Britain rebuilding ability to manufacture large-calibre guns

I agree, but you must add competance and training of those armed forces..France lost very rapidly to the 3 rd Reich because of its total incompetance of their military leadership..Thier total misunderstanding of the enemies capabilities, a total inability to accept the intelligence, and a total breakdown of the command structure…..The head of the forces was more a political , or “friends” choice rather than based on skills…

Don’t forget doctrine, a key factor in the French defeat in 1940.

I’m fully aware. That is why I made clear in my other comment that privatisation of key defence manufacturing sites was, for a country as small as Britain, a grave mistake. Why if the army felt they had enough AS90s would they order more? The closure of so much of our land defence industry is entirely the fault of politicians.

It wouldn’t have made a difference if BAE was privately owned or not in this sense. Those factories would’ve closed either way.

The army never ordered any more AS90s. A planned second batch was never ordered because of the end of the Cold War.

The army didn’t order a single piece of artillery after AS90 was ordered in the early 90s and ended production in 1995.

Barrow being government owned wouldn’t have changed that and would likely have meant production of barrels would’ve ended sooner than it did as exports would’ve been less likely.

I don’t accept your argument. Other European countries have sustained defence manufacturing through lean years. How did Sweden keep the ability to make artillery pieces when no one was ordering them? Or Nexter? In peacetime, orders for new equipment are likely to be scarce and irregular. Sweden wisely funded BAE Bofors to design and build Archer. To date just 48 have been manufactured.
The TOBA agreement with BAE sustained warship construction through years of no new orders. But we failed to sustain the capability to build new warship guns. Utterly stupid short sightedness on the part of successive governments.

France ordered 72 Caesars for in 2004 for delivery between 2008 and 2011. They ordered 109 more in 2022 for delivery from 2026 to 2030.

Sweden ordered 24 Archers in 2010, and 24 in 2016 for delivery between 2013 and 2022. They ordered 48 more in 2023 with delivery starting in 2025

A 15 year period with no Caesars delivered to the French army, a 3 year period with no Archers delivered to the Swedish army.

The first Boxer RCH155s will be delivered later this decade, the last AS90s were delivered in 1995. That’s a 32-34 year period in which no artillery was delivered to the British army.

I doubt there is a single country that manufactures artillery, that has periods of over 30 years in which none are delivered to its own armed forces.

Exactly. 179 AS-90s was deemed sufficient and were fielded from 1992. Since the turn of this century the numbers have only ever headed South, at an alarming rate.

No-one should blame the army though. Cameron ordered a 40% cut in the active fleet in his 2010 Defence Review and a more recent politician has gifted 60 to Ukraine. I am sure too that a politician cancelled the Braveheart upgrade – Army officers do not cancel major programmes.

Was it really the army’s choice not to order artillery after AS-90?

AS-90 came into service in 1992. Back in 1990 Marconi/BAE Systems was awarded a contract to upgrade 96 of AS90s to the Braveheart spec with 52-cal barrels. These were expected to enter service in 2003. Not sure who at the top cancelled the contract but it would not have been an army officer. 

There was no need to buy more L118 Light Guns or to replace them, even after many decades of service (ISD was 1974). However some upgrades were done. It could be argued though that M777 155mm (first ISD with US 2005) could have been bought in the last decade-ish to augment or replace L118.

[ We ordered MLRS in the 1980s, and later upgraded it but that was a US product]

When I said the army, I really meant Blair and his wars that cost nearly £50b and forced the army to posture towards COIN operations rather than a peer enemy.

When 19 mechanised brigade converted to light, M777s for 40 RA and the 2 TA regiments should’ve been ordered. After Army 2020 when 3 RHA and 4 RA reroled to support 1 Division, they should’ve got M777 along with the 3 TA regiments. They didn’t because it was cheaper to use Light Guns from storage into a role they weren’t designed for.

AS90 should’ve been returreted with Braveheart or replaced years ago.

These opportunities were missed and now BAE doesn’t design and manufacture artillery in the UK.

