James Heappey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, has stated that the British Army is capable of deploying an Armoured Brigade in Estonia “if tasked to do so”.

An armoured brigade comprises armoured, mechanised and light role troops, you can read more about how the UK operates an armoured brigade by clicking here.

The information came to light during a written question exchange between Heappey and Kevan Jones, the MP for North Durham.

Kevan Jones, MP for North Durham, asked:

“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the UK Army is capable of deploying an Armoured Brigade in Estonia.”

James Heappey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, responded:

“The British Army is capable of deploying an Armoured Brigade in Estonia (if tasked to do so).”

What does Britain already have in Estonia?

This week British F-35 jets landed in Estonia as they prepare to undertake air patrols over Eastern Europe to deter Russia from taking any aggressive actions against NATO members.

British F-35 stealth fighters arrive in Estonia to deter Russia

Additionally, Challenger 2 tanks and armoured vehicles of the Royal Welsh battlegroup have arrived in Estonia, with further equipment and around 1000 troops arriving over the coming days, according to the Ministry of Defence.

British tanks arrive in Estonia to ‘deter Russian aggression’

This will lead to a doubling of the UK presence in Estonia, where the UK leads a NATO battlegroup as part of the Alliance’s enhanced Forward Presence.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

87 COMMENTS

  1. In light of the ubiquitous use of Anti-tank missiles these past 10 years; I really do think the UK should accelerate the fitting and fielding of a hard APS system onto our armoured vehicles.

  2. Well we probably could get a brigade together but at the cost of gutting the wider Army and even then what would it currently field? Increasingly ageing Challenger 2’s, Warriors, a handful of AS90’s and even fewer Sky Sabre systems.

    • If this war has proven anything, it’s that large amounts of kit are worth only slightly more than nothing unless you have a strong logistics system and strategic planning to back them up.

      I agree we don’t have enough kit, but I’m also confident we have the ability to fight with the kit we have, unlike Russia.

      • In addition to this, seeing how easily Russian tanks are brewing up at the moment I suspect their ERA isn’t as nearly as effective as they make out. I suspect CHARM is still effective at traditional combat ranges too.

        • The beauty of the Royal Ordinance L30A1 L55 rifled gun. Is that its bloody accurate, more so than a comparable smoothbore. At 1500m it can put a round through a previous round’s penetrative hole. Though it takes a gunner who has the skill and more importantly time, to fire the second aimed shot! The explosive reactive armour (ERA) on Russian tanks is only good against one hit. Unlike the Chally’s passive Dorchester. Once activated it leaves a weak point in the tank’s overall protection. The Chally2 can activate ERA using HESH or a APFSDS round, leaving a gap for a follow up round.

          The replacement Rheinmetall Rh120 L55, is the better option overall. The one piece ammunition means that the APFSDS can be fired with more muzzle velocity. But more crucially is that the APFSDS long rod penetrator can be that much longer. Thereby allowing it to counter both ERA and spaced armour much more effectively. The L30’s two piece ammunition limits the long rod penetrator’s length.

          The MoD has used Charm rounds against Russian MBTs, specifically T72 and T80. These tanks were bought “surreptitiously” and included Kontakt-5 ERA, that was then tested against a Chally’s main gun and its ammunition. There was no urgent replacement for the Charm round, so I can only presume they performed ok. The T80 later went off to the US, the T72 was not in a good enough condition.

          • I have always suspected that CHARM is still effective in over 90% of cases and we forget that apart from in deserts, normal combat ranges for tanks are sub 2k.
            The current fighting and images of abandoned vehicles also reminds us that you don’t have to penetrate the turret or hull and cause a total loss to render a vehicle inoperable, most Russian tankers seem quite content to get out as soon as they suffer significant damage, and I can’t blame them. If you’ve been hit and you don’t immediately know where it came from and are less a few dozen metres from cover like buildings or forest, your best bet is to get out before you get hit again.
            I also expect that a HESH round to the front of a turret or hull glacis would wreck most of the sensors and vision aids even if it did no internal damage. I hope they can overhaul and upgrade the CH2 powertrain and suspension quickly and then replace the turrets more slowly, as the the former seems much more urgent and needn’t take 10 years.

