First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said in a video update the Littoral Response Group will operate out of Duqm.

The specific section of the video can be found here.

The UK will operate two Littoral Response Groups, one deploying to the Euro-Atlantic region and the other deploying to the Indo-Pacific.

This was outlined in the Defence command paper (essentially a defence review) published earlier this year.

“The Royal Navy will be a constant global presence, with more ships, submarines, sailors and marines deployed on an enduring basis, including to protect shipping lanes and uphold freedom of navigation. With support from partners in the Indo-Pacific, Offshore Patrol Vessels will be persistently deployed and a Littoral Response Group (LRG) in 2023 will complement the episodic deployment of our Carrier Strike Group; contributing to regional security and assurance.

This will be enabled by the deployment of two Littoral Response Groups; the first in 2021 will be deployed to the Euro-Atlantic under a NATO and JEF construct, while a second will be deployed to the Indo-Pacific region in 2023. They will also be able to deliver training to our partners in regions of the world where maritime security is most challenging.”

What is a Littoral Response Group?

The Defence Command Paper defines a Littoral Response Group as “A bespoke force assigned to a geographical area, that contains dedicated shipping, helicopters and boats”.

In fact, the UK has already practised this deployment. More than 1,000 sailors and Royal Marines sailed to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea aboard amphibious assault ship HMS Albion, destroyer HMS Dragon and amphibious support ship RFA Lyme Bay.

British Littoral Response Group sails for Mediterranean and Black Sea

The Royal Navy say that while deployed the ships tested the new and experimental Littoral Response Group concept (which replaces the UK’s long-standing Amphibious Task Group) and shape the Future Commando Force and evolution of the Royal Marines into a hi-tech raiding and strike force.

In addition, a Bay class vessel will be converted to deliver greater littoral strike capalities at a cost of £40 million.

Bay class to be converted to deliver ‘lethal littoral strike capability’

“The Royal Navy will invest £40m more over the next four years to develop our Future Commando Force as part of the transformation of our amphibious forces, as well as more than £50m in converting a Bay class support ship to deliver a more agile and lethal littoral strike capability. Forward deployed to respond rapidly to crises, this special operations capable force will operate alongside our allies and partners in areas of UK interest, ready to strike from the sea, pre empt and deter sub threshold activity, and counter state threats. This will be enabled by the deployment of two Littoral Response Groups; the first in 2021 will be deployed to the Euro Atlantic under a NATO and JEF construct, while a second will be deployed to the Indo Pacific region in 2023.”

You can read more about this here. 

For more a more indepth look at the By class as part of the Littoral Response Group, I’d recommend heading over to NavyLookout by clicking here or clicking below.

Converting the Bay-class auxiliaries into littoral strike ships

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

137 COMMENTS

  1. Makes sense after investing in substantial port facilities there. Good location to deploy to The Gulf or into the Indo-Pacific as necessary.

    Wonder if the west of Suez group will be based at home or somewhere like Gibraltar to enable similarly quick movement into The Med or down to West Africa.

    • Would assume that the NATO-tasked one will be 45 Cdo and that it will remain at Arbroath. Its primary area of deployment will remain Norway but extend to the Baltic republics andKaliningrad.
      With only 2 Commandis now, can’t see that we have the capability to do much in the Med. Italian Spanish, French, Turkish Greek marines/matrne infantry are plentiful enough to take on the task.
      Littoral Strike Group is a rather grand title for one reduced-strength battalion-equivalent limited to light, short-duration raiding. Wonder if the RM will lose 29 regt in the process?

          • Not tried experimenting with windows. This post is from my android phone but mostly I use an iPad. I’ve seen several scenarios: the post might be highlighted but remain displayed with a subject to moderation highlight, or it may appear fleetingly then disappear. I might receive an email days later saying the post is approved but it does not appear or might appear not linked to its original thread. I can see how if you delete one post on s thread then the whole thread might have to go. Sometimes I get a flag saying we’d love you to comment. I don’t know if this is their way of saying oops we didn’t mean to delete that one.
            I appreciate it’s complex and I don’t think they are watching 7×24 . I am probably testing the system limits. I think there might also be a flag they can set at person level so they can watch suspected trolls. I try not to do politics now that keeps me out of trouble ..most of the time 😂

          • Lol…indeed …strikes me that occassional commentary or threads at odds with ‘mainstream’ view get deleted.

            Interesting forum

            Cheers

          • Yeh. Good natured for the most part; well researched and knowledgable posts. Good place to share.

      • I once thought that.

        A slide I saw some months back ( that i think was not for releasing yet but was tweeted anyway ) showing some of the components of the future LRGs and future kit makes me think not.

        148 will certainly be needed. I’d imagine the regiments 2 gun batteries will just spilt between the 2 groups and end up with, hopefully, loitering munitions and rocket artillery.
        Hopefully same with 24RE, CLR, and 30 Cdo.

