The senior official responsible for the British Army Ajax armoured vehicle programme has been removed from post following a ministerial review that found serious failures in how safety risks were reported to ministers.

In a written statement to Parliament, Defence Minister Luke Pollard confirmed that the Senior Responsible Owner for Ajax is no longer in role, after investigations revealed that ministers were not fully informed of known safety concerns before the platform was declared safe for use.

Pollard said he had been told by senior Ministry of Defence personnel that Ajax was “demonstrably safe” prior to Initial Operating Capability being granted, only for 35 soldiers to later report symptoms consistent with noise and vibration injuries during a training exercise in November 2025.

“To say that I am angry about the findings of the Ministerial review is an understatement,” Pollard told MPs, adding that issues raised within the programme had not been escalated appropriately.

The incident led to an immediate and indefinite pause in Ajax training, followed weeks later by a second report involving vibration symptoms during testing, prompting a halt to all trials and evaluation activity. While the Defence Accident Investigation Branch found the response to the incident was swift and well coordinated, Pollard said this did not alter the fact that personnel were harmed and that the underlying causes remain unresolved.

The minister confirmed that although departmental submissions had technically described Ajax as safe to operate, they failed to reflect the “full breadth of known aggregated safety risk”, particularly relating to vibration injuries and the programme’s historical issues. He said this incomplete advice directly contributed to the decision to declare Initial Operating Capability.

“Ministers rely on accurate, timely and complete information to make decisions in the national interest,” Pollard said. “When that information does not meet this standard, the consequences are not abstract. They can be real, human and serious.”

An interim Senior Responsible Owner has now been appointed by the Army, while oversight of the programme has been transferred to the National Armaments Director, who will provide regular updates to ministers. Pollard confirmed that he will not comment on individual HR matters, but the removal of the programme lead follows the review’s findings.

The welfare position of affected soldiers was also updated. Of the 35 personnel involved in the November exercise, 25 have returned to duty, two were found to have symptoms unrelated to Ajax, and eight continue to be monitored. The soldier involved in the later testing incident has since returned to duty with no ongoing issues.

Pollard also confirmed that Initial Operating Capability for Ajax has now been formally paused, stating that the platform cannot meet the minimum standard required for IOC until concerns raised during Exercise Titan Storm are resolved. Limited trials and testing will restart to inform a forthcoming decision on the vehicle’s future, which will be taken as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

“Members of our Armed Forces voluntarily place themselves in harm’s way to keep the rest of us safe,” he said. “It is therefore wholly unacceptable for them to be exposed to avoidable risk.”

Despite the programme’s difficulties, Pollard said the Army would continue working with General Dynamics to identify solutions, stressing that any future decision would place personnel safety first.

“Let there be no misunderstanding: the safety of our people remains paramount,” he said. “That is the standard our Armed Forces deserve, and it is the standard our Government will uphold.”

George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison

84 COMMENTS

  1. He has not been sacked just removed from post so he is still a Civil Serant. Sadly they can’t be sacked even though they are grossly incompetent

        • And that is the issue.. sometimes very senior people make it clear things need to go away.. ( the just get it done mentally) but when the junior buckles to the overbearing bullying culture and the SHTF it’s them that carry the blame not the senior that backed them into to the corner.. I’ve seen it many times the backed into a corner responsible officer ends up taking the hit for the accountable individual.. in this case it’s the minister who is accountable officer .. but does not seem to have been removed.. just the responsible officer.

          • To be fair we don’t know what was told to the minister. Really that should be published, and then they can live or die based on public opinion, since we live in a democracy.

            • It’s not so much what is told to the minister.. that is the problem.. official reports go through iterations and senior leadership can and does request alterations to what they are being told in reports.. so you can never really be sure the official published advice is what was really told.. because everything is opinion especially risk assessment and a a senior responsible officer.. accountable individuals will often tell you they don’t agree with your best-worst- most likely model and can you tone down the worse please.. and in the end responsible officers only ever give advice and ranges of options and possibles.. it’s the entire Job of the accountable officer to fully explore and dig into those options and make a decision.. then live and die by it.. one of the problems with modern politics is lack of ministerial accountability, the public no longer trust senior elected officials to fall on their swords when they truly get it wrong ( not a decision people don’t agree with.. but make a true mistake).