          • With the additional theatre entry kit fitted, the tank weighs close to 70t. The suspension and final drives take a battering, it’s these that wear out the fastest. The engine copes, but could be better. If the engine does get tweaked with the common rail diesel and new turbos modification. They have been talking of power outputs near 1500hp. Which isn’t bad, but it is still giving away 21.6L to the Leopard’s larger (47.7L) MTU engine. This means the Leopard will still win in an acceleration race, as its much gruntier and doesn’t need to rev as much to develop power.

            If you have seen how cramped the turrets are in T72s and T80s. Having to squeeze out of one that is on fire, is something I’d rather not think about. In the T80, the commander and gunner cannot swap sides, they have to climb out to do it. In the T72 you can just about squeeze around the autoloader if you are small. But anyone of western proportions i.e. greater than 5’10” is going to seriously struggle ergonomically. Similarly, if you’ve been eating to many pies, getting out in a hurry may not be doable.

        • The Russian ERA bricks have mostly been found to be simply sandbag bricks. Looks like ERA and would provide some protection from HEAT rounds but otherwise…..

        • Another problem with ERA is when it goes boom you do not want to be stood anywhere near it. If you have supporting infantry teams to close by when tat happens they will catch it.

          And you need infantry to support tanks in urban environments….Do you see where this is going…

      • I agree we don’t have enough kit, but I’m also confident we have the ability to fight with the kit we have, unlike Russia.

        That’s assume that UK would have half the losses of Russia, by this time it would be with a big chunk of its Challenger fleet not operational or destroyed. Today basically the British Army would be unable to do combat except with ATGW and some artillery.

    • I think this has shown there is little wrong with CH2 or Warrior compared to the scrap heap in Ukraine.
      The main issue for the army is a lack of modern longer ranged artillery and counter battery ISTAR systems, plus air defence.

      • Speaking of air defence, does anyone know how many Sky Sabre units we’re actually getting?

        Hoping that regarding artillery we just go for Boxer RCH155 to replace AS90; get 150 or so in plus 200 Boxer direct fire support (hoping that on the 23rd Rishi will announce additional defence funding).

        Probably the best options for mobile fires.

        In terms of MBTs I think current events should justify retaining and upgrading all 227 Challenger IIs.

        • Not for certain. I’d read 18 from I think Airborne but don’t think he’s firm on that either. A pitiful number that needs doubling at least.

          The Boxer SPG variant certainly looks the part though I’d read it’s one of the provider options. But we are good at choosing those.

          Agree on Tanks. I’m still not one for a big expansion in this area but retaining our minimal number seems sensible. Would require changes to the planned ORBAT though as 2 regiments with 227 is outlandish, even given reserves. Maybe the equipping of the QRH will be cancelled.

          • Hopefully that number of Sky Sabre will be increased dramatically.

            The problem is, I think, that the army has been pretty much tailored to fight insurgents and the thinking prior to now has been a small likelihood we would come up against an enemy with any significant air assets. Clearly that’s not the case any more, so hopefully that number of Sky Sabres will, as you say, at least double.

          • I think that 18 is the number of launcher units, rather than batteries. If I recall correctly, we’re only picking up 3 or 4 of the radars… Pretty depressing, seeing as one of those is permanently in the Falklands, so we’re going to be trying to deploy the whole of 3 Div under an AAD umbrella comprising ~2 radars and at most a dozen launcher units.
            I’d get a few more radars and then purchase the same number of launchers again for CAMM-ER. That way, division HQs etc. hold the ER and brigade distributes the normal CAMM further forward. Stormer can support the mobile elements like Strike (if they’re even still a thing?) I suppose. I’d probably also chuck in a Stinger (do we have an equivalent with HVM?) and an N-LAW in every Boxer and other vehicle we have- in addition to whatever the troops are carrying.
            re tanks, I’d be happy with 150 CH3 and the balance retained as CH2- given that individual vehicle capability seems to take second place to the way they are deployed and supported. I know there might be some concern at a two-tier armoured force, but I’m presuming we can’t afford 227 CH3.