        A LRG?

        Commando. 40 / 45 ( 45 will be north as arctic trained and at Condor. )

        Enabling elements from
        ( 30 Cdo/ 24RE/29RA/CLR/539/

        1 Bay. 1 Frigate. T31 eventually?

        LRS(N) will have an LPD as well as 1 Bay, 1 Frigate. I’d hope to see both LPD in use in time so both can have an LPD But not holding my breath.

        Add SBS, UK CSG, 42 Cdo elements depending on need.

        My biggest concern remains airlift for the 2 groups.

      • “Littoral Strike Group is a rather grand title for one reduced-strength battalion-equivalent limited to light, short-duration raiding. Wonder if the RM will lose 29 regt in the process?”

        Firstly – No, it’s not. LSG is the renamed Amphibious Task Group, comprising of two Littoral Response Groups. It’s amusing that people consistently mistake persistent forward presence for the aggregated warfighting capability. It’s akin to mistaking lane forces on CABRIT for the UK’s Warfighting division.

        Second – Light, short-duration raiding and the ability conduct theatre entry are not mutually exclusive.

        Lastly – losing a regiment of 105mm Light Guns is not synonymous with losing 29 Cdo Regt RA; Commando forces need the former far less than they need the latter, if it’s in the form of a modern fires/joint effects regiment. Lt Gun has put in a decent shift, but it has limited range, lethality and survivability against counter-fires. It’s also a nause to get off – and back to – the ship, with a decent ammo load, in a hurry. 21st century fire support needs to be delivered in a different way for Commando Forces.

        • ‘It’s amusing that people consistently mistake persistent forward presence for the aggregated warfighting capability.”

          What aģregated warfighting capability? Instead of a combat brigade, we will have 2 small Cdos, both reduced considerably in troop numbers, based X,000 miles apart, each equipped for different terrain. I don’t see any ‘aggregate’ here.

          At a strategic level, 3 Cdo Bde provided a warfighting infantry force to reinforce Norway. We have reduced that to a batallion. The reduced army has nothing to spare to fill the gap. We basically can no longer fulfill that NATO reinforcement role.

          I would think it us on the cards that 29 Regt’s L118 guns are for the chop, partly for the reasons you mention, principally lack of helos to insert troops + guns + ammo + logistics. I had assumed that the 25 Merlin HC4s had all been reconfigured for naval use (marinised, folding rotors etc), but read very recently that only 18 have been converted.

          Ref future Cdo artillery support, what is in the pipeline to replace the L118’s 10-mile range? Anything? HiMARS would be good but no sign of that. Suspect it will just be a mixed battery of Starstreak and STA, with maybe some 120mm mortars, per LRG.

          It is difficult not to conclude that this is just a cost-cutting exercise. In the past, if we had seen a need for an additional out-of-area readiness force in the Gulf, we would have raised an additional batallion or Commando. Instead, we have effectively cut several batallions and a Commando, while taking on more overseas committments. I very much doubt this is the military’s choice, rather one imposed by the political masters.

          While the RM will make it work somehow, they will do so with reduced numbers and equipment and without the aggregated warfighting capability that 3 Cdo Bde offered.

          • ‘…2 small Cdos, both reduced considerably in troop numbers…’. The Vanguard Strike Companies are not replacements for 40 and 45 Cdo, they’re part of those units with the balance of the force held at remainders in the UK or used elsewhere. 40 and 45 will not be as large as they once were, but they’re certainly not Coy-sized. Nor do they need to be the size they used to be; 3 Cdo Bde isn’t a capability which relies upon pure mass to deliver effect.

            I’d also point out that: a) aggregating force is a relative term, and that you can deliver an aggregated effect whilst remaining geographically dislocated just fine. It’s simply the manoeuverist approach of striking an adversary’s weakness, not their strength – the ‘British way of war’; b) The Littoral Response Groups may aggregate to form the Littoral Strike Group. When combined with the Carrier Strike Group in turn, this forms the Expeditionary Strike Force, and; c) the Corps started down this path three-or-so years before the Integrated Review. The concept of employment for commandos relies upon reduced mass and increased lethality when compared to conventional forces. Other peer allies (witness USMC, and the recent US Joint wargame) have also concluded we must operate in a different, more dispersed manner in order to survive and prevail in peer competition or combat in the 21st century. We know we’ll have to ‘fight to get to the fight’ given adversary ‘A2AD’ (not really a thing, and overhyped), so the concept sees a forward deployed force changing an adversary’s risk calculus by already beating the ‘Anti-Access’ bit.

            The Lt Gun is an interesting point. One school of thought suggests that 29 Cdo Regt RA might transform along the lines of 148 Bty, as you suggest – lots of STA and Fire Support Teams. That could work – we still don’t know what Type 31 will become in detail, or what the concept for Type 32 looks like. If more fires come from the sea then you remove the problem of landing and restowing artillery and (the greater consideration) artillery ammo. A decent 120mm mortar can still deliver a comparable weight of HE to the 105 gun, and could also be an option – look at the Patria AMOS or NEMO. The requirement for SOMETHING able to suppress/neutralise/smoke/illum an area will probably endure, so fire support won’t be all drones and loitering munitions, but the Lt Gun has had its day.