My point was that it isn’t BAEs fault that it didn’t happen.

Bravo.
Someone else who remembers the Labour years!
Re the army especially, we are still paying for it now.
Post 2010, Light Guns replacing AS90 when 3 RHA and 4 RA lost their SPGs as the Armoured and Mech Bdes were reduced from 5 to 3 was ridiculous, especially as they would have been the artillery element for the Strike Brigades until that was also put to bed.

And then your in a peer war…and you’ve sent every penny you ever saved + huge amounts more ( untold billions) …trashed your economy for years and got untold numbers of people killed…all so you could save a few billion quid a year of you defence budget….to say the “ end of history and the last man” brigade were idiots is to make a massive understatement.

Soldiers have been killed because we once did not have enough body armour, and we only had Snatch LRs rather than full PM vehicles in the early years of the sandbox wars.

Indeed I know it’s not something that’s is shared but I don’t believe the light role infantry are truly deployable unless they have at a minimum light protected vehicles available.unless they are specifically..airmobile/rotor mobile…

It’s why I think it’s important we see the armoured infantry retain warrior ( the infantry battalions in the armoured brigades should be in tracked IFV)…then essentially scrap the light protected infantry battalions and convert them to mechanised infantry battalions in box boxer. This would leave around 6 battalions worth of light protected vehicles maybe as pool for the light role infantry..this would mean that light role infantry could always be deployed as light protected infantry..unless they were going to do a deployment you don’t want protected vehicles for…( up a mountain or something similar).

If the infantry could get to:
6 armoured infantry battalions ( warrior) establishment 729
6 mechanised infantry battalions ( boxer) moving from light role to mechanised, increasing their establishment to 729 from 581.
3 heavy protected battalions ( mastiff), establishment 709.
12 light role ( with the ability to deploy with foxhound in 6 of the 12), establishment 561.

Again, you’re back in the early 200s again. If only.
3 x AI Bdes each 2 x Warrior Bn.
3 x UK MECH Bdes each 2 x Bulldog, 1 x Warrior.

Later AI Bdes had 2 x Warrior and 1 x HPM Mastiff until Carter came along and wrecked it with his Strike plans.

Yes but I liked the early 2000s better….not so much Carter.

Totally. 6 strong brigades, plus 16, plus 3 Cdo.
The cuts then started and one of the Mech Bdes became 19 light and UK based Bdes started losing tanks with Scimitars replacing them.

Hi mate, I honesty hope that there is a way back to that force level, as in reality that’s what the British army needs to be…where it needs to be…in my own mind the test of the the British army being a truely relevant deterrent is the ability to sustain for a longish period a heavy division or indefinitely a heavy brigade combat team..as well as having the ability to deploy a light air mobile brigade…if it cannot do that i question what we are about as the 6th richest nation on the planet with a population of 70million.

You’re right but unless you want to spend that cash…. ot how many of your 70 million would stand up and join zhe forces in peacetime nevermind fight

I recall an exchange Daneile and I once had – we weren’t sure whether Lt Role Inf had any or sufficient soft-skinned TCVs to move the battalion! Protection levels should match the threat. Of course we never know what threat the guys are going to face next, so maybe that is why you moot a minimum of light PM vehicles for all lt role inf. The beancounters won’t agree, of that I am sure.
We have deployed lt role inf numerous times and I don’t recall them always having PM vehicles. On Op Banner lt role inf were often driven around in aged wheeled armoured vehicles (Humber Pig, Saracen) driven by RCT drivers. But that is a blast from the past. I wonder what the Para bn had when covering the Aug 2021 evac from Kabul airfield?

As to your other comments Warrior is going and nothing can bring it back (even if the army was forced to accept not having the upgrade (WCSP) to save money). I agree that it is mad to lose IFVs from the armoured brigades and have only the ‘wunder-APC’, Boxer instead.

Boxer is a Mechanised Infantry Vehicle and it is for the mechanised infantry. It should not have been foisted on the armoured infantry.

