The Defence Secretary has said the troubled Ajax armoured vehicle programme must now be either fully rescued or cancelled, admitting that ministers were not given the full facts before key decisions were taken.

Giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee on Tuesday, John Healey said he was “furious” that critical information had been withheld from ministers ahead of decisions on the programme’s initial operating capability.

He told MPs that it was now clear ministers did not have a complete picture when earlier judgments were made, saying “it’s clear we didn’t have the full facts in the lead up to decisions about the initial operating capability,” which has since been formally withdrawn.

Healey confirmed that the Army has been removed from control of the programme entirely, with responsibility transferred to a new senior responsible officer. “The Army is no longer in charge of this programme. A new senior responsible officer is now in place,” he said.

He added that work is now underway to reach a definitive decision on the future of Ajax, stating that the government must now confront a clear choice. “I have been clear that we must back it or scrap it,” Healey told the committee, stressing that safety would be the overriding factor in any outcome. “First and foremost will be my concern for the safety and protection of our forces personnel.”

Ajax has already cost several billion pounds and has suffered years of delays, technical problems and governance failures, becoming one of the most controversial defence procurement programmes of recent decades. During the session, Defence Committee chair Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi MP described the programme as an “absolute shambles” and pressed ministers on accountability for its failings. Healey did not attribute personal blame but accepted that flawed information reaching ministers had undermined decision-making at key points.

The ongoing review will now determine whether Ajax can be safely and credibly fielded, or whether the programme will be cancelled altogether after more than a decade of development.

George Allison
George Allison
George Allison is the founder and editor of the UK Defence Journal. He holds a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and specialises in naval and cyber security topics. George has appeared on national radio and television to provide commentary on defence and security issues. Twitter: @geoallison
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98 COMMENTS

    • But who is? He says there has been appointment of an officer in charge. Officer indicated active armed forces and not civil service. Surely needs to be someone that can actually understand the issues and requirements.

      • Steve, some refer to high-ranking civil servants as officers but that can confuse. Far better to use the term ‘an official’ or ‘a civil servant’ or to refer to the individual by their civil service grade (the SRO may well have been an SCS2 ie Director who typically leads departments, implements government policies, and manages resources) or refer to their short-form job title.

  2. If we really wish to prepare for a major NATO war with Russia, we need to recognise that the MoD desperately needs root and branch change to the procurement system. In fact, despite some recent cosmetic “reforms” nothing has changed at all

    We have blown ~£6.5bn on the disastrous Ajax project, which at ten years late and several £billion over budget should now be cancelled. This machine, built by General Dynamics – but managed by the MoD – has so many vibration/noise problems that soldiers are being made ill whilst training in it.

    From authorising GD to buy the wrong grade of Chinese steel (which had failed the weldability test) to hulls built in GD’s Spanish factory out of square (also approved by the Authority) to the really stupid decision to change the design half way through manufacture, MoD incompetence has resulted in a gold-plated heavy recce vehicle that cannot be used in the field

    GD and the MoD have repeatedly assured successive SoS Defence that the problems have been solved. As is usual, the guilty have covered their tracks and moved on upstairs to a cushy number in the Treasury.

    We should only buy equipment off the shelf for our armed forces. The BAE equivalent, their CV90, has sold thousands of units right across NATO. The people responsible for this latest procurement fiasco have retired or moved on to jobs on the gravy train. We should be looking at recovering the costs from them

    • … and yet when the proposed remedial actions were reported on here many of us with expertise or even none questioned whether as prescribed they could possibly solve the serious issues reported beyond a short term fix at best, simply postponing the issues returning perhaps even worse over their lifespan. Now if one’s really cynical one might even postulate ass covering of a considerable order here by going through the short term motions of corrective (if unconvincing) efforts to suppress them long enough, hoping once in service the effective cover up will be far too entrenched and widespread to dare question and the poor soldiers effectively used as cannon fodder, any complaints from them corporately suppressed thereafter. Wouldn’t be the first time though one might have hoped not in the 2020s. Even more damning if by extension there was a wide ranging conspiracy rather than diabolical incompetence I wonder if that will truly ever be revealed. What a damn mess.