              • True, that is the place for a public inquiry, to get to the facts. As I fear it’s the only way that anyone will be held accountable or at the very least the only way lessons will be learnt.

                • No one person is responsible, it’s just the unfortunate individual who signs off on a project who take the ultimate risk. They are always the first domino to fall.

    • A lot of people are involved in these complex projects. Its never down to just one person. But if you are top of the chain, you take the responsibility. I don’t like to follow the narrative and call civil servants useless. Vast majority of people could not do these very demanding jobs.

      • But in this case the senior civil servant is responsible not accountable.. the accountability sits with the minister and it’s the accountable officer ( minister) who should be taking the hit…

          • But and this is key, it’s about its sign off for IOC and the fact it went on exercise… so it’s not the last 7 years ( that’s a different story.. ) it’s about presenting the data on it being safe in a more favourable light and forcing sign off.. I have spent years trying to fix poor services that were not safe..sometimes I failed but I was not incompetent as by all reasonable measures I was very good at my job, some of the jobs I did were simply insurmountable and I was bound to fail. But as the responsible officer I always presented the facts to the accountable officer..infact it was my normal practice to present three potential outcomes ( the best, the worst and the most likely)… because it was not my job to decide the final outcome ( to close down the service or to continue) it was my job to advise. I ended my career because one day I was told to only present the best outcome.. and when I did not I was ignored, the worst possible outcome happened and afterwards I was “asked” to “change” the record on the recommendation and risk assessment I had given, I refused and informed them I could no longer undertake the role… but I was in a very secure financial position no mortgage, years of cash reserves and close to voluntary retirement age anyway.. if I was younger and had a mortgage.. could I have truly made a decision leading to possibly financial ruin and my kids losing their home for principle ? ( it’s something I do actually ask myself).

        • It will almost certainly have been the Permanent Secretary(ies) who has been pressuring this individual.

          That is why Haddon Cave was so important. People were bro v bullied into signing things off they should not have done.

          • Yes completely agree.. but it’s the role of the minister to ensure that is not the culture.. Ive alway been a buck stops at the boardroom person.. it’s caused me trouble in the past.

  2. Considering Millions been spent on Ajax and bad management , I really don’t think Ajax is going to succeed if it does looking like taking years .Which is no good for the Army .Bite the bullet and Bin it I say this with a heavy heart .let’s look at CV90, Lynx etc .Sorry guys 😟

    • I agree completely on cancelling Ajax but I do wonder if a tracked Boxer would be a better choice instead of CV90 etc (good options that they are). There would of course be commonality of support and spares if we go in that direction.

      In addition, while the vehicle (both wheeled and tracked versions) are large, this does mean that they have the necessary space as drone hub/controller. Might this be better than purchasing a smaller vehicle which was more nimble and speedy.

      I’m no expert but I wonder if this is worth looking at as an option.

      • Recce Boxer module already exists (Australia). If a module exists, then it can be either tracked or wheeled (or even static). Tracked is still a bit new, but wheeled is in service. Static is basically a powered module on a stand. The most obvious use of static would be an AA module. Boxer strikes me as a system that has more to give. Develop a Boxer module to do what you want & actually works & all this Ajax nonsense disappears. CV90 could have done the job from the start. Lynx (Germany) & Redback (S.Korea) have developed newer & similar weighted armoured vehicles without the Ajax problems, in half the time (actually less) than GD has taken to fail dismally. At some point you have to realise that even if you can make it work, it’s now so sub par, it’s not worth it.

        • I’m not aware that any orders have been placed for tracked Boxer, or if it has been developed beyond the concept from 2022.

          We really do need Ajax to be fixed and become a success. Too much money has been spent and there is no money for a replacement. A follow on order for an Ajax IFV variant is needed, even if not procured in the numbers needed to replace Warrior on a 1 for 1 basis. What do you need to support 148 CR3, maybe 200 to 250? It would certainly make more sense of 3rd Div, although I fear we’ll just be using lightly armed Ares and Boxer, with Ajax filling in as an IFV when required. Maybe, just maybe, the DIP will shed some more light on the plans and the magic money tree will yield some budget for a true IFV.

