The UK faces mounting security risks and is failing to take them seriously enough, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has warned.

Speaking on the Lord Speaker’s Lord Speaker’s Corner podcast alongside former First Sea Lord Lord West of Spithead, Lord Robertson argued that Britain is falling behind in resilience and national defence. “We are under-prepared, we’re under insured, we’re under attack and we’re not safe,” he said.

Their joint appearance followed growing debate in Parliament about the UK’s readiness to withstand cyberattacks, sabotage and wider geopolitical shocks.

Lord Robertson raised concerns about Russian activity across Europe, saying Moscow is increasingly outsourcing operations. “They can’t do it themselves. So they are now contracting out, a good capitalist principle, to organised crime… Our undersea cables, which carry 99 percent of all the data we use, are vulnerable and they’re watching them and, in some cases, attacking them.”

He also pressed for realism about China. “We’ve got to engage with China, but recognise that it is going to be the future challenge… I think it’s probably better to call the Chinese a problem rather than a threat at the present moment.”

The peer described global power alignments hardening, noting the image of Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, Vladimir Putin and India’s prime minister together in Beijing. “It should have put a shiver down the back of pretty well everybody… They are collectively getting together essentially to diminish the power of Western values and the West as a whole.”

Lord West warned that the Russia-Ukraine war carries a genuine nuclear risk. “Would they then make that stupid mistake of going nuclear?” he asked, arguing that a defeated Russia could take extreme decisions. He said any eventual peace deal would need enforcement by credible forces: “You can’t just have them there watching or you get massacres like we had in Rwanda.”

West also recalled a moment during 9/11: “I remember getting a phone call from our nuclear firing cell… ‘Sir… the Americans are starting to move to immediate readiness for nuclear weapon release… What do you want me to do?’”

Both peers called for more serious public debate. Robertson warned that if critical infrastructure fails, citizens will demand answers: “When the lights go out, and the hospitals close down, and the data centres melt… people are going to say… ‘why did you not do something about it?’”

The full conversation is available via the Lord Speaker’s podcast.

George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison

36 COMMENTS

    • @ Just Me, people call it the Mind Virus and it is certainly doing as much or more damage than any computer virus we’ve been hit with this far. I’m all for equal opportunities but we also need to be seen by the world as serious about our self-defence, and other countries are literally making fun of us day in, day out. We just don’t see it because our media curates what we are allowed to know.

  1. Well if this is all true its time for the UK and the MOD to truly wake up and get its act together! Is it that hard? The experts should know whats needed by now. Where’s GBAD at, options for increased availability of ships, subs, planes, missile stocks, drones? Measures of societal resilience?

  2. “Nuclear weapon release, immediate readiness.”
    A bit dramatic.
    I think the reality was all their forces went to higher readiness and alert due to the twin tower attacks, including nuclear forces.
    The government were spilt into hiding at Mt Weather ( or wherever the VP went ) and up on Air Force 1, so they were vulnerable.
    They also alerted the Russians just as happens whenever
    either side conduct missile tests.
    Routine. Why is West, of all people, highlighting that?
    The US wasn’t about to drop nukes on Afghanistan.

  3. “Some things in life are bad
    They can really make you mad
    Other things can make you swear and curse
    When you’re chewing on life’s gristle,
    Don’t grumble, give a whistle,
    And this’ll help things turn out for the best.

    And,

    Always look on the bright side of life !

    It’s only Monday Guys, have a great week.

    • Lol….I know we all have a go at Defence and the MOD but we must also give credif too as there must also be a lot going right all the time. I’m sure the 🇬🇧 forces will rise to any occasion as will our allies and the Aussies and Kiwis down here will too. We do know what freedoms we’re defending and fighting for.
      Don’t forget Ukraine, they’ve got barbarians squatting in their front garden!

