On March 27th, The Conversation published an article by Dr. Becky Alexis-Martin of the University of Bradford, titled “The US has the power to switch off the UK’s nuclear subs – a big problem as Donald Trump becomes an unreliable partner.” The headline itself is bold—and deeply alarming.
It’s a headline designed to provoke concern—and it certainly does. But while the article touches on genuine long-term strategic questions, it also reinforces a dangerously misleading impression: that the United States holds real-time control over the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
It does not.
This is not just a theoretical issue of wording. When a piece opens with the line, “The US can, if it chooses, effectively switch off the UK’s nuclear deterrent,” it leaves little ambiguity. This framing implies a direct, present-day capability that simply does not exist.
Yes, the UK relies on American technology, logistics, and cooperation for the maintenance of its Trident missile system. But operational control? That remains exclusively with the UK. This is what defence officials and experts consistently refer to as operational independence.
Once a Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarine carrying Trident missiles sails from Faslane, it is under British command alone. It is submerged, undetectable, and capable of launching its nuclear payload solely on the order of the UK Prime Minister. There is no American “kill switch,” no joint code, no foreign veto.
Even the article itself briefly acknowledges this reality: “The UK has some autonomy, as it is operationally independent and controls the decision to launch.” But that line is buried, and the broader narrative—from the headline down—undercuts it. Readers are left not with a nuanced understanding of allied cooperation and sovereign control, but with a sensational and incorrect impression of vulnerability to US political whims.
It’s important to separate structural reliance from operational dependence. The UK does lease Trident II D5 missiles from a shared US-UK pool and relies on US infrastructure for their maintenance. But these are long-term support arrangements, not immediate operational enablers. If US support were cut off tomorrow, the UK would retain the ability to launch for years, thanks to stockpiles, training, and independent systems.
The system is built to endure. As former Defence Secretary Philip Hammond made clear: “There is no veto in the hands of the Americans. The UK deterrent is fully operationally independent.”
Moreover, the UK’s warheads are designed and manufactured domestically, using UK scientific expertise. The crews are British. The command systems are British. The final decision rests solely with the Prime Minister.
That doesn’t mean the UK is immune to strategic risk. Yes, dependence on the US for support over decades raises questions about resilience and future autonomy. And yes, the political reliability of any ally—including under a potentially transactional US administration—is a valid topic for debate.
But those discussions should be rooted in accurate facts. Suggesting, or even implying, that the US has the power to unilaterally disable the UK deterrent is not only wrong—it’s misleading.
If the intent of the article was to challenge the cost, logic, or morality of nuclear weapons, that is a legitimate position. But even in that debate, clarity matters. The UK chose to build a deterrent that is technically supported by allies but controlled only by its own government. Trident is not on loan; it is sovereign.
So no, the US cannot “switch off” the UK’s nuclear submarines. And we should be wary of any narrative that suggests otherwise—especially when public understanding of nuclear policy depends so heavily on how we frame it.
But as provocative as the claim sounds, it doesn’t reflect the operational reality of the UK’s nuclear posture. The UK’s deterrent remains under sovereign control—technologically supported by allies, yes, but not subject to foreign veto.
So when people ask whether Britain could fire its missiles without American permission, the answer is simple: yes, it can. And that’s the whole point.
I really think we should spend more time discussing what happens when the appeaser volunteers more concessions to Putin.
It doesn’t matter how logical or mutually beneficial the relationship is if Trump’s handlers tell him he doesn’t like it: it’s gone.
Problem is he holds no cards.
The Russians wanted SWIFT sanctions lifted and the Donald said ok (he doesn’t know what SWIFT is)
SWIFT is controlled by the EU they just said no.
The Donald has no leverage on the EU, he can’t even threaten them with tariffs because he already did that over other stuff.
The Russians are demanding Nord stream pipeline be restated and the EU just said no
Eventually the Russians will get board of talking to the USA as they will realise that the only people who can end the war are the Ukrainians and the Europeans. The USA is a distant fourth in terms of who is holding any cards over Ukraine.
