Some critics view aircraft carriers as expensive “white elephants,” questioning their relevance in modern defence and highlighting their substantial costs.
In an age of cyber threats, asymmetric warfare, and advanced missile technology, some argue that these vast ships may be vulnerable or even unnecessary. Yet, for the United Kingdom, aircraft carriers remain essential, I’ll explain why.
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Far from being outdated, these formidable vessels are a cornerstone of Britain’s defence strategy and its influence on the global stage. Aircraft carriers offer unmatched mobility and operational flexibility, enabling the projection of power across vast distances without reliance on foreign bases.
They are tools of diplomacy, showcasing resolve, strengthening international partnerships, and safeguarding the UK’s economic and security interests.
The Basics
At their core, aircraft carriers are unmatched for their versatility. These vast ships, with their full-length flight decks, essentially function as mobile airbases capable of deploying fighter jets and helicopters wherever needed. This mobility provides a distinct advantage: the ability to operate in international waters, close to areas of interest or conflict, without requiring diplomatic permissions for airspace or basing rights.
The Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers—HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales—bring this flexibility to life. Both are designed to operate F-35B Lightning II stealth jets, giving Britain a cutting-edge capability for precision strikes, reconnaissance, and air superiority missions. Their ability to launch and recover aircraft quickly from anywhere at sea makes them indispensable in crises.
But their significance extends beyond combat. These ships can also carry helicopters and deliver humanitarian aid, host medical facilities, and act as command centres for joint operations. Whether it’s disaster relief or combat operations, an aircraft carrier’s adaptability makes it a versatile asset for Britain’s defence and foreign policy.
Securing Economic Lifelines
Maritime trade is the lifeblood of Britain’s economy. With 90% of the world’s goods transported by sea, the stability of major shipping lanes is critical for economic prosperity. Aircraft carriers, as the centrepiece of Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), provide the muscle to ensure that vital sea lines of communication remain open and secure from threats, whether they come from hostile states or non-state actors.
Britain’s global interests are particularly vulnerable in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, where disputes over freedom of navigation frequently arise. A carrier at sea is a reassurance to allies and a signal to adversaries that Britain has the capability—and the will—to protect its interests.
For the UK, whose economy depends on uninterrupted trade routes, the presence of a carrier isn’t just a matter of national pride—it’s a practical necessity. In regions where disruptions to maritime traffic could ripple through global markets, Britain’s carriers stand ready to safeguard economic stability.
A Diplomatic Tool and Strategic Deterrent
The 1972 deployment of HMS Ark Royal to Belize is a textbook example of how aircraft carriers balance diplomacy and defence to deliver strategic impact. At the time, tensions were running high between Belize and Guatemala, with the latter claiming the British colony. Belize, with its modest defence capabilities, faced a serious threat from its far larger neighbour.
The UK’s response was to send Ark Royal, then the pride of the Royal Navy, to the region. The carrier’s arrival sent a clear and immediate message: Britain would stand by Belize and was prepared to defend its interests. With its complement of aircraft, including Phantoms and Buccaneers, Ark Royal represented a level of firepower Guatemala could not hope to counter. Its very presence effectively deterred any plans of aggression, proving how carriers act as both a shield and a statement of intent.
But Ark Royal wasn’t just flexing muscle, the deployment also had a strong diplomatic element. By supporting Belize’s limited defence forces and engaging in regional cooperation, the carrier showcased Britain’s commitment to stability in the Caribbean.
It was a clear demonstration of the UK’s ability to project power and influence far from home without firing a shot, and the cost of the carrier was very low compared to the cost in treasure and blood of conflict.
HMS Ark Royal’s mission in Belize shows why aircraft carriers remain so relevant. They’re versatile tools of diplomacy, capable of preventing conflicts while strengthening alliances. It’s a reminder of the unique role carriers play in safeguarding Britain’s interests on the global stage.
Operational Independence
One of the most compelling strengths of an aircraft carrier lies in its unparalleled independence and operational flexibility. Unlike land-based airfields, which require permission from host nations and are often tied to complex diplomatic negotiations, carriers bring the advantage of mobility and autonomy. They are essentially floating cities, equipped with all the essentials to sustain extended deployments—fuel, food, spare parts, ordnance, and even advanced medical facilities. This self-sufficiency allows them to remain on station for weeks or even months, responding to crises without reliance on external support.
This independence translates into rapid response capability. Britain’s carriers can be deployed quickly to areas of need, bypassing the logistical and political hurdles that often accompany the use of foreign airfields. In times of tension, this means that a carrier can be positioned to de-escalate a situation or enforce international norms, such as no-fly zones or maritime blockades, without waiting for diplomatic approvals.