  4. ‘I can absolutely assure the Committee that we can provide a trained divisional headquarters and certified and assured brigades—16 Brigade, 7th Light Mech Brigade Combat Team, and an armoured brigade—but there will be capability gaps in our ability to get there and our ability to sustain it for time.’

    Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders, H of C Defence Committee Oral evidence: Armed Forces Readiness, 7 November 2023

    That’s it. That’s all we’ve got….and we can’t ‘sustain it for time’

    What to do?

    Drop net zero. At a conservative estimate, that will free up 1-2% of GDP immediately.

    ‘BEIS’s [the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s] own analysis find the costs to be 40% higher, at around £70bn per annum, but still within the annual cost envelope of 1–2% of GDP estimated by the Committee. On the basis of these estimates, the total cost of transitioning to a zero-carbon economy is likely to be well in excess of a trillion pounds.’

    We know what to do with a 1-2% increase to the Defence spending because we have just had a Strategic Defence Report

    ‘Role 2: Deter and defend in the Euro-Atlantic: providing one of two Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, in line with NATO’s Regional Plans, ready to deploy rapidly from the UK to anywhere in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Army must also sustain its contribution to NATO’s forward presence in Estonia and Poland.’

    That means a minimum of two armoured divisions.

    Britain’s national security, the first duty of its government, requires a credible conventional deterrent. At the moment, we have no such thing. Since we may very well be at war within the next few years without such a deterrent, that requires the Government’s immediate attention.

    ‘In a modern strategy the Atlantic army must provide for the West a sense of security to a degree that will encourage it to act and react in respect to global events with confidence. That forecloses (to an adversary) the options of intimidation, blackmail, and political leverage’ (Lt Gen DeWitt Smith, U.S. Army)

    • It goes way way beyond being able to supply 2 divisions to Europe.. I also thing that is an impossible dream at present and there is a very good chance Russia will attack the west and or specifically the UK in ways that completely negate the need or use of an armoured division.

      So what is the very first mission

      The first needs to be to make sure the UK is safe from all domains of attack.. kinetic, grey or political warfare. Because Russia sees the Uk as its leading European enemy it’s going to try and knock the UK out of the game and if it does that having 2 deployable divisions is useless.

      So this is odd for me as I’ve always been a believer in the geostrategic picture first, but I think the present threat to the Uk from Russia is direct personal and multifaceted as well as going beyond NATO. So first the Uk must

      1) harden its system against political attack and ensure its political and communication systems are robust.. because Russia will attack these systems to get the UK out of the way. If it can change the political to a state of “ not our problem” it wins.
      2) harden its civilian infrastructure.. power, health, food and water..because this links to the political.. you take these out and the population and political system folds like a pack of cards and the UK is out the game.
      3) industrial.. If it can hit the UKs industrial capacity it will reduce its ability to impact any war and it best does that through attacks on number 2
      4) wealth.. money matters in war, you run out of money you cannot fight a war.

      So first and foremost we need to manage these..
      1) a huge look at how our political system is funded as well as how the state can control external social media political warfare attacks from our enemies
      2) overdevelopment of power and water supplies as well as better emergency health services, food distribution security, greater and well organised civil defence.. active defence of our key infrastructure nodes against attack.. physical and cyber ( just consider last year two retailers had almost no food on shelves, including my village store due to a cyber attack)
      3) massive redevelopment of defence industries
      4) a complete relook at our economy and a utter focus on the national debt as that is going to cripple our long term ability to fight a war.

      So we need to first and foremost be able to defend our shipping lanes to and from critical resources and trading partners as well as defend our airspace and cyber and political space’s as well as a full spectrum of nuclear deterrent ( we should be able to instigate MAD or fire a single sub strategic response ) .. and our main contribution to NATO should be those elements after that a full armoured division and finally at the end a full light division.

