The Government has insisted it remains realistic and strategically necessary for the Royal Navy to deploy an Astute-class submarine to Australia under the AUKUS partnership, despite concerns over the size and availability of the UK’s attack submarine fleet.

The issue was raised during a Defence Select Committee session by Labour MP Emma Lewell-Buck, who warned that recent periods without a single UK nuclear-powered attack submarine at sea risked undermining security in the Euro-Atlantic at a time of heightened Russian activity and growing pressure from the United States for Europe to shoulder more of the burden.

Lewell-Buck questioned whether committing to a rotational deployment from Western Australia made sense given the strain on the fleet, noting that the Royal Navy operates six Astute-class submarines, with one publicly known to be out of action. She argued that sending one to Australia would leave the UK increasingly exposed in critical areas such as the GIUK gap.

Luke Pollard, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, acknowledged the concern but defended the plan, confirming that the first UK rotation is scheduled for 2026 and remains a core planning assumption. He declined to comment directly on submarine availability but stressed that the deployment was central to the success of AUKUS. Pollard told the committee that the rotation was designed to help Australia develop the practical skills needed to dock, maintain and operate nuclear-powered submarines, including those based on UK design principles.

“There will be rotations between a UK Astute boat and the Virginia-class American submarine operating out of Western Australia,” he said. “That will build the knowledge that the Australians will need to operate those boats, and in particular for a UK context, understand how they would operate a UK-designed and operated boat.”

Pollard added that the deployment would also generate training benefits for the Royal Navy that could be brought back to the Euro-Atlantic theatre. Pressed again on whether the UK could afford to spare a submarine given current threats, Pollard was unequivocal.

“Yes, it is realistic,” he said. “It is in the planning assumption for the Royal Navy that we will participate in the rotational forces. It is key to the delivery of the AUKUS programme, and we are maintaining our ability to deliver the tasks asked of our submarine fleet.”

The exchange then turned to the Government’s longer-term ambition to expand the attack submarine force to up to 12 boats under the Strategic Defence Review. Lewell-Buck cited evidence from former Cabinet Secretary Sir Simon Case, who had expressed doubts about the feasibility of the timeline. Pollard accepted that the ambition was conditional and dependent on major industrial improvements, particularly at BAE Systems’ Barrow-in-Furness shipyard.

“To deliver those 12, a number of things have to be true,” he said. “We need a new submarine emerging every 18 months. That depends on skills, housing, education and transport in Barrow. That is what Team Barrow is designed to address.”

He also highlighted the importance of sustaining the existing fleet through investment in Devonport, described as a “Team Plymouth” approach, and pointed to the £9 billion Unity contract with Rolls-Royce to underpin reactor production. While acknowledging the scale of the challenge, Pollard argued that demand for hunter-killer submarines was only increasing and justified the Government’s focus on expanding output across the entire supply chain.

George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison

58 COMMENTS

  1. The UK Government never ceases to amaze me. Its open source information that our Sub fleet is not exactly in a great position, but sending one to the other side of the world to meet the needs of the AUKUS partnership !!!!!!!!!!!!

      • The deal strategically makes sense and politically, but at what cost. I’m sure the defence chiefs and intelligence agencies will have voiced their concerns but none of that will matter as it makes the Government look good as they are doing something. Removing a tactical and strategic asset, when things are very uncertain is not a good move IMHO. Something similar happened to the Tornado Force when they went through the Mid Life Update (MLU) to GR4 standard. Removing assets from Frontline aircraft so an aircraft can go to Warton as per the agreement. And in one instance a piece of equipment was removed from an aircraft in an operational theatre!!! MOD has never really got procurement and never will, but MOD are happy to leave the troops in the lurch or the country with out a strategic asset. Defence on the cheap!!!

  2. Fully support AUKUS, but surely we should have at least 2 deployable SSNs, and probably better 3, before even thinking of sending one to the other side of the world. This is absolutely nuts given the current crewing and availability crisis. Meanwhile Gnerals and chiefs all warning about the Russian submarine threat and predicting 2027 for imminent war with Russia, whose main front against UK would be high north. Unbelievable.