MoD has made its decisions and I doubt the army staff had much, if any, of a voice in that. Sorry but your fantasy fleet is just that.

Hi graham..with the light role infantry..what I think they could actually do is hold the foxhounds ( we have 6 battalions worth) as a divisional asset..so when any of the light role are working up for deployment or if they are on 30/60/90 days they get the foxhounds…..indeed we don’t need every light role battalion in foxhound all the time after all 2 are always doing civil duties and a couple of other are hanging around deployed in perfectly safe places..( unless Turkey decided to invade).

I always object to the word fantasy fleet, it’s not a fantasy to feel the armed forces should be equipped to the level that the rational pre 2000 defence reviews said they should be equipped to to manage the post Cold War risk, in my mind it’s actually fantasy fleets to pretend that what they have now is fine and if the UK sent the army to war with it or the navy had to fight a peer it would all be ok…stating the actual risks and requirements to mitigate those risks is not fantasy..it’s realistic…the fantasy is pretending the risks don’t exist or it’s all ok. I think we should expect more and actually advocate for more…

We don’t really have light role Infantry left in the army anymore.
12 and 20 AI’s 5 Battalions are on Warrior/Boxer
7 Brigade’s 6 Battalions are either on Foxhound, or stationed in Cyprus
11 SFAB’s 4 Battalions are aimed at STTT’s
ASOB’s 4 Battalions have their own mobility requirements that I won’t go into.
16’s 4 Battalions are Air Assault.

That leaves 4 Brigades 6 Battalions, one of which is in Brunei, one is in Cyprus that are “Light Role” (but they don’t have CS or CSS so not deploying at scale), and I think they’re due to be equipped with LPM and MPM vehicles when that program gets funded.

Foxhounds and similar MPM’s require training and units to maintain a force structure that enables them. This means not only training for it on exercises, but also maintaining significant numbers of CAT-C qualified personnel. Holding six battalions worth of vehicles, not assigned to a unit, with nobody assigned to maintain them, and then suddenly expecting a unit to do a 90 day crash course on them. Not really a reasonable state of affairs (plus it means stripping 7 Brigade of it’s vehicles).

Fantasy Fleet is called fantasy fleet not because the desire to see the forces equipped is unreasonable, but because designing an TOE or ORBAT with no reference to what is affordable is ignoring constraints, and at that point you might as well post a 1960’s BAOR orbat.

Interesting on the light role…but to be honest l simply don’t accept that as a nation we could not afford to update warrior and keep it for the armoured infantry..thus freeing up boxer to equip 6 of the protected Mobility battalions turning them to mechanised infantry …that’s not fantasy fleet..the challenger 3 upgrade costs around 5.6million a pop, which is around 25% of the purchase price of a new MBT…a warrior upgrade is not coming close to that 5 million each figure…we could probably upgrade the entire warrior fleet for a third to a quarter of what we are spending on boxer….you cannot tell me that at most a couple of billion over say a 5 year contract for such a massive uplift is not within the realms of the 6th richest nation in the world…that would be say 200-400 million a year…that’s a rounding error in our nations expenditure…asking for the BOAR would be fantasy fleet Im not saying that. I’m saying we are at risk of a peer lane war so increase the number of our heavy battalions in a cost effective way is just clever…spending at most say a couple of billion to allow you to retain your IFVs for 6 battalions of armoured infantry..when the risk assessments are saying you may be heading to a a peer land war..is just common sense.

HMG has to stop cutting capabilities to keep in year departmental budgets and instead asking how can very expensive irreplaceable capital assets instead be upgraded and maintained in a cost effective way and refurbishing expensive armoured fighting vehicles is profoundly cost effective..scrapping them is just tossing away billions in defence assets..who are the fantasists here Dern ?

Sorry, but it’s the definition of fantasy fleet, unless you can explain what you’d cut to pay for the Warrior upgrade (saying that the Treasury should cough up the money, while again, a reasonable thought, is also a hall mark of Fantasy Fleets).