      • The first mission is to deter, as set out in the SDR. In Poland, Germany, Finland, the Baltic States, that is well understood. Drones, deep fires capabilities and so on and so forth are all vital for war fighting…but the only true victory is the war that you do not fight. Putin asked himself how many Armoured Divisions did the Pope and the rest of Europe have. Seeing that there were none, he invaded Ukraine. Next time Russia asks that question, the answer will be different and we are committed to playing our part in that conventional deterrent. Now is the time to act on that.

        • Yes but you need all of those things I stated to deter.. a division is functionally irrelevant as is any military capability as either a deterrent or warfighting capability if the nation itself is incapable of fighting a war.. deterrence is the 3 Cs and if you cannot communicate capabilities and credibility of your nations fundamental ability to fight deterrence does not work.

          • We’ve done all this before. We know what to do. It works:

            ‘The 20 Soviet Divisions and their Air Army in East Germany were all what were known as ‘First Line Divisions’; they were fully manned, equipped with the very latest missile systems, tanks, artillery, aircraft and command, control and communications systems.

            They constantly carried out large scale manoeuvres to practise for their war role of an attack on the West. The British, American and French Missions were therefore in a unique position to observe the tactics, organisation and equipment of these Divisions and provide professional intelligence assessments on their effectiveness as well as give early warning on any hostile intent to mount an attack on the West.’

            SOXMIS did the same for the USSR.
            Verified credible conventional deterrents on both sides of the iron curtain. The result? The Long Peace 1945-2014.

            But there has to be something to verify and communicate. At the moment, as General Sir Patrick Sanders has pointed out, Britain does not possess a sustainably credible conventional deterrent.

            We can’t recreate the thirteen or more major state owned munitions factories that we still had, and more, in 1984. But we can create the mechanised Army Corps that we have promised NATO and that will re-create demand for domestic production of munitions.

            It is the conventional deterrence of armoured divisions that we require immediately.

            • I would dispute that either the USSR red army or the massed armies of NATO on the inner German border did sod all.. the reality is it’s called Paxatomica for a reason.. the west made it clear as a bell that as soon as its armed on the IGB broke they were going nuclear..for most of the Cold War the balance of ground forces was in favour of the USSR.. it was the fear of buckets of sunshine that kept the USSR and NATO from war. It’s different now Russia knows it cannot conquer and break NATO all it can do is nibble at the edge and NATO knows that when Russia tries it will need to graduate its response because if Russia thought it would lose everything it could trigger MAD.

              • Here is someone who knew what he was talking about:

                ‘He served with the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division in Europe, earning a Silver Star Medal, two Bronze Star Medals and three Purple Hearts…..He returned to active duty during the Korean War.
                Smith later commanded the 2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division in Germany and a combat brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. In 1974, Smith was appointed commandant of the Army War College. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1977……Smith returned to the Army War College as commandant.’

                ‘Warfare is tri-dimensional and has been since at least the Spanish Civil War. To distinguish between surface and air, whether the struggle is for control of a sea area or a land mass, seems wrong. Making a distinction between an “air”battle and a “land” battle is not possible except at the lower tactical or procedural levels, certainly not at a strategic level. There is one air-land battle, one thing, one operation. So in my references to “land” forces, please recognize that I am including tactical air forces……

                Strategic nuclear parity, coupled with conventional superiority in Europe, could lead to temptations that even the traditionally conservative Soviet regime might find hard to resist…..but of equal concern to the West is the
                political leverage and freedom of action this condition would provide the Soviets in other areas of the world. An Atlantic community paralyzed by its military inferiority in Europe could only wring its hands as Soviet power and influence moved unimpeded into the so-called Third World, portions of which provide the materials upon which the industrial, economic, and social health of the industrial West depend…..

                So even if one believes that an attack on Western Europe is not a very likely scenario, he still cannot view the growing strength of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe without a certain uneasiness. For that Army not only serves the Soviets’ legitimate security interests, but it also exercises an influence on the Atlantic Community that could be in the long run as fatal as naked aggression.’

                And that is precisely where we find ourselves again today. The only difference is that, this time, the Russian Army has a great deal more European theatre battle experience than we do.