          • Yes, launchers. 16RA has 4 batteries and an HQ battery. One battery is rotated to the Falklands. So 3 available. How many launchers per battery? Who knows, might be as few as 4 which leaves 2 spare for 14RA training regiment.

          • Hi Joe, 18 launchers only? How do they come up with these ridiculously low numbers? I thought that it was more like 24 units but could be wrong on this. Seems like GBAD does not seem to be taken very seriously in the UK these days. Surely looking at Ukraine it is a huge wake up call to our defence planners. We don’t ever want our people, facilities, ports, bases, assets caught with nothing to defend against with from the ground.
            I’ve seen images of 2×6 Camm launchers on the back of 4×4 trucks, I wonder if these will also be purchased? I’d imagined that batteries could be expanded if need be. No news of a tracked CAMM or CAMM-ER either but I think there might be Mastiff based Dragon-fire unit being looked at by the UK.

          • Yes, unfortunately I think 18 is our lot at the moment. I think the ’24’ figure you’re referring to might be the MBDA statement that the system can control 24 missiles in the air simultaneously?
            I think this will equate to 4 batteries (one permanently Falklands-based), with a radar, command module, and 4 launcher units (8 missiles each), with a couple of support trucks for reloads. Not bad as far as a battery goes, but I’d want more than 4 batteries!
            We do also have shorter range air defence in the shape of HVM (high velocity missile), which is either Starstreak (on tracked Stormer vehicles) or LMM/Martlet (on tripods). But I don’t know how widely they’re distributed.
            Italy is moving forward with ground-launched CAMM-ER, and I understand that they can even get the same 8 rounds on the launcher despite the greater size.
            I don’t want to draw too many lessons from a live conflict where information is being very carefully controlled. But it would seem that organic SHORAD in the form of MANPADS are still very effective, whereas the longer range stuff like S300 doesn’t seem to be doing much (or at least it isn’t being reported). I’d hesitate at putting something as expensive and high performance as CAMM on smaller systems like 4x4s (presumably for front line service?), they wouldn’t be able to pack enough reloads. Equip them with more HVM and MANPADS. Get another regiment of medium range systems (CAMM/CAMM-ER), and make sure we have some spares of everything. I think we own something like 10 total of those radar systems, and we use them for other stuff than just GBAD. It’s not just western nations that can carry out SEAD/DEAD, and the radar is the primary target.

          • 18 seems extremely low a number. Considering its high tech equipment, you have to assume a number of them will be out of service for maintance /upgrades at any one time, and the bad habit of using spare parts off equipment out of service to keep stuff in service, means that they will unlikely to be quickly pulled back into service if required. Doesn’t sound like enough to defend all miltiary air/land based let alone major cities and definitely not enough to cover any fighting forces away from the defensive side.

            On the flip side, for wars occuring at distance, it should be enough to protect bases, especially when you assume we will be sharing them with other forces, who will bring their own air defence.

          • We have 4 batteries of CAMM, assuming 4 launchers per battery. 1 battery is permanently in the Falklands, so we have 3 left for deployment elsewhere. These are definitely only for operational deployment, rather than for national air defence, and even then would likely only be for putting a bubble up around divisional HQs and similar very high value targets. Our actual combat forces will likely need to rely on Stormer and HVM on tripods (not sure if we have a proper MANPADS like Stinger), and I don’t know that we have enough of them…

          • Yeah 3 regiments makes sense, preferably with slightly more than 56 tanks each. 3 brigades means only 1 will be at readiness with 1 more available a few weeks later, i.e. we will usually only have 1 armoured brigade in a division or at a push 2. In these scenarios it would be nice to be confident that our armoured brigades can go toe-to-toe, and even over-match, their peer counterparts. Otherwise you have an armoured brigade, and thus a division, that constantly needs babysitting and having extra units attached to be confident of success, that might have been acceptable 6 months ago, not now.

        • I think I’d initially go for the MAN HX77 8×8 truck and BAe/SAAB Archer combination. It should be at least 1/3 of the price of a Boxer with the RCH turret.

          If funding was available, I would then look at a tracked option.