I am making a good salary from home $4580-$5240/week , which is amazing under a year ago I was jobless in a horrible economy. I thank God every day I was blessed with these instructions and now its my duty to pay it forward and share it with Everyone,
Here is I started_______ 𝐖𝐖𝐖.𝐖𝐎𝐑𝐊𝐒𝐓𝐀𝐑𝟏.𝐂𝐎𝐌
The Best opportunities To Earn $22,000/Month. We all spend a lot of time on social media every day – Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, and the list goes on. If you’re used to getting a lot of likes or comments, or if you’re great at motivating others through your posts, you might want to consider turning this into a profession. It appears unbelievable but you won’t forgive yourself if you do not check it…
HERE →→→→ 𝐖𝐰𝐰.𝐇𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭𝟏.𝐂𝐨𝐦
Is there a reason why you decided to not link the article on question George?
I’ve just read it, and you appear to me making several strawmen.
You make the point that the UKs deterrent is operationally independent. Over several paragraphs, in fact. Yet the article you’re responding to explicitly acknowledges that the Deterrent is Operationally Independent.
“The UK has some autonomy, as it is operationally independent and controls the decision to launch.”
The sentence you didn’t quote, and you even quoted a caption!
You’ve made an entire argument to suggest that Dr. Alexia-Martin didn’t acknowledge that very point. It’s the bases of irony that you accuse the article of being misleading, when you mislead it’s conclusions.
The fact remains that the UK is dependent, reliant, or whatever you want to say on others or specifically the US to deliver it’s nuclear deterrent. And the article makes the point that with Trump this deterrent can be “switched off” by Trump. Not instantly. But especially as we come to the time that the Deterrent is being replaced, to be reliant on an unreliable partner it’s quite something.
Here is the paragraph.
“The UK is currently in the process of upgrading the current system. But its options seem limited. If the US were to renege on its commitments, the UK would either have to produce its own weapons domestically, collaborate with France or Europe or disarm. Each scenario creates new issues for the UK. Manufacturing nuclear weapons from scratch in the UK, for example, would be a costly and protracted activity.”
Nowhere in the article is a kill switch mentioned or alluded to. Nowhere is is it asserted or implied the Deterrent is not operationally independent. Nowhere is it asserted that it can be remotely disabled.
And the thrusts are for it to be strategically independent or geo-strategically independent in every sense, one needs a indigenous system. If one can’t afford that, the UK needs to decide who it can and can’t trust. Or whether it needs a deterrent in the first place.
Freshly George, what utter guff. Unworthy of the Daily Mail. Factual accuracy matters.
Disappointing.
Thanks for your reply. I want to be clear: you’re misrepresenting both my argument and the tone of the article I wrote.
You claim I’m attacking a strawman and ignoring that the original piece acknowledges operational independence. But my entire point is that while it briefly mentions the concept, it then actively undermines it with statements like: “The US can, if it chooses, effectively switch off the UK’s nuclear deterrent.” That’s not a neutral observation about long-term strategic dependency—that’s an assertion of disabling capability.
It’s misleading for the article to raise that idea so prominently and then bury a single line about operational independence halfway through. My rebuttal doesn’t pretend that line doesn’t exist—it challenges the contradiction between that line and the rest of the framing. You suggest I’m ignoring nuance, but in fact, I’m highlighting where the original piece lacks it.
I also never denied that the UK relies on the US for technology, support, and infrastructure. I explicitly say so. What I challenge is the implication—stated plainly—that the UK deterrent can be “switched off” at will. That’s a misunderstanding of operational independence, and it’s what the piece invites readers to believe.
If the article’s intent was to raise philosophical or political questions about the cost and logic of deterrence, fine. That’s a legitimate debate. But presenting exaggerated claims about control—especially in a national security context—deserves scrutiny. I’ve responded firmly, but factually and fairly.
So no, this wasn’t “guff,” and dismissing it as such doesn’t strengthen your case. If factual accuracy matters, as you say, we should apply that standard to the original piece as well.