      • Ok, but in terms of deterrence a continuous SSN presence in the HN is credible and would greatly change Russia’s deployment calculus. Having a 6 week lag time for the astute to even get on station is a pretty major gap. I understand that there might be earlier signs etc, but the point remains, our only SSN is on the other side of the world not deterring HN shenanigans

        • Russia has islands in the Pacific. In a war with Russia would a submarine based in Australia not be beneficial? It could reach them much sooner than 6 weeks and strike them forcing them to divert attention from the UK.

  3. At the same time as service chiefs are telling us that war with Russia is imminent. The disconnect between reality and the rhetoric of the decision makers knows no limit!

  4. The problem is that this is an important part of what the UK actually signed up to under AUKUS and one of the first major deliverables under the pact’s first pillar.

    • Thanks Greg for putting matters into perspective. If AUKUS fails at the first hurdle we are in deep excrement so this is probably the best bad decision. Not sure what choice they had, so get the other five as operable as possible I would say.

      • If we had the boats available to cover an SRF-West rotation, CBG, and one closer to home without much difficulty, we probably wouldn’t be talking about “up to 12 boats”. So even though it’s a bad position to be in for a while, hopefully it’s enough for the government to realise that we do actually need 12 boats going forward to meet commitments.

        Also, the government will do everything possible to keep AUKUS on track for the grandstanding and kudos points. If that means we end up with higher numbers, then let them crack on as far as I’m concerned.

    • Astute with it seems Reactor problems earlier this year, not sure if there has been any updates since. Audacious was having problems too.

  5. The issue isn’t so much about current crewing levels, but more about SSN availability. We currently have 1 SSN (Anson) that is deplorable and is likely to be the only one available until early 2027.
    Audacious is currently.y in dock and currently won’t be out until sometime in summer 2026. She will need to go through a long package of trials, noise ranging, weapons firing and a full safety/operational workspace before resuming operational tasking. 1st quarter 2027 probably.
    Agamemnon should be .having Barrow around Easter next year. She will have an even longer period of testing and trials etc before joining the fleet for ops. Again probably 1st quarter 2027.
    Astute, Ambush and Artful are either in dock for a refit or require an extensive period in dock, so forget about them until 2028 at the earliest, then only one, poss a second towards the end of that year.
    Achillies realistically won’t be available until 2029.
    The original SUF-West rotation had the UK providing an Astute boat from sometime in 2027 onwards for a period of several years I believe.
    Can we supply one, probably, will it impact on UK operational capability, most definitely. Still, I expect someone in MOD has a plan…..
    Just my thoughts on the issue.

      • It’s alright mate we understood you didn’t mean deplorable lol. But then again who knows the state of our navy and army….not even funny though 🤣

    • 2027 for a 2nd boat! Not surprising judging by available docks and state of the subs but still, throws all this waffle about meeting operational taskings out the window

      • Yes indeed, but back then we had between 9- 12 SSNs in service depending on what year we’re looking at, then it was only the S boats that were affected. But yes, that was bad enough.

        • The T boats were stuck on the wall, tileless Tireless was on the wall in Gib when the coolant leak snag was found to be a design fault & we were all stuck on the wall till the fix was implemented across SM2. Can’t remember if the S boats were stuck on the wall or not.

          • Yes, can’t exactly remember (probably an age thing!!) but I left my last S boat during this issue and went to T boats. The ones I was on didn’t have that issue, we were always at sea – or so it seemed.

    • 1 SSN left, and HMG GRANDSTAND yet again sending a boat to Australia.
      Thanks Deep. The RN is at rock bottom.
      But all is well in HMGs dream world, as we will have lots of toy boats and mini submersible in the GIUK. That’ll deal with Russia.
      Why is the IUSS being ignored in all of this? It’s worked and is comprehensive all these decades? Is it now compromised as it’s static?

