it wasn’t designed with the protection they wanted (like others may be) so they figured they could add 12 tonnes of armour(!) without issue. When we look around the products on the market today, the only company that has a modern product that appears to fit the requirements (including heavy armour packs) & have a track record of being able to quickly and effectively integrate kit, seems to be… Rheinmettal. They developed the Lynx on their own dime, leveraging the knowledge gained from Puma programme. Maybe BAE should take note.

            Boxer in Aus – I’ve read some stuff & it’s a little bit about the weight to Lance 2 adding APS, and mostly about can’t fire spike (only an issue in the first ones delivered as a stop-gap), and having to buy ammo & tyres from European sources… APS is not several tonnes so I’m going to call BS on it “being too heavy”. The Aussie Army are saying APS is not required now anyway so my guess is it’s a tweak to the requirements to save some cash.

          • Thanks for all the add-ons, Stu (wow!). Just to pick up on a couple of points… SEP is not a ‘concept’ but a built and tested product – the US had a couple to trial at one point.

            For 8 x 8 info, you have to go to Google Images. Here’s one:

            http://www.military-today.com/apc/sep_8x8.htm

            As you point out, the 6 x 6 is a quite different beast (no hybrid and a modified hull), more down-market then.

            I don’t understand your point about the lack of sprockets to the tracks as I’m no engineer. But are you sure? I don’t read that in the info available.Surely the slippage would be unbearable?

            What BAE has done from its own resources is to develop hybrid-electric drive for the CV-90, presumably built on this technology. I don’t know what stage it’s at though.Ditto the CTA 40. That makes it even more compelling as an Ajax replacement: short-term straight off the shelf, longer term new drivetrain version.
            .

          • “Add-ons”? Apologies, I don’t know what you mean.

            “Concept” – fair point. Should have said working demonstrators.

            Sprocket – My sincere apologies. I read it late last night & in my haste, I misread the article. The tracked version does in fact use a sprocket – neither of us are engineers but looks like we both figured it wouldn’t work without.

            ‘BAE from it’s own resources’ – I don’t know what they did with the tech since SEP but Wiki says “It was originally contracted by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration.” (This would be their version of DE&S) and “Swedish Armed Forces announced the cancellation of the SEP programme” – This sounds like they were doing the development work with Swedish Gov money.

            I have heard BAE sketched out a CV-90 hybrid but have no idea if they did create one. As you rightly say, common sense says for the sketch (and if they make one) they probably used some of the SEP tech for this. For the OMFV programme, they’ve been given a contract for dev work (and should utilise the SEP tech here) but all the sketches I’ve seen don’t appear to be SEP or CV-90 based.

            CV-90 to replace Ajax – agreed. IMO It’s certainly an option that should be explored. As above, my suggestion would be to: ‘Take the working elements off Ajax (gun, cameras etc) & tell BAE (CV90) & Rheinmettal (KF31) they have 3 months to work up design. Pick a winner & get moving.’

            My preference for Lynx is not a love for Rheinmettal (or hatred of BAE), it’s because it seems (from what we in the public are allowed to know) given the higher base weight, to offer the protection the MoD want out of the box whereas CV-90 would likely need a little extra (albeit not the 12T ASCOD needed) added.

            For adding hybrid drive to Ajax replacement – I’d probably say “NO!”. Given the time crunch, let’s keep it simple. CV90/KF31 please & we can worry about adding hybrid etc to next gen/refit.

          • ‘Add-ons’ – badly written phrase by me. Apologies. I meant the additional insights you provided to my original post.

            Funding – I agree with you and understand that the Swedish DMA coughed up for the dev’t costs on the SEP. Which probably means they own the IP. So for BAE to take it anywhere else, they would need consent, and no doubt to pay up for a licence.

            I believe BAE’s OMFV bid is loosely based on the Bradley chassis.

            Ajax replacment – bit of a misunderstaning there too. Again my fault through lack of clarity. I wasn’t suggesting SEP for this, rather as a long-term Ajax replacement replacement. I totally agree with you on the need for a speedy solution now. I wouldn’t even ask the Army what they want – just add Bowman of course and as you suggest transfer across useable items from Ajax, to be determined by minimal interference and expense.
            .

          • Add-ons – thanks. That’s one thing I like about these forums, sharing knowledge.

