Babcock and IAI work together on UK SERPENS project

 “expect Daniele would have more accurate figures”

Not really, David, before my time. I’m more interested in the late 80s onwards. I recall the army by the 80s at 160,165,000, so in the mid 70s ( when I was 3! ) you’re probably correct at that 175,000 figure.

I joined in ’75 and recall that the Reg Army was 180,000 and TA was 50 or 60k.

Bit like the rest of the forces, all be over in an afternoon

Bit like the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, all be over in a few weeks

That’s the part that I dont get. Russia has seen a lot of combat over the last 20 years through multiple wars and proxy wars and yet they seem totally lost in Ukraine.

True, they even identified lessons learned after Chechnya and Georgia. Reforms we’re even supposed to take place, to improve interoperability between army and air force (noted as a weakness in Georgia), as well as look to weed out corruption and move somewhat to a professional army. But corruption stalled it, crippled it, and quietly killed off any attempt to change the status quo. Thankfully for us.

To be fair to them I would dread to think what would happen if we had to do a full deployment. Maybe not from an officer /leadership perspective but I suspect massive integration issues between the 3 forces and huge logistic and supply problems, plus masses of polictical interference. Luckily not been needed since suez, and even then it was only 45k during a period of a much bigger armed forces.

Failure to learn from past mistakes and update obsolete tactics appears to be one of their weakest points

True but same generals lost 300k men taking Berlin. Our definition of good and there’s probably had a wide gap.

Indeed. The Battle of Berlin was a disaster due to political interference and military incompetence and the pressure to push on despite not being properly set up to do so, amongst other things. There was no tank and infantry coordination and the troops were used as mere cannon fodder to hit the set time scale. In fact it was so bad that many of those troops rebelled against their officers. All sounds familiar to me.

I’d read Stalin drew a demarcation line between Zhukov’s and Koniev’s fronts and it stopped just short of Berlin. Encouraging both to go for it even though Zhukov was closer.

To be fair Zhukov also had to fight through the Seelow heights and the Germans were not going to go down without a fight.

Yeees, ASP and LCMR. I’ve got all this stuff on my database but couldn’t access it at work yesterday to remind me what it was.

“could gut the MOD completely with each service taking on responsibility for the activities that they actually value.” 

Hmmm, I don’t agree on that detail Mark. What about those many areas of MoD that are purple? That is tri service, and sometimes multi national.

You cannot just dismember DES and DD as just 2 examples, they support the whole force and would not sit well under a single service either. The services now have TLBs to spend on their areas not on things of no relevance to them that one or other of the services would need to take on.

Who do you place Defence Intelligence with? Army? RN? RAF?

They could try, but there would be numerous pieces left that sit no where logically except under the MoD and Strategic Command which binds all the services together.

The problems with the MoD are well known and have been discussed ad nauseam by numerous Select Committees in Parliament. Their record on managing large projects is “abysmal” and if you disagree with disbandment, what is your proposed solution? The constant reductions in military capability to pay for their never ending cock-ups are what everyone who posts here deplores.

Def Intel for e.g could be managed within SIS

No Defence Secretary in living memory has been able to reform their procurement procedures, Wallace is no exception. A radical solution is realy the only option

One of the major issues with the Levine reform is that the creation of TLBs has weakened the centre and led to divergent thinking. What we need is more integration, not less – what you’re proposing would in essence split the forces further.

Let me give you an example of why it is a bad idea. Amphibious capability. Because the funding for it is devolved to the RN, it hasn’t been prioritised – because they value Carrier Strike and CASD. So, the RMs have been forced to come up with the Future Commando Concept to try and create a relevant capability that can be funded. Concurrently the Army have decided to go down a highly deployable wheeled route, predominantly for out of area operations. But we don’t have the ability to put mass ashore at a time and place of our choosing – because the RN is slowly divesting itself of the capability.

What we need is a genuine central body with a single unified strategy on HOW we want to fight across all domains. Then we need to fund that strategy centrally so that people hold to the intent and deliver the required capability.

Defence IS NOT ABOUT PROCUREMENT! It’s about the deployment of capability to deliver our strategic aims. You can’t propose to reform defence based on procurement – it needs reforming so that it delivers capability adequately.

Your arguments amount to maintaining the status quo in the MoD/Armed forces – which, clearly is no longer tenable. The problems in procurement are the root cause of the never ending reductions in military capability which the Treasury insists are necessary to pay for the endless series of mismanaged cock-ups in major procurement projects.

The MoD has blown billions of taxpayers hard-earned money on disasters like Ajax – with no vehicles yet in service despite the billions spent and the project being years late. The Type 45 destroyers have never worked properly and to date, only HMS Dauntless has received it’s PIP – the rest have spent much of their time alongside. Originaly the RN needed 12 of them..

