Sir Stephen Lovegrove has told MPs that the UK’s ability to deliver AUKUS submarines at the scale and tempo set out by ministers depends on sustained political commitment, long term investment in Barrow, and a more disciplined approach to major nuclear projects across Government.

Giving evidence to the Defence Committee, he said the UK has a record of building advanced nuclear capabilities but failing to preserve the skills base required to keep them viable over decades.

Asked whether Barrow needed a more deliberate skills pipeline to avoid the stop start pattern seen in the civil and defence nuclear sectors, he agreed that the challenge is structural. “Nuclear is a very extreme example… we have built extraordinary capabilities over the years and have found ourselves… not maintaining the skills, the people and the capabilities around them,” he told MPs. He added that the United States faces similar problems, citing under investment in its submarine industrial base since the end of the Cold War.

Lovegrove linked this directly to the Government’s aspiration to acquire up to twelve AUKUS boats. First of class vessels always carry higher costs, he said, but efficiencies emerge only if production is sustained across a batch. “The ambition to say ‘up to 12’ in its own right is incredibly important,” he told the Committee, because it forces ministers to underwrite the second functional production line needed in Barrow. Without that investment, he warned, the figure would be “a deeply hollow claim.”

Committee members pressed him on whether political decisions were being taken quickly enough to meet the programme’s compressed timelines. Lovegrove said the pace had accelerated over the past year. “The pace of investment is definitely picking up… but that will need to be maintained for the next 20 years at a minimum,” he said. The main risk, in his view, is ensuring that Barrow’s infrastructure plans are properly scoped and designed so that funds can be released on time. “We need to make absolutely certain that there is no excuse for delay.”

On the wider AUKUS review he conducted for the Prime Minister, Lovegrove said he had been given complete freedom to assess progress across both submarine construction and advanced capabilities. He found that the UK must move more quickly to build two effective submarine production lines in Barrow if it is to deliver the first British boat in the late 2030s. He also said the UK and Australia will need tighter integration of their industrial systems, given Australia’s parallel requirement to operate and maintain US built Virginia class submarines.

Lovegrove told MPs that AUKUS pillar 2, which covers technologies such as hypersonics, AI, quantum and cyber, had become too diffuse. His recommendation was to reduce the number of trilateral projects so that personnel and funding could be concentrated on the most credible options. Final decisions remain with the United States, he said, but progress is expected once Washington completes its own review.

On governance, he said AUKUS could not be treated as a routine defence procurement programme and required sustained attention from the centre of Government. Changes of administration in all three partner nations had created gaps in leadership and continuity. He recommended stronger central coordination and more active strategic communication to maintain public support and counter misinformation campaigns by states opposed to AUKUS.

Lovegrove also stressed that AUKUS is not limited to the Indo Pacific. “It radically improves and enlarges our deterrent capability in our own backyard, the Euro Atlantic,” he said, arguing that the initiative has a strategic signalling effect that adversaries dislike.

Committee members raised the civil infrastructure demands that Barrow faces as it attempts to expand its workforce. Lovegrove said current commitments were only a foundation. “The social infrastructure… around Barrow needs a radical improvement to be able to sustain the kind of workforce that the submarine enterprise will require,” he told MPs.

George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison

21 COMMENTS

  1. Expand BiF? They can’t get enough people to work there now, so where are they getting the extra people from? The pay isn’t particularly good for permanent staff. Location and local housing poor.
    As a long term strategy it would probably be better to start building nuclear boats at another ship yard.

    • Local housing is cheap outside Barrow.

      I agree that yard pay is quite poor but relocation packages could help with that. As could renovation grants for houses. Given that the rented housing sector is a dead duck that and soft employee loans are the way forwards. Problem is HMT and its approach to BiK. Solution create regeneration zones where BiK is suspended on those benefits for X years.

      That drives the investment required into Barrow.

      There is always a solution.

  2. So if we start now we might have the first “AUKUS” boat operational in about twenty years. Meanwhile emerging tehcnology will have surpassed the need ? I don’t know but given our recent record of not being able to do anything on time and on budget it is extremely worrying to say the least.

  3. What did Starmer Grandstand again? 12 SSN! Lovely. In whose lifetime.
    Always with the big headline to detract from the cuts and lack of money, and the MSM fall for it every time.
    I’ve been educated several times by ABC on what expansion is taking place at Raynesway, at Barrow, and elsewhere, and how long lead items are ordered.
    Yet, we have this. Doubt.

  4. Barrow is a small town in the middle of no where. It is daft to centre submarine production there. They should have used the vast sums of money to reinstate Cammel Laird. Even back in the 60’s when we had a vastly more capable submarine industry and the boats were far simpler we used two yards to build them.

    If SSN A can be built in an Australian yard with little ship building experience on the other side or the world then it can be done in a major city region with an existing facility that is only a couple of hours away from Barrow and workers can be easily exchanged.

    We managed this in central Scotland with the aircraft carrier alliance between Babcock and BAE no reason the same could not have been done with Cammel Laird and BAE.

    • In those days, would you have built nuclear in the middle of a city?
      I know they did in Liverpool, look at what that did.

    • Interesting question, I took a little tour around Barrow and It’s various parts including the “Ship” building areas and the museum, It’s probably an age old ship building area that escaped all the cuts that virtually all other “English” yards have had inflicted and when you get to specialise in one particular area, you get to remain.

      That’s just my particular silly thoughts !!!

      Could we not re-open Chatham ? they were the first to build Sinky Boats.