            Thanks again for introducing SEP. I never knew of it before. The more I read and ponder, the more I like it. Can see why you liked the concept. Just the power train alone is really quite smart; smaller engines, cheaper & easier to maintain, cheaper to replace & upgrade, redundancy (lose an engine & not immobilised). Very cool.

            ‘IP’ – I think more often than not, the contractor would keep this.

            ‘BAE OMFV on Bradley’ – really!? Interesting. I’d say that’s not a great idea unless they’re making it bigger. The US Army have squads of 9 & it only seats 6 so it’s been a complaint for a while.

            Agree with you; long term, SEP technology could/should be applied, maybe they could figure a way to add to whatever replaces Ajax, when it gets cancelled, as an upgrade (probably much harder than I make it sound but I’m thinking of the Type 45 PIP) in future.

          • Looks like we’re tiptoeing towards a broad agreement here, Stu. Which is nice and a good justification for sensible discussion. So thanks for your feedback. Only – as you’ve already gathered – I wouldn’t even include Lynx. Just give a single supplier contract to BAE Hagglunds.

            The other thing no-one has mentioned on here is the one group of stakeholders that is blameless in this fiasco – the several hundred strong workforce. As a UK company, BAE is the only one HMG could do business with to re-instate those 2 GD factories, for the assembly of 500 or so Ajax replacements.

          • I believe we (almost) have an agreed solution. Buy off the shelf, use what we can from Ajax, hybrid later. Now, how do we go about getting the MoD to do our bidding? 😆

            I’m curious – why so down on the Lynx? They could be made in the UK, they could take over the GD factory. If you need a UK contractor, RBSL already exist or they could partner with someone else. Is it a Rheinmettal thing with you or is there something in the design you don’t like?

            Where possible I’d like to see UK owned Co’s get the jobs too. Not BAE if we can avoid it though. The issue I have with UK owned at present is the MoD never seem to see a viable option for the big stuff in the UK, other than BAE. All public sector procurement looks at “risk” & the MoD always see BAE as “safe” because of their size. That means if you want a UK owned Co, you’re dealing with a monopoly. This not only means BAE don’t have any pressure to be efficient/cost-effective, it encourages/causes apathy, inertia and timidity. Ask yourself this: why didn’t BAE include the SEP power tech in the MK4 CV90 already? They already proved the tech. We can both see it’s advantages. A lot of customers would want hybrid. It’s been 20 years & still they haven’t…

            You seem very pro-BAE. Do you work for them perchance? BAE is not & IMO should not be the only Co HMG can do business with. JCB (build armoured engineering kit for the US), Qinetiq, Supacat (SC Group), heck even INEOS created the Grenadier in 4 years from scratch. There are several options with the engineering & PM prowess to make it happen.
            I appreciate the desire to build everything in the UK & support this 100%. The US insist upon it for security reasons, I see no reason we shouldn’t take such things as seriously. In fact, I’d like to see several industies flagged as important to security & prevent their sale to foreign buyers.

      • Stu. You should run for PM mate. Much much much more sensible than all the bafoons in whitehall and all the top brass blithering donkeys in charge at the MOD.

        • 😆 cheers bud but they’ll never let me be in charge. Job 1 would be sacking 10% of civil servants. Job 2 would be sacking another 10%.

      • It’s my choice also. With boxer, challenger 3 being done by rheinmettal and some of the work being done in the U.K. KF31/41 are an obvious choice. For up and coming projects can this also be worked into a bulldog replacement.
        I do hope the army can work out what it wants. They need light stuff also easily deployable and/or get a load more heavy equipment transporters.
        I really hope something from the ajax program is salvageable, hopefully the whole thing.
        Is the heavy armour needed? It can’t stop a missile or a main tank round no matter how heavy

        • My understanding (and I’ve no special knowledge of this) is the up armoured KF31/41 (if you look at various pics & look at the side armour pack, you’ll see some thinner & thicker versions) is actually proof against a lot of main tank rounds across the front arc & against 30-40mm on the sides.
          Is it needed? No idea. I don’t know what the next conflict will look like. Better to have & not need than need & not have IMO.
          Re; bulldog replacement – yes. My thoughts would be a force structure of ‘strike’ with boxer (inc mortar/artillery & 120mm turreted versions) and ‘armoured’ with Lynx providing IFV and APC versions, possibly even some 120mm armed versions to augment C3.
          For the recce solution, create/take turret with all recon systems, comms, cameras etc and slap that onto both boxer and Lynx to serve with each type of brigade.