      • One option, bung all current Ajax variants into Ashchurch as war reserve and buy or lease a competitive vehicle for service in late 2027. In the meantime, retain Warrior and even upgrade some with the latest countermeasures. What else can the MOD do?

    • CV90 doesn’t have a recce variant. Ajax is not an IFV

      Line of least resistance (and cost), rip the recce guts and turret off Ajax, put them in a Boxer module & deploy on wheeled Boxer. Now that Germany has put it’s weight behind tracked Boxer, we should build several hundred of those & transfer the recce modules from wheels to tacks, once that variant comes into service

      • I question if ground recce even exists in its traditional form anymore in the age of the drone and helicopter.

        CV90 isn’t a traditional recce vehicle, but I don’t see what it can’t do Vs what the Ajax would realistically be used for. What am I missing?

        • Steve, drones and helicopters if available can be a tool for conducting recce, but we will always need manned recce.
          GDUK offered to adapt an IFV design (ASCOD2 Ulan/Pizarro) to create a recce vehicle – got the contract and screwed it up for many reasons.
          BAE offered a recce variant of an IFV also, based on CV90. MoD didn’t order it but CV90 recce variants are fielded in other armies, notably Norway’s.

          I am not sure what you are missing. Its fairly simple to grasp.

            • They canceled a number of projects for dedicated vehicles on the basis they were too under armoured and under gunned for a realistically threat environment.

      • Actually it does have a recce version, fielded by Norway at least. It comes with a sensor mast, is digitally networked and has something called the Observation Targeting and Surveillance System. It can act as a command node, suggesting that it can call down fires on any identified targets.

        My guess is that it is far too cost effective for the UK MoD / Army as it lacks the necessary gold plate… but it is probably good enough. One vehicle could replace our Warrior tracked IFV’s and recce vechicles and probably a few other roles as well. Also, it would give us commonality with many JEF allies in northern Europe.

        There is an article on the WavellRoom website. I searched: ‘CV90 recce version’ and it came up on the first page.

        Cheers CR

        • CR, I think you mean a family of vehicles could replace the CVR(T) family and the Warrior family – based on CV90.

      • Caribbean, BAE bid for the job back in 2010, offering a CV90 modified for the recce role, and did a physical mock-up. Bizarrely it was rejected. There are now CV90 recce variants in service with other armies, notably Norway.

    • David, MoD will not have spent the entire £6.5bn budget as they have only built 100 vehicles out of the 589. Anyway, if we cancel it, what then? There is no money for a replacement.
      Changing the Requirement by the Army staff in 2016, some 7 years after the document was first released is not stupid. This happens in long gestation projects. I am surprised that it only happened once in the last 16 years. When it happens, there is a Contract Amendment and the MoD have to stump up some more money – it doesn’t have to mean that the perfect vehicle will now be an imperfect one.
      We cannot always buy off the shelf, but we should wherever possible.

  3. Hole program needs binning off, the MOD and DES haven’t and didn’t learn from Nimrod and the mess that caused along with the massive gap in capability that left and only his been filled in the past few years.
    Unfortunately it will take some massive balls along with the billions of pounds worth of lessons learnt.

    Or more likely some nice fat brown envelopes are getting passed around Whitehall with the promise of board jobs with high pay on retirement.

  4. I hope that the issues only effect some vehicles rather than all, and some can be used.
    The RAC needs a recc vehicle.
    Who were the ministers who first decided to take an ASCOD and modify it, and what input did officers have in that?
    They’re the people I want to see at a public enquiry.
    More chance of cheese being found on the moon.

    • If BAE now throw their hat in the ring with a bloody good deal involving the CV90, decent numbers, decent cost and long term support with a quick in service date that would be an offer hard to refuse!!!!

        • Exactly. We know the hulls are problematic, but most of the expense will be in the systems. The question for me is what’s the best way to get hulls properly designed for the weight. Is it CV90 or tracked Boxer, or do the hulls needs to be custom redesigned and a factory built that’s capable of turning them out. I bet that’ll be cheaper than ditching the systems.

          I’ve always said we need to test tracked Boxer anyway, but testing a fuller set of options is the best way to proceed. The one thing we can’t afford to do is just patch the current hulls by buying rubber tracks and bigger ear defenders. The vehicles will degrade with use, so even if we could bring them up to scratch, it’s unlikely they’ll stay that way.

