Have you wondered how many days the Type 23 Frigate fleet spent at sea over the last few years?
The information below comes from a response to a written Parliamentary question.
“The normal operating cycle of every ship involves them entering different readiness levels depending on their programmes, periods of refit and Departmental planning requirements”, said Jeremy Quin, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence.
“In addition, these figures represent days at sea, and it should be noted that, while deployed away from the UK, ships will spend both days at sea and alongside in ports around the world.”
FRIGATE | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
ARGYLL | 25 | 0 | 111 | 141 |
IRON DUKE | 85 | 132 | 94 | 0 |
KENT | 124 | 67 | 0 | 57 |
LANCASTER | 157 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
MONMOUTH | 68 | 113 | 209 | 131 |
MONTROSE | 0 | 0 | 41 | 145 |
NORTHUMBERLAND | 48 | 0 | 0 | 117 |
PORTLAND | 107 | 176 | 41 | 0 |
RICHMOND | 180 | 73 | 51 | 0 |
SOMERSET | 131 | 113 | 95 | 60 |
ST ALBANS | 122 | 136 | 138 | 120 |
SUTHERLAND | 127 | 127 | 103 | 166 |
WESTMINSTER | 0 | 0 | 126 | 152 |
Could the article be updated with the 2019 figures…?
If we had them, certainly, however this is the information contained within the response.
It would be good to see a list of the current fleet:
Full modernisation?
Part modded?
OSDs?
Which have a tail?
And, whisper it quietly, it seems the Scots stepped up to the plate in 2018 😉
A relatively recent update from STRN https://twitter.com/NavyLookout/status/1219956561289928704
Lancaster with no days at sea for three years, surely that can’t all be the life extension refit?
On a wider not compare what we have with these 13 ships against the 13 (of two different types) that they will be replaced by.
Lanc was alongside laid up before her refit.
Was that a crewing issue?
Yes.
Effectively, a T45 and T23 have been laid up due to crewing issues over the past few years. With the T23 fleet, this has moved between ships as they’ve gone into refit: Lancaster -> Portland -> Iron Duke -> Monmouth.
Lanc has now re-joined the fleet, with Portland out of the shed, Iron Duke in the early stages of her refit and Monmouth getting ready to go in.
Official word is that the crewing issues have been resolved.
*
The first sea lord announced towards the end of last year that the crewing issues were now over. I suspect those figures won’t jump up for 2020.
There will be some other excuse, like the T45s being re-engined
Crewing issues were entirely self made though. Money saving exercise
It will been Senseless to refit Monmouth, at this late stage in her life. Less then a decade before retirement!
Just keep her maintained and seaworthy. Use the savings to uparm T31!
Logically yes the money could be better used elsewhere,but while Monmouth is still on the RN’s books having been LIFEXED can be justified,plus it increases the chance of a sale to a friendly partner on its retirement.
Why we are spending so much on refiting the type 23s is beyond me, do they really need new engines! couldnt we have just patched them up for a few years. On the other hand it’s good and needed work for the yard, would it cost much more to fit the 23s mushroom farms onto the type 31s? 32 VLS is needed.
Cam – At the end of the day there surely was no other option,the T23 replacement has taken far too long to start production,if these Frigates were not to be LIFEXED should they have been retired then sold or scrapped with nothing to replace them ? .The added benefits of the Refit work is that Sea Ceptor has been bought into service,and the New Engine arrangement that will go into some of them will go towards preventing any future issues on the Type 26 when they come ( finally) into service.
Paul, this is what happens when the fleet has been poorly managed for decades….. What really infuriates me the most is the fact that the process of concept, design, development, costing and rubber stamping a project takes so bloody long in this Country.
The QE Class Carriers, the Astute Class, the Dreadnoughts, the Type 45’s, The Type 26’s, the Type 31’s, the OPV’s, the new RFA ships, the refit of the older hulls in the fleet etc etc…. and this is just the chuffing Royal Navy FFS!!!!!
The T23 mushroom farms, are originally Sea Wolf hot launch silos. They have be adapted to launch Sea Ceptor.
They look as they are really welded in. So will require a lot of cutting and welding to remove. So another refit with all costs associated would be required.
Might as well start afresh with a new type of silo designed to launch Sea Ceptor!
Meirion – The benefits of Sea Ceptor I was inplying were the introduction of a completely new Weapons System and the lessons that would be learned,im aware there is absolutely no reason to transfer any VLS from T23 to T26/31..
I do agree Paul. I was replying to Cam, no worries!
Lancaster was laid up at Porrsmouth stripped of weapons prior to being towed to Devonport in late 2016/early 2017 and entered refit. Iron Duke was then laid up at Portsmouth and was towed to Devonport last year I think, and now in refit. Portland was disarmed and laid up at Devonport around Jume 2017 and now in refit. Richmond has now completed her refit including new engines.
Any news of St. Albans? She was laid up last year, maybe waiting for LIFEX? Also Portland was fitted with a new sonar.
https://twitter.com/NavyLookout/status/1269166931828932610/photo/1
Lancaster is now now active and undergoing at-sea training following reift/crewing issues.