  12. Here we go again. The whole re structuring of the army in it’s various guises has been a fiasco. Ten years and billions of pounds have been spent achieving ZERO.

  13. I’ve pretty much given up on Ajax at least in its current incarnation, but the delays with Morpheus and LE TacCIS, another £3+ billion programme, are arguably an even more serious problem, also affecting RN and RAF. General Dynamics is the Transition Partner for Morpheus as well. Aren’t they doing well?

  14. Finding it difficult to square PAC statement that December 2022 anticipated as Go/No Go, in light of the BBC Newsite article today stating Army ‘cautiously optimistic’ that Ajax will be in service by 2030.
    Cautious optimism has been extant since 2010, so no change, then.
    But, on that basis, whoever in the MoD makes the 12/22 decision is going to be ‘extremely optimistic’ that they will be nowhere in the vicinity by the end of the decade. So what motivation will they have to call time in a few months?
    I anticipate a Go decision, but am inclined now to say “regrettably”.

  15. I hope the contracts have some way of minimising the nations losses over this dismal project. HMG has an obvious blind spot when public money goes to their mates with little public benefit. Our forces are lacking so much essential stuff yet we spaff vast amounts up the wall uselessly.

  16. Ajax is forcing the MOD and it procurement team to look hard and fast at its requirements.
    AJAX we know, but has to follow a set process, so that if the program fails there is no risk to the UKgovs. Failure in MRA4/Warrior highlighted some big holes in MOD procurement.

    Ajax requires a new hull, as 90% of its vibration issue are related to the bracing of flat panels, issue with this is the internal fit is designed around that Hull and now is fouled by the bracing.

    this is why the MOD is doting I,s and T,s so that if its dumped its at no cost GD have to be given the chance to put i right, at there cost.

    which moves you onto the next procurement which is the Medium Lift helicopter, and its options.
    4 platforms in the running and only one is a proven concept, rest are all twinkles in someone’s eyes.

    So based on the AJAX does the MOD play safe and buy the most suitable, or does it accept something that maybe another pile of rubbish, but has UK Jobs. that is assembling parts made in Europe to a poor standard.

    maybe its time that rather than the Army decide on what it needs, it is told what its getting.

    Oh and just to remember the CV90 and BAEs failed in there Bid for this program because they could not deliver.

    so if you go back is that not 2nd best again

    • Could not deliver what? Where is your source? They have, in fact, delivered a generation of products in the time that this project has been faffing around.

    • “Maybe its time that rather than the Army decide on what it needs, it is told what its getting.”

      So who decides what the Army will get?
      And do the decision makers know what to get?

    • Could the BAE ‘failure’ actually arise from their telling the MOD that what they were asking for could not be delivered in any known hull?

    • “Ajax requires a new hull, as 90% of its vibration issue are related to the bracing of flat panels, issue with this is the internal fit is designed around that Hull and now is fouled by the bracing”.

      1. Does the bracing stop the vibrations?
      2. If it does the internal fit can surely be reconfigured – better option I would say than a completely new vehicle program.
      • All large flat steel panels tend to drum and vibrate if subjected to movement. This is why bulkheads , bracing and pressed indentations are used in vehicles and ships. Seems odd not to build a afv hull without stepped sides !

    • Recce and APC are different roles. As a starting point, maybe. I also heard some negatives on the Puma; serious height restrictions for troops in the back, bad screens, poor situational awareness (badly designed UI). I believe the German Gov have had to allocate a lot of money to try and bring it up to spec. It’s failings are part of the reason Rheinmettal (50% partners on Puma) came out with the Lynx. It’s a Puma with the errors designed out of it.

  17. Maybe it would be easier just to scrap the Army and start over. What public school educated green wearing Donkey thought it was ok to have a contract with 1200 specifications in it.

    • Public school educated army officers are in the minority.

      Army officers do not draw up contracts; DE&S Commercial staff (civil servants) do.

      • DE&S works at the behest of the army officers, I’m pretty sure no one in the civil service came up with 1200 separate requirements. DE&S also works for the RAF and the RN and I have not seen them come up with such convoluted nonsense for the other services. Privately educated army officers should be a minority given private schools make up less than 7% of the country however there numbers especially at upper levels of the army appear to be suspiciously high.