                So What does the good General DeWitt, speaking to us from on high, suggest that we do?

                ‘I have mentioned earlier both the increased effectiveness of the Soviet Army and their achievement of strategic nuclear parity….This latter achievement puts in serious question the credibility of both strategic and theater nuclear weapons as an appropriate and useful response to Soviet aggression. It places an increasing burden on the conventional forces deployed in Germany……

                As a bare minimum, it is the role of the Atlantic army to replace the strategic nuclear deterrent as the instrument with which the attack option is foreclosed to the Soviet Union. But that is a bare minimum. In a
                modern strategy the Atlantic army must provide for the West a sense of security to a degree that will encourage it to act and react in respect to global events with confidence. That forecloses to the Soviet UIlion the options of intimidation, blackmail, and political leverage.’

                LAND FORCES IN MODERN STRATEGY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL DE WITT C. SMITH, JR. US ARMY 1977

                To what extent should Britain’s land forces play a part in that? The SDR 2025 answers that question, as I reference below.

                • But we are not fighting the soviets on the inner German border we are fighting the Russians who are playing a gray war in the high north.. we don’t need or want an army corps in Central Europe and the Uk is an island the 2 divisions we have is perfectly adequate they just need the correct equipment and correct CS CSS.

                  • If it looks like a duck…..

                    The Russians are still using Soviet era tanks. They are familiar with them because the bulk of the Soviet Army became the Russian Army in 1991. We may very well end up fighting the Russian Army on the borders of Germany.

                    And we certainly do want an Army Corps in Central Europe:

                    ‘The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC). The SRC should be led by the Corps HQ (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and enabled by, and command, Corps-level capability. The first division should comprise a fully deployable Headquarters, three manoeuvre brigades with armoured and mechanised capabilities, support brigade, and associated enablers. Planning should include the integration of the Royal Marines Commando Force into the SRC when appropriate’

                    ‘Role 2: Deter and defend in the Euro-Atlantic: providing one of two Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, in line with NATO’s Regional Plans, ready to deploy rapidly from the UK to anywhere in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Army must also sustain its contribution to NATO’s forward presence in Estonia and Poland.’

                    SDR 2025

                    Britain is, of course, an island, a ‘precious stone set in the silver sea’. If we want to keep it that way, we would be better off supporting a forward defence of NATO countries well away from these shores…the scars from ‘Doodlebug’ and V2 ‘Wunderwaffe’ are with us still.

      • Sub sea defence needs to be further bolstered. Why not a small fleet of SSKN’s to complement the Astutes and drones? Based up near Edinburgh North Sea facing, share ops with Norway, Germany and others. Is another T26 needed, if rule of 3, with 9 can then surge to 6? Improve ASW on T31s? Incremental increases. I know, money, personnel, but is it needed or not? If not why are people complaining?
        Deployable ground based defences . Isn’t Ukraine showing what will come over the fence? And that’s just for starters. And not just drones. Why even allow yourself to be hit with next to no GBAD anywhere in the UK? Beyond stupid. Shared missile inventories across Army, Navy, Airforce maximising utilisation. If already happening can it be expanded upon?

        • To be honest SSKs is one of the areas I’ve almost changed my mind on to be honest.. I was always of the view that the UK needed to focus strategic capabilities such as SSNs because any war the Uk would fight would far away.. now I think the next war is going to involve direct attack on the UK and it’s infrastructure and I think the UK needs massive investment in both absorbing those attacks and also causing massive pain back to the enemy. I do wonder if AIP boats could be part that mix either to take control of the North Sea and Norwegian Sea to prevent Russian SSNs and SSGNs getting in position to attack the UK with land attack missiles or even an cruise missile armed SSK to increase our ability to attack.

          • I don’t have an issue with the RN getting SSKs, so long as its not seen as a path for cutting the numbers of SSNs.