          Lets see what the Ajax review concludes, fingers crossed it can be fixed or the army will be in even worse shape.

          • RobW, Ajax cannot fill in as an IFV as it is not an IFV. It cannot carry a rifle section of 8 men. It is a recce vehicle.

            • It’s not what Ajax is meant to be, but with 3rd Division seemingly being focused on tracks again, what else is there once Warrior goes?

              Ajax is touted as recce and direct fire support for armoured infantry. Does that not mean working closely with Ares to jointly replace Warrior? Ajax isn’t an IFV in itself, of course not. Hopefully we get true IFVs in future.

  3. Which dept. was this guy in – was it DE&S? Will be interesting to see if all the accountability falls on one office, or if there will be further removals/firings.

    • Nate, The Senior Responsible Owner, Chris Browbrick, did not work for DE&S. I think he worked either in the new (created in 2023?) Programmes Directorate (led by a Major General) or the Army’s Directorate of Capability.
      Mr Browbrick was reportedly enjoying a £160k salary plus a £40k bonus – nice work if you can get it!.

  4. Nobody does failure as well as our wonderful Civil service.
    Remember Bowman radios, Nimrod etc.
    Andrew is right, bin it and move on, Hagglunds would be happy to oblige. Just make sure the civil servants involved in this mess don’t stay in post to repeat their mistakes on the next IFV.

  5. Said CS should be facing removal from the CS but will their pension be binned?

    However, will there not have been counter-signing Braid; both that person and their cohort of underlings should also walk the plank

    Bin Ajax, go with CV90 and as the Welsh vote Reform and Plaid Cymru let the workers get the good news too.

  6. “Let there be no misunderstanding: the safety of our people remains paramount,” he said. “That is the standard our Armed Forces deserve, and it is the standard our Government will uphold.” And yet they have voted to screw over and stitch up NI vets by tabling a removal order on the legacy act! Yet hundreds of confirmed and previously convicted Provo scum are wandering about with a juicy letter from HMG saying all is forgiven, does not matter what you did you are safe!

    Is this relevant to this article? Of course it is as no matter the shite our Governments, and these disgusting dictators we have currently as a Government, say or do, they do not give a shite about UK service personnel or in fact the UK!

    Repeated and disgraceful actions and decisions carried out by this Government and its many civil service mandarins, all with the intention and aim at doing whatever they want to do, according to their ideology and pathetic international socialist agenda, while pretending to be UK centric and lying to the British public.

    The only reason they pretend to support the defence industry is to pander to its union paymaster, spending and wasting billions for absolute minimum platforms and capabilities, and spending excessive amounts on numerous “projects” while kicking multiple cans down the road. This is an effort at pacifying the industry they are so desperate to raise money from and keep them interested, and investing, all the while prioritising their own survival and success in politics. Maybe when our dear leader goes to China he can get some more ideas about keeping the troops moral and motivation high from the Communists over there!

    • Spot on. With recall being set at 65? Over 90% of guys I am in touch with have said “bollox”, they will be a no show. NI being one of the main reasons, followed by the present regime.

    • Spot on old boy, The word that sends shivers down what was a spine in every politician and CS mandarin is Accountability, the lack of it allows these people to get away with just about anything they like to the detriment of the UK but seems to be more focused on undermining the UK’s ability to defend itself (or others).

  7. So many people serving or have served in the army 10 years ago knew it was doomed and even down to NCOs. I expect the culpability has been spread so thin it is now invisible

  8. A senior official has been removed because ministers were embarrassed .
    The people really responsible are at GD, delivering a vehicle that is not only years late but still more or less unusable. Deal with that.

    • While BAE (UK/Sweden), Rheinmetall (Germany) or Hanwha (S.Korea) et al don’t seem to have a problem delivering usable vehicle’s with similar or better specs. Ajax was a failure from day one (however many governments ago), & it was obvious it was going to fail.