To answer your final question ahead of time: People who propose fantasy fleets are fantasists. I’m really sorry that you don’t like being told that you are engaging in fantasy fleet’s but that is what you are doing. That’s fine, it’s not the end of the world, but it requires an understanding that thinking of orbats without the considering the reasons why those orbats currently don’t exist is escapisim. I’ve engaged in it too, somewhere I have a lovely orbat stashed away that shows how the British Army could operate with a significant uplift in cash, my 1 DSR orbat has a wiff of fantasy fleet about it because it requires a Challenger Uplift.

So what would you cut to fund Warrior CSP (bearing in mind it was already at the 500million mark when it was cancelled and hadn’t entered production yet). Goodbye ARRC?

HMG you can argue is being irresponsible, reckless, or just illconsidered, but it does not consist of fantasists.

Well considering the plan is to increase the defence budgets to 2.5% when conditions allow..it gives plenty of opportunity..the defence budget and army budget is not something in isolation, it’s part of wider government spending..and at preset it’s likely that the chancellor will have a level of headroom within government spending….the government will have choices to make…in reality warrior is still in service, there is no physical or major barrier to it remain in service into 2040…so the only barrier is choices…do we choose to keep a tracked infantry fighting vehicle in service or do we not..to pretend it’s not a choice is to simply accept what could have been a bad decision.

I wish it was a given, but with the black hole in the equipment budget and the general dislike of armour that the self proclaimed cassandras have, I’m not holding my breath.

What happened to the 120mm mortar? Was reported ages ago it was incoming.

I think the ISD has been accelerated to 2032? 😛

🙄

Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think it will happen. But if you go back a 3 years it was the plan to have both armoured infantry battalions in warrior ( until 2040s ) as well as Mechanised infantry in boxer, so it’s not like it’s completely left field…the cancellation of WCSP was a bad decision, but while we still have 600+ warriors in service it’s a bad decision that can be reversed. I will be writing to the new review and defence ministers giving my personal view on why it was a bad decision. Mainly because I feel you should alway fight against bad decisions, until the point it cannot be reversed. Not that I think it will be reversed. But is a new review, a new government and a different geopolitical picture from when WCSP was cancelled..so you never know.

Eyebrows raised, ears pricked, nose sniffing, at mention of ASOB mobility requirements, for, was it 8 man teams?

12 man teams.
Can’t walk everywhere, especially if you are the only 12 people in country.

Damn. Thanks.Must try harder to remember that, especially as I’ve asked you before….🙄
Intriguing.

I’d invite you to think about how you’d maximise the utility of a ASOB type unit and what kind of mobility that would require.

👍 Already have since you mentioned earlier.
I’ve an idea, whether it’s accurate I have no idea till I sniff something out.
And if I do, I won’t post it anyway.

Funny how I’d noted one formation elsewhere in UK mil using them, but didn’t think of an ASOB requirement.
Good few hundred ordered I’d hope given Rangers geographical spread.
That was another of my concerns should Labour literally go all Europe, the area specifics per Bn beyond Europe, bar one.

Ohhh, and another type as well.
Gotcha.

Just wait until the Para’s find out that Rangers need jumps quals for insertions 😂😂😂😂

ARSE would BURN.
(Let’s be clear: This is a joke)

Hi Jonathan, I could not say anything more relevant than Dern who is a serving soldier. Soldiers deploying on operations should be equipped with all that they need to move, survive against the threat, and do the job.
Referring to the army webpages on the MoD website….Infantry up against the most demanding threat (enemy with heavy and medium armour) are AI in Warriors (currently), then a level of threat less will be met by the Mech Inf in Mastiff (currently), then a threat even less could be met by Lt Mech Inf in Foxhounds, then where the threat is nil to minimal would be Lt Role Inf. Horses for Courses.

The post Cold War risk is not any one thing – every operation the army has done since the Berlin wall fell in 1989 has been radically different to each other – in different parts of the world with a very different threat presented and might be One-Shot or Enduring. The army has gi=one equipped accordingly.
The threat varies according to the nature of the enemy, how they are equipped, their TTP, their proximity to our own forces.