        • An army officer, a Requirements Manager, probably from the RTR or Cavalry, would have written the various Requirements documents, which should have specified the output required and not the method of achieving them. Certain Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) was specified as is usual and there was a proviso that Ajax had to have the CTA40 cannon in commonality with that specified for Warrior upgrade.

          I cannot comment on the fabled 1200 figure (as I do not have the information on this point) or whether RN or RAF projects have a lot of requirements. Requirements documents are very involved and lengthy documents.

          Commercial staff (civil servants) write the requirements in to the contract with industry as a Technical Specification.

          I really do not understand the discussion about which school any army officer in the project may have been to in their childhood. A Requirements Manager would be more likely to have gone to a State school, not that it matters. Are you saying that an officer who went to public school in their teens is somehow going to be less competent in their 30s, 40s or 50s, at Defence procurement than one who went to State school? Surely you would have some evidence to make such a point?

      • I just went through the bio’s of the last 5 heads of the British army and low and behold they all went to private schools. Is that just a coincidence or do you simply think those that attend such schools have a right to rule? Clearly given the mess of the British army not one of these gentlemen was capable or running such an institution. Do you think they perhaps used their privileged birth right to overcome their limitations to rise to the top of an organisation desperately I need of reform.

        • Martin, I’m not sure what ace you’re trying to grind here other than just being bigoted. The Army has a slightly higher proportion of privately educated officers than the other services, but it’s only slight.

          Equipment isn’t the only thing the Army dies and it actually has a very good record of managing its budget vis a vis the other FLCs – and at some pain I might add.

          Your delusional if you think the other FLCs have managed themselves better. The last 5 FSLs and CASs have overseen the greatest reduction in combat power in their services since the war. Why do you think that record is any better than the Army (it’s no worse). Carrier Strike was twice over budget and delivered 10 years late. Nimrod MRA4?! Don’t even need to comment.

        • Martin, you are seriously off-topic. Do you think the last 5 CGSs have anything very much to do with Defence procurement in general or the failing Ajax programme specifically? They will have influence over the future shape of the army and some personal views as to what equipment is required but are not involved in decision-making on procurements.

          Very much aside from Ajax….Promotion in the army does not depend on which school you went to. These officers got to their high rank in a meritocracy, where only performance as stated in an annual report written by their superior and his/her superior is considered by a Board.

          Plenty of people who went to public school do not feel they have a ‘privileged birth right’, or a certainty of fast track promotion in the army or the ability to mis-manage a disastrous procurement programme and make many other poor wide-ranging decisions.

          You seem to want to heap all blame for Ajax on very senior army officers who have nothing to do with the programme. Blame should be laid at many doors for Ajax debacle and that includes: Treasury, Ministers, Industry, DGDQA – as well as those some of those officers in the army who were involved in Requirements, Project Management or those with senior sign-off powers for the programme.

  18. For a change I didn’t read “more agile and lethal” wonder friggin why!!! They can’t bluff there way out of this one surely.

    • People have now seen through the emperors new clothes and can no longer say the rumours are unfounded as my chum at GD says !

  19. This never made sense to me. Never a breakthrough design. Not sourced in UK. weighs and as much as a WW2 Sherman We need something now that shares spares with our other vehicles. The Army must have huge problems with its OOD and unique equipment.

  20. The British Army’s problem is that they have no plan as they’d got by saying we are fighting in iraq and Afghanistan but now that those conflicts are over the British Army has to fight for funding

    • You could argue that the sandbox years were responsible for causing considerable damage to the Army.

      It was ever sharply focused on rotating infantry elements, year in and year out and everything else slowly withered on the vine.

      It was the same with the Royal Marines, it took years to regenerate lost capability, as they effectively became line infantry too and effectively lost their specialised focus on amphibious and commando operations.

      When Afghanistan operations were over, a decision was taken that we couldn’t (or rather wouldn’t) rebuild the pre War on terror capability…

      When you add incompetent tail wagging the dog procurement to the mix, where the most important overriding capability is “build it here and build it from scratch” you have a perfect storm of Fu*k ups!

        • Certainly, the RM’s are back on track, possibly going too far in the Commando direction, in an over correction!

