Global Britain – Where are we in 2023?

In June 2018, the UK Government released a policy document entitled ‘Global Britain: Delivering on our International Ambition’.

This paper was partially aimed at a post-Brexit Britain and the intended role of the nation in the world moving forward. It was followed up by further documents including: “Global Britain in a Divided World” (2022) and “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy” (2021).

Given the COVID-19 pandemic, massive increase in inflation and ongoing concerns over the future of the Armed Forces’ finances, how far has the nation gotten in achieving the aims set out in the original policy, and how much has the policy’s aims changed in the last 5 years?

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The 2018 policy stated: “The three centres of the global economy and political influence are in North America, overwhelmingly the United States, in Europe and its neighbourhood; and in the Indo-Pacific region. Maintaining influence in these areas is essential to making Global Britain a success. At the same time, to realise fully the vision of Global Britain means being active and influential in all regions, the institutions of the rules-based international order and key global issues.”

In the time since it was written, the UK’s cooperation with Europe and the USA has
obviously increased significantly, in part due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

We’ve also seen the UK’s deployment of the new carrier strike group around the world,
with a particular focus of that deployment being the Asia-Pacific region, although as above
the situation in Europe has taken centre stage since then, and as HMS Queen Elizabeth
leaves port this week heading back out on another deployment, this time focused in the
Mediterranean, it becomes clear that “Global Britain” may not be as global as was hoped.

While NATO’s focus remains on Ukraine and the ongoing Russian invasion of the country,
developments in the Asia-Pacific region are startling and should be of great cause for
concern to the UK Government. Over the last week as an example, we’ve seen North Korea unveil their first modified Romeo-class ballistic missile submarine (hull number 841), China and the Philippines come into conflict over ongoing Chinese Coast Guard attempts to block their transit, and China’s claim to more territory at sea (the infamous 9-dash line seemingly now being re-drawn on official Chinese Government maps as a 10-dash line) causing uproar among its neighbours including Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines. The South China Sea and surrounding waters are fast becoming a potential flash-point with China’s increasingly militaristic and expansionist actions posing a threat not just to those nations surrounding it, but also threatening global trade and the safety of key British allies such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

Part of the original proposals for a Global Britain included a “pivot” towards the Asia-Pacific region, with plans initially for the forward-deployment of a pair of offshore patrol vessels – presently HMS Tamar (P233) and HMS Spey (P234) – to the region, and intentions to increase the permanent presence with a future frigate deployment to bases in the Indian Ocean, Australia or Singapore.

The Type 31 Frigate programme is now underway, with 5 ships planned and 2 of those under construction. Plans for a follow-on second batch or near-identical Type 32 Frigate design have been tentatively confirmed for “beyond-2030”, especially amidst ongoing indication of further defence cuts (with the Army’s rumoured further cut to full-time strengths making national news briefly earlier in 2023).

Also lacking has been firm commitments to additional F-35B “Lightning II” fast-jets, with the current 48 jets originally due to have increased to 138 jets, but with the last proposals suggesting this would be reduced to 74 airframes, but no further order yet been placed and the planned follow-on GCAP (formerly Project Tempest) not expected to fly until the 2030s.

The only positive move towards the Asia-Pacific tilt was the announcement of the AUKUS
programme between the United States, UK and Australia. The key component of this plan
was the future SSN-AUKUS, a proposed class of nuclear-powered attack submarines to be
built for and by both the UK and Australia with assistance from the USA.

Although details remain largely unconfirmed, there have been suggestions that the programme will see the UK’s SSN fleet increase from the currently expected 7-ship Astute-class to 10 or more of the new design beyond 2035. It is expected that a small portion of these new submarines could be forward-deployed to Australia to work alongside Australia’s own SSN-AUKUS boats (up to 8 expected to be built by the 2050s).

The presence of a frigate and submarines in the region would be a huge step forward
towards the Global Britain aims stated in 2018, but the plan is unlikely to be realised until
the late-2030s at the earliest and as I’ve already mentioned, China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour and incredible military production may render such a deployment too little too late.

China’s naval shipyards alone are turning out an astonishing number of new warships each year, with a US Navy briefing slide estimating the nation has 20 times the shipbuilding capacity of the USA at the present time (see article). The US estimate suggests that China will have a core battle force of 475 warships by 2035, and this does not include the Coast Guard or militia groups China has used in recent months to harass neighbouring nation’s warships.

By 2040, it is believed China will operate a fleet including 6 fleet aircraft carriers. Data is limited on exact numbers, but the 2022-2024 shipbuilding period is expected to see some 60 new warships enter PLAN service.

If the UK wishes to continue to maintain a global role and adhere to the original 2018 mission statement, a military presence significantly larger than an OPV is going to be
necessary, especially amidst ongoing US political posture changes, North Korean nuclear
ambitions and uncertainty for the future among Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the other
southeast Asian countries who will be looking to the west for leadership, should China
continue to expand its land claims in the region.

An oft-proposed solution to the aim of a global presence was the “Modern Sloop of War”
suggestion, dubbed the “Black Swan-class” (2012). Although partially realised in the Batch 2 River-class OPVs, the concept never fully materialised due to a combination of factors.

The proposal was for a light ocean-going combatant that would serve as a launch platform for unmanned aerial and unmanned surface vehicles, with a unit cost of £65m per ship. The basic specifications proposed are laid out below:

– £65m unit cost
– 2,000 to 4,000 tons displacement
– Diesel-electric propulsion capable of maximum of 24kts and cruise speeds of 10-16kts
– Endurance of 30-90 days
– A core crew of 8 personnel with capacity for up to 60 if required
– A main gun of some description (likely a 30mm autocannon up to 57mm DP gun)
– Small hangar for 1 medium and 1 light UAV
– Large flight deck capable of landing a Chinook
– Capacity for 2x Rigid-Inflatable boats

Now most of these specifications sound a lot like the River-class OPVs, however these ships were never build in the quantities required. A “Batch 3 River-class” could well provide the extra numbers needed, or something based on the Royal Navy’s new XV Patrick Blackett (X01) experimental ship.

Another key factor in the UK’s global reach would be air power. A review this week by a
parliamentary committee has criticised the continuous cuts to air power in the UK, noting
that of the 4 major powers in Europe, the UK has the smallest fast-jet fleet and that the
recent decommissioning of the C-130J fleet and reduced size of the future E-7A “Wedgetail” fleet are both areas of concern. Once again, fixes will not come quickly and as with the Navy a rectification of the issues to meet any global threats will not arrive until the mid-to-late 2030s at the earliest, which in global affairs is a long time and could prove to late for a key ally.

The war in Ukraine has also shown how critical quantity still is. With our most recent
conflicts having been fought in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan against terrorist groups, a near-peer conflict is not something we’ve trialled equipment against. The loss this week of the first Challenger 2 main battle tank in Ukraine against Russian forces and the plans to reduce the UK fleet should be sending alarm bells throughout Whitehall. The reality is that even with allies, if the UK “whole force” were tomorrow to begin engaging a near-peer enemy like Russia, (or perhaps in light of the current climate, China is a likely candidate), the UK would run out of resources far sooner than some of our allies.

Poland appears to be learning this lesson from Ukraine the most clearly, with some
enormous military contracts in recent weeks as it seeks to re-arm itself in the face of an
aggressive Russia on the border.

Yes, the UK has allies between it and our major enemies at the moment so we are not
alone, but a Global Britain needs to be able to defend it’s interests anywhere, not just in a
corner of Europe. Only major increases in defence spending and prioritisation of key
capabilities will stop the UK Armed Forces slipping further into obscurity.

In short, Global Britain in 2023 has a long way to go.