Perhaps even more significant is the reach these vessels provide. With the majority of the world’s population living near coastlines, carriers serve as platforms for projecting power into critical regions. They enable Britain to deliver air power directly from the sea, ensuring that geography is no obstacle to the nation’s ability to act decisively.
Whether providing humanitarian relief in the wake of natural disasters, enforcing international law in contested waters, or carrying out precision strikes in conflict zones, a carrier brings a level of adaptability that few other assets can match.
Challenges and Investments
Operating aircraft carriers is no small feat. These ships rank among the most expensive assets in any navy’s arsenal, demanding vast resources for construction, maintenance, and the intensive training required to operate them effectively. However, the benefits they deliver justify the significant investment, offering unmatched flexibility, reach, and strategic value.
As Ray Mabus, former US Secretary of the Navy, famously noted, “They get there sooner, stay there longer, bring everything they need, and don’t have to ask anyone’s permission.” This autonomy and capability make carriers indispensable assets for any nation seeking to maintain influence on the global stage.
The Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class carriers embody a forward-looking approach, designed to remain in service for at least half a century. This long-term commitment ensures that Britain will retain a key element of its maritime power well into the 21st century.
Britain has worked hard to regain its carrier-operating expertise following a gap in operations after the retirement of its previous large carriers. Significant investment has been made in training the next generation of naval aviators and deck crews, often in collaboration with allies like the US Navy. Facilities have been modernised, and operational frameworks developed to ensure that these state-of-the-art vessels remain at the forefront of maritime innovation.
These efforts reflect not just a commitment to maintaining carrier capability but also an acknowledgement of their central role in projecting Britain’s power, securing trade routes, and responding to global crises. Despite the challenges, the Royal Navy is ensuring that its carriers are not just relevant but evolving assets for decades to come.
Britain ‘assessing options’ to increase air wing of carriers
The Point
Aircraft carriers are far more than floating airstrips. They are symbols of national power, tools of diplomacy, and guarantors of economic security. For Britain, an island nation with global ambitions and responsibilities, the importance of these vessels cannot be overstated.
In an unpredictable world, aircraft carriers give Britain the ability to respond to crises, protect its interests, and project influence far beyond its shores. They ensure freedom of navigation, deter potential aggressors, and enhance Britain’s standing as a leader on the international stage. Simply put, aircraft carriers are not just essential to Britain—they are indispensable to its future.
Will the Type 31s be used for CSG work? Their CAMM-MR would provide useful bulk for air defence work.
No official intention to procure CAMM-ER/MR at any point yet. Chatter in some army forums has suggested ER variant as well as the larger Giraffe S has been on the cards and may end up in inventory as a short term stop gap to some air defense shortfalls although nothing official as of yet.
The SDR is focusing heavily on air defences across the board so we’ll have to wait and see what happens, we are co-developing MR with Poland so it would make sense to end up procuring the missile later on. Besides the point, having a dual packed medium range SAM for naval vessel could give our up coming frigates a high level of area air defense and take a lot of strain off of the destroyer fleet, could have the T-31 packing 32 CAMM, 16 MR and the twin 40mms for a very potent defensive vessel – even if they only get 16 MK-41 cells that would still be practical, if the full 32 get bought they could carry 16 cruise missiles on top of that. The intention for T-31 was always to use them more as patrol frigates for second line roles, think Red Sea merchant escorts and Hormuz patrols, whilst T-26/45 can be retained for TAPS, CSG escorts and serious front line taskings – although as history shows second line vessels often end up alongside the capital ships and with a smaller fleet that is to be expected now regardless.
It would seem ridiculous to spend all that money and time developing a medium range SAM compatible with Sky Sabre to then not procure it. It would be a strong boost to GBAD without being incredibly expensive.
BOOM! from George.
Totally agree.
Yes, a very nice read George. I think the two carriers and their F35Bs will be even more important if any of the UK’s land based airfields ever become inoperative in a conflict with maybe damaged runways, hangars etc. As Daniele said a little while back, the carriers are the two best airfields the UK has , even in isolation, with three Phalanx’s, ECM, decent radars and all the F35Bs. Have to laugh.. the best shorad/gbad (or sbad?) is all at sea!
Carriers only work when they are the centrepiece of much bigger picture, but the RN has not been broken or distorted due to the carriers as many critics seem to state.
The woes of the services in general can be blamed on a decade of having to fund high intensity COIN operations and absolutely terrible procurement practices.
We have a defence budget heading towards £60 billion and yet the outputs are poor and getting worse due to abysmal waste on ever changing requirements, consultancy fees, private contracting and a lack of long term planning, save a penny today to spend a pound tomorrow ethos.