Away from deployed operations in the face of a very real threat there are many tasks that can be allocated to a light role inf battalion and they would just need soft-skinned TCVs. There surely is something wrong if we have to deploy Lt role Inf to a task with a significant threat, when we have AI, Mech and Lt Mech Infantry available.

Sorry you don’t like the term fantasy fleet. But it is a fantasy to think that Warrior could be reprieved, and that some 15 inf battalions could have over 700 posts.

I don’t think the Para’s had anything in Kabul aside from CAV’s,

…and that seemed to be enough for the situation. Maybe they sourced them in-country? If so, that is a quick and practical solution when prep time is limited.

You can’t source CAV’s in country, although they may have used ones that had been brought in by previous British Forces.

Yep, of course. Thanks.

While the unecessary deaths in the Sandbox Wars where really terrible, they are sadly one of the more minor examples, British Soldiers moving in Snatches without body armour had very little impact on the outcome of that war.

Yes, true. [I was pleased to play a role in ABW that got PM vehicles procured fast by UOR].

Yes but how do you get them to join up?

Or why did do many people join in the past?

Agree. An army around 90,000-100,000 troops would be sufficient and ensure we can fulfill our NATO commitments. The new government needs to get us match fit and ready. Everyone knows China and Russia are spoiling for a fight. Our European allies are mostly moving in the right direction, Poland especially.
Our gift to NATO should be a very capable and much larger navy and an RAF that can field superior platforms and smart precision guided munitions available in adequate numbers.
We need massive investment in homeland defences as well, so the UK industrial base and our key military sites are not knocked out on day one of the conflict we all know is coming.
If Trump gets in would it be the end of NATO? Possibly/ probably so Europe needs to look to its own defence and not continuously rely on a regressive and ever more inward isolationalist USA.
A unified European defence strategy involving the UK as an ally is needed. Not so we have to fight and die in Europe but to improve our combined defence forces so they are a very real deterrent to Russia and China.

I have much confidence that this SDR will be competently done but less that HMT doesn’t hack back at what £££s is really required ‘in the final chapter’. I see some cuts being detailed but played down as well as enhancements, which will probably not cover all that you suggest and to the level required.

Strangely enough, I am less worried about Trump. He may not get in to power now that a more credible opponent than Biden is in the offing, both Houses may not be taken over by Republicans, Trump is not as anti-NATO as he once was, Trump could not rescind NATO membership without Congress agreement. Even if he got in and opted the US out of the military command structure as de Gaulle did, that does not mean NATO is finished, just that it changes to be a Canada/Europe grouping.

I am not sure that China is much deterred by European forces if they only experience a small and occasional presence in their region.

Good post 👍

Yes the right size is a good question and to be honest I don’t think HMG has been very clear with the army on what it wants it to deliver for a long time now…if it’s a heavy division + a light airmobile brigade both for extended operations..then it’s to small…if it’s a max effort heavy brigade for and extended operation and a light brigade now and then ..then it’s about the right size…

Hi Jonathan, I am not sure why you are not sure what HMG wants the army to deliver by way of organised, trained capability. It has clearly been stated in the various recent defence reviews, IRs, Defence Command Papers.

The booklet, ‘Future Soldier’ or ‘FS’, is a very good read and describes all this and has all the relevant Orbats. There are deficiencies with the various Orbats in FS (mainly caused by insufficient headroom) and much of the army’s heavy metal kit is old and/or unmodernised. Also, MoD don’t always buy the right kit from the right manufacturer either.
Dern, Daniele and others have given very good analyses over the years. But the army knows what they are expected to do and train for. At a micro-level there can’t be a single CO who does not know what his unit is structured and equipped to do – and relevant training is conducted accordingly. Not to say there aren’t surprises along the way.

