The Defence Committee has been told that short-term pressures on U.S. and UK submarine fleets could complicate the delivery of AUKUS commitments, particularly the planned Submarine Rotational Force-West in Australia.
Giving evidence on 9 September, Dr Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute outlined the geopolitical trade-offs facing the trilateral pact.
He told MPs that “in the relatively short term, there are real geopolitical trade-offs that the pact, and meeting its terms, entails. Getting past that short-term period of uncertainty will be absolutely critical.”
Dr Kaushal highlighted the limits of U.S. capacity to operate in two major theatres simultaneously. In the Indo-Pacific, he noted, the U.S. faces China as “an economic peer and arguably an industrial superior” for the first time, while also confronting a “trough in capability” as older attack submarines are retired faster than new Virginias can be built.
For the UK, he said, this coincides with the strengthening of Russia’s Northern Fleet, including the growing availability of Yasen-class submarines. That development, he argued, will drive demand for Astute-class submarines in the Atlantic at the same time as London is expected to commit an Astute to the Indo-Pacific rotation.
“There will be serious questions, particularly given issues around the readiness of the UK’s SSN fleet, about whether a rotational deployment in the Indo-Pacific is viable,” he told MPs. Failure to deliver, he warned, could undermine AUKUS domestically in Australia, while success would represent a major draw on UK assets in the North Atlantic.
Committee member Fred Thomas MP raised the broader question of U.S. expectations, recalling that during a recent visit to Washington the Committee was told by Pentagon officials that the priority was for Britain to “take care of Europe and the High North.”
Dr Kaushal indicated his agreement, underlining the strategic dilemma facing the UK as it balances commitments under AUKUS with its role in countering Russian naval activity closer to home.
The slippage in Achillies commissioning date from late 2026 to 2028/29 will surely have a huge impact on our ability to deploy an A boats to SRF-West in 2027?
If we do manage to get one based out in AUS, that will have an impact on UKs ability to rotate its hulls to our main AOOs. Decades of stupid decision making is now at home and roosting.
Let’s hope we get a golden egg or two.
Yes but Let’s be positive here.
Ermm,
Anyone got any positives ?
Honestly I don’t know why these “experts” bother. The main thing is the facilities are avilable in Western Australia. The Boats are always going to be subject to being deployed where they are needed.
We don’t have a lack of boats to achieve this we have a lack of facilities for maintenance.
Jim I can see why you never got the job at the MOD, far too logical in your thinking.
“To take care of Europe and the high nort”… even the US would struggle with that on their own.
“In the Indo-Pacific, he noted, the U.S. faces China as an economic peer and arguably an industrial superior”… has anyone told Trump that, surely the US is the hottest Country on the planet and no one else comes close and everyone agrees US weapons are by far the best in the World and no one else can compete. Now who’s right I wonder.
So, is this a crew rotation while the sub can be maintained in Australia, or is it an actual boat rotation? The reason I say that is that if they are doing it this way, there will be at least two boats away from the UK via the transit period. If you know what I mean.
Realistically the chance of the U.S. being able to supply any Virginia class boats (even older already in service boats) to Australia is rapidly receding to zero given the strategic demands on the USN fleet, the slow build rate of U.S. shipyards and their maintenance backlog. The current Pentagon review of AUKUS commitments is only likely to confirm this.
The best way to save the AUKUS pact, meet Australia’s looming capability gap with the ageing Collins class, and save face for the U.S. is to redefine the AUKUS Pillar 1 (submarine program) as two phases: Phase 1 near term replacement for Collins; and Phase 2 long term construction of new common AUKUS boat design for RN/RAN/ USN
Remove the agreement for the USN to supply Virginia boats and instead commission the building of at least 4 Japanese Taigei class conventional submarines (with options for 2 more) to be built in Japanese shipyards (following on from the Mogami frigate deal)
This provides the RAN with replacements in a shorter timeframe (the Japanese yards are turning them out at a rate almost as fast as the Chinese and it’s a live production line)
The Taigei are arguably the most capable conventional submarine with lithium ion batteries able to stay submerged for up to three weeks and a range just shy of Collins
It will give Australia more time to develop the industrial base needed for nuclear powered boat construction, save significant taxpayer funds both for acquisition and operations (smaller crews) and provide a better transition to a future nuclear fleet
The RAN would remain committed to the AUKUS boat but ultimately operate a two tier mixed fleet of conventional and nuclear submarines
There are also operational benefits to a mixed conventional and nuclear fleet. While nuclear boats have a distinct advantage in deep open waters, conventional boats are arguably more effective in littoral and shallow waters (which includes a large part of the SCS)
Ultimately a common AUKUS nuke design being built in three countries shipyards provides a better chance of being able to coming closer to matching China’s rate of submarine production so there are still significant reasons for the U.S. to remain committed to AUKUS over the long haul