          • Agreed. Boxer is too expensive to be used as a chassis for artillery unfortunately. What do you think of Ceasar, or is that more expensive than Archer?

          • Of the two wheeled systems, I’d say Archer is the better and more advanced, Caesar would be considerably cheaper. This is based on Archer’s higher level of automation. The Caesar is still pretty mandraulic, needing a minimum crew of 5; that still needs to feed shell and propellent onto the load tray. They say it can be operated by a smaller crew, but that means they will get fatigued quicker humping the shells and propellent. Archer is a fully automatic system, it does have a manual back up. The propellent and shells are loaded in to a magazine that feeds the shell into the breech, then feeds the requisite number of propellent bags, depending on the required range. To replenish Archer’s magazines you need a special ammunition vehicle with a feed tray and crane. Though at a push I reckon you could do it manually.

            The main difference between the two is that with Archer, you can be set up and firing in as little as 30 seconds. It also has a faster sustained rate of fire of 8 to 9 rpm fed by its 21 round magazine. Caesar is dependent on the crews fitness and the 18 rounds are stored in a separate magazine located in front of the gun. Unlike Caesar the Archer system has yet to be used in anger.

          • Given the choice, I’d always go with automation- something I’d stretch to autoloaders in C3 as well. I understand the arguments, but not sure that they can be fully defended. We need bodies in other roles, especially if we stick with the reduced headcount. They’d be better placed in logistics support units that loading an artiller piece.

        • On the subject of Boxer, has anyone seen how poorly the Russian BTR’s perform in mud? They get stuck instantly, perhaps that’s why they are sticking to the MSR. Does that have any relevance to the Boxer compared to tracked vehicles?

      • Your first point occurred to me also- it is far more critical how the platforms are used and supported than the number of bells and whistles, it would seem.
        I’ve seen a lot of articles on Twitter (I’ve finally joined- purely to get the latest updates of what’s going on in Ukraine!) on wish lists based upon a presumption of increased spending. I agree with many of them, as well as what you highlight there.
        But more than that, I’d say support and logistics- all branches, tactical and strategic. Get FSS and the multirole vessels, get that order for additional A400M in now, look into a C17 successor, sort out medium lift, make sure we have the CS and CSS elements that allow our army brigades to deploy in full, make sure we have sufficient trucks and tankers to take casualties and still keep our combat elements moving.
        Oh, and sort out the MOD estate etc, so that our servicepeople have a place to come home to that respects the sacrifices they’ve made. Recruitment and retention is key to getting any uptick in capability actualised.

        • Hi Joe.

          So, another enablers man like me! Yes, it is the less sexy stuff that underpins everything else. Get that CS/CSS sorted.

          • I’m a project manager with an engineering background, it may not be cool to most people but foudnations matter- enablers or the lack thereof makes or breaks everything!

      • I think this has shown there is little wrong with CH2 or Warrior compared to the scrap heap in Ukraine.

        Everything is wrong, it is just a nudge better than what is there.

    • Yes, that’s the idea. On paper the British Army has 1 armoured division (3rd UK), which means around 1 brigade would indeed be ready for operations in Estonia if requested. Somewhat similarly, on paper the Deutsches Heer has 2 and a bit divisions but would self-admittedly struggle to deploy 1 fully-kitted armoured division.

      • Agree with all of the replies here!

        In a way things never change (have heard that they had to basically strip The BAOR to get 1 fully equipped armoured division for The Gulf in 91) but I think what we’re seeing now is that in terms of quality Challenger 2 and Warrior probably aren’t as outdated compared to the opposition and the main deficiencies with The British Army are in ranged firepower and air defence.

        Clear too that logistics and training are absolutely vital!

        We have always been pretty good at making the best of what we’ve got and prioritising training, reliability and supply over sheer quantities.

        • In 90/91 didn’t we have just under 1000 C1’s, 720 were deployed, the others were due to go to the Jordanians, but got routed to the British Army?

          The US 3rd and British 1st Armoured Divisions chewed through 850+ Tanks of the Republican Guard who had T72s in theatre. Looking at the Oryx website, 95% of the Russian Tanks destroyed are the T72 A-B variants.