            The recent Sky News/Tortoise Media war game, with Ben Wallace acting as the PM, was rather eye opening. There were four main points I took away from the war game. The first is we don’t or can’t field an effective defence against a cruise missile attack. If I remember correctly, the QRA aircraft accounted for some, but there wasn’t sufficient time to scramble more jets to intercept more, before targets were starting to get hit. The second is that we couldn’t mount a strategic response. The third point was how easily Russia manoeuvred the politics, based around a false flag event, to separate the UK from NATO sufficiently long enough so we had no support for a couple of days. I think the fourth and perhaps most pertinent point was how poorly the US supported the UK. Especially when it came to invoking Article 5. Admittedly it was a war game, but it did highlight how NATO politics and rivalries, could allow Russia a couple of days free reign, before NATO actually started doing something.

            However, the wargame was written before Russia launched the Orishnik intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), or Ukraine’s operation Spiderweb. Which was a clandestine in-country coordinated attack by Ukraine on five Russian Airbases, using one way attack drones launched from the back of trucks.

            When we had the E3 Sentries, we had a degree of pre-warning for a cruise missile attack. As the Sentry regardless of its faults would have detected the swarm of cruise missile approaching our coastline. Thereby giving more time for more Typhoons/F35s to be scrambled. The E7 Wedgetails are desperately needed, as they will be our primary cruise missile early warning, but you’ll need more than one flying at any one time.

            Fylingdales along with some other RAF radars, will detect and track something like Orishnik, Which Russia can launch at UK targets from inside mainland Russia. We have next to nothing that could intercept an IRBM. The T45’s Aster 30 Block 0 and the upgraded Block 1, has a degree of proven anti-ballistic missile capability. But against the six Orishnik’s multiple independently retargetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), it’s not guaranteed! Once the Block 1NT comes in to service, it should have a much better chance at intercepting some of the six MIRVs. But again the ship will have to be close to the target area. The shopping list for Western designed missiles, that could intercept Orishnik is fairly small and expensive, i.e. SM6, THAAD, Arrow 2 & 3 and SM3. The MBDA’s HYSIS is at least 15 years away from coming in to service. So we’d need something in the interim. If the T45s had strike length Mk41 or even the longer A70 Sylver launcher. Then it would be possible to change the Aster’s first stage booster to a much longer one. Thereby, giving Aster a similar performance to the first block of SM6.

            A similar Spiderweb style of attack on our airbases, barracks, depots, or docks, currently will be next to impossible to stop. However, if Dragonfire and the directed microwave weapon do come into service, then these could provide local anti-drone defence. But they will have to be operational 24/7 and next to key sites.

            This brings me on to the next point, which is a conventional strategic offensive capability. The two Stratus-LO and RS, will take over from Storm Shadow/Scalp. But its range I think wont be not that much greater, if it’s expected to be carried internally on the Tempest. Other options on the table is the sub-launched TLAM, but I’d say they’d be too busy hunting the subs either getting in to position to launch an attack on the UK, or will be chasing after them, making sure it was a one off effort. Similarly when T26 comes in to service, it will be supporting our subs hunting the Russian ones. Then there is the two carriers! But our F35s can only carry Paveway for air to ground attacks, unless we went cap in hand to the US. Who under the current administration wouldn’t guarantee giving us some JASSMs etc. The joint German-UK memorandum to develop a 2000km range weapon, will be sorely needed. Be it a ballistic missile or a cruise missile, it may offer the UK a conventional offensive capability against strategic targets. That is independent of getting one of our few ships, subs or aircraft in to a position to launch Stratus.