          The reasons I like tracked Boxer, if it can be reasonably done, are commonality and even a chance of UK exports, as we’ll be the first to manufacture the bases. Others in the growing Boxer community might want to follow. It’s still a risk, and if the right people aren’t in charge — that’s engineers and project managers — it could fail again. Nevertheless we know it’s designed to a high enough weight tolerance to begin with, which ASCOD certainly wasn’t, at 45 tons also higher than the CV90’s.

          • Bit of a silly ask but if Ajax is scrapped could the internal systems and communications gear even the CTA 40mm turrets be removed and be reused on other platforms? Even the engine, as the only problem issues are with the hull build, suspension and tracks? Might save a few quid

          • Thanks Jon for stating that basic fact, that’s why I so queried the original remedies, as stated they were never going to give this vehicle anything but marginal safety levels when new and as so boringly repeated ever since the proposed remedies were described a vehicle will never be quieter or have less vibrations through prolonged use and those proposing them must have known it was not a true fix. As it has turned out it didn’t even enable them to claim even a temporary fix.

            The only real hope was that the original cause and thus a possible solution lay in the fact that they could so improve the production quality or methods that the inherent problems could be much reduced by machining them out at source. Whether they have made an attempt to do that I don’t know as that problem to my eyes at least was only expressed through contributors here as a direct potential cause. Without a substantial re design I cannot see how this will have a chance of being solved, is anyone going risk their reputation now by claiming they can fix it?

        • Given how the buzzwords these days are drones, effectors and measuring our forces in terms of lethality rather than numbers of forces, I would have thought the way forward would be to stick the recce sensors on unmanned ground (and also air) vehicles that wouldn’t be overburdened with armoured protection for human crew and could maintain some of the lightweight, nimble characteristics of Scimitar. Ajax would be the tracked armoured box for human operators hanging further back from the unmanned recce assets, guiding them with prompts, analysising the optical, electronic and signals the drones collect and relaying the pertinent stuff to HQ.

          The recce mission seems perfectly suited for expanding into uncrewed, autonomous capabilities. And a ground vehicle seems a lot easier to get into service than an aircraft, ship or submarine, as it doesn’t have to defy gravity, the ferocity of the oceans or the crushing pressure of water. And yet, the Army, in their infinite wisdom, developed Ajax…

          • Watching the war in Ukraine, I’ve been thinking for a while that the future of reconnaissance is drones. All you need is a vehicle they can be deployed from and allows the operators to combine the data streams from each drone to form a picture of the battlefield.

            • Gotta say and again I accept I am no expert but the concept of Ajax has not aged well during its delays and laborious crawl towards any possible in service date. The old horse designed by a committee comes to mind just looking at it.

            • I was thinking something a bit larger that could self-deploy a certain extent, but you could go smaller, depending on the minaturisation of sensors/systems. The tricky part for ground based autonomous vehicles will be navigation offroad: obstacle avoidance, picking the best route through trees and uneven terrain, judging the firmness/suitability of the ground etc.

              But as Ajax is by all accounts a noisy f*cker, acoustic low observability isn’t a requirement, so our drone army could be mini hovercraft!

          • I read somewhere that the weight of the sensors and compute is already old enough that current technology of same capability would be significantly less heavy and could be more compact.

            Probably not much point in keeping the sensors ar computers if above is true unless an expensive rubber track refit would significantly reduce vibration.

            It’s all guesswork and here say.
            Everything is drive by wire these days so theoretically it would be inexpensive to turn Ajax into some kind of pointlessly large robot cannon fodder. Or automated cya cannon with a larger magazine would be expensive to maintain

      • And the Army might even get a tracked IFV in the CV90 to replace Warrior unless tempted with RM Lynx or more Boxer.

        • I do love how prominently the Warrior features in Army recruitment adverts. Maybe it’s some sort of hint or just a sick joke. Feel sorry for the poor recruits who fall for the smoke and mirrors.

    • I wonder if the existing builds could be re – purposed as a base hull for a SHORAD platform and used for protection of CNI /airfields/ dockyards etc. Equipped with Starstreak or similar and its 40mm cannon it could be a better option.
      And buy CV90.