            Re size of the force for Norway – wait and see what happens with Winter Deployment 22. But the Corps is written into the Norwegian National defence plan, as referenced below. You talk of the strategic level – it’s hard to get more strategic than being written in to an ally’s national defence plan – Norway will endure for 3 Cdo Bde.

            https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-new-defence-arctic-strategy

            Lastly, in the past (four decades or so) we have used Very High Readiness forces held in the UK if we needed an ‘out of area’ force in the Gulf, as per your example. All this LRG concept does is place (part of) said VHR force forward, so that transit and therefore response/notice-to-effect times are much reduced. The force is able to be persistently forward-deployed AND held at VHR for contingency, as opposed to being held in the UK at VHR for contingency.

    • I see East Africa as the most likely areas of attention for the Gulf LRG.
      Islamicist groups are active threats in Somalia, Kenya and Mozabique. We are basing one of the new Ranger regiments in Kenya.
      Ditto for West Africa and Gulf of Guinea where Gib would be the obvious base.

    • The Euro-Atlantic group is linked to the JEF, so its focus will be the Arctic and Baltic areas, so UK basing makes sense.

  2. Mainly because it would take most of the RN’s personnel strength to man it Nate!

    Knackered old hand-me-down ships are all very well in wartime, but today, we are going hi tech, lean manned, taking on a Wasp class would be massive retrograde step..

    Re the basing location for the ready group, about perfect, I would say.

    An excellent location to reach deep into the Indo Pacific region, or into the Gulf.

    As suggested, I would be tempted to base the second group in Gibraltar, another strategic location and should both groups need to merge for a large operation, in either geographic area, they are close enough to each other to do it relatively quickly.

    I wonder if we will see some limited QE class attachment to the group’s too, on occasion.

    Very pleased with how this is panning out.

    • Agree Gulf basing. A Ranger regiment will go to Kenya. I think East Africa generally is a likely area for littoral raiding intervention. ISIL groups are active from Somalia down to Mozambique. Ditto agree another LSG should be based in Gib to cover Gulf of Guinea and West Africa. Can’t see us striking anyone East of the Gulf. Typhoon relief is more likely mission.

  3. If it’s only GBP50m to convert the one Bay, why not do the other two Bay’s too for three times the capability,?! Seems a no brainer.

  4. It would be pretty nice having a full permanent overseas presence. Obviously there are standing commitments and a small squadron in the Gulf with a frigate, LSD and some MCMVs but with potentially 2-3 extra major vessels (amphibious vessels and major surface combatants), that’s quite a competent naval force regularly operating outside Europe.

  5. My question is whether any of these task groups are going to be big enough and equipped with sufficient gear, to actually do anything or whether they are just HR stunts.

    With the serious lack of helicopters and another heavy firepower gear plus merlins being lightly armed and overall low numbers of marines, could either of these task groups actually be deployable to anything other than a training exercise?

    To me it seems to make more sense to have one combined task force stationed in Gib or Middleeast and arm it properly so it actually has a punch, but i don’t get the shift to asia/pacific region, we don’t have a serious economic reason for focusing on it.

    • The Defence Review indicated there would be a rationalisation of helo types. The strategy surely has to be that if you cut purchase and running costs by standardising you can afford a larger fleet.

      • My assumption is the reverse, the logic will be that having a common frame means that less are needed becasue they can cover more rules.

        • There’s been no announcement but Leonardo have made an offer to build their helos in the UK. It’s attractive. They have a range of machines from light through medium to heavy which share a lot of components. This would reduce maintenance costs and increase availability. So on that score you would be right. Increased availability would mean you would need fewer machines. But horses for courses would still apply; you would still need different machines for different roles. A Wildcat is not a Merlin and neither replaces the Dauphin or Gazelle used by SF.

          • I am no helicopter expert, but it seems to me that whilst a wildcat can’t be a Merlin, a Merlin can cover my roles that a wildcat is asked to do.

          • In theory yes but Merlin is large heavy and expensive. Other nations do often use a single type like NH90 for both ASW and surface attack. The UK went in a different direction mainly because of political and industrial strategy to keep manufacturing at Westland.
            Puma replacement is an opportunity to review our strategy.

        • There is also the question of whether there will be enough escorts to go around, a littoral response group without air coverage is going to be a sitting duck and we have seen with how unreliable the t45 are that 6 isn’t enough to cover the carriers, so its going to be down to the frigates and their numbers isn’t huge either.

