U.S. Army General Darryl A. Williams has now assumed command of NATO Allied Land Command from U.S. Army Lieutenant General Roger L. Cloutier Jr. during a Change of Command Ceremony at NATO General Vechi Akin Garrison.
With military leaders from across the NATO Alliance, diplomats, LANDCOM staff and distinguished members of the local community in attendance, Gen. Williams spoke about his return to Izmir and how excited he is to serve again as the LANDCOM Commander.
“I am privileged to once again join this outstanding team, and to reconnect with this beautiful country of Türkiye,” Gen. Williams said.
“As the Commander of LANDCOM and U.S. Army Europe and Africa, my main effort is readiness. To provide readiness to the alliance. Our forces number one job is to be ready – to be able to defend our freedoms and interests wherever and whenever necessary. This will always be my focus as your Commander.”
NATO say here that the Change of Command Ceremony is a critical cornerstone for a headquarters as it represents the responsibility, authority and accountability of the command, and ensures the unit and its soldiers are never without official leadership.
“Today’s ceremony was presided over by Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. Army Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli. During his address, Gen. Cavoli thanked Gen. Cloutier for his relentless pursuit of excellence, his distinguished service and lasting impact on the men and women that served for and along side him.”
Gen. Cavoli also reiterated to those present on the strength and resolve of NATO.
“This Alliance is the greatest alliance in human history. We deter and we defend the entire European land area. And right now our task has become ever more important in response to the illegal and unprovoked Russian invasion to Ukraine. LANDCOM leading the way has been central to adopting NATO’s posture to ensure we remain ready to deter and defend.”
General Williams is the sixth commander to take the leadership reigns at LANDCOM, and the first four-star to do so. He currently commands U.S. Army Europe and Africa in Wiesbaden, Germany, and was previously the first African American Superintendent of the United States Military Academy.
Nice selection of stories this morning, @George.
Do you have anything on the Sky scoop wrt the RAF allegedly freezing recruitment of white men in order to prioritise diversity targets?
In the press it’s going to be framed as part of a partisan political argument in a descending spiral, and I’d welcome a (partial?) confirmation or debunking from the less partisan coverage here.
here.https://news.sky.com/story/raf-pauses-job-offers-for-white-men-to-meet-impossible-diversity-targets-12674409
I’m cynical enough to think it’s exactly what could happen, or could equally well be leaked as a distraction.
At a time when apparently we have ~7 F35B to go between two aircraft carriers, only 60 airworthy Typhoons out of the 175 bought – and those do not have the latest radars – and the Herc fleet being run down, the issue really is how many pilots are we training? The general public is not allowed to know (can’t possibly rock the boat old boy) but you can bet your bottom dollar that the Russians certainly do.
The last thing the RAF needs now is wokery from the senior ranks
Well said that man!
I hope you both have your tin hats ready… how very dare you question this sort of thing…
There is a Gramscian neo-Marxist Revolution going on upper classes of society Every one in top management has to be woke. This is not only only RAF.
Why do you think they got there?
From the top Radakin…
It’s quite funny if you consider the class of our latterday Revolutionaries.
Not a few of them are aristocrats or top tier wealthies who don’t seem to have any problem at all with their own status.
My favourite was the family of one of Corbyn’s sidekicks who previously sold off a Picasso and made £50m.
It is the so called “Luxury Beliefs” one of ways for the elite to distinguish from the crowd.
It is clear in human psych that after getting rich(bourgeoise) people want to justify their existence by establishing a ruling class (aristocracy/religion). Politics is the last religion.
Maybe white working class are not interested to join the RAF or the pay isn’t good enough in this post pandemic inflation world? The RAF if it has no budget to increase pay will resort to engage ethnic minorities who are willing to take up the job, if it does not, it will be accused of failure. Maybe he saw a better recruitment response from the ethnic minorities that are British ? I see nothing wrong with this at all! Ethnic minorities already serve in the navy and army and they are British citizens many died for Britain
Nobody anywhere is saying they shouldn’t…No- one anywhere is requesting any discrimination or ‘positive bias’ (which is the same thing) …unless , of course , this is true in which case the RAF are . If you see nothing wrong in that – then ask yourself this…Would you feel the same way if they decided not to employ BAME candidates using the same criteria. Its a sad indictment of the indoctrination into all walks of life of this subvervise and divisive so called ‘diversity’ mantra.
Bravo. Nail on head. If it was no BAME there would be riots in the streets and a melt down in Labour,the Guardian, the SWP, BLM,and all the rest.
As it is, in a nation 84% or something white, and that is discriminated against excluding the very people who make up the majority of your force and the people it recruits from??
This nations gone wrong, badly.
Let’s choose the right people, not exclude based on any colour.
“If it was no BAME there would be riots in the streets and a melt down in Labour,the Guardian, the SWP, BLM,and all the rest.”