          Are we sure just 225 C2/C3 will be enough without relying on others? Sure, whenever working with the US, they always brought their own special qualities. Others were not so good.

          Thoughts on the numbers of C3’s we will eventually need?

          Secondly, if we go back to the days of 1990, the BAOR was in effect its own thing, no doubt, whether it’s Poland, the Baltic or Romania, we will need to establish another BAOR there at some point?

          • Ian, we bought about 420 CR1s, of which 221 deployed on Op Granby (Gulf War 1).
            392 of those tanks were sold to Jordan under a March 1999 agreement.

            We are only converting 148 CR2s to CR3 – I assume residual CR2s (unconverted) will be withdrawn from service.

        • 1) but I think what we’re seeing now is that in terms of quality Challenger 2 and Warrior probably aren’t as outdated compared to the opposition

          Of course they are outdated. The opposition do not only have T-72, also have ATGW’s, and other dissimilar combat systems.

          • Disagree as every weapon system has advantages and disadvantages, it’s about mitigating weakness and using TTPs to ensure your platforms are used effectively. Of course there will always be losses but a competent military will be trained and experienced in the correct use of its forces arc every level, to achieve the mission statement. It would seem this is missing within the Russkie mil at this time!

  3. Pandemics and wars don’t recognise borders or state lines, if we beef up the UK presence in Estonia then we need to be ready to fight. As I’ve mentioned before, up-armour kits and Trophy systems (or equivalents) for all armoured vehicles, is the very least the MOD could do to protect the troops.

  4. Although nothing is always obvious, from this war it seems to me the balance of power in modern warfare has reverted back to highly mobile camouflaged Tommys equipped with the likes of ATMs, stingers and drones. Mobile artillery to take out rear positions would still be needed.

    • I think one of the most obvious lessons to come away from this sad state of affairs. Is that combined arms training is key to achieving real war performance (play hard, fight easy!).

      Other issues would be:

      1. Clear and protected lines of communications. Which includes comprehensive logistics planning and dedicated main supply route force protection.
      2. Perhaps one of the biggest gotchas for the Russians, is using unencrypted and very poor communication doctrine. Not only can the Ukrainians and the World listen in. But even basic direction finding can roughly locate the broadcaster. Encrypted comm’s is the only way to operate in and around the battlefield. Seems our Bowman is pretty good by comparison.
      3. MBTs designed with an over-reliance on explosive reactive armour (ERA) instead of passive armour. Therefore, your infantry cannot operate in close proximity with the MBTs in fear of being hit by shrapnel from the ERA .
      4. Vehicle maintenance cannot be skimped on. Something that is drummed into everyone in the British military, through daily and weekly parades etc.
      5. Armed and reconnaissance UAVs are a threat to all, even with a so called world leading air defence system. Protection against UAVs must be a priority.
      6. To have any chance of your armoured vehicles surviving against a modern ATGM, such as Javelin, you need an active protection system.
      7. Troops capable of fighting 24/7. The Russians seem only to fight during daylight hours. Thereby the assumption is that they don’t have enough night vison devices. Also an army marches on its stomach. Troops have been seen raiding and looting for food, suggesting they aren’t carrying any. NATO infantry carry at least a 24 hour ration pack. That is part of the resupply plan including ammunition.
      • The key message to me is that you need solid logistics and you needs to be well defended. The entire logistic chain needs to be looked at to ensure its armoured enough against small arms fire. Plus clearly it needs to be large enough to support an advancing army, not just a static one that we saw in Iraq/afgan or one able to transverse open sand.

        • How many of the AH64B’s do we still have? I know many are worn out, but how many could we keep in effective service to protect our tail and HQ? Would that be a better and more lethal option?

      • Don’t forget the company that makes dorchester is no longer a British company, it now answers to it’s US owners. Does that make a difference?

      • Also, I think they take it off during routine training because the extra weight will adversely affect reliability. Apparently, the Chally 2 weighs in at about 100tons with all the extra armour bolted on (I think I read that on a post on here?) – must put a lot of extra strain on brakes and transmittions if correct.

        Also, I would imagine that the reactive armour would be subject to explosive materials regulations and perhaps it has a limit on useful life in a similar way that other explosives do(?).