We bought 175 Typhoon fighter jets for the RAF – at the time the most expensive project ever. Currently we have ~60 airworthy, and these are without the latest radars. The RN have two strike carriers with only 7 F35B Lightning II between them!.

We cannot continue in this manner with the current MoD. The nettle must be grasped and we must accept that their endless series of cock-ups have reduced us to a third rate military power. The only way forward is to disband the MoD – saving billions – and allow the armed forces to purchase their own off-the-shelf battle proven kit.

Firstly, it’s illegal to have Armed Forces without a department of state; political primacy is paramount to a correctly functioning state so disbanding the MOD is a non starter.

Secondly the forces are responsible for purchasing their own equipment now – the equipment budgets are devolved to them as TLBs – and since that happened Defence Procurement hasn’t improved – all it has led to is divergent capability development. All of the issues you state above have happened whilst the Services have been managing their own equipment plans so it’s a bit of a dead argument to be honest. Who holds CAS to account for aircraft availability when the services have primacy? It should be CDS but CDS powers are actually very limited.

I’m not proposing the status quo, I’m saying we need more centralisation of strategy and capability development in order create a convergence and collaboration on how we fight. The separate services will always develop a parochial view if you separate them – that’s not good for winning wars.

Whilst I acknowledge your arguments, with respect it’s all been heard before. Continuing to do things in the same old way and expecting a different result – projects that come in on time and on budget – will result in more expensive cock-ups, resulting in further capability reductions. Radical thinking out of the box is required

At the least, private sector accountability procedures should be introduced at Whitehall and Abbey Wood. If you fuck-up, your out. The system where MoD civil sevants only spend two years in post and then move on to the Treasury should be scrapped. Allowing senior military officers to retire into highly paid jobs on the gravy train must be banned at all costs. I could go on

None of this is possible because of the group-think civil servant problem at the top of the MoD. Throwing more money at them will just result in bigger office empires and more seniority for failure. Which is why many people – not just me – think radical reform is the only answer. Why is it that countries that spend the same amount of money on defence end up with bigger armed forces, with more kit, transport aircraft, artillery, fighter jets etc etc?

If the service-based TLBs are abolished in favour of a cross-domain procurement model, at least for major projects, the siloing might be less pronounced and the politics less influential. If you hand budgeting to the services, it’s likely to get even worse.

I’m wary of falling prey to the Politicians’ Syllogism: we must do something; this is something; therefore we must do this.

Hi David.

I’ve commented on that to you before when you wanted MoD disbanded.
There are literally dozens of agencies and organisations within MoD that have nothing whatsoever to do with procurement. You cannot just disband, there needs to be a structure.

Why not take a look at MoD website, they’ll list many of them? Though in little real detail in how they fit into the wider structure.

Manage DIS with SIS!?? 😆 Do you actually know what DIS and SIS respectively do and are responsible for?

You might as well “save money” by merging carrier strike with the FANY.

Are a few thousand plus uniformed military personnel now to be paid, supported, and effectively become SIS officers and support staff?

There is an argument, which I also oppose, to merge the intelligence commu ity into one organisation. It has as many issues as forming a UK Defence force which has also been suggested.

😆 Brownie points for those who know what “FANY” is, no cheating!!

Entertainment for the troops, but with bandages and some ointment for Woodbury rash…

😆

Hi Daniele – I am not going to be goaded into getting into an argument with you about disbanding the MoD, but I welcome your contribution to the discussion.

How about some suggestions about how to prevent the next cock-up? You might like to start with Frank Ledwidge’s excellent book “Losing Small Wars, British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan” – it’s the culture thats wrong, and the total lack of accountability. Not to mention the civil service propensity for downright obstructiveness, directed against anyone who has the temerity want change.

No goading or arguing from me David.

Answering questions? Well I’d asked plenty to your goid self on this topic many, many months ago to which I got no response from you, or at best a tangent reply.

So I won’t be answering yours promptly in return! 😉

Though I’ll add maybe D Cummings was right. He wanted to reform the “Whitehall blob” and procurement too.

That on its own is fine. Disbanding the MoD, which has been explained many times, including by myself previously and BobA in this thread, that it is not that simple and not purely about procurement, is not.

If Liz is to steamline the Armed Forces and increase spending whilst lowering taxes she will need to address certain issues which are repeatedly critisised by people on this forum. Her first objective must be to change the position whereby responsibility is split between two organisations. Never works and never will. That said just because you have responsibility does not mean you have to do the work. Much of what the MOD currently do could remain there, be set up under separate agencies, outsourced, embedding staff etc. All have their pros and cons. Also none of these issues will get anybody away from the necessity for political control which means that the MOD will continue in some form or another even if some of their functions have been moved elsewhere. Defence Intellegence could be set up as a separate agency serving all the services for example – it would seem to make sense.