Whilst I totally agree with every word I am afraid I think at least one carrier will be gone within a decade. The run down of the military in the last quarter of a century is going to continue as the U.K. economy shrinks still further. Our GDP per capita ranks us at around 26th and falling and the nonsense of quoting ourselves as having the 6th largest economy means absolutely nothing as your average person feels and is becoming poorer when compared to other nations.
Until we have a Government and the country at large that recognises we need to make and sell more to support our spending I see little prospect of any real improvement. The fourth pillar of defence is economic strength.
The Government statement in 2034 will note we have today dispensed with some legacy equipment that is no longer fit for the challenges of modern warfare and saved £1Bn, which will be reinvested in new equipment when we can decide what that is.
I hope I am totally wrong.
Your assessment is somewhat skewed to try and fit your argument and all you are doing is adding to the narrative that we are becoming irrelevant. Not true. We are not 26th in the GDP per capita rankings, we are 20th (latest figures). Before you say that isn’t much better, the per Capita figure is misleading not the economy size, so total reverse to your argument. We sit at 20th just a smidge down from Germany, who are at 16th and who are the others in the Capita rating who are above us and therefore according to you, means they have more economic muscle and power, well top is Luxembourg, but above us we have a complete set of military powerhouses, from Singapore, Ireland, Iceland and many others similar. The US are 6th on the list, I don’t think the 5 above it or the 20 below combined could beat the US. Britain has a large population and a huge economy, those are what you need. The issues are do do with will, and poor governments making poor decisions, not us fading into obscurity. Stop moaning.
Aircraft carriers appear to be the new dreadnoughts, they’ve had their day, a determined enemy will put them on the bottom before you can say ‘drone swarm fodder’
Technology is moving through Moore’s law like a Californian shoplifter through a Target.
The argument has as much relevance as line or Collumn or for a better anology, crossing the T.
We might as well deploy longbowmen against the bear and dragon.
How else can a naval force counter threats beyond the horizon?
Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a critically important mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation if operating any distance from friendly air bases.
The carrier puts fighters in close proximity to the assets or area to be defended without needing an excessive number of aircraft, and Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft carrying anti ship missiles are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows. Airborne radar can see far beyond the radar horizon of shipborne ones and can detect low altitude targets at range, and fighters provide the means for interception and visual identification beyond the horizon, and engagement far beyond the range of shipborne missile systems.
Constant ASW helicopter operations are best supported by a large deck with multiple helicopters, as collocating them simplifies coordination, communications, and maintenance and support. Physics also shows that modern long range sonars fitted to ASW warships need to be used in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential – and vice versa. As with all such detection systems (radar/sonar/optical) there is trade off between range and resolution. The long range sonar provides long range detection, and the dipping sonar provides pinpoint accuracy.
Speed/Time/Distance considerations and radar/radar horizon matter!
Carriers are fine to have, but a carriers not much good and our case two, without aircraft, neither has even half the aircraft they were designed to carry, nor decent defence to protect them, add it that we don’t have anywhere near enough ships that deploy with a carrier group, and have to rely heavily on other Nato countries, to supply ships, to travel with our carriers. Most of the British Navy ships have been sitting in port for years some since 2010 waiting for engine parts. For decades various UK governments have been cutting back on basics that each of the 3 services need to run effectively, and using antiqued methods of buying instead of allowing our military to buy of the shelf proven systems. Just so their “pals”,get the big contracts, and we then get sh1t service in return. No accountability at government lvl, for massive waste. And no danger of any of them losing their jobs, or going to jail for miss-management of Taxpayers money.
Few would argue that carrier borne airpower is unimportant. My concern from the announcement of the final design was that we had gone way beyond a larger replacement for the Invincibles. I was convinced that the costs would vastly exceed the original budget and that the F35 commitment would limit us to a single combat aircraft over whose development we would have no control. In the event, the build costs rose from £3.5b to £7.6b and the F35 has been an appallingly slow programme..
To date we have, after spending £16b + on carriers and aircraft, the capacity to operate @ a dozen combat aircraft, and these still only capable of launching a single type of bomb and AAMs similar to those the Harriers carried.
For around a third of the QE cost, Italy has acquired Cavour and Trieste,, able to operate F 35s in numbers similar to those we are likely to achieve for years to come.
The RN lobbied hard for the QEs, variously arguing we needed to generate sorties at similar levels to USN supercarriers( West) and that once committed, any government would have to find extra money for more escorts (Zambellas).
The first was untrue the second naive to the point of stupidity. The escort fleet is down to a handful of available ships.
To give Britain a carrier capability we actually needed could and should have been done far more cheaply. The original 30/40000 ton design, capable of carrying similar aircraft numbers to the Invincibles would have been perfectly adequate.