Are you proposing that we get rid of all the minorities?
No! 🙄 I’m saying look at the headlines if the RAF introduced a no BAME policy for recruitment.
There would be outrage, rightly.
Why is anyone surprised when it’s the other way round people are angry.
Cheers DM,
Personally I’m always uncomfortable with any situation where a certain group is excluded but context is always important. It’s undeniably that well qualified minorities have always been passed over for certain positions whether in the military or the larger society. Policies intended to make a more fair and equitable system is not necessarily discrimination against a particular group, unless the goal is to cynically say… too bad if you’re not a white male. It’s also quite telling that the whenever we see a minority getting one of these positions, the almost reflexive response of many on this board is to dismiss it as a “diversity hire” or standards being lowered. As it is inconceivable to them that that person might actually be the most qualified.
Again, I appreciate your response as I know this is a very sensitive and uncomfortable subject to discuss for many but I also think it is critical that good intentioned people discuss openly and honestly.
Of course. 👍
“Would you feel the same way if they decided not to employ BAME candidates using the same criteria”
Hasn’t that always been the case historically, or are we pretending things have always been equal for minorities?
One hundred per cent agreement from me David but points not always well received.😉
Would love to see an article on Russian threats to take down an RAF Rivet Joint planned flight.
Shhh – somebody probaby decided on the “provocative” flightpath specifically to goad the Russians into lighting up the skies with radars etc – we get the locations, power curves and characteristics of their systems – The Russians do it all the time to us with their Bear flights near Scotlands’ airspace
I note Gen. Williams is focused on readiness. On the face of it this a good thing, but I wonder what that means for those NATO forces not included as part of the high readiness NATO Response Force (NRF).
Expanding the NRF from its initial 40,000 to a planned 300,000 is a good move but I worry that nations will rob Peter to pay Paul i.e. they will focus their spending on their contribution to the NRF at the expense of the rest of their forces. Such a trend will rob nations and NATO of depth. Never a good thing in an uncertain world.
I remember a story from the late 1930’s when RAF squadron readiness was measured by the availability of aircraft. This meant that those squadrons that limited their flying time could reduce the wear and tear on their aircraft and so apparently achieve very high readiness rates. Those squadrons lucky enough to have a commander who thought in terms of ‘effectiveness’ got on and trained their pilots even though their apparent readiness was lower.
I hope there is a more balanced approach to the overall Measure of Effectiveness for the Alliance than the Readiness of the NRF something that includes being able to fight over an extended period of time. If the West should learn anything it is that any war can last a lot longer than next Christmas..!
I know the Russian’s have apparently shot their bolt in the Ukraine, but they will learn lessons of one sort or another, and they have their mates in Beijing…
Cheers CR
Readiness is of course important for all NATO assigned (or potentially assigned forces) not just those held at high readiness.
Very good point you make that the definition of readiness has to be a good one and which cannot be fudged.
I remember the days of the NATO Operational Readiness Test (ORT) in Germany – that was a much feared and quite effective way to assess readiness.
Hi Graham,
I think there are lessons to be learnt from Ukraine already and one of them is the need for depth of forces held at deliberately different readiness levels.
At one extreme there are the high readiness formations, but what about the follow on units – including those that do not yet exist.
I raise this because I think the big lesson from the Ukraine War is that countries, nations, just do not stop fighting because the ammo runs out. That was the working assumption for NATO governments it seems. I know many said that had NATO and the Warsaw Pact come to blows it would have ended after a couple of weeks, something I never really believed. Unless it went nuclear, obviously.
So if we assume NATO gets into a fight with a peer enemy that doesn’t go nuclear but instead drags on into months at least there is going to be a scramble to generate forces to continue the fight. These forces might actually end up being equipped with ‘simpler’ equipment and trained to fight differently.
I think NATO countries should have plans in place to start to call up and train replacement forces and these plans need to be stress tested in some way. THey would also need to include industrial mobilisation!
The ‘readiness’ element doesn’t just come down to how quickly training units can be generated from standing forces / reservists needed to train the ‘people’s army’ but also what can be produced to equip them and designing tactics to make the most of the capability. Basically, if the, you know what, hits the fan then NATO will need to respond very quickly on a whole set of different levels from quick reaction, through second echelon to irregular and volunteer / conscript forces.
I don’t see any kind of readiness to undertake that kind of mobilisation planning and training, In fact, I strongly suspect that since the end of the Cold War governments have dismissed the idea that such a need even exists anymore!
Ukraine has managed to generate new forces in part thanks to a very significant response from the West, but also thanks to the UK and US training 10’s of thousands of Ukrainian troops since 2014 and even more since the war started… ergo a blue print for NATO I’d suggest.