It should be said that none of this might happen. It takes a brave politican to take on the civil service and/or the media. Most opt for a quiet life because large scale change is not always popular.

I can agree to sime extent. But lets take DI as an example as you suggested.

It is in large part already formed from people in the 3services. And it already carries out that role, supporting all 3 and liaising elsewhere.

Where is the saving removing it? It’s personnel remain. It’s infrastructure remain. It’s utility bills remain. It’s payroll remains.

It’s just moved, the output is still there. It’s CDI is now answerable to whom? Who pays the bills? Central government?

To me the biggest item that needs fixing in MoD is the nuclear deterrent renewal placed into it’s budget from 2010. That’s 30 billion plus already spare over a decade.

To me this dismembering will just cause utter chaos and cost even more.

Personally I think the answer is Four fold: Make Strategic Command the primary and sole 4* command and have a single strategy branch therein. Make the separate services 3* Operational Commands (akin to Field Army)

Make all senior Officer Careers tri-service in the same way that the Army has created the modern General Staff to remove regimental identity.

Make Defence Procurement an actual profession, not a posting that an officer enters into at Career Stage 2.

The Department of State should then be the prime policy maker and interlock with wider government / national strategy and funding alignment.

If I’m following your meaning, to me paragraph 1 has already happened in 95, 96 Bob, with PJHQ and now Strat Com.

The 3 services aready take their lead on Ops and planning combined ops from Northwood, and the other parts of their
stand alone HQs are admin, personnel, and so on.
I thought overall strategy/Policy was already centred on the Main Building Directorates.
I know you know all this better than me already. 👍
I like your suggestion re DES procurement.

Because it has already been recognised that DI needs a strong input from from the services it just suggests that full control by the services takes it to it’s logical conclusion. The Civil Service is by it’s very nature full of Government generalists who could (and do) move from department to department. The Armed Services need people who live and breathe the military sitting next to speciaists in other disciplines all working in the same team to the same objectives. That is the benefit. The saving is not in head count or office space but in more projects which achieve their objectives because people are working together under the same leadership. It goes without saying that they need to be well motivated & focused.

Change is messy but necessary.

The 30 billion surely is ring fenced and should be simply ignored.

I might be getting the wrong end if the stick here…but you’re describing what already exists….in DI! There are already civil servants and service personnel in combined teams within it. Doing exactly what you suggest already.

So….moving it out of MoD achieves??

You may find that moving several facilities out of the MOD might have little if any benefit. If so the services have a number of options one of which is to leave them where they are. It is not a one out all out scenario. Personally in the case if DI I would say it should sit independently with strong links to all the appropriate organisations.

Raising these types of radical re-organisations will always lead to fears that it will simply end up as a cost cutting exercise by removing people, office space etc. and to be fair that quite often happens. However there is an opportunity here to save money and/or increase productivity by increasing collaberation, reducing conflict between competing organisations and focusing ownership for projects.

I can’t say that if I were looking to achieve benefits that DI would be my first port of call. Indeed I would want it insulated from the re-organisation going on around it.

If we looked at another organisation such as the NHS which needs a lot of work if it is to thrive, not just money, there would be many functions which are working really well which would need to be insulated from the changes going on around it.

I can agree with David that procurement needs improvement, an understatement!

Reform of DES and procurement was looked at by Hammond when the idea of privatizing the lot was floated. It didn’t happen, thankfully, as DES had other functions at that time that should rightly remain in house, and still does.

No, DI should not be the 1st port of call! It lost too many staff as it is with previous reforms, especially in the all important DIAS functions.

DI, being a tri service, civil service organisation sits within Strategic Command, which was created to centrilise and streamline these disparate organisations in the ways BobA describes.

Procurement is highly difficult in defence. When you are spending billions trying to define your needs, motivate suppliers, ensure quality & pay a fair price it is perhaps best to ensure you have the very best people and are not hamstrung by constraints which have evolved over time but nobody is quite sure how they are relevant to the current situation.

If you want change you need to shake things up a bit (maybe a lot), think outside the box & question the status quo. If you are not prepared to do these thing you cannot be surprised if things stay the same.

So for example, putting Defence Intelligence into Strategic Command?

DI should work well independently. These are two different functions and merging functions rarely works. That said if these functions are not working well together you have a problem.

Well that is the point I keep trying to get acros. One no one is saying there is a problem regards DI not working well in its current set up and two, DI
IS within Strategic Command already, it is not “merged” with it no more than any of the other organisations that sit beneath Strat Coms umbrella.

It is in effect an independent entity whose 3*/OF-8 ( CDI & his deputy DCI3 ) report directly to the 4* star head of Strat Com operationally or if necessary to the VCDS / PUS in Head Office.