      The Australian IFV competition really highlighted the difference (they actually paid for & had actual pre production vehicles on test). At the end they blew them up on a destruction test. BAE was eliminated early on because it was considered too expensive (not that it didn’t work). GD (Ajax) was eliminated because it was not fit for purpose. Rheinmetall (Lynx) was a new heavyweight design & performed well (& made it to the final 2). Hanwha were looking to put forward a version of their light KF21 IFV, but read the spec & realised that was never going to work. So they used the chassis of their K9 SPH as their starting point. Hanwha & Rhinematall both survived something Ajax would never have.

      If you want a 20t vehicle, then design a 20t vehicle. If you want s 40t vehicle, design a 40t vehicle. Do not design a 20t vehicle & try & turn it into a 40t vehicle. Build 1 or 2 & then test the daylights out of them (if necessary send some to Australia to test break ability – Australian army can break anything – it’s just a matter of time). But most of all – build a couple & then thrash them, then destroy them & then decide a winner.

  9. There will now be a discussion programme for a replacement, taking into account the need for diversity and inclusion training prior to the post being advertised after budget considerations have been taken into account during early 2027, subject to any unforeseen delays.

  10. This is unbelievable, even from this distance when we read the list of so called remedies, and even though I am far from an expert on such matters I expressed doubts as to how successfully those remedial actions would solve the core problems and thought at best would simply ameliorate them during early operation of newly produced vehicles and couldn’t see how as they aged those problems would not again raise their heads. I assumed the ‘experts’ must have known better at least on reducing them to ‘acceptable’ levels upon leaving the production line, despite gut feelings. Geez it seems not even that has been achieved on at least some of these vehicles. Such ongoing incompetence seems unbelievable and smacks of the old ‘tell them we have fixed it and no one will contradict it’ solution or even an arrogant view from above that most of the victims were not truly suffering at all and were suffering perhaps from some group association of some kind. Certainly attempts to get the damn things not operation no matter what were prevalent. Just how deep does that go, so many questions remain unanswered, perhaps legal ones.

    How the hell can this now be properly fixed after this charlatan attempt to cover up the true nature of the problems and years of delays? Pitiful.

    • Pollard is the man who has inherited the ‘assignment’ to fix the Ajax problem. Changing ( shortening) the program / project management structure is a good first step. I am not an expert but its clear to me from reading many of the posts here that several folks do have the relevant engineering expertise and have a pretty good idea of the the root causes of the Ajax problems. There needs to be a program to experimentation to validate suggested engineering fixes viz. tracks, suspension, weight, hull variability. Pollard needs to know options, costs and timescales. Very possibly, early vehicles whose problems stem from widely out of spec would be scrapped ( for spares). The remainder with suspension issues could well be fixable. I would have thought that the most urgent thing to validate is the hypothesis that the vehicle is just too heavy for the suspension. Once you know that you can make a decision to either reduce its weight or modify or to redesign and change the suspension / drive. Quality improvement and QC is best assured during design and manufacture but we are where we are – it’s a question now of QA – individually inspecting out and scrapping or modifying defective vehicles. It will be expensive.

      • If this were a Boxer module – yes. But no it’s not. They have built hundreds of these things without fixing the first one. If you fixed the first one years ago – we might have some assurance they can be made work. It reminds me of the F35. FFS, build 1 & make it work, then build a whole heap more. Don’t build a heap & then hope they will work.

        • You are probably right, but I think we have to go through a due diligence process to see if anything can be salvaged before we hit the nuclear scrap button. Settling up with GD will be messy. Ajax is whole family of vehicles; would you have to replace all the members? Isn’t the only realistic option from a cost and delivery point of view a Boxer recce module?

  11. It is all but impossible to dismiss a civil servant after their 6 month probation period. That needs a “smoking gun” related to gross misconduct, potentially criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, e.g. theft, fraud, violence, severe negligence and falsification of records. Even then there will need to be a lengthy formal investigation which in most cases – after a lot of time and expense – will result in just a written warning. Just a few hundred civil servants are actually dismissed every year and almost none are of a senior grade. [I recommend watching the 1980s TV series Yes Minister!]

    • A civil servant at ABRO Bovington put a pallet down in is work area and then later tripped over it injuring himself. He took 6 months full paid sick leave, six months half pay and started union legal action. In the end he was paid off as was easier than legal case.