These numbers complete a worrying picture when aggregated with yesterdays T45 numbers.
The fleet activity has been clearly cut back since the end of 2016
HMS KENT spent most of 2019 at sea data needs to be updated !!!
It’s not our data.
An average of 2.9 frigates at sea during any one day, surprisingly slow number.
I am wondering if days restocking / days ashore during port visits are being taken out of the number and it is purely days at sea.
The average for the destroyers for 2019 was 1.4, so assuming 2019 for frigates was similar to 2018 that means on any one day of the year we had 4.3 escorts at sea. Considering how wide the deployments are around the world, that seems kinda low compared to the 19 potential.
I don’t believe this includes port figures. There is also usually one or two vessels kept in the UK for escort/interdiction through the channel and national security.
Point is that it doesn’t really accurately depict the number of escorts major surface combatants available to the Royal Navy overall. For example, if we send a frigate to the Middle East and, over the course of a month, it spends 14 days at sea and 14 days in port where it is supplying or its troops are conducting other working port or at the local naval base, that doesn’t mean that asset is only available for two weeks. You are still presenting the same level of force over the whole month with the ship regularly available for operations.
Man power limit is surely there.
“19 escort with 80 sea-going days each” is equivalent to “16 escort with 95 days”, or even “14 escorts with 110 days each”.
RN is not operating “19 escorts” for more than half a decade. I am not sure why RN is ordering five T31, while keeping at least 1 T45 in extended readiness for lack of crew.
The manning requirements on the T26 and especially the T31 are significantly lower than T23, with T31 at perhaps 50% of the T23’s complement. So as T23 leave service raw headcount requirement falls, although there’s clearly still a requirement to have the right trades with the appropriate experience.
Yes. But.
With manning in short, even with T26 (~150 crew) and T31 (~100 crew) coming, man power cannot be cut = payment level is the same as of now.
With huge automation, the cost of automation will significantly increase. (because these new ships needs equipment doing something a crew is doing in T23. Note, T26/T31 is significantly larger than T23, which means ship maintenance load will increase.)
When we say, “automation saves cost”, it means “saving from man power reduction exceeds the increase of cost by automation-equipment support”. In T26/31 this is not the case, because the man power is already cut. So, simply maintenance support cost will increase.
On this regard, RN now must be very “wealthy” because it is not running the ship. But, it looks like RN is still in short of money. If not, re-engine of T45 must have been funded 1-2 years ago, T23 LIFEX program must have been ended already, and many RFA vessels must be at sea.
In short, the current RN vision does not meet its budget. Trying to stretch is further damaging the fleet, because of many delays of program partly caused by lack “additional fund in the right moment” = save 100M GBP now to lose 200M GBP next year.
Not sure, why RN is building five T31. Why not 4, or even 3. I guess reduction in hull will give zero damage to RN. By re-locating those money elsewhere, RN will be more active, powerful, and reliable.
I’m not surprised if T31’s usage be limited in 2030s (or T31 draining man-power and operational cost from T45/T26) and we again claiming “too low sea-going days”)
All so true. Trying to do too much without resources. The best kept secret from the Parliament, Media & Public. If this was a ‘civilian’ entreprise it would have gone bust and the management would have been deemed in capable by the shareholders who are told what goes on in the company. RN shareholders, tax payers, are not allowed to know because service people cannot speak out. Can’t think of any senior officer being fired, perhaps they never make mistakes?
Sorry Donald not sure I understand the arguments you’re making.
With 8x T26 (~150 crew), 5x T31 (~100 crew) and 13x T23 (~185 crew), 13x T26/T31 would require ~1700 crew while 13x T23 would require ~2400, so the new frigates would only require ~2/3 the crew for the same number of ships to be manned.
Obviously these are all approximations, would depend on what systems are embarked on ships and requires the availability of all necessary trades with appropriate experience. However, T31 might be significantly lower than ~100 crew.
Alternatively, ~1700 crew today might only enable 9x T23 to be manned, hence the number of T23 currently in refit/lifex. Perhaps this is what you meant about man power not being cut? So OK, no reduction in total crew numbers from today but with the benefit of actually having enough crew to operate 13 frigates.
Assuming maintenance costs just increase because the ships are larger isn’t a very sound argument. Iver Huitfeldt in particular was designed from the outset by the Danes to have low purchase and low through-life operational costs. First time I’ve heard the argument that automation of anything (done properly) drives up total costs of operation.
I know you’re not a fan of the T31, but your reasons for the RN to not have them, or to reduce the number of them seem to be stretching your arguments a bit thin. Given the UK wants to increase its WW naval presence, along with operating a CSG, it needs to at least maintain frigate numbers at 13.
Have budgets been tight? Certainly. Bringing up two large carriers from nothing and manning them is effectively a new expenditure for the RN, along with the expense of the Astute-class program, both of which may have contributed to slower than desirable T45 and T23 programs. Not to mention a flawed austerity approach to recovery from the Great Recession compounded by the 2010 SDR headcount reductions. We don’t have to repeat the same mistakes going forward.
Thanks, Glass Half Full-san
On crew number, yes, that is my argument. However, T31 crew size will be 100 or more. Current number of ~90 does NOT include helicopter flight (while the ~185 number for T23 does).