There can be little doubt that a regular army of 73,000 is too small. [Who thinks otherwise?] Even the Conservatives for years were sayng there was no justification to reduce below the-then 82,000….until they did. No cuts since those required by the very significant Options for Change defence review (published in summer 1990) which reduced the army for post-Cold War duties to a mere 120,000 have been justified by a reduction in the various threats. Cuts have solely been made for financial reasons.

The army never has just one task. It always has multiple tasks, of varying priorities. It needs to be able to cover the entire spectrum of armed conflict with sufficient capability – and should really be prepared to have 2 major operational tasks at a time – for many years Op TELIC and HERRICK ran simultaneously. For many decades the army had to have a strong light role force in NI (Op BANNER) whilst having a strong warfighting deterrent force in Germany (this was essentially an Operation, although not called that).

I don’t think anyone in the army with a copy of FS does not understand what the army is expected to do and how it is structured to do it.

As I have said many times, one of the greatest concerns is the army’s great difficulty/inability in now conducting an enduring operation of brigade group strength, such as was done in Afghanistan. It would be impossible if another major operation occured simultaneously during the long period of an enduring operation (TELIC lasted 8 years, HERRICK lasted 12 years and BANNER lasted 38 years!)

If the requirement was for ‘a max effort heavy brigade for an extended operation and a light brigade now and then’ ….the army cannot do it – it does not have five heavy brigades to achieve roulemont. The army’s remit is though far more complicated and wide-ranging than your pithy sentence suggests.

Hi graham, sorry I was probably not being clear..when I say not sure what HMG wants ..what I mean is that when you have a published set of requirements..but you don’t then resource for that requirement, you have not been clear what you want….essentially HMG can publish what it wants.but if it’s not providing and supporting having the required capabilities to achieve this then it’s providing a confused message..I’ve lived with this for ever in my roles…the Department of health and the cabinet office have always had lovely “ this is the mission type guidelines” but actions and available resources would say differently…essentially when I say the message is confused I mean what is written and what is reality ( as in available resources) are not the same….I’m a simple person and I’ve alway believed that we should resource an organisation to the level of the ask…If we don’t we are are essentially being incongruent.

That makes sense. All know what the army has to be able to do, but it is a matter of debate if resourcing is sufficient to achieve a mission with a high probability and a high level of success, with minimal friendly forces casualties.

I was out in Afghan Nov 08-May 09. Task Force Helmand (TFH) was a Brigade Gp which was well supported by air, avn, med (Role 3 Hosp), log, ES etc. But I always reckoned we needed an Infantry Div to cover our real estate, and given the threat. [Not saying we had a spare Inf Div, and we would have needed five to roule – that’s another story]

Under-resourced from a head-count perspective. Troops work-rate was very high, rest periods limited. 2/3 of Bastion’s FP Coy was TA. MoD had not sourced PM vehs as early as the Americans had, hence Snatch for a long time etc. We struggled to be consistently effective in the nastiest places like Sangin, Nad e Ali etc. In the battle of Musa Qala in 2007, we had to be augmented by 800 US Army troops from 82 AB Div.
A bit later Obama surged extra troops into Helmand because we were not numerous enough and were clearly struggling. We ended up with 17,000 USMC in Helmand. US political leadership and many of their senior officers thought we Brits had failed in Helmand.

457 British fatalities during Op HERRICK, and thousands with life-changing injuries – I am sure the toll would have been less if we had more troops out there. We should also have got PM vehicles earlier, notwithstanding fast UOR procurement after the faltering start.

Pretty much mate, yes. Short of Ajax for 5 Bdes though, 1 Reg per AI Bde and one for a Mech Bde.

I suppose they could hold the Recce regiments as divisional assets…then if 1st division had 2 it would be less of an issue…or we could ( not a lot of chance I know)..find the money for an extra regiment of Ajax and Ares….it would be nice to have 5 heavy brigades…and it would make any UK contributions to deterring Russia meaningful …as in we could almost permanently deploy a heavy brigade combat team into Eastern Europe..and not just battalion battlegroups.