    • It’s was Phillip Hammond (spread sheet Phil) that signed the contract with GD in 2014 however down select was Michael Fallon.

  6. I say stop it now, and turn the completed units into unmanned attack drones. Buy a proven design off the shelf. Stop pouring good money on this ridiculous mess.

  7. We really are in some sort of parallel universe, the Army has been removed from an Army project, as HMG are desperately looking to push out the blame! However, it may come to pass that certain head sheds in the chain involved in the programme have been bluffing somewhat, as this would seem to be a project not allowed to fail! Pressure on this involved to ensure it does well no matter what, too big to fail and all that. Either way, it’s a shit show, from top to bottom and as usual the two groups who suffer are the taxpayer and the Army as the end user!

    • Yes reflects some my sentiments above sounds almost conspiratorial like behaviour to me, with cover up covered by further cover ups and hardly carried out with any great expertise either. No Minister can escape blame it seems to me for not sniffing and digging deep into what was going on, I fear they didn’t want to dig too deep into case they later got implicated. Rather like how Britain starts out in wars until the actual competent people by necessity get a go in desperation after initial disasters.

      • Whilst I would normally be quite willing to believe that ministers were part of the problem – they certainly were in the past – I am not so sure about the current lot in this case. Firstly, how do the ministers find things out in a world protected by the Official Secrets Act? It’s not as if they can hire independent investigators at the drop of a hat, far too many hoops to jump through! Secondly, it sounds to me that they did indeed ask some difficult questions but were lied to! Hence, the sacking and drastic action vis-a-vis Army control of the project. That sounds like they did their job for once. It is not the ministers fault they were lied to, they have every right to expect their department to tell them the truth to be fair.

        Like you said cover up upon cover up. Disgraceful in the extreme! More heads should roll as one person could not possibly manage this level of cover up unaided. I wouldn’t trust GD either! I cannot believe that their engineers do not know the full details of the of problem. It smells like senior executives pushing profit over quality to the extent that safety is compromised. Remember the Boeing 737 scandal..!? For this reason alone I do not think we should push on with Ajax. The lying had to be backed up by others for it to have worked for this long even allowing for non technical ministers probably being over trusting and vulnerable to being bamboozled by techo speak and acronyms.

        CV90 has a recce version available as used by the Norwegians. Buy some off the shelf from BAE Hagglunds and open an UK factory if there are enough orders from the British Army. Buy the IFV version to replace the Warrior that would probably justify the new factory. Europe needs to significantly increase and diversify production after all and this government wants to drive growth in the economy. We need mass as well. Drones alone will not cut it, they will help, but more troops and AFV’s will be needed. The growing economy means actually buying stuff that works and occupies a UK supply chain properly, not spaffing billions on a failed development program…! So just bloody go for it!

        I’ll stop there because my blood pressure is rising..! This program has been peeing me off for years!

        What a mess. How many CV90 would £5.5b so far spent have actually bought by now..?

        Makes me want to throw the phone down!!!!!!

        Cheers CR

  8. It endangers its operators rather than the enemy. Court Martial required for those in service and criminal proceedings for civilian employees. Clearly the whole process and relationship has become institutionally corrupt.

    GD Spain are not competent. We have 150 hulls which need scrapping – But even those that are better (Drop 3) are still causing vomiting and loss of bodily function in operators.

    The only fix is for GD at their cost to redesign the suspension and hull and get a vehicle that rides acceptably – No more limited to 15 minuytes exposure at maximum 20KPH stuff. GD fix it or scrap it

    • You do feel they thought it could be acceptable because they were never ever going to be needed in an actual war so simply looked good on the recruitment calendars.

  9. Scrapped. Throwing good money after bad is never a good idea and there are a lot of off the shelf options out there that actually work.