Moving out of where it is within Strat Com to be independent does not change anything, as within Strat Com it works directly with and for the stakeholders that need its intelligence product to plan operations. It can also liaise with other areas like 5 eyes, SIS, SS, GCHQ and MoD Head Office as well within or out, it makes no difference.

Procurement is a different matter, as I mentioned above privatising DES was looked at.

My original point was that an incoming political leadership set on low taxes, small state and 3% spend on the military suggests a leaner and more focused organisation with less duplication is an obvious objective.

It might not happen but if it does I can’t think of a more obvious target than the MOD. Merely because there are functions which sit logically there & need no change does not invalidate this type of policy in any way. There will always need to functions sitting above the services.

It is also quite an incentive for radical change if you are offering a 50% increase in budget in return. The military is not likely to be top of the list for change but the top brass might just want to move forward sooner rather than later if they need the cash – which obviously they do.

The UK military needs, as you know to be effiecnet and agile. In general it achieves that but there have been mistakes and consequently we need to look to reduce the risks of such mistakes in the future.

Ah, not uniformed CS CSS then.

All those areas are merged within MoD for all 3 services for a long time already, or theirs office buildings have been relocated, merged, or closed, all to save money. This has also started in the intell community too with unified HR departments and so forth.
I don’t see savings there save wholesale privatisation, which only saves short term before causing more issues and which in some areas of DES is impossible.

Thanks Mark. I am not sure many would agree that Finance, Payroll and Procurement were irrelevant! Non-core, perhaps, but very vital.

I recall my first experience of outsourcing in HM Forces was the contractorisation of the officers and sergeants messes, probably in the 1980s – not at all popular amongst the mess members, but their voice didn’t count! Serco was one of the companies involved.

Since then, much is already outsourced – much training is run by contracted companies. Two troop transport helicopters in the Falklands are run by a private company (was Bristow, then Brintel).

REME’s static workshops, once under the banner of ABRO, were handed over to Babcocks to run some years ago.

Since 1997, RAF Shawbury has a contractor delivering initial helicopter training to all 3 services and Ascent delivers fixed wing flying training since 2016.
Some Apache training for REME maintainers is delivered by a contractor.

Most of Colchester Garrison (and presumably several more now) has been administratively run under a PFI arrangement by a JV company (RMPA Holdings) which includes Serco, an FM company called ADAM (I think) and a bank, since about 2005. It covers catering, running of messes, access security, hard and soft FM, cleaning, etc etc

My army pension is paid monthly by a company called Equiniti.

I am not sure there is much left that can be outsourced, although some contributors here feel that DE&S, wholly or in part, should be outsourced.

Hi Graham. Clearly there would be no Armed Forces if you didn’t have a payroll. The point here is that the MOD do not need to have a roll. Appointments, promotions etc. can be handled by the service as can the rest of the personnel issues. Nowadays it is in a system and done.

Procurement is an interesting area where Government tends not to outsource. Contractors are now few and far between because of IR35 and it is reliant upon inadequately recompensed civil servants handling massive important contracts. Government would not hesitate to go to a major law firm to get major legal advice why not use a professional procurement firm to ensure their procurement contracts and the specifiactions are watertight & they are actually getting good value for money.

It is not unhealthy to review how you do things from time to time. Sometimes it is best to roll back changes which were made in the past. If it aint broken don’t fix it – but if it is broken then perhaps changes are needed?

Hi Mark, thanks for your good points. Procurement gets a shake up now and then but it needs a really good one now. I do wonder how many procurement cock-ups are down to poorly written contracts though. I used a corporate lawyer from time to time when I was a PM at Abbey Wood but it was to help draft a contract with Industry, not to check one that had been produced already by MoD.
I am not sure who these professional procurement firms are but I wonder if they could understand the very complex business of procuring cutting-edge military hardware.

Procurement is a much meligned profession. Most people don’t really know what it is for and others regard it as something which just prevents them from doing their job. It is regarded in much of the public sector as a low grade task following a pointless process made up by the evil EU. If done properly procurement have a pivotal role which binds the suppliers to the clients, brings in the subject matter expects, ensures there is benefit to all parties & the right product comes out at the end.

Many of the best procurement people cut their teeth in the private sector working for the likes of RR, BAE and IBM. Some emerge from public sector gain expereince in the private sector and then go contracting quite often back into the public sector where they are earning exellent money and contributing greatly to individual projects but not influencing the broken system.

Those contractors are now draining out of the market post covid. The Government are discouraging contractors despite being reliant on them.

There would be no problem providing quality people and a pipeline of up and coming people providing the Government moved to reform procurement. Many have been working on the type of projects (military or otherwise) that you refer to.

You are correct when you say it is not the contracts alone.