We had 5 heavy brigades up to 2010 when SDSR did it’s damage. 7 and 20 Armoured, 1 and 12 Mechanized, and 4 Mechanized, which came back to the UK first and had previously been Armoured. Though there was v little difference between and Armoured and a Mech Bde, all had tanks, AS90, Warrior ( plus bulldog Bns in the Mech Bdes ) and their full VS CSS allocation.
Getting that back now would be very difficult.
Interestingly, in BAOR in the 80s the Recc Regiments were at Divisional level. I forget when they became Bde level formations.

In the 90’s, when the BAOR became BFG, reduced from 4 to 2 Divisions and every formation that wasn’t in the BAOR was cut, the Scimitar Regiments generally survived the cuts and divisional Recce forces became Brigade Recce Forces.

Also worth noting that for a long time the Divisional Recce Regiments would have been detached and have operated together as I (Br) Corps screening command in the event of war. I suspect the desire to retain that had a factor in keeping the heavy Recce Screen (shades of 1 DSR).

The difference between Mech Brigades and Armoured Infantry Brigades (in the 2000s) was that Mech Inf had 1x Warrior Battalion and 2x Bulldog battalions, while AI had 2x Warrior Battalion and 0 Bulldog’s

Evening Dern.
Thanks for that.
On last para, yes, aware, as I noted in my post above, though I didn’t list 1 Warrior vs 2 Bulldog as didn’t see the need.

I recall a whole back there was also 1 Recc Bde. Wonder what the idea behind that was? I assumed it a mere admin formation like 1 Art Bde.

15 of our Bns were mech or armoured infantry. 9 + 6 Bulldog ( previously Saxon)
Went down to 9 post 2010 ( excluding Light Mech) 6 + 3 HPM.
The Strike business would have reduced it to 8. 4 + 4 Boxer.
Now just 5.
Utterly pitiful and far too small for a nation of our stature, population and wealth.

I think it was similar to the Commander Screening Force Idea? Not entirely certain though.

Me neither.

Thanks mate.

It defines civilians as protected persons thus compelling the attacking (or defending for that matter) force to protect civilians. Fire bombing Dresden does not fit that bill. Attacking the homes of civilians in order to disrupt the war effort and attampting to force them to surrender is a tactic. It was used by the RAF and it is no longer permitted under the Geneva Convention. This is why the Israelis and Putin are in trouble. So YES it does outlaw tactics.

Dresden as a target, included many dispersed sites, including Zeiss optics etc. it was also an area controlled by one of the most ruthless Nazi rulers. In practice it was a highly organized, high precision, raid by both the Americans (daylight) and the British (at night).

In reality the Nazis invented the concept of firebombing to create a firestorm. Spain suffered from this during its Civil War, and as did cities like Coventry in the UK early in WWII during “The Blitz.” Indeed the term to be “Coventrated” comes from this.

German civilians from Dresden later interviewed said: “what did we expect…” [after their behaviour and ethics].

That may well be true however the theory behind amending the Geneva Convention in 1949 was clearly an effort set the tone for future conflicts and eliminate terrorising the civilian populations, destroying their housing etc.

Whilst the major powers have moved away from firebombing and more towards precision weapons there have been cases where countries have appeared to step over the line. Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian cities being one plus Israel’s high civilian casualty rates in Gaza.

The issue with Ukraine is they may decide not to exercise restraint and stick to militarily necessary targets especially if armed with artilery. From a legal perspective I don’t think that because Putin is ruthless and Russia started it will be any kind of defence.

To be fair to Ukraine much of their targetting has been consistent with western values thus far. However do we need to be careful what we provide.Some weapons might be better than others.

Agreed.

Hats off though to Ukraine for showing Western values in their restraint under such inhuman provications, but They must be enabled to strike back at Russian military and infrastructure targets in order to defend themselves and remove the invader from their country..

Maybe so, but if you do some research on the Bomber Command attack on Dresden you will see that the target areas were the built up areas of the city, the main marker force target was a sports stadium. Most of the industrial areas were not in the targeted area. It was a deliberate area bombing raid in which the target was the built up area and the population.