    Examples (from Google AI search):

    ‘Top Alternatives and Potential Replacements.
    BAE Systems CV90 (Sweden): The CV90 Mk IV is widely considered the most direct competitor and the most common alternative suggested if the Ajax program was cancelled. It is a proven, battle-tested platform in production, often described as having similar mobility and firepower options but with better, more mature development.
    Rheinmetall Lynx KF41 (Germany): A modern, tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) that is also offered in various configurations. It is considered a strong candidate for future requirements, offering similar weight (30-45 tonnes) and firepower to the Ajax.
    Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (Germany/Netherlands/UK): As a 8×8 wheeled vehicle, it represents a different mobility approach but is often proposed in the “Boxer Tracked” concept or as a direct competitor for reconnaissance roles within Strike Brigades.
    AS21 Redback (South Korea): Developed by Hanwha, this was a finalist in the Australian LAND 400 Phase 3 competition, making it a serious contender for heavy IFV requirements.

    Other Similar Platforms

    KNDS-France Jaguar (6×6): Considered a direct equivalent in the reconnaissance role, specifically designed for the French Army as a replacement for the old AMX-10RCR.
    Polish Borsuk IFV: A modern, amphibious infantry fighting vehicle, though it may be lighter than the Ajax.
    Otokar Tulpar (Turkey): A tracked IFV designed for compatibility with main battle tanks and to support high-intensity conflict.
    ASCOD 2 (Spain/Austria): The direct ancestor of the Ajax. While the British Ajax is a heavily modified variant, the original Spanish/Austrian ASCOD 2 is an alternative with similar base design’

  11. I just can’t see how they are going to solve this. It’s a “brave” minister who is willing to give General Dynamics billions more and years to solve this. Even braver one yet that is willing to cancel a program and close a factory in wales with 750 job losses just before an election.

    CV90 sounds great but it will no doubt take years to get and still cost billions.

    Will armoured recce even be a thing by the time any of this is delivered.

    Bean Wallace really screwed this badly.

  13. Politicians hide behind the disfunctional civil service who hide behind the disfunctional military

    Or

    The Civil service hides behind the disfunctional politicians who hide behind the disfunctional military

    Either way, the military end does not care about what is spent or does not have a clue (why do people join the military in the first place?)

    Maybe, the military just does not have a relevant voice.

  15. Could the British Bulldog chassis, engine and body ever be reworked upgraded to a recce role? It must be significantly lighter?

  16. When you design an entire vehicle around a strange and unique type of gun that no one wants, you know it’s all going to end in tears.

      • Very much like the lynx41 the cta in french jaguar and naval guns are not yet fully proven.

        Seems unlikely that jaguar with cta40 will work well…..the French are probably just a bit better at covering up the disappointment.

        The very high pressures created when firing cta 40 were a massive issue for Ajax….jaguar is a much lighter vehicle so probably worse off.

        As far as problems with heavy, tracked apc type vehicles has the German puma been fully accepted into service yet?

    • Rubbish.

      Big problem was awarding the contract to an organization that had never developed or produced a vehicle in its corporate life whose submission was a pile of slides and a list of promises.

  17. Looks like the bullet is finally going to be bitten.

    Wonder from which service the new officer responsible is from. Royal Marines or RAF Regiment maybe?

  18. Get a team of Ukrainian Engineers over. If it can be fixed. They are the people to do it. Same with challenger 3. Give them the tank for testing .

  19. They are thinking out of the box and coming up with practical new ideas , I would certainly not under rate their abilities.

  20. I am puzzled by Healey’s announcement about the army being removed from the project.

    The way things work on procurement.projects, the service sets out the staff targets and evaluates industry’s offerings. Once the project passes Main Gate, D&ES takes over and runs things. The army continues to have a role in something like Ajax, feeding in its endless changes of specs, trialling the kit and inputting on development. But the overall authority remains with the D&ES.

    If Healey had said that he had removed the rather hapless D&ES from the project, that would make sense. But removing the army, which didn’t have operational control of GD and Ajax, comes across as the civil servants and D&ES msnagement desperately passing the buck to the nearest scapegoat.

    • I’m not knowledgeable enough to know, but Healey’s move could be a smart move to position a senior, credible independent ‘peacemaker’ between the army and the D&ES. The situation needs a respected neutral figure who doesn’t have a history or a vested interest – someone who can get all parties to accept whatever decision ( rework or scrap) is taken now, and make it work.

  21. A lot of Ajax issues go back to the turn of the century when the Army were supping deeply the Kool aid of omnipresent, omnipotent forces. ‘Dominating the digital battlespace’ presented by primarily US defence companies like GD, LM etc. The Army bought into these lines hook, line & sinker. Trying to produce the ‘ultimate’ ISTAR vehicle.

