Thales UK in Glasgow has secured a £169m contract to manufacture advanced optronic masts for the upcoming Dreadnought-class submarines.
The masts in question are ’21st Century successors to the iconic periscope’ for the four forthcoming nuclear deterrent submarines (HMS Dreadnought, Valiant, Warspite, and George VI).
Unlike traditional periscopes, these masts do not breach a submarine’s hull, but rather generate a comprehensive 360-degree digital image for the command team to review at their convenience. They offer additional functionalities such as night vision, thermal imaging, and support communications, aiding with targeting, navigation, and situational awareness.
The same technology is currently utilised on all five Astute-class submarines serving the Royal Navy and is slated for installation on the last two submarines in the class, Agincourt and Agamemnon.
The Dreadnought ‘integrated optronic combat system’ masts contract will secure over 150 jobs, making up a small portion of the estimated 30,000 people across the UK involved in the broader programme to deliver the four new submarines.
CEO of Thales UK, Alex Cresswell, expressed his pride in their involvement, stating, “We are proud to say that our combat system mast and sonar will be providing the eyes and ears capabilities of the new Dreadnought-class. It is an incredibly exciting time for the Submarine Service and its contribution to global security with the build of the Dreadnought class.”
Great names for this class, I’m glad we are not just sticking with letter groupings anymore.
I will disagree there. I prefer the letter system.
Good news on the masts. They must be pretty impressive for the cost of them.
I’ve heard of these masts, but not much more, so had a gander on what they are capable of, most impressed from the Thales glasgow website:
Optronic mast
At the Thales’ facility in Glasgow we have over 100 years’ experience in design and manufacture of state-of-the-art periscopes and optronics masts for submarine platforms around the world. We are presently manufacturing our latest generation optronics mast – the Low Profile Variant (LPV). LPV is an evolution of our first-generation, sea proven design that has been fitted to over 30 platforms worldwide.
The features and benefits of LPV are as follows:
Fitted with up to 4 very high resolution sensors and an optional laser rangefinder, providing situational awareness for all environments.
Ultra High Definition Day Camera
Thermal Imager
Colour Low Light Camera
Short-wave Infra-red Camera
Full 3-axis stabilisation, achieved opto-mechanically for maximum image and video capture performance.
LPV has a very small diameter, low radar cross section and a single window for all sensors – optimising stealth capability whilst ensuring the maximum quality of light reaches the sensors.
It is also fitted with Digital Crew, an artificial intelligence and automation functionality, allowing for automatic detection and tracking of targets to assist the operator.
It is also compatible with the latest electronic warfare antennas.
In addition to the described performance, LPV has been designed for low cost, high reliability and ease of maintenance.
The Low Profile Variant optronics mast ensures that Navies will have the maximum performance possible with the lowest signature and minimal exposure time.
We also offer a further two versions of the LPV optronics mast. These variants have a high degree of commonality with LPV and therefore offer the customer a reduced cost of ownership if operating a mix of mast configurations on their platform.
The first version is called Ultra Low Profile Variant (ULPV). This version is much smaller in diameter, similar to that of a traditional attack periscope and offers the same functionality as LPV but it benefits from enhanced stealth properties.
The second version is called Combat System Mast (CSM). This version is identical to LPV but integrates a state-of-the-art, world-leading fully digital electronic warfare antenna, designed and manufactured in Thales’ Crawley. This offers navies unparalleled capability for superiority in the contested and congested maritime environment.
It is good to see that progress is being made on our Dreadnought CASD submarines. However, under what circumstances would we consider using nuclear weapons? The UK has never declared a “no first use” policy.
Following the 2021 Integrated Review of Security etc it is believed that the
the UK has ~260 nuclear warheads. However to extend our position of deliberate ambiguity, the UK no longer provides public figures on the UK’s operational stockpile, deployed warheads or deployed missile numbers. All of the deployed warheads are controlled by the RN, which maintains a continuous at-sea presence via its four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered submarines. This posture ensures a secure second-strike capability in the event of the UK receiving a nuclear attack.
The UK stoppped producing and refining weapons grade uranium and plutonium in 1995, however we have a stockpile of ~23 tons of highly enriched uranium and ~3.5 tons of weapons grade plutonium. AWE retains a sovereign capability to design and produce nuclear warheads using this material – should it become necessary.
The UK has never declared a no first use policy. We reserve the right to use our nuclear weapons preemptivley under unspecified circumstances. For the avoidance of doubt, the UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent and only the Prime Minister can authorise their use.
While our resolve – and capability to do so if necessary – is beyond doubt, the UK remains deliberately ambiguous under which circumstances we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. The March 2023 “refresh” of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security reaffirmed the UK’s longstanding position of ambiguity on the precise details of when, how and at what scale the UK may consider the use of our nuclear weapons. Both reviews confirmed however, that nuclear weapons would only be used in “extreme circumstances of self-defence”
So this begs the question, under what extreme circumstances might the UK be obliged to consider a first strike? And from where might such a strike be launched, from the open ocean? From under Arctic sea ice? Or in extremis, from Faslane?
This is a densely populated country and a credible threat of a major attack using nerve gas or chemical weapons on our cities would mean that a first strike using nuclear weapons would be considered. Similarly, a large invasion fleet approaching our shores following the defeat of the RAF and/or the RN. Or possibly, even a large mass of enemy armour etc assembling on the French side of the Channel Tunnel following a French capitulation
An important consideration is whether our CASD boat fires all of her Tridents – or whether she holds some back. A peer adversary would be expected to identify the launch point quickly and rapidly respond in kind. Other nuclear armed states may not have such a capability – yet.
A Trident II D5 missile has a range of 4500 nautical miles. The re-entry vehicle contains an unspecified mix of MIRV capable nuclear warheads and decoys
David wrote:
The Government webpage on the very subject:
But this snippet encapsulates everything:
“”The UK maintains only the minimum amount of destructive power needed to guarantee our deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats. Our submarines on patrol are at several days’ notice to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state.
We are deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how, and at what scale we would use our weapons. This ensures the deterrent’s effectiveness is not undermined and complicates the calculations of a potential aggressor.
The UK’s nuclear deterrent is operationally independent. Only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of our nuclear weapons even if deployed as part of a NATO response. We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.””
The essence of nuclear deterrence is uncertainty. This is important to the UK because, alone among the 5 nuclear weapon states (under the terms of the non-proliferation treaty), we only operate SSBN and not the triad of silo based first strike systems and nuclear capable warplanes. As do the USA, the French, the Chinese and India.
The passages that you quote from the government website are deliberately ambiguous for this reason. If we decide to launch, it happens out of the blue with, of necessity, very little or no warning. As such, any potential enemy cannot be sure of the circumstances under which we would. The recent introduction of Russian low-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons into eastern europe demanded a similar response and the refurbushed W76-2 warhead (which may, or may not be on our Tridents) has a yield of “only” 8 kt
It’s a game of chicken, particularly when rogue and inherently unpredictable states such as N Korea are involved. The wonder is that, other than in 1945, nobody has used nuclear weapons in anger since.
I would suggest that if Biden/Netanyahu allow the Ayatollahs to get the bomb, all bets are off. For the Israelis, post Holocaust, it’s an existential issue