Crumbs, no need to be so condescending mate, You don’t know me or what I have done. I’m not saying it was not against the civilian structures. I was just trying to add some context.

A lot of the industry (e,g, Zeiss) was dispersed in civilian buildings. The RAFs main force target markers were not always the intended target, but rather forward of the actual target. This was due to something called “creep back” where crews tended to release early and get the hell out of there. The US daylight raids which bombed on a lead aircraft suffered from this.

The raids intention was also to destroy the Nazi regional government and speed up access for the Russians coming from the east.

Disagree by all means, but dial down the rudeness mate – no need, and just makes you look like a agitator/plonker.

So you just decided to ignore my point, cheers for that. You don’t seem to understand the difference between Tactics, Operations and Strategy so let me explain:

Strategy is the top level (only superseded by Grand Strategy): The Decision to Bomb German Cities is an example of Strategy: It’s a decision of where to allocate resources at a National Level.

Operations: The next level down, is the decision of how those reasources get allocated. We’ve decided that we want to target German Cities, at the strategic level, so now we are going to conduct specific Operations to further that goal. In this context, the Bombing of Dresden is a specific Operation. “We will fly at night and drop fire bombs in large numbers on the city to create maximum destruction.” Is a Operations, till not tactics.

Tactics is the lowest level. In terms of the Dresden Raid tactics might be “There is a guy shooting at me with an 88, I will respond to this by flying higher.” or “A BF-109 is coming at us, we will fly in close formation so our MG’s can provide mutual support.”

The Strategic and Operational aim of attacking civilians is prohibited. But tactics? No. Maybe consider learning what words mean if you are going to use them?

Hi Dern,

My mistake let me explain.

If you look to the dictionary you will normally find two interpretations of “Tactics” one will be the military one and one will be more standard

noun
plural noun: tactics
an action or strategy carefully planned to achieve a specific end.
“the minority attempted to control the Council by a delaying tactic”

I used tactic in the non-military way mainly because the decision in question is not really a military one it is a political one. Also the Geneva Convention will have been drafted by politicians and lawyers.

However (without checking) the Geneva Convention will not mention tactics at all. It will say that certain persons under certain circumstances are protected and therefore cannot be attacked. The relavance of discussing WW2 campaigns is merely to emphasise what changed after 1949 and what sort of outcomes are deemed unacceptable.

This is obviously relevant as we need to be aware if their is a danger of becoming complicit in a war crime.

There are a whole host of things done in WW2 that would have problems today otherwise they would never have bothered making the changes to the Geneva Convention after WW2.

One small example:

Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, collective punishment is a war crime. By collective punishment, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions had in mind the reprisal killings of World War I and World War II. In the First World War, the Germans executed Belgian villagers in mass retribution for resistance activity during the Rape of Belgium. In World War II, both German and Japanese forces carried out a form of collective punishment to suppress resistance. Entire villages or towns or districts were held responsible for any resistance activity that occurred at those places.[14] The conventions, to counter this, reiterated the principle of individual responsibility. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the conventions states that parties to a conflict often would resort to “intimidatory measures to terrorize the population” in hopes of preventing hostile acts, but such practices “strike at guilty and innocent alike. They are opposed to all principles based on humanity and justice”.

The distruction of whole cities such as Leningrad and Berlin might well have been problematic. Was it militarily necessary etc. etc. Hitler’s goose was cooked just on the holocaust alone and it sometimes is difficult for countries like the UK who hold higher standards not wanting to break any rule even if it puts them at a disadvantage.

The deliberate targeting of a civilian population IS outlawed in the Geneva Convention, so that would make the entire Bomber Command area bombing strategy illegal and would outlaw the policy of targeting civilian built up areas and population.

As would the indiscriminate firing of V1 and V2 rockets on London not to mention the Luftwaffes bombing of other European cities, so why single out Bomber command for recriminations?