          • Well there aren’t. The R2s do free up frigates and the ‘permanent’ solution is meant to be 5 T32s.
            Agree with you and many that cutting T45 numbers from 8 to 6 was an error. I would advocate putting a better than Artisan radar on the first 2 in build T26 and some Asters or Standard missiles in the Mk41 launchers.

    • Different government at the time to be fair, this government does at least seem to care somewhat about the Armed Forces. The government under Cameron were totally apathetic

  6. Seems to me that 3 Cmdo Bde has been cut by stealth. These two ‘action’ groups will be based around one Cmdo each with the third Cmdo (I think it is 42) now a training a liaison team. That means that the UK can no longer put a full Bde over the beach and limits our ability to reinforce Norway with significant forces. This seems odd in a time of increased Russian competition and the renewed importance of a NATO presence in the high north.

    • 42 Commando delivers Maritime Interdiction Operations, Fleet Contingency Troop, Joint Personnel Recovery in support of the CSG and force protection tasks as well as being a ‘training liaison team’.

      We haven’t been able to put a ‘full Bde over the beach’ for decades, mainly owing to a lack of shipping; witness the amount of shipping taken up from trade in 1982. Smaller does not also mean worse – certain elements of the military rely on mass to deliver effect. The Royal Marines is not such an element.

      We also don’t need to put much over the beach – we like to go to the objective and cut out the middleman as much as possible (Ship to Objective Manoeuvre, or STOM), which is why the loss of HMS Ocean without replacement was a much bigger deal than any apparent cuts to the RM. Anything that can be done in the short-term to rectify the lack of deck spots and helo facilities – like the modification to an LSD(A) – is a decent step.

      • Indeed, worth remembering Ocean could host up to 18 helicopters and project several companies of RM. I think it had 10 helicopter landing spots.
        A LRG of say, a modified Bay, a frigate and maybe a R2 gets you about 1/3 of an Ocean. Better defended though.

    • Taking aside that this may or may not be a cut to 3 Cmdo Bde, your last comment is really pertinent.

      UK via NATO has held the task of reinforcing Norway for decades, indeed thats one of the reasons the RMs spent so much time training there, as they were the lead brigade to do so.

      Im assuming that we still have the job, so begs the question of who is now going to do it and with what? £ Cmdo Bde have always been a ‘Light’ Brigade. so does this role now fall to one of the other multitude of Lt Inf Bdes we posses, or is it going elsewhere?

      Not sure if we have anything to offer really!

      • I’ve asked that too mate. I’d speculated if some if our infantry battalions could be given the task.

      • The USMC will provide the mass in Norway. Incredibly the Norwegians have allowed them a permanent presence something they’ve never done for anyone before.

          • They and NATO, who no doubt are thinking that until we sort our reduced sized/LPD/LRG selves out the smart move is to base a significant US force on the ground in Norway.

        • Yes mate, appreciate that they will form a major part of any reinforcement effort, but even they have now lost their tanks, so are now a mechanised force with tanks coming from the army.
          Post Trump rants, NATO needs to do more to help itself, which I’m not sure we are doing unless the army take on this task!
          It will be interesting to see how we square this circle, unless we pull out of this obligation!

          • I know but I don’t think we should take on the job of filling the gaps left by countries most of whom have a higher standard of living then us and some that have a far higher GDP. Were pulling our weight maybe more than. Others need to be ‘encouraged’ to do their bit.

      • We don’t really have many Light Inf Brigades left now. Realistically we will be looking at 1 Light Brigade consisting of 2-3 Battalions and 1 LBCT in Light Role until it can get enough vehicles to be tasked as a Light Mechanised formation.

        • Are not the larger number of our Inf Battalions roled as ‘Light’? I assumed that as they had a lack of Arm/Mech transport that was the case, could have misunderstood that too.
          Interesting to see how it develops, as the army appear to be in a right state WRT major equipment renewal programs.
          Something along the lines of what you have said equipped with a mix of Viking/Warthog vehicles and something to do recon and AAD would probably work, although the army
          currently probably have bigger fish to sort.

          • As of the Army 2020 plan yes;
            There where going to be a handful of Light Mech units spread across the 7 Regional “Brigades,” with the rest of the Infantry units being Light Role. That changed with Refine and again now.
            At this point that pool of Light Infantry has been used in the following way:

            • 4 Battalions converted to Rangers
            • 4 Battalions converted to SFAB
            • 1 Battalion converted to Experimental Group
            • 1 Battalion disbanded

            Remaining in the Light Role:

            • 2 Battalions in Cyprus
            • 1 Battalion in Brunei
            • 2 Battalions on Public Duties in London
            • 2 Battalions in 16 AA
            • 2 Light Infantry Battalions for a Light Infantry Brigade.

            So although there are 9 Light Infantry Battalions (assuming 3 Mech Inf Battalions per LBCT), only 2 would be available for a Amphibious Royal Marine Replacment Brigade.