  12. I’m fairly certain that if I worked in the private sector and caused a multi billion pound project to be an utter disaster that led to billions of £ being wasted I’d not only be sacked but likely arrested and imprisoned

    • Sacked yes, imprisoned no, because incompetence is not a crime. However, if it could be proved that the person deliberately misled his employer for his own financial gain, then he could be charged with fraud. But it would be difficult to prove without a ‘smoking gun’.

    • The private sector contracter i.e General Dynamics should also get punished

      There are obvious quality assurance gaps in their manufacturing and testing processes

    • If they sacked the preset SRO it would end in tribunal.. and it’s not the SRO or the long line of SROs who made the decisions that mattered ( they essentially did what they were told to do.. wrong or right) it was the AOs ( Ministers ) who made the decisions.. and any employees legal counsel will go straight to the AO and point out it was your decision.. so why are you sacking the SRO and all the dirty horrible truth of government ministers decisions will be public record.

  13. Please correct me if am wrong but the Ajax program seems to have been in disarray for years. Sacking one individual is making a scapegoat whilst many others get off the hook.

  14. Let’s not forget that this programme was started by the Conservatives under Cameron. A succession of Tory politicians talk about the dismal state of the nation and UK defence, but they were the ones in power when many of these failures began. Labour is more of the same. We cannot afford this kind of incompetence and dysfunction. If you think things are bad with Trump now, everything is likely to get a whole lot worse in the years to come.

  15. Whoever he is, his bank accounts should be checked for any transfers from FSB/GRU controlled banks in Moscow. As should the rest of those invovled in this latest gold-plated MoD cock-up

  16. As I have said on here before for years, the UK needs a Sovereign capability for key strategic things like heavy armour. I suggest a separate National organisation is set up from the MoD that is tasked with such. A bit like the Sheffield Forgemasters/Royal Ordnance factory things but looking at all the key strategic assets and capabilities across the board.

    Sue General Dynamics for £zillions as a starter to help fund this.

    • Except you would be suing GD (UK) who don’t own anything. GD (USA) don’t care (or they would have stepped in years ago). Yes, you could sue & hurt the likes of BAE, RR, Babcock & even Thales. GD – waste of time. The lawyer’s will be the only winners.

      • Just to be clear – BAE, RR, Babcock & Thales are not at fault here. They are meant as examples of where a law suit might be plausible if they were involved. GD can close up shop & walk away & nothing MoD can do about it. The aforementioned can’t.

    • Sue for what? the MOD has signed off all down the line and thats what they will say in court, if they wernt happy why did they accept and sign them off

    • Sadly it’s not general dynamics.. it’s general dynamics land systems LTD.. with a big capital on the LTD.. and I will bet my bottom the LTD company has no money in the bank or significant assets…

        • Yep sadly almost all the money for the contract has already been paid and taking a LTD company to the cleaners when it’s already lost it’s shirt will net you nothing but legal bills… essentially if the government pulls the plug on the contract they get nothing… best outcome is they extract what vehicles they can and see what can be fixed without investing to much money…

          I suspect their only option will be a massive weight reduction program and hope that sorts things out… but as it’s also an issue with ares as well as Ajax and ares is a lot lighter im not sure anything the do will help much..

          My understanding it’s a mix of really poor build quality on the armoured hull down to the level of welding and casting issues, poor build quality around the electronics and engine mounting as well as very significant drive train issues..

          Basically the bones were bad and they new it in 2018-20 but kept on going due to the sunk cost fallacy

          Which is a shame because if they had killed it in 2019 the losses would have only been about 2.5 billion.. 2020 2.9 billon with about 5 billion down the drain by 2025..

          As the have now even stopped operating the fleet for even test and evaluation purposes I don’t see a way back.. and I think their only option army has sadly spent 5 billion to get 150 ish piles of junk.