    Sadly, of course reality is a little different. As threats evolve so do solutions. Just like WW1 when the UK invented the ‘TANK’. Ukraine has shown proliferation of multiple, high volume, low cost systems like FPV drones which cause most of the damage. This was acknowledged by CGS Roly Walker during his recent speech. Bizarrely though he went on about GD praising them? On a project that is eight years late, fails to meet any reasonable standards of safety and is hemmed in by restrictive use orders! Just exactly what do GD have to do to be critiqued? It seems the tail is wagging the dog here. Roly also seemed to indicate that GD would be supplier of choice on every new contract? The One Team approach has led to an unhealthily system of non competitive contracts & Development being placed ‘on the Nod’ It should be scrapped immediately

    A full rescue for Ajax entails full suspension & Hull redesign and replacement, New road wheels and amour to accommodate CRT’s. The implementation of configuration control, skills, inspection and quality systems in GD.
    Addition of MIPS, resolution of battery & power, turret issues, Autoloader issues £3+ Billion! and four years?

    Meanwhile the world has moved on, technology has passed Ajax by in its envisaged role. You could buy 12,000 drones for the cost of one Ajax! Which offers better reconnaissance and bang for buck?

    The Army have created this disaster themselves by their ignoring ATDU, DSTL advice and trying in effect to cover up a failed design and platform. Bullying soldiers into promoting and using a vehicle that has caused disabling life changing injuries. It appears there has been collusion with ex service personnel from DGS and senior officers all the way down to REME, ATDU, DE&S now employed by GD. These roles bear a proper investigation as timing of decision making and agreement or acceptance of Ajax seems suspiciously closely related. I am not a great believer in Multiple coincidences. If there are indictions of malfeasance I public office or the forces, Courts Martials and criminal proceedings should follow. This would include any personnel in contractors proven to be involved.

    This may be the nuclear option but is really the only option left. The programme and GD have had multiple opportunities to resolve and correct the issues. GD say the vehicle is the most tested and safest in the fleet. Clearly this is a lie. If these issues are not resolved we just accept US contractors can do anything they want, ignore the specification, safety, performance and supply any old tat! trouser billions in profit and walk away – Then come back and charge billions more to put sticking plasters on problems.

    Any future contracts should be to a British company with British R&D, Design and production

    • Your perspectives are spot on m’Lord. The soldiers of the British Army have been victimised by a culture of deceit, greed and management by fear.
      The most important thing we can salvage from this project is the rediscovery of faith in ourselves and in British Industry and engineering.

  22. As a previous captain of industry I find it totally unbelievable that so called experts and a major organisation could get it so wrong. Where were the pre production checks? Why was a pre production vehicle not field tested and by whom and was it then further checked before full scale production. Total incompetence by both the MOD and manufacturers and there needs to be a full investigation as to what went on. There are no excuses for incompetence.

    • Why are you blaming the customer for a bad product? Are you to blame if your new car doesn’t work the way you want it to?

      • I would suggest that the customer would have to accept a contract with no pre production vehicles and test program. If they did, then why?

        The product is obviously down to GD, but acceptance is the customer’s responsibility and they even gave it IOC rating when clearly it wasn’t ready. It should never have been given IOC…

        Cheers CR

  23. Shouldn’t future needs be reviewed again from scratch? I hate to say delay, but I think that’s where we are for next few months. We need to ask what recon and armoured fighting capability the army needs, and figure out how we get there from here. If we decide we need an Ajax-style armoured fighting vehicle, we can revisit those options. Perhaps we need to go back to IFVs instead, with recon delivered some other way. Then we need to look at what we can salvage from the Ajax project. Ares is supposed to work all right, isn’t it? But isn’t that just a specialist APC?

  24. They should put the people that oversaw the raven air defense system together in charge of this. Tell them they have to build us something quickly using accumulated parts of Ajax, warrior and whatever else we have left in the inventory. It could be called operation ‘scrapheap challenge.’

  25. It is clear that this is a intrinsically flawed platform we have already squandered billions on. We need to scrap it but CV90 (without fiddling with it) and move on.

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