          • Cheers mate, that’s interesting, will be very interesting to see if we ever can square that circle of a 3 Cmdo Bde replacement. Perhaps that role will eventually fall to one of the proposed ‘Strike Bdes’ when they get up and running, but then again, perhaps not.

          • Strike Brigades are dead, mate.
            And they dragged an entire armoured brigade to hell with them.
            Their boxers will be the infantry in the HBCT, and their Ajax, if they ever materialise, will form the heavy cavalry in the 2 HBCT and the Deep Strike Bde CT.

          • Yes, cheers for the reminder ( both you and @Dern) too much reading along a timeline 2010-present to see where we are going, lost the detail in the clutter of false dawns WRT army plans….

          • That’s one of the main problems. The army has been under a never ending reorganisation since FAS “Future Army Structures”

            One reorg ( cut ) is never fully completed before the new review ( cut ) arrives. And so on and so on. It is never ending.

            A period of stability is badly needed, with a clear idea where the army is going.

            Look at SDSR 2015. For the army its been pretty much scrapped. For the RAF, many of the positives of it – Herc retention, extra Typhoon T1’s retained, Sentinel retention, have all been shelved.

          • Strike Brigades are gone. Now 3XX will consist of 2x Heavy BCT’s and a Deep Fires/Manuever BCT consisting of several Ajax Regiments, supported by MLRS.

          • Has a 4th battalion been added to 16AA to join 2 and 3 Para and the RGR Btn?

            Know which one?

          • No, I know there was an announcement that a 4th was being added, but I for the life of me can’t remember where.
            *edit: Also nothing has moved yet, it’s planned but the new Army Orbat is supposed to be announced in the next few months in detail (rather than the somewhat vague DCP).

          • Yep, the Autumn announcement I alluded too.
            Something for us ORBAT types to get stuck into.
            The devil will be in the detail, and not just in regiments or battalions but their components.

            Am I making it up or was the 1st Bn RIR with 16AA once?

            Or maybe one of 1 or 2 RA will be allocated given Colchesters proximity to Cottesmore.

          • They are. Of 32 battalions, only 4 will be mechanized! Until more vehicles are procured to equip the ones in one of the LBCT.

            The rest, as Dern says.

            • 4 H. Mechanised Battalions
            • 6 L. Mechanised Battalions (?)
            • 2 Public Duties Battalions
            • 2 Cyprus Battalions
            • 1 Brunei Battalion
            • 2 Air Assault Battalions
            • 2 Light Inf Battalions 16 AA
            • 2 Light Inf Battalions “spare”
            • 4 SFAB
            • 4 Ranger
            • 1 Experimental
            • 1 SFSG

            I count 31.

          • Will have a think and scan. I thought we had 33 currently? ( the 33rd being the newish 3 RGR In the SIG.
            So I listed 32 taking into account the planned disbanding Btn.

          • Isn’t the Current SIG ( which changes to future SFAB ) made up of 5 Btns?

            Are your 6 L Mech the previous LPM ones with Foxhound?

            Current 33?
            4 warrior.
            3 HPM.
            2 Air Assault.
            1 Gurkha 16AA.
            2 Cyprus
            1 Brunei
            1 SFSG
            2 PD
            5 SIG
            12 light.

            This will get me to go get the files fired up to see! 😆

          • No, the SpecInf Group is becoming the basis for the new Ranger Regiment. 4 of the Light Infantry Battalions are then being selected to form SFAB. Edit to clarify: Yes there are 5 Battalions in the SpecInf Group: 1 Scots, 2 PWRR, 2 Lancs, 3 RGR, 4 Rifles; but only 1 SCOTS, 2 PWRR, 2 LANCS, and 4 RIFLES are transitioning to Rangers.

            Yes the 6 L Mech are the old LPM’s, although you are right currently there isn’t enough Foxhound to go around so I think the plan is more realistically 3 L Mech + 3 soon to be L Mech.

            Your current list looks about right to me.

          • Yep, sorry I didn’t portray that well. I meant the SIG role is taken in a new name as the SFAB, like the American term.

            I know it itself goes on to become R Reg and S Ops bde later with its component battalions.

          • Yeah I don’t like the fact that they’ve adopted SFAB, should have just taken the SpecInf flash and title, but I suspect they wanted to draw a line and start afresh.

    • 42 has a plenty of other tasks. I wouldn’t describe them as a training outfit. They did lose some people and heavier weapons as part of the switch to the maritime ops Cdo from a standard Commando.

      They also gained some roles from 43 so that 43 can concentrate on denial to nuclear weapons.

      The rest of the brigade is intact AFAIK? 29RA lost a battery or had its guns reduced years ago, and 24RE has never been at full establishment to support all 3 Commando.

      I thought establishing 42 in new role was welcome.

      With the LSGs, if necessary the 2 can combine, along with the CSG, to form a larger force.

      As for Norway, isn’t there an MoD policy paper on the arctic due soon? Maybe the army will have a wider role there? Though 45 are the specialists.