          The slow switch away from operating as a Brigade is worrying, perhaps the sudden need to look once more at the North ( not forgetting it’s about get far bigger with responsibilities coming with Finland and Sweden), we ‘might’ see a 180 degree switch back towards mass again.

          • i am a big fan of the RMC and believe it should be enlarged and given the task of having a brigade in the high north permanently.

            I also think the army need to learn lessons from the RMC and USMC who seem able to adapt to modern tactics and have a plan and set their organisation to deliver that plan. Whether those plans are perfect is another thing, but as Others have pointed out the Army is a paper organisation that seems to think it is double its current size and has not really addressed the fact it is t anymore.

          • Totally agree, I would like to see the Royal Marines expanded to a strength of 10,000, with renewed amphibious shipping as appropriate.

            Add an additional Commando, allowing deployment of a Brigade and a single Commando as the “Marine Raider” Second tier SF element.

            I’ve nothing against the Marine Raider as a concept, it will be needed for the on going war on terror and it will be an excellent ‘ go to’ tool for many world wide tasks.

            But it should be a bolt on addition, not breaking the Brigade role…

        • Well NATO expansion, ramped up threat levels and the war in Ukraine, are increasingly making SDSR 2021 look outdated.

          It looks like the next review might have to think again about force structure, size and more importantly funding….

          • Well it never made sense for me to buy so many Ajax(which should be split in various recon systems not just a tracked one) without a big increase in artillery and attack drone expense.

          • Originally 1,010 Ajax and variants were required – cut to 589 by HM Treasury.
            Certainly agree we need more arty and attack drones.

  21. So which senior managers on this project are getting fired then? If this were in the private sector heads would’ve rolled ages ago.

    • Won’t happen. Even in many private organisations (especially larger ones) in the U.K., it’s hard to get rid of incompetence. Got to follow those ACAS guidelines…. Means you only get potted for gross misconduct, not gross negligence or gross stupidity. It is admittedly worse in public sector though.
      Best we can hope for is they’re moved sideways, not promoted and never given any responsibility to waste money again. But rest assured, we’ll all be paying their fat salaries for years to come.

      • Absolutely, by way of an example, last year I was referred to a private hospital by the NHS for surgery.

        My consultant told me that when they get people coming from the NHS there was always a period of “cultural adjustment” to go through…

        Basically, getting them to understand that they are entirely individually responsible for their actions and there was no longer a monolithic bureaucracy to hide in and be protected by, i.e raise your game!

        I was quite taken back at this, but he did say a proportion of highly qualified individuals, just can’t make the necessary adjustment needed for the private sector and end up going back to the NHS.

        I suppose (big generalisation here) that for some people, they never cut the governmental umbilical cord, i.e, go to play group, school, collage, civil service of one sort or another, all the time under government control.

        Always being told what to do and when to do it, from the age of 3 until 65.

        Living life in such a regimented, controlled way, I suppose it’s not surprising that some folks simply flounder in the private sector.

        • “individually responsible” – careful! Imagine what the nation would look like if everyone took responsibility for themselves & didn’t rely on the Gov. to look after them. 🙄

          “never cut the governmental umbilical cord” – You’re not wrong. Unfortunately this phenomenon is not restricted to those in work…

          What really boggles me is that 1 in 5 (20%!!) of all working people in the UK get their paycheck from the state. “The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy.” ― Oscar Wilde

          • “The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy.” ― Oscar Wilde

            Love it….

          • careful! Imagine what the nation would look like if everyone took responsibility for themselves & didn’t rely on the Gov. to look after them. 🙄

            Wait….the government is looking after people? (Apologies for the flippancy, couldn’t resist…)

          • 😆
            Well, I didn’t say the Gov. was any good at it. Makes me wonder why anyone relies on them.

  22. Reallocate the surveillance and reconnaissance components intended for AJAX to a mission module for Boxer. Since MoD is never going to recoup the money spent, might as well force GD to do the work they couldn’t do with AJAX. I don’t think any “fix” will come without some drawback or capability trade-off. British Army will never get the AJAX to work accordingly, they might as well do what Australians are doing with their Boxers.

    • Well… I spoke to a guy who has just left the Aussie Army (a tanker) and who said that they are really worried about Boxer. In his words, ‘perfect for Mali, but we can’t take it anywhere we actually need to operate. It simply doesn’t cope with wet and hot, when the ground is wet it sucks and the turret makes it too heavy on everything in between!’