      • Hi mate, I know utterly depressing isn’t it.
        They’re snorting some good stuff if they think these little toys are going to be the answer – not for another decade at least.
        IUSS isn’t being ignored mate, its a useful asset, we just need some technology refresh all over to keep ahead of the game I imagine.

  6. It isn’t a question of “Is it necessary for the UK to show the world it respects its allies and partnerships, and will meet commitments across the globe” – this projects power, influence and an image of reliability. No-one wants to partner with a nation that shuts up shop and hangs a “Bugger off” sign on the door.

    But there’s a difference between meeting commitments we can fulfil, and making promises that we can’t realistically keep.

    Every day now I’m shaking my head at the state of the UK. Look at what we were, and what we are now. Bad leadership. Bad management. All by people who should never have been in the position to do either.

  7. Honestly glad that Australia ans the US are forcing the government to do things for the hunter killer fleet. It should never have gone to 6 boats in the first place. If we can deal with having no astutes available then we can manage with one online being at least used operationally in Australia. Not to mention the obvious benefits of the experiences in different operational environments.

  8. The problem is we need 4 operational, so 10-12 in total. One riding shotgun on the Vanguard CASD, one in Eastlant, one oit-of-area, which also supports the carrier strike group deployment and now one in Western Australia.

    We only have one operational and five alongside with various ailments. So there is currently nothing to send to Western Australia and won’t be for at least 3 years and even then it will be at the expense of other more important roles for the UK.

    For £1.6bn a boat, the Astute has been pretty disastrous from the outset, with a heap of construction quality issues and now maintenance facilities ones.

    The best answer right now would be to order a couple of SSKs off the shelf. They are increasingly capable of deep sea deployment, with lithium ion batteries extending range and reducing acoustic signature and cost under half of an Astute. Just about every other capable navy uses SSKs, we have got ourselves locked into this ‘world class’ aspiration without the deep pockets needed to pay the bill.

    A capable SSK would be fine for Eastlant pro tem and could also do out-of-area/CSG adequately enough. That to me is an essential purchase, because we basically have no submarine service.at all as things stand. It will be years before we have 7 operational Astutes, therefore 3 at most at sea, so we need to plug the gap ASAP.

    • Submarine force fears SSNs being chucked out in favour of SSKs, or vice versa there simply isn’t the funds to invest in an SSK force and all the support elements required

    • That’s not how SSN Ops work. They aren’t tasked and deployed on an ad-hoc basis just in case.
      They do not ride shotgun for our SSBN force, they don’t need to, as the bombers are generally quiter then our
      SSNs. They are designed to disappear and hide, which they are good at.
      Eastlant is an old cold war AOO, which was run by the UK out of Northwood. Do you mean our Eastern flank which encompasses the Baltic? If so, we don’t put SSNs in there it’s SSK territory which our NATO cousins handle.
      OOA deployments and specific tasking including CSG deployments is what we use SSNs for. This includes locating/tracking Russian underwater assets.
      Agree that we should have a mixed SM force which should include SSKs, but, we went away from that in the late 90s when we sold off the Upholders. Unfortunately for various reasons we aren’t going back down that route.
      SSKs have their uses, often better at certain ops than a SSN, but power projection and CSG deployment is not one of them.

      • Deep,
        Season’s Greetings! In a more perfect world, both RN and USN would significantly benefit from a flotilla of latest gen/next gen SSKs for littoral missions. Defence/defence fiscal conditions should improve to some degree over the next decade w/ NATO approved funding agreement. Perhaps an opportunity to revisit issue then?
        Separate issue, any insights available re progress on submarine infrastructure revitalization at HMNB Devonport? Floating drydocks for HMNB Clyde? Maintenance backlog critical issue for both RN and USN and the future success of AUKUS. Rant over. 🤔🤔

        • Well the Astute drydock is finally a thing after 15 years, the dreadnought drydock is under construction and submarine decom should start soon.