      • Good post Daniele. However I see a few probs with the RM structure. Firstly a Bde isn’t a Bde if it doesn’t train / deploy / fight together. I think 3 Cmdo Bde is now an administrative rather than operational Bde. Secondly the RMs have made great progress in the new ‘raiding’ role but raids don’t occupy or secure ground. Lastly about the Army putting a light Bde into Norway, there is absolutely no evidence that the Army are preparing an arctic warfare Bde Grp.

        • I’d agree with that Rob.

          3 Cdo still has a deployable Bde HQ alongside 30 Cdo, which is more than other administrative brigades the likes of which were in the old 2, 4, and 5 Divisions and some in Force Troops.

          DSF tip of spear.

          16AA, 3 Cdo and the S Ops Bde rapid deployment, raiding, small groups, grey zone.

          It is in 1 ( UK ) Division where holding battalions could be found.

          I’d read, not sure how accurate it is, that in the autumn the army will detail just how these new BCT are organised. Maybe some more details regards arctic strategy will emerge then.

          • Hope that you are correct WRT Arctic strategy, if it’s not the case, we will be looking a tad silly at the top table in NATO.
            I’m not really a Trump fan, but what he said about NATO countries stepping up, is absolutely correct, so trust/hope that something will eventually be done within the confines of our defence budget.

          • To be fair, given it’s proximity, importance of the northern flank and GIUK Gap, it should be a priority.
            Even ahead of the wider deployment of assets, which I agree with.

  7. I think MOD is still figuring out how the LRG concept will work in practice and what resources are needed. For example, the SAS were recently in action when a UK businessman was kidnapped in Mozambique. With Al Shebab active in most of East Africa its easy to see the need for a special forces insertion and raiding capability for protecting UK nationals, hostage rescue and strategic intervention in support of friendly nations. We will base a Ranger regiment in Kenya. It is not often realised that Mozambique which is struggling against an Islamic group is a member of the Commonwealth. I would argue we have an obligation there. The Boko Haram situation in West Africa is similar in many ways. These modified Bays look to be ideal for these raiding and insertion taskings.
    But if we need to reinforce Norway from the sea the balloon has gone up. Totally different adversary, geo political situation and force requirement.

    • Being picky, sorry. Ranger Battalion. The wider Ranger regiment I believe will be made up of 4 Battalions and will eventually have other enablers assigned as part of the S Ops Bde.

      This S Ops Bde, it must be noted though, is not SF.

      Agree on the SF insert raiding capability from the sea. I was a fan of the LSS, shame they don’t seem to be going ahead with them.

      A converted Point might have been useful.

      SF do have access to a ship that could in theory be used in a covert manner to carry small boats and HSIC / RC, which is officially used for training.

      She lacks aviation facilities though.

        • I agree, actually. Security would be an issue, and I assume no accompanied posting like Cyprus.

          A lilipad to deploy from, maybe. We’ve seen the DS opening the expanded facilities there.

        • Yes, Victoria. But not that covert. I said it “could” be used in a covert manner, as in lower key than a grey painted warship or obvious RFA. The truely covert things I would not even be aware of or if I was I’d not be talking on here about them.

          HSIC High Speed Intercept Craft or Raiding Craft.
          Sometimes also known as FIC, Fast IC.

          At a guess procured to intercept larger vessels where a RIB won’t do or a high speed insertion, extraction, onto a hostile shore

          The SBS, or rather the RM specialists assigned to the outfit supporting them, have operated various types.

          For example, a FIC Troop, SDV Troop, RIB Troop, exit, or existed. You’ll see the FIC/HSIC in Poole Harbour and plenty photos and video online. The latest ones were procured under Project Belle so I’d read, and replaced the older VSV, very slender vessels.

          Victoria has been seen carrying them, and side bays that can carry craft for ease of loading onto, out of the water.

          All that is online BTW or out there if you know where to look, so open source.

          I see the LRGs, and the LSS mooted before them, as ideal for these types of operation. I’d still prefer the proper T1 SF to have their own converted vessel like the USSCOM ship, and leave the LRGs to the RM.

    • Mozambique joined the Commonwealth for the cash only. They have very little contact with UKAF. Their neighbours are going to help them fight their local Daesh.

      • Have to say I’ve no idea why Mozambique joined the Commonwealth. Portugal is England’s oldest ally is all I can think.
        I see HM Gov recommends caution when travelling there. Occasional terrorist attacks on local gov institutions but none on foreign interests so you are right about there being no need for anything on the scale of a UK LRG.

  8. Wonder if Oman has been ‘generous’ in helping to build our base there, wouldn’t blame them if they wanted a country like the UK to buddy up with. Could be mutually beneficial.