            Analysing the war game, one thing that stands out, is we must be able to defend ourselves regardless of the NATO first rhetoric. If we can’t defend ourselves, what use will we be to NATO, if things did kick off properly with Russia and a lot of materiel and infrastructure was taken out? Russia sees the UK as a major threat to its efforts in Ukraine. In the last three years it has been pilling on the anti-UK rhetoric. It may get to a point where it decides to do something, as it has allegedly done in Poland! Will we be able to respond in kind, if we can’t stop the initial attack? #

            • Yes one of the things I think the Uk very much needs to do is have a lot of options to really hurt Russia. Yes it’s important we act as part of NATO but I could see a possible geopolitical shift that saw the UK isolated. We know that there a rupture between the US and European NATO, what most people don’t seem considering is that if the U.S. pulled the Plug on NATO then the treaty will fall apart completely as the whole treaty is built around US participation and some of the articles only function under US control ( Washington oversight forms part of the article’s).. essentially a whole new treaty would be required. Or under extreme pressure NATO could simply fracture…

              So I see a need for the UK to be able to independently hammer Russia back hard if Russia does something to the UK. That involves:

              1) an adequate supply of land attack missiles for the SSNs… the UK needs to be able send out constant strike missions.. so a good 200 of these ( 10 missions)
              2) the CBG needs a long range strike option for its F35Bs.. that so for now AGM-154 and GBU39 so the F35Bs can attack out to the 100-140km range.. to be replaced in the long run by European and home grown JSM and spear 3.. but having all four of those in the armoury means 3 different options of procurement…
              3) continues growth of the stormshadow stockpile and then replacement by stratus-LO.. the UK should aim to have 2000 of these really.. ( 250 missions+)
              4) the 2000km+ missile, this really wants to be a 2500km range so the UK can hold Moscow at risk from its own soil, again a good 1000 of these.
              5) long range ( 1500km range cruise missiles ) for MK 41 silos in RN escorts.. essentially you want to be able to put 18 of these in per active T 26 and T 31 and have reloads.. so a good 200.

              With a good 3500 long range cruise missiles even Russia would blink at pissing in the UKs tea.

    • “That’s all we’ve got”
      In all arms manoeuvre Brigades to form a Division.
      But you’re ignoring the rest of the Army like you were doing the other day when Dern and I were trying in vain to explain to you.
      A Division has other elements attached to it, and in a war other parts of the Army would deploy in all out effort rather than the 1 silver bullet Division scenario.
      So no, it’s not “all we’ve got.”
      FAT. 11Bde. 77 Bde. ASOB. SG. UG. 2MG. CEMAG.
      ARRC. 1 MPG. 8 Bde. 104 Bde. 1 Bde. ARRC HQ elements.
      1 Div. 7 Bde. 16 Bde. 102 Bde. 4 Bde ( has no CS CSS )
      3 Div. 12 Bde. 20 Bde. 1 Avn Bde. DRSB. 101B. 7G. 23G.
      DSF UKSFG. 21,22,23,SRR,SFSG,18 Reg.

      That’s 15 Brigades, 5 Groups, plus the DSF.
      Yes, there are CS CSS shortages and plenty of issues.
      But you keep repeating this stuff while keeping your fingers in your ears.
      Go ahead….

      • Putin is only interested in what he can see. What he sees is exactly as General Sanders set out above. That is all in the way of real teeth that Britain can put in the field. That is the sum total of our credible conventional deterrent. And we cannot even sustain that for any extended deployment. I would expect that the good General was exceptionally well briefed when he made that statement to the House of Commons Defence Committee but if you disagree with him, why not give General Sir Patrick a shout. I’m sure he’d be delighted to hear from you. Then please let us know how you got on.