Cheers CR
Hi CR, I left the army in Sep 2009 so may be a bit out of date but there was a system of formations and units (or Force Elements) being ascribed a required Readiness number from R1 to R15 which was all about a Readiness To Deploy (RTD), as I recall, that indicated how quickly a unit could ‘get out of the door’. I would be surprised if this (or similar) no longer exists. So, not just high readiness forces had a set RTD ‘target’ but all units in the Field Force.
Not sure what you mean about units that do not yet exist?
I have never considered a scenario when the ammunition runs out, but I don’t see how you could continue to fight if that happened (unless you acquired any compatible munitions of allies or the enemy).
In the days of the Cold War, it was not generally thought that WW3 (an invasion of Germany by the Soviets) might end by one side running out of munitions. The Warsaw Pact (WP) may well have used chemical and/or biological weapons on an opportunist basis but then I think that tactical nuclear release would have been initiated by ‘the West’. Gen Hackett supposed in his book ‘The Third World War’ that a WP advance would indeed end in weeks/months and that they would not get further than about Krefeld in the west or the Netherlands in the NW. But that is all history now.
A conventional war between NATO and a peer opponent that dragged on would certainly require reinforcement and possibly by units with simpler equipment if we are pressed to, albeit they would be unlikely to be deployed well forward where their simpler equipment could be overmatched.
We are not talking about Battle Casualty Replacements here ie replacing individuals.
There are of course two sources of national reinforcements to augment and/or replace Force Elements who deployed early to a warfighting operation against a peer opponnent – ie follow-on forces – lower readiness regular units and Army Reserve units. Individual Reservists could be called up in extremis, but this is ‘penny packets’. I guess you are concerned that this would not not deliver enough manpower?
Conscription at the ‘eleventh hour’ seems very unlikely and will not prove effective. I am sometimes envious of countries that can mobilise large numbers of citizens who have had military training (Every Swiss male under 50 is a reserve soldier in Switzerland).
Hi Graham,
Thanks for the reply, appreciated and interesting.
I suppose my concern is that any future peer on peer conflict between NATO and a.n.other could last years a la WW1 or WW2. The conflict in Ukraine and the Ukrainian response is highlighting that modern high intensity wars between technically advanced nations is still possible.
Whilst I was working in Operational Analysis for the MoD I heard more than a few talk about the ‘2 week’ war. I never believed it. From my experience I believe that these are planning assumptions built into the government planning and I don’t think the UK is the only country in this position.
As for my point about ammunition supplies? Well it was reported on the BBC that a Rheinmetall executive had stated off the record that the West was struggling to or couldn’t meet Ukraine’s ammunition needs. Of course, the clarity of that statement is muddied by the fact that Ukraine now uses Russian and Western weapon systems. However, the full statement stongly implied that our manufacturing capacity had adapted to the post Cold War ‘reality’. Just look at the UK’s ammunition supply chain – it is full of holes! We rely on others for our artillery ammunition, for example. Oh yeh, and the guns as well… However, dumb shells is probably not where the supply constraints would first be noticed rather it would be the complex guided weapons where the issues would first arise. Take Shorm Shadow. As far as I am aware that is not currently in production, although production could probably be re-started. Even so I bet we could easily fire them off at high value targets faster than they can be built.
Also my big underlying concern is that NATO isn’t just facing Russia. Given that declared ‘friendship’ between Russia and China I think we are already facing a new Axis of sorts. The time we should really get nervous will be when some Chinese troops or naval units join Russian forces on exercise west of the Ural Mountains – and don’t go home again afterwards… That situation could arise very quickly indeed, just look how quickly the Ukraine War sneeked but on us a few months warning – no where near enough warning for the West to adequately rearm and scale up.
We’re not just talking re-building the armed forces, but also rebuilding the industrial base needed to support them and that could take 10years as a minimum, because it takes at least that long to train the engineers you need to design, develop, build and test all the kit that will be needed to equip the enlarged forces. These are the units I refer to when I talk about future units.
In the end I think the only difference between our points of view is that I think that any future peer on peer conflict between NATO and a.n.other(s), assuming we avoid blowing the world up, will grind on and will ultimately come down to volunteer / conscript forces – so we will need a significant re-industrialisation an dit will need to be done in a ‘green’ manner as well, as Climate Change is going to turn the geopolitical tension up unless we doing something soon.
On the plus side, given the way industry rallied to meet the Covid threat, I think it could be done but it would seriously benefit from a pre-conflict headstart and some seriously good political leadership in the West. Sadly, I don’t see either coming along anytime soon, but there is still a little time left.