  9. I think everyone needs to give this some time it’s a completely new idea for RN/RM. We’ll have a fair idea what it will look like in 5 or so years but until then it’s a work in progress. It’ll be interesting to see how this and the Ranger batts will work there might be a clue in the LRG op areas N.Atlantic/Baltic and Indian Ocean/Gulf. This might be a clue to where the Ranger Batts won’t be deployed.

    • I’d say it is pretty well nailed on that one will go to east Africa (Kenya) & another to west Africa (Nigeria) to counter Islamist groups. If all four are deployed at once (?) then maybe the far east (Malaysia / Singapore) and one the middle east (Oman).

      • Pretty sure Germany and Cyprus were mentioned as bases to cover NATO and Mid East. But maybe they’re going to treat them like SF’s and confirm nothing.

      • They might end up all garrisoned in Aldershot like the current SIG!
        Deploy by company abroad where needed.

  10. When are the countries in the Persian Gulf area going to be able to provide for their own defense?? They spend billions upon billions on new high tech hardware but still need Western countries to defend them. Ugh

    • Take a look at their populations and compare it with Iran’s.That’s their 1st prob. 2nd is Iran prefers proxys to do the fighting/dying for them. Last year there was a huge SSM attack on Saudi launched from Iraq and ordered by Iran ! If they’re invaded it’s as likely to come from there as across the Gulf.

  11. Interesting announcement, makes me wonder if HMS Jufair will survive in the longer term (c.2030). It may make sense to move everything to Oman, rather than have two small naval bases within two days sailing time. Probably depends on how 9 Mine Countermeasures Squadron evolves. Also, can’t see the Bay class converted to a LSS tole carrying more than a strike company of about 150 RMs, British Army specialists and special forces. For extended ops in the tropics, the current austere accommodation for an embarked military force of up to 350 will need to be completely revamped and upgraded. That will probably halve the number of bunks.

    • Moving to Duqm would be the equivalent of moving Northwood to Port Stanley.
      Bahrain is the Headquarters of 5 Fleet, 3 x CTF’s and the GCC Maritime group. That is not going to change so why would the second biggest military contingent want to move away from everyone else and go it their own in the middle of nowhere…

      • I’m talking long term. I agree that Bahrain is the base for the US 5th Fleet et al and that is useful. Indeed, I actually worked adjacent to the ASU SWA in what used to be British Army barracks when I was the only RN (actually RNR) officer in Bahrain in the late 1990’s. At that time the RN’s SNO in the region was based in Dubai – so things can change.

        • I cannot see it happening. The UKNSF footprint in the US part of the NSA base footprint is substantial. It is not only the accom, waterfront, warehousing and workshops at the UKNSF specific areas but the UKMCC Headquarters is housed in the NSA side of the base area.
          Added to that the seperate UK contributions to the seperate CTF groups which are also in the US Base .

          If you have been to Duqm you won’t want to stay there. There is absolutely nothing there except for the port. The basing options on MCMV, Bay and T23 in Bahrain do mean that the crews actually get out and about and can wind down in the wider Manama area. (when covid isn’t a factor). The nearest big city to Duqm with similar facilities is Muscat, a five hour drive away.

          The Bahrain based crew swap option has worked out well. Units spend a far greater proportion of time at sea than you would expect. The shore side portion of the crews time now spent in the UK with family so actually being at sea in the Gulf is expected.

          Whilst Duqm is busy with Indian Ocean operating ships the Bahrain base is also busy with Gulf operating units. As of this morning 3 UK MCMV, T23, USN AB, USN Tico (I’m working on that one!) USNS Fleet Tug, 3USN MCMV, 5 USN PC, 4 USCG and 3 USN MK6 are all in. The USNS EFT has just undocked from a huge maintenance period in the Shipyard Drydock and will move over to the base shortly.

          Add to that the Bahrain Naval forces OHP and various small missile boats and corvettes are also in. Its a busy place!

  12. Only thing that needs to be announced is an order of more Helicopters now to make all these plans credible, its been a issue for a long time on land and at sea.
    It seems the navy is moving in a good direction and not having everything at Bahrain makes a lot of sense.

  13. Its interesting the Omani’s are quite happy with this, since the previous ruler passed away the country has been on a expat exodus drive with the priority very much Omani only to get a job in the place.

  14. From the press release ‘… pre empt and deter sub threshold activity, and counter state threats.’

    Translation: the plan is to set up a force that can deal with encroachments by Little Green Men (Russia) and Little Blue Men (China’s maritime militia or ‘fishing fleet’).

  15. One aspect of the new LRGs isn’t clear to me. Assuming they operate separately from the CSG, are they not going to need AAW and ASW protection? The trial deployment included Dragon
    but Type 45 availability is rather limited and the CSG will presumably have priority. The only solution I can see is to improve the T31 equipment- heavier missile load and at least a Wildcat with a dipping sonar like S Korea deploys. Even if operating on its own, the T31 really needs a better all round capability, more akin to the Danish original.