      • Fair enough, but the British Army is getting the Boxers starting next year, so that’s better than nothing. The version the Australians got is not what the British Army will be getting and they have not made their decision yet on what turret they are putting on their version. We’ll see where that leads to.

        I’m sure the person that you spoke to has legitimate concerns, but there are multitude of countries that have purchased the Boxers and they have had real world experience in Afghanistan. Which is more than we can say for Ajax.

        I’d be real interested in where this review goes, I truly hope they just end this sad chapter and move on from here.

          • Is that a fact. We must be ordering 3 tranches of Boxer – the first to replace FV430/Bulldog and Saxon (very belatedly); the second for the Strike Brigade(s) and the 3rd to replace Warrior.
            Surely at least the last tranche will sepcify a stabilised cannon of 30-40mm on each wagon?

          • The whole Boxer order seems so wrong. Only 85 are Infantry.

            “Of its 523 Boxer MIVs, the UK will receive 85 infantry carrying vehicles, 60 engineer section vehicles, 62 recce and fire support vehicles, 28 mortar carriers, and 50 equipment support and repair platforms.
            The British Army will also acquire a mix of 123 command and control vehicles and C2-utility vehicles, 19 observation post vehicles, 24 beyond-line-of-sight platforms, 11 electronic warfare & SIGINT (signals intelligence) vehicles and 61 ambulances.
            The UK vehicles Remote Weapon Stations will be equipped with a mix of Heavy Machine Guns (HMG), Grenade Machine Guns (GMG) and General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG).
            Some Boxer variants are also expected to be equipped with Javelin anti-tank missiles that will be capable of being fired from under armour.”

          • Those 85 APCs would equip 3 battalions. Not sure how many battalions are getting Boxer but it will be more than that. This order is just one tranche and I expect there should be 2 more tranches.

      • I have been concerned about Boxer’s mobility in ice, snow and deep glutinous mud for some time. Infantry need a tracked IFV.

  23. Just my 10 bobs worth, but I think we should stop wasting our very limited defence budget on trying to rectify Ajax and buy off the shelf kit that is already tried and tested as we need something that works now not something that might work in 10/15 years time.

  24. Many comments say that Ajax should be replaced by another armed vehicle.

    look further

    Rather than Ajax, we have to go further beyond the necessity of an armed reconnaissance vehicle.

    Russia is already relying on toy drones for bombardment.

    Would you try reconnaissance on a battlefield like this with an armed vehicle?

    British Army already has the latest CAS-capable drone power equivalent to 100 bayractars.

    We need to get rid of the prejudice that we have to rely on armed vehicles for reconnaissance on the battlefield for details.

    In addition to small toy drones that can fly, various countries and companies are testing drones that can be remotely controlled on the ground.

    In reality, the British Army, which invests in drones rather than investing in expensive armored vehicles, and has already established air superiority, is sufficient even if it is an older tank. The main tanks and self-propelled guns on the battlefield will be wiped out by drones. Why do you need an armored vehicle with the latest performance in protection and armament?

    Are you going to wage a war that forces the British Army to win in an environment where they have to die in a war without air superiority?

    Unless it’s a suicide mission in a war without air superiority, you don’t need the latest armored vehicles. In such an environment, even the latest armored vehicles will surely die.

    Why stick with the latest armored vehicles?

    Before sticking to lastest armed vehicle to protect from the enemy’s anti-tank weapons, it is more efficient to invest more in reconnaissance drones that will search and monitor the enemy’s anti-tank weapons in real time.

  25. If the British Army’s air superiority is not broken in any war, there is no reason to spend unnecessarily large sums of money on the latest armed vehicles.

    It is better to buy a small factory for the repair, maintenance and use of older vehicles such as Warriors and Scimitars. -3D printing etc.

    It is more efficient to use a small number of expensive drones that do not require features such as the latest hud for an armed vehicle, and require the latest technology.

    • Do you see no downside to extensive use of drones? They can be shot down or jammed, have limited loiter time and most importantly cannot seize, hold or dominate ground. The army has always had a mix of capabilities to achieve the same task to offset the drawbacks.

      • Why should drones replace reconnaissance of armed vehicles?

        The reason is simple.

        because it’s cheap

        That’s All.