Cheers CR
Hi CR, I always like reading your posts. I think we agree. Gen Sanders talked of our ‘1937 moment’ – I reflect that a Rearmament committee (Defence Requirments Committee) met in Nov 1934 to look at preparedness to wage a war against 2 major powers (Germany and Japan) and rearmament was well under way in 1935. By late 1937 we were halfway there and the Hurricane was in squadron service and the Spitfire had been demonstrated to the public and full scale production was weeks away. We went on to win the Battel of Britain with these 2 aircraft and would not have done so without them. We thus had 5 years of prep time before WW2.
I have always been shocked by those who think that peer-peer warfare is somehow a thing of the past , especialy for advanced nations. That really is letting your guard down. Boris said that the days of tank battles was over before the Ukraine war. Also naiive to suppose that a modern war would last about 2 weeks – why? Alarming if that came from OA experts. I recall Defence Planning Assumptions but never was close to the subject. I am sure DPAs for WW3 in Europe in the Cold War era would have assumed conflict between WP and NATO for more than 2 weeks.
Ammunition – I recall using poor quality Indian SAA ammunition, and was shocked that much of UK’s SAA ammunition was bought from overseas as RO was privatised and no longer under Govt control. Why and how was that allowed to happen? We have allowed UK’s AFV production facilities to ‘wither on the vine’ too due to lack of orders for new kit or overhauling vehicles at Level 4. It makes sense that the RN warships have to be UK-built. This protection was needed elsewhere in defence for equipments and ammunition. There was always merit in retaining government armaments factories, but to allow them to do ‘civvy’ work during the time of low MoD orders.
I would not be surprised if high tech munitions supply was weak. We will presumably have small stockpiles of expensive munitions. We do need large stockpiles of cheaper, dumb munitions to offset such a situation.
Volunteers – I could not see many young people volunteering to serve their country in WW3 as happened at the outbreak of WW1 (and less so for WW2).
Conscription might be a necessity but it currently takes Capita a year to recruit someone and then the Combat Infantrymans Course is 26 weeks long to turn out a basic line infantry soldier – I am sure a few corners could cut!
Hi Graham,
Just to clarify the point about the two week war. I got into OA post Cold War. The idea that the WP / NATO conflict would last two weeks was “historical” by that time and based on Cold War ammunition stockpiles and anticipated usage rates. Most agreed that both the WP and NATO would “throwing crumpets” (see the film Sink the Bismark for quote 🙂) at each other… or it would go nuclear.
That seemed to have carried over into the post Cold War planning assumptions and these are set by the grown ups, not the OA specialists. Most of us were sceptical for the simple reason that if two sides want to have a go at each other they’ll find a way!
The problem is that war, to quote Clausewitz, “is a continuation of policy by other means”. So if your policy is based on an unrealistic assumption that wars of national survival are a thing of the past you start to plan for winable wars only. This in turn means that in defence procurement you end up with unrealistic campaign scenarios against which to justify your procurements. So you end up being prepared to enter wars that you can’t loose militarily. Which means if a peer on peer war comes along lots of politicians quickly end up with cold sweats…
Another biiiiggg problem is it will now take far longer to rearm than it did in the 1930’s. Why? Well park a Spitfire next to a Typhoon and take the covers off. Anyone with with a mechanical bent will be able to understand how the Spitfire works – the Typhoon will be a mystery.
In OA the words complicated and complex have very different meanings. A mechanical watch is complicated as it is entirely deterministic i.e. a spring, a whirly thing and a bunch of cogs that when you wind the spring will tell you the time. Anything controlled by millions of lines of software risks unanticipated outcomes because it is impossible for one person to understand the whole, unlike the watchmaker who understands well how the watch works. Modern defence equipment is complex, whereas WW2 kit was complicated. Modern equipment is therefore blinking difficult and challenging to develop. The reasearch and development program that lead to the SAMPSON radar went through at least two trials and development generations before SAMPSON was built – which was another reason supporting the short war idea.
So my reading of any future peer on peer war is that it would start of with expensive and complex kit operated by highly trained people fighting at high intensity. That would likely slow down quite quickly as both sides run out of the initial head of steam. Numbers would be made up with people who have been trained to do a job and perhaps only that job to save time. Replacement equipment would be limited to the simpler to use and build stuff, towed tube attillery and NLAW type weapons, for example. New kit would be designed with advanced tech, because that is what the engineers know but there would be less new stuff and or it would have less tech in it as the engineers rushed stuff out of the door that they could have confidence that it worked! So they would either reuse stuff already developed, particularly software, or would chuck loads of nice to have capability out and focus on what had the biggest impact on the battlefield to speed up production. As the national economy is fully mobilised more complex systems might well make a reappearance if the war dragged on without going nuclear.
This is just my take based on what is happening in Ukraine and WW2, which was the last time we fought a war of national survival.
Cheers CR
Yep CR. I agree with all of that!
They already seem to have managed to lose the Head of Recruitment and a female Group Captain over this bit of over ambitious self-flagellation.
Ooops.