        • The simple fact is the land powers of eastern and Central Europe are the armies of deterrence against Russia .. the Uk will not without harming its own interests by massive overbalancing towards the army every be able to create any form of credible army based deterrent.. our armies part in this is by nature alway going to be supportive and a show of political will and more about communication of intent to fight. In reality a couple of extra UK brigades is not what will deter Putin.. what will deter Putin is

          1) Germany and Poland having very large land and air forces that are able to be in a position to defend the NATO eastern boarder these are the two nations that need to be able to put significant numbers of divisions on the ground.
          2) The UK supported by Norway, Denmark etc being able to dominate the high north and smash the Russian northern ocean bastions..essentially killing Russian access to the Atlantic and its high northern infrastructure. The British army is about being able to put 1 good division into Europe to show its intent to fight.. nothing more nothing less ( so sustain 1 heavy brigade, 1 meduim brigade and 1 light brigade with full CS and CCS).
          3) France and Italy focused on control of the med and like the UK being able to supply a heavy division each into the eastern boarder of NATO
          4) USN, RN and La Royale closing down the Atlantic
          5) UK and France ensuring a MAD nuclear response as well as sub strategic response
          6) The ability of the larger nations like the UK, Germany, France, Poland etc to send constant conventional strategic attacks into Russia with missiles, aircraft and drones.
          7) UK France and Italy having the light expeditionary forces to kick Russia out of Africa and deprive it of resources.

          • If history has shown us anything, it has certainly shown us, since at least the 18th Century, that we cannot rely on European powers for our own security. Many Central and Eastern European countries have strong pro Russian political factions. Consider the strategic balance, should Poland elect a pro Russian government. Germany and France (and the U.S.) expect us to pull our weight regarding land forces in Europe. That is why we have committed to providing a mechanised Army Corps to NATO as recently as within this year’s SDR. As General Sir Patrick Sanders pointed out to the House of Commons defence committee, for now Britain cannot provide even one credible Armoured Division and cannot sustain the Division (light minus) that we claim to possess on extended operations.

            That is why we once again have war on Continental Europe, a war approaching ever closer to our shores.

            • We have not committed to an army corps since the fall of the wall.. yes the European powers may want us to put more troops on the ground but we have always had the smallest army of the major powers for a reason.. our strategic needs are best met with air power and naval powers.. our army is and always has been about being there to support allies.. or kicking minor powers.

              • ‘There is an unequivocal need for the UK to redouble its efforts within the Alliance and to step up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security more broadly—particularly as Russian aggression across Europe grows and as the United States of America (US) adapts its regional priorities. The defining principle of this Review is therefore ‘NATO First’

                ‘Role 2: Deter and defend in the Euro-Atlantic: providing one of two Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO…The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC). The SRC should be led by the Corps HQ (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and enabled by, and command, Corps-level capability.’ SDR 2025

                Where are we, at the moment?

                ‘I can absolutely assure the Committee that we can provide a trained divisional headquarters and certified and assured brigades—16 Brigade, 7th Light Mech Brigade Combat Team, and an armoured brigade—but there will be capability gaps in our ability to get there and our ability to sustain it for time.’

                Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders, H of C Defence Committee Oral evidence: Armed Forces Readiness, 7 November 202

                How much time do we have? If Ukraine crumbles, not much……

            • Zero chance of Poland electing a pro Russian government. The only people they hate on par with the the Russians are the Germans

              • But if and when Germany has completed its rearmament and has itself elected a right wing government?

                These are the long term factors that any SDR must take into account.

                There was ‘zero chance’ of Russia invading Ukraine, according to many informed commentators…….

  5. The most serious warfare against the nations of the British Isles have been actively nurtured by the UK Government itself since 1997. It makes little difference if we’re bled to death by a thousand cuts or one big stab to the heart. The end result is the same.

  6. We desperately need some good news on the defence front, but every article on this site about purchases and armaments always seems to relate to foreign nations. All we seem to be getting are the Ajax vehicles absolutely no-one wants and which seem to be being built in Europe?

    I don’t understand why defence is such a difficult situation for UK politicians to grasp. Apparently Rishi Sunak would glaze over and obviously stop listening when defence was raised in his presence. No interest whatsoever.

    In our rush to allow over-representation, our government and various councils seem to have become top-heavy with people who see Britain as a piggy bank to advance interests that are actively harmful to the UK. People were given these roles not on merit, and not with much screening, which means anti-British agendas are rife.

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