On the operation cost other than man-power cost, a ship with automation surely be higher than a ship without. To be operated with less crew while complying similar level of damage control, to start with, you need, e.g. a fire sensor (with double back up), fire-fighting sprinkler with more than double back up, and even automated door. Of course these assets needs maintenance, but most can be done at port, and be out-sourced = needs money.
Another example is the navies with less GDP per capita buying ships with more crew. If automation is free, all navy must be pursuing automation. No, clearly it is not. Automation requires new equipment, and these assets requires maintenance, which needs money.
“Cost reduction” in automation ONLY comes from manpower reduction. All other aspects requires more money.
If UK want’s to increase its WW naval presence with THIS level of budget, RN shall stop wasting money on assets they cannot use (or need to sacrifice other assets to use it) = sunk cost. For example, disbanding 2 T23GP now has zero impact on RN escort fleet, but RN will not need to may for its maintenance, stop LIFEX, or even sell it to gain money.
Even with the days of T31, RN shall better “over crew” them to obtain as much as 200 sea-going days per hull. With its relatively simple armaments requiring less maintenance load, it will be easy. With this RN can
– relocate the precious few 100M GBP to build it, into increasing operation cost, upgrade cost, and even the pay-rise to stop skilled members going out of Navy
– increase WW presence. The net sea-going days will even increase.
– fill the capability gap, such as SSM on T45 and T31, BMD on T45, add CAMM on CVF,
Donald, we are probably going to have to agree to disagree regarding T31. However, I am not disagreeing with your point that “Cost reduction in automation ONLY comes from manpower reduction. All other aspects requires more money.” I am stating that we know T31 is a low CapEx frigate, with it already including its automation CapEx costs, and that it will be a low cost ship to operate, i.e. low OpEx (crew), low VoyEx (fuel) and low maintenance costs. These were all very explicit design requirements, with OMT leveraging experience from Maersk to achieve this. I suggest that if the Danes can operate an Iver Huitfeldt AAW frigate with 116 crew, then a T31 should be significantly less.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/OMT-Dansh-Frigate-Programme-April-2014.pdf
I agree that disbanding 2 T23GP now would have zero impact on RN escort fleet currently, I’ve suggested it before for the two oldest frigates, but the MoD may be locked into contracts at this point.
I think we have to be careful about using sea days as a metric for effectiveness, its a bit crude. For example with the plan to increase forward basing of ships there will be no transit from the UK to the areas of operation, so an example were reduced sea days is actually a good thing.
This table is the rationale for the Batch 2 Rivers.
5 more rows forward based at HMS Forth at sea levels of availability.
The figures are misleading when taken in isolation with no understanding of notice for sea.
Removing the vessels in refit who’s availability is greater than 48hrs notice for sea, include 30 days leave for the crew and one possibly two 4 week maintenance periods its not bad.
Vessels alongside in maintenance or with crews on leave usually remain at 48hrs notice for sea. Occasionally if there is a big job such as an engine change it may go to72 or 96 hrs. So whilst not being at sea they are doing things that improve availability and readiness.
If push comes to shove vessels can sail with minimum crew and the equipment that was in bits cobbled together or fixed at sea on sailing.
Measuring a ships sea time is the same as measuring a tanks time on the road or a planes time in the air. Its a pretty meaningless piece of meta data.
Of course the other factor to consider is the crew who should (Note I say Should) spend for the period of a draft the ratio of 60/ 40 away and in base port for Harmony reasons. Breaking harmony rules is one of the biggest no nos there is. If a crew member is going to break the rules without good reason the ship will send them on leave to get the ratio back in balance and live with the gap for a time. Alternativly they will get a temp replacement in to cover.
Mick
To those of you complaining about the numbers of days at sea. 7 of the T23 listed above spent in excess of 100 days at sea during 2018 and some much more. I suspect this is a fair reflection of the 2019 figures as well. When you add T45 to the mix, more than half the RN escorts spend c.100 days at sea each year. From a manpower perspective that figure does not include days away from home port but alongside somewhere else which would make the figure much greater. The RN has to balance unit availability for contingent operations against training, trials, maintenance and many other draws on the platform whilst trying to allow sailors some time with their families. If you fail to get that balance right then you lose the personnel you depend on to go to sea, you cannot open a new box of experienced officers and Senior Rates when you have exhausted the old batch. They take about 10 years to grow and this means getting the work/life/balance correct. The real demon is insufficient hull numbers, which would allow the load to be spread more evenly over time, increase capability / availability for contingent tasking and improve the work life balance. But that costs money and defence has very little available.
To the casual reader, these figures will look absolutely shocking…. you’ll get the “Why’s, what’s, Where’s, when’s and how’s” questions about the management of the Fleet.
if you actually look at those figures in that way it seems almost unbelievable that a Country as important, powerful, wealthy and influential as Great Britain has such a poor turnout from its Navy.
There’ll be the usual excuses from the M.O.D which will satisfy most people but for the more interested folk such as ourselves, they’ll have to do better than that.
Rule Brittannia!! ????✌️✌️