  5. This is the problem maintaining an SSN capability is its comes with a massive level of ongoing commitment that essentially requires a nation to take on consensus planning over many many decades, infact hundreds of years, If it’s chop and changed over political expediency your in trouble.. lose a couple of SSNs or delay a program for in year savings and you have reduced your capabilities for decades. Don’t plan out and fund the disposal as part of the through life costs and your sending an unpaid debt through the generations.. SSN capability most be planned and implemented meticulously around a highly sustainable program, from building through to managing the HLNW for many decades before it’s to the point you can then burying it in a GDF a 1000feet underground in a unit designed to survive for 100,000 years… the last decades of the Cold War essentially saw a burst of none substantial growth, followed by a massively unsustainable retrenchment of investment following the end of the Cold War..

    SSNs are such potent strategic weapons as nothing else can simply set off travel the globe unseen at 500 miles a day for 2 months then sink 20-30 ships or rain down 30 cruise missiles on any nation and return home for another go, linked to the fact it takes so long to change trajectory on numbers, says something. This means maintenance of a fleet and which way it’s going is a massive red flag to a nation’s intentions. The UK and the U.S. essentially gutted their abilities to maintain their fleet sizes and the reality is even though the US mains a need for 60+ SSNs as soon as the LA class crisis has run through ( early 2030s) its industrial capacity means it will only likely be able to maintain a fleet in the low to mid 30s and even with all the talk of the UK having 12 boats it still only has the capability to replace its present fleet on time and expanding will not come until the late 2040s.

    The reality is for both nations this essentially has waved a flag of strategic withdrawal to its competitors, the voices may be loud, but the stick is 30-40% smaller.

    Then we go to china.and it’s massive red flags it’s waving all over the place ( rabid communists love red flags) . if we have said SSN production needs to be finally balanced what message is the Chinese SSN programme tell us.. well for most of the time SSNs have existed china was not much into them.. first it saw production as a point of national pride..and so invested heavily to get essentially a token force of the worst SSNs in the world, then as it’s started the program its relationship with the USSR crumbled and by 1969 was at a state of essentially Cold War. So it pushed forward to essentially try and have an SSN force that could compete with the USSR in the north west pacific and develop a second strike nuclear capability that could hit Russia…that was its driving force essentially till the end of the Cold War… this lead to a cold war force of 1 type 092 SSBN and 5 type 091 SSNs.. that was all it build from laying down its first SSN in 1968 to 1990… its then started drifting even more.. building only 2 SSNs in 1990 to 2000. It then decided it needed a peer level second strike capability and between 2000-2006 laid down 4 SSBNs..it then had a nuclear submarine crisis and by 2007-2010 was seriously contemplating getting out of the nuclear submarine building business as it was essentially focused on engaging with the world and not really focusing on geostrategic competition beyond the china seas and the potential enemy that was Russia was becoming a friend.. this all changed direction dramatically in 2012 when xi become leader and we had the first red flag.. that Xi had a less than friendly plan, immediately on Xi becoming leader china started building the type 093A program, this was not a cogent class but essentially a set of SSNs testing and developing stolen and purchased tec ( stolen from the UK and purchased from the Russians). The first was laid down in 2012 and the of the 4 last was commissioned in 2018. So the moment xi came to power he ordered and launched 4 SSNs within 6 years.. now he did that with essentially very little capacity the Bohai yard had 4 slips for SSN and SSBN building.. but sill they build 4 in 6 years. As the last of the type 093As was launched ( with pump jet propulsion, full tiles and good if not full deck rafted acoustic rafting ) the next huge red flag occurred.. the nuclear boat facility at Bohai literally exploded and they build an SSN mega factory.. with a new 12 slip SSN shed, a 8 slip SSBM shed, tilling shed, supported by huge major and minor component factories and a fueling facility.. red flag 3 is the fact they then immediately laid down 12 new SSNs ( type 093B) and have launched about 3 a year from 2022… red flag 4 is that they then moved straight to a new SSN the 095 ( this it is believed will have everything a modern peer SSN has and it’s safe to assume will be a close peer or peer to present product SSNs) and red flag 5 is that they have build what is believed to be yet another SSN construction hall for a possible another 8-12 SSN bays.. so in less than a decade moving from 4 bays and a possible 4 SSN/SSBN every 6 years to up to 32-36 bays and about 8 SSN/SSBNs a year.. for true red flag context that is simply a completely unsustainable level of SSN building as no nation can possibly sustain a growth of around 6 SSNs a year for more than a few years, before it has a huge number hanging around, if this was a facility for sustained maintenance of a fleet it could keep a fleet of about 120-180 SSNs going long term. That’s an impossible number to maintain so this whole massive investment is not a sustained investment at all but a crash programme in which the massive investment in infrastructure will then be cast aside… why, when you think about it there is only one answer.. a sudden SSN production surge to match the USN in the mid 2030s and then eclipse it by the late 3030s.. ready for ? ( because no nation spends essentially possibly 100s billions in a could of decades for just bragging rights and to then close down the largest SSN/SSBN production site ever created ( for scale its larger than the rest of the world put together)

    • Maybe the Chinese, as they have plenty of space, realise that building aggressively in cramped facilities isn’t very efficient as it depends of a ridiculous level of planning and choreography with baked in inefficiency if one thing goes slightly wrong.

      Whereas they can build and line up segments in bay and build in a more relaxed but ultimately more efficient manner.

      It is really worth thinking about the extent to which we over manage complex processes not trusting skills and knowledge but totally relying on process to the exclusion of all else.

      The trouble is you need real knowledge to create a proper process which is where this all falls over.

  6. Take a Google Map tour of Murmansk and in particular, Saida-Guba, you can see a nice selection of neatly parked containers and space for an equall amount yet to be salvaged.

    That’s someone else’s problem to deal with, just like our own and so many other countries.

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