        Cheers CR

        • Nah, its 70t. The Abram’s is heavier at 72t with its bolt on armour.

          At the end of the day explosive reactive armour (ERA) is just two pieces of metal sandwiching plastic explosive (PE). Just like any PE, it does have a shelf life, due to the chemicals leaching out.

          • Geez Davey b, I did not realize the current Abraham is that heavy. I imagine that is fully loaded – ammo, fuel, crew etc?

        • I hope they train, on a regular basis, with it on though. Looking at the images and Russia is having a lot of equipment getting stuck in the mud. Massively heavier tanks fully specced will no doubt handle very differently than they do in base spec and assumptions on what you can and can’t cross will need to be adjusted.

          • Having noted the same, especially the wheeled BTRs getting stuck axel deep, does that have a baring on Ajax?

  5. The problem with Estonia is sufficient manouver room and a strong logistics chain.

    Kaliningrad is a huge thorn on SLOC, air and land corridor.

    The Brigade would have to have a strong, protected, logistics prescence in-country.

    Estonia would be a war of liberation for some of the natives and the Russians would bring out the A-Team.

  6. Defence assumptions are for us to be able to deploy a division with armoured brigade any where in the world. Sustainment is the issue. Plus sticking the bulk of our army at the end of a thin strip of land next to the biggest army in Europe sounds like a bad idea. Better stay in Poland and counter attack with invasion of Belarus.

    • The Biggest army in Europe is also showing its size means nada, corruption means troops sell their limited supplied fuel off, don’t do maintainence, and this is their main active force, I can only imagine how their sub standard forces would fare. All in all, while we have some things to fear, the British army with it’s night capability, abundant Anti-tank capability, EW and quite frankly beautiful logistics chains would not be suffering too much even in Estonia should the Ruskies choose to be aggressive to other neighbours.

      Also why invade into Belarus? It’s unnecessary losses handling a force that will stand down anyway once Moscow cannot defend them and their puppets a la Lukashenko are gone , send a SOF in to take Lukashenko like they tried to do with Zelenskiy, and most of Belrus people will switch sides seeing as many are unwilling.

    • I don’t think we can deploy a division of 3 brigades with an emphasis on heavy armour, at the moment. Gen Lord Dannatt said that over 6 months ago.
      Such a force or one close to that strength should be based in western Germany (Paderborn/Sennelager hub) as part of a SACEUR reserve. Let the bulk of forward defence be done by Continental European NATO nations, especially Germany, Poland.

  7. Wouldn’t it it takes us months to deploy this? I seem to remember it did in gulf wars. Then the shake down and testing of kit and Comms. It will probably be over by Easter and Badputin will be happy he’s wiped Ukraine off the map. We should have put troops into Ukraine straight away and defended Ukraine with a wall of multinational strength he wouldn’t have fired a shot against all NATO countries. he’s a bully and needed his bluff calling but we let him walk straight in. But hindsight is a wonderful thing.

  8. Concerning Sky Sabre numbers, everyone is overestimating them – think single figures at the moment. The organisation of 16th Regiment Royal Artillery is about right but equipment is no longer assigned to each battery as in the past, so numbers of sub units (batterys) is not an indication of numbers of Sky Sabre. We need more capability, and soon!

  9. We’ve got so use to to thinking and talking about “penny packets” of troops and equipment – Battalion size battle groups at best – that going back to Divisional let alone Corps level operations will require a major change in both mindset and training. It’s easy to forget that the 2nd Gulf War was 20 years ago, and almost everyone involved has now left or retired from the forces. The Royal Marines are no better off than the Army, reconstituting as 3 Cdo Bde as an operational combat formation would take a lot of money and several years – and is unlikely to be a MOD / RN priority even if the Defence budget gets a significant uplift.

    • It would take weeks to deploy a large force and all the supplies from the UK, including large amount of time to get the supplies sorted (look at the mess that was the rushed job of the Falklands supply logistics). In that time the transporters could do multiple trips, so 93 probably isn’t such a bad number against the maybe 100-150 tanks and same number of warriors, that we could realistically deploy.

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