        • Think you’d be putting all eggs in one basket there sir. Whilst there is no denying the day of the drone is upon us, using nothing but drones would be an error.
          We’ve had aircraft over 100 years & there was still a requirement for ground based recon. I don’t see that need changing just because we now have more aircraft in the form of drones. There are ways for people to hide from drones & at some point, someone has to close with & engage the enemy. Having the option of closing from within an armoured box seems a good idea.

  26. I think best for our interest Cancelled this and shift to full medium weight boxer 8 x 8 and tracked replacement Ajax issues. Will more reduce price as lots of order more boxer.

    https://defence-blog.com/rheinmetall-unveils-tracked-version-of-its-boxer-fighting-vehicle/

    Would be good move as 155mm tracked ideal to replacement AS90 and wheeled can shared 155 MM artillery just transferred or needed to use would save logically.

    Also it is could use 40mm CTA turret on boxer mean same company to order reduce lose on some money on Ajax fund.

    120mm MBT version meant could weight save and able transport bit longest range than challenger 2/3 will more help airborne drop tank to support Para or rapid reaction force tank support infantry.

    Meant Challenger 3 will more available toward British army.

    • The boxer’s unit price is 5 million, and the combined total of a large number of non-general purpose vehicle orders will never be cheap.

      The mod order method I’ve seen never gets cheap unless it’s something like cheap beylactar in the first place.
      MOD orders it as if it had to be bought expensive at any cost.

      Rather than relying on a boxer, it’s better to buy a cheap drone made in China that can be used as a surveillance resource for tens of thousands of units priced under £1K per unit.

      Even if the British Army spends from 100,000 to a million, it’s still cheaper than a boxer.

      In addition, as the days of using robot dogs in war are approaching, investing in the latest armed vehicles is simply a waste.

      • Sort agreed with this, I think Polaris or similar combined with drone, faster movement around battlefield. Commando and Para, special force Level but regular level possible we lack.

        I can understand where u come from as I think polaris combined with these

        Use Drone as scout and strike, Loitier drone/weapon and use NLOS like mmp or artillery, brimstone and spear 3 upgrade to NLOS canister launchers, lots of money to better spent on these.

        Like Robotic logistics platform 6×6/tracked and towed platfom, use drone launcher or nlos or mortar whatever is wise money spent.

        Deadly force to combat against.

        But

        they use boxer IFV tracked/wheel and jtvl. sometime imagine if standard infantry or even commando use Boxer

        it is would better choice tracked for go up hill or bog mud or sand, over the fields movement to new position etc set up HQ whatever action need to decide or other etc boxer big meant carry more equipment and personally.

        it would better perform, over we currently have which is obsolete, improvement these is waste money? I don’t think so rather in these over these terrain over polaris or jtlv or 8×8 boxer (they still can but tracked better perform) to assault.

        Only con limited dry ground or road which easy target like Ukraine war. If Dry ground everywhere so Boxer likely waste money. Remember British weather always dry 24/7? No it is wet.

        that why Boxer tracked would make sense to carrier over and can variants task can switch easy and common with 8×8 boxer will save logistics and training, weapon etc all different is tracked and wheel would easy for mechanical engineering. Benefit too.

        Aiax waste money cos keep try fit problem when boxer tracked like beacon to save money move there.

        5 millions maybe expensive but long term more efficient and good logistical, mechanical, support worth over time.

        • The Ukrainian war I saw was not a war on dry land, but a traffic war in which armed vehicles and tanks rushed to the road desperately to avoid wet swamps.

          Heavy armored vehicles and tanks in wet swamps are powerless, contrary to what is known and expected by everyone.

          It’s simple physics.

          As the weight applied to the unit area increases, it becomes difficult to obtain surface tension and friction force.

          = Armed vehicles are powerless on wet ground.

          In fact, in many industrial sites, tracked vehicles weighing less than half the weight of a tank fall out of mud and overturn.

          The latest expensive armed vehicles and tanks are too heavy
          (more than 35 tons, more than 50-60 tons)

          And it’s getting heavier.

          Can Ajax and Boxer stop a toy drone with over 100 grenades?

          What if 1000 drones siege 20-30 armed vehicles and tanks?

          1000 drones at £10k vs Ajax at £5m and 20-30 boxers

          simple economics

          If you need an armed vehicle for the British Army, the M113 will suffice (engine and drone transport upgrade required)

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