    • USN ARGs don’t have escorts permanently assigned. Escorts drop in and out depending on what the ARG is are doing.
      There is no reason why that would not happen in the LSG organisation.

      • Generally the ARGs operate under the protection of a carrier strike group. Our LRGs are more modest affairs but they will need protection. With 2 planned plus the CSG, it is hard to see how escort protection can be provided with the small numbers available, unless we allocate the whole of the operational surface fleet to the role.

        • Err… Not out here they don’t. 3 units in an ARG. A couple of LPDs, usually a San Antonio and an older unit, and an LHA. No carriers in sight and no escorts except for an AB /Tico dropping into the group occasionally. Mostly they sail around doing their own thing. That said the LPD usually carry a couple of CH53s and an Osprey whilst the LHA has Harriers, Sea Cobra, Huey, CH53 and Ospreys embarked.m so they do look after themselves.

          AN LSS could carry a couple of Merlin and a Wildcat/Apache. The proposal for the Hangar is a quite substantial affair. Capable of housing 3 Merlin sized Helos and having a 2 spot chinook capable flight deck. You could keep 2 more Helos stowed outside on deck and rotate through the Hangar for maintenance as needed which is what the USN LPD units do.

    • RM group or SF raid from sea, using small boats, FAC, ORCS, mini subs, and so on.

      Most likely however would be helicopter assets used for transfer.

      • But what would they be raiding? Can those ships get anywhere near a hostile coastline undetected? Doesn’t raiding involve a certain level of surprise?

        • Whatever is needed. Raid. Evacuation of nationals, rescue of hostages, Strike, using Apache. Whatever. It gives options.
          And timely response.

  16. Not sure if it’s already been mentioned, but why are we spending £50m converting an RFA ship when HMS Bulwark is sat in ‘extended readiness’??

  17. Hi all … “converting a Bay class support ship, to provide a more agile and lethal littoral strike capability”… so what exactly is that supposed to mean?

  18. Although the LSG sounds good in concept without a strategic reserve they would only be a hindrance in a significant conflict. With half the amphibious force pre deployed to two different corners of the world are ability to land anything larger then a battalion is almost no existent. Unfortunately the time, vulnerability, and ware caused by transitioning one group to the other means it would be almost impossible to build up a combined amphibious group. And this is all presuming one isnt destroyed within the first few days of any conflict.

    • Raiding is in, large landings are out.
      The days of doing opposed landings are long gone and to be honest they have been for a while.
      During Taurus 09 raiding using 539 boats was well tested in Brunei and something of an eye opener.
      We did do some conventional landings in Bangladesh via LCUs and LCVPs to but that was about it
      Small raiding teams can cause a lot more havoc in a lot more places than a large landing over a beach.

      • Unfortunately raiders can’t take and hold ground. If the uk ever finds itself in a similar situation as East Timor or god forbid another Falklands like scenario then we would require substantial forces to be landed. Even in the case of a limited conflict in eastern Europe, raiding forces will have practically no strategic or even operational impact if there is no follow on forces to exploit their success.

      • So a couple of things; first the plan for two LSGs makes me hopeful that Bulwark and Albion will operate simultaneously with the LSG rounded out by a upgraded Bay class. eventually we might procure improved shipping but that seems good enough for now. second, re the arctic and Norway it would make sense for 51st Brigade which is pretty much “Highland” (Scottish) to be fully fitted out with enabling units and re-roled as mountain and artic warfare specialists. we could rotate battle groups through a permanent RM training facility in Norway. Mobility could be provided by the JLTV and some Vikings from the RM….

        • Yes, I’d go with that.

          Just a note, its a LRG. The LSG is the overall parent organisation of the 2 LRG as part of the FBS that replaced the ARG.  😂  Sorry! Acronyms!

          51st Brigade would be nice wouldn’t it? But the army is in such a state not sure a Light brigade could be found. As Dern noted not many LI Bns left after many were diverted to SIG ( SFAB ) and the S Ops Bde.
          As for enablers, they are few and far between after the Cap Badge Mafias antics and would need to be stood up anew or diverted from 3 UK Division.

          The existing 3 Cdo enablers really need to support the LRGs except maybe 24RE if they are now a raiding outfit and don’t need Field Engineer Squadrons.

          • Surely, the biggest problem is the lack of heli’s… unless chinooks are going to be embarked!?

          • Agreed.

            I’d take more helicopters over escorts myself.

            The CHF has a handful of Army Wildcat in 847 NAS. And the army only has 34 pooled in its single regiment, 1 AAC. Ridiculously few.

            It also has the ex RAF Merlins, 845 and 846 NAS are still building up I believe.

            Are these squadrons going to have permanent dets deployed with the LRGs, or will they use some Chinook, as you say. We have more Chinook and there was the order of the extended range variant recently.

  19. Does this mean a return of families posted with their spouses or even more seperartion? Surely it’s time to think of them before there’s another mass exodus of manpower?

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here