          But the floating drydock project is nowhere to be seen

        • Greetings and seasons salutations to the former colonies.
          As @Hugo points out, we have 2 Dry docks now being used one for SSNs (Astute), one for SSBNs (Victorious). Another is in the process of being completed sometime next year which will allow us to start decomissiong our legacy units in Devonport.
          The other two major dock refurbishment will not complete for another year or so, but as they are intended for T26, poss T31 and the other for MRSS size ships, that’s not a urgent requirement.
          I believe the centre dock of the Frigate refit complex is able to take a T31 – just, but not certain about the state of the facility. Again probably not urgent as they are still in build.
          Interestingly the floating dock(s) proposal has gone silent, but did read an article last week that the RN still have it under consideration – whatever that means?

      • TBH there is zero chance of U.K building SSKs as it steals resources from SSNs and the AUKUS commitment makes it all bar impossible. There just aren’t any spare resources that can be diverted from Dreadnought or SSN-A, no spare Yard space, no other experienced workforce so it’s Barrow or nothing.
        Whoever thought this one up just can’t have ever been involved with RN Submarine service no sane person would even suggest it. You would know better than me but I can’t think of any long term U.K. submarine deployments in this Century, in fact I think it was probably post Falklands 🤔 So doing this with an SSN half way round the world is going to be mmmm a challenge. .
        On the other hand it may be a bit of a blessing in disguise and may yield some positive outcomes. My way of looking at it is if they deploy an Astute to Australia it has to be properly supported with a resilient supply of parts if required and they will have to get used to rotating crews ! Otherwise it’s just a waste of time and money.
        Getting it wrong will be a massive embarrassment and could put AUKUS at risk, so just for once HMT may be forced to resource it properly by providing adequate funding.
        One thing is for sure they will not be short of volunteers ?

        • Hi mate, it is my understanding from the original release about this, that we would be basing an Astute out in Aus for some 5+ years along with 3 US Virginia’s until their boats came on line.
          Instead of crew rotation, believe that it was going to be a married and accompanied draft for the duration of the basing- would be a plum draft for certain. Not sure if that’s still the plan or not.

          • If that’s true, it could just be a real boost for recruitment and retention, but they will need to take a very long hard look at pay or allowances as prices in Australia are comparatively far higher than U.K.

        • Actually that’s not correct, they aren’t required to do that. They may on occasion conduct a exercise with one whilst it’s on patrol, but it’s not to see if anyone is following it, it’s for something else other than just try. That doesn’t happen all the time either.
          The way we keep SSBNs safe is by knowing where the opposition units are at any given time. If we have a Russian OOA deployed NATO units will be tasked against it, keeping Northwood informed of its whereabouts. We still receive said info if its a NATO asset that’s reporting on it.
          That way NATO SSBNs stay safe.

      • no one is using their bombers in the SSN role, and there is the requirement for an SSN to “clean” the SSBN when it deploys, ensure it hasnt been tailed etc.

  9. From a geostrategic point of view its worth remembering that Russia is also a pacific power, with very important naval based on its pacific coast.. if you consider offence is the best defence then planting a UK SSN in a place it can hit Russias pacific fleet or prevent it reenforcing the northern fleet is not a bad move… from a geostrategic point of view..

    It’s also gives it a different route into the high north.. makes Russias equations on managing the RN SSN threat a whole lot more complex. So an RN SSN in the pacific would not be out of the fight until it returned to Europe, it would be instead a constant knife at Russias back.. it’s not even like the coils noble it in port without expanding any war…..

  10. Hmm with 6 subs, although too few, there should be two ready to go all the time if we follow the rule of thirds. So what happened there?

  11. One thing that is over looked with the AUKUS deployment of Astute’s and Virginia boats is the simple fact, that the Australian Collins class subs are rapidly ageing out…. The Collins class was going to be replaced by Japanese subs…. Then that got cancelled and they moved to the ridiculous plan of denuking a French design and making it conventionally powered…. Then that plan got cancelled for the current AUKUS arrangement…. The Australians can quite possibly be looking at having no active subs and will end up relying on the British and American boats covering for their own disastrous procurement policies…

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