        • Sadly not the parent Company only has liability equal it’s shareholder investment into the LTD company.. it can loss what it puts in but no more.. that only changes if there are contractual guarantees in place ( so if the British government had been switched on it could have inserted shareholder liability beyond the standards of a limited liability company or if there is a very significant relationship between the parent and the subsidiary ( chandler v Cape plc 2012).. essentially UK case law is around health and safety responsibility and parent company responsibility and all the following need to be in place and proven for liability

          The business of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same
          The parent has or should have superior knowledge of some relevant aspect of health and safety in the industry
          The subsidiary’s systems of work are unsafe and the parent company had knowledge or ought to have known this
          The parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on using that superior knowledge for employees protection

          Basically it is case law that ensures a rotten company in an unsafe industry does not set up a subsidiary to avoid costs around health and safety protection and liability.

          So case law is all around health and safety liability not debt.. the other way a parent company can be found liable is if it was using the subsidiary for fraud or law breaking purposes.. then it can be found to have liability…

          ( I was a corporate risk manager as well as a clinical risk manager and needed to understand corporate risk😂🤣).

          • Thank you Jonathan for that clarification.

            I’m still of the opinion that a scorched-earth policy may be the way to go. Yes a temporary stop-gap to fill would be needed, but also concentrate on getting back a UK Sovereign capability for heavy armour, as part of a wider re-industrialization of the UK. I also worry about the murky world of international arms sales and brown envelopes.

    • Yes because if they sacked him it would go to tribunal and the findings of that are public record.. and it’s never the SRO who makes the final decision.. it the AO ( minister in this case).. so any bets how a tribunal would go ( so you sacked him or her over a decision you made ?)

  17. How long has the SRO been in post?
    Unless he blatantly lied, seems like a convenient L H Oswald patsy to me. This goes way, way back to the officers now working for GDUK, the usual old boys financial network, and the ministers and army officers who chose the type over OTS CV90.

    • Defo a patsy.. when the SRO gets canned by the AO for a decision the AO made you know it’s arse saving by the girl or boy in charge.

    • Daniele, its funny that you think that army officers chose GDUK to build this thing.

      If that was the case, according to Lt Col (Retd) Stuart Crawford we would have bought Leo2 instead of CR2 all those years ago! Army officers consider whether a Bid describes an equipment that meets the Staff Requirement (now the User Requirements Document), and that’s all they are (or should be) interested in – kit that does (or is likely to do) the job. Thus a shortlist of valid contenders is drawn up.

      Min DP decides who the contract should be awarded to from that shortlist of acceptable Bids….and is influenced by financial factors (VfM) and political factors (UK jobs in deprived areas etc).

      Really someone should be looking at the likely ability of a company to deliver an acceptable product – if this had happend with Ajax, then someone might have spottted that GDUK before Ajax Contract Award in 2010 (yes, it was that long ago!) they had only ever produced military avionics and radios! Specifically, avionics for Tornado GR1, Harrier GR7, Nimrod MR2 and Eurofighter Typhoon….and Bowman. They had never produced any kind of military vehicle, let alone a complex tracked recce vehicle with cutting edge features…and did not initially have a suitable ‘tank factory’ or experienced AFV staff.

  18. Perhaps all the defence ministers from Healey down and the various MOD clowns should just get the arses out of the office and go have a ride in one of these wagons and see what its like?

  19. This just about sums up the rotten state of UK defence: one guy gets reassigned for the cardinal sin of misleading a politician. A politician that on a daily basis happily misleads the UK population.

    No one and no business has been in any way punished for the decision to order Ajax in the first place or for delivering an unusable vehicle 18 years later.

    And all shrouded in layers of absurd secrecy.

  20. Anyway, we have to try to fix the problem, because there is not another £6bn down the back of the sofa. If it can’t be fixed that is £6bn that will have to come from other army equipment programmes and we will be lucky to get a fleet of 4WD trucks for the armoured recon role.

    We need to get stuck in, strip some of these dodgy vehicles down to the ground and diagnose what the basic problems are. There are automotive engineering specialists and REME personnel who can do that.

    If it’s a weight problem, then it will likely need a strengthened chassis, a better suspension system, heavy-duty shockers etc. Maybe different tracks too. It seems the main drive just now is to pass the parcel to the scapegoat and write reports about health and safety. Need to get someone capable in there, with an automotive engineering background, who can get some practical examination underway. Civil servants need not apply

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