That’s exactly the point though, isn’t it?
There is a valid concern, that seems to have been expressed in the article you mentioned, that over a period of months or years a single decision made by the US could leave us without a functioning nuclear deterrent.
It isn’t strictly a “Kill Switch” as we’d still have time to cobble together a sovereign alternative, but we are ‘reliant’ (look, there’s the word!) on American goodwill for the continuation of the deterrent as it has functioned for 67 years.
Your fact checking articles tend to be very good, but here I think there was room for acknowledgement of the underlying issue rather than just denying specific phrases from the article.
By the way is there any news on restoring the comments functionality? The bot situation is getting inconvenient now to say the least and we still can’t have the fluidity of debate that was here previously.
Nice one! Grab him while he’s available! 😆
Having read your article now and previously the one in question, I humbly agree with you Mr Allison. Thank you for an insightful and thorough article!
This is factually untrue.
The detector was and is correct in all statements. THIS o oblivion piece is misleading. It’s not a factual article, it’s an opinion piece. Salted with a bit of propaganda and white washing
No one knows for sure the answer to that, saying definitively they can’t is misleading.
It’s unlikely but as they designed the sortware, who knows what kill switches they could have included somewhere in the code.
Because you aren’t familiar doesn’t means others aren’t.
That is a blasé answer. Unless the UK has independently verified every line of code, has overseen the transfer of the code from a secure version control store to the missile and has reviewed in detail all hardware then it is impossible to say what backdoors may exist.
While I hope the US is an honest partner, I don’t don’t do blind faith. I would operate under the assumption that any US provided weapon could be in some way controlled by a foreign power.
BTW, I don’t just mean the US. There ar plenty of recorded incidents of other counties injecting hostile code into US and other countries’ products.
If the UK had gone through the code line by line and checked no backdoors that info by now would have come out. It’s not possible that after so many questions on the topic over the decades to senior civil servants, MP’s and admirals that none of them wouldnt have stated this to close to story down once and for all. The lack of confirmation tells me that no one has done said task.
Even if they did write the software code, they would have to have the ability to activate the kill switch remotely, and I would assume the software is air gapped and cannot be interfered with by a third party, it would be a terrible liability that an enemy could potentially exploit if that is the case.
You underestimate the technology. If you own the GPS, radio, hardware and software then there will always be a way to send a kill.
With Trident we should move to the same deal we had with Polaris. So we own our missiles, can load/unload our submarines with them. Have the ability to service & upgrade the missiles in the UK.
Secondly, we should have a second, non American means of deterrent. Buying 40 ASN4G from France to fit to tranche 4 Typhoon (with conformal fuel tanks) is the obvious option. Fit an adapted UK Trident warhead.
Based on my own understanding and research, George is correct on all points.
When these sort of claims are made, I often look at the person’s background, and the truth dawns. Just like the CND supporting Labour MP asking about unilateral disarmament the other day.
What a shocker.
Their deeper agenda, and this ones, is obvious.
So debunking articles like this are needed in reply.
I’m really sorry George I don’t agree with your reading of the article, I think it pretty reasonably states that the issue is the long term viability of the partnership and that without the US the UK would be hard pressed to maintain a system based on a U.S. SLBM and that if a breach in trust occurred the UK would have to either develop its own SLBM program or work with France either of which would be profitable expensive and difficult. The article does not anywhere state that “operational Independence” is compromised only that “independence” is comprised and I think within the context of the article it is clear that they are using “ independence “ in the wider term and not the clearly defined term “operational independence” that they never mention.
I would say it’s a pretty reasonable reading of the long term challenge if the UK and US strategically part ways,which at present is a realistic risk.
This was meant to be a response to George, not to you Daniele, sorry.
I know, no worries mate. 👍
Your “understanding and research” is, as usual, woefully inadequate 🤡🤣
Just your usual far right pandering gibberish 💩
I’m really sorry George I don’t agree with your reading of the article, I think it pretty reasonably states that the issue is the long term viability of the partnership and that without the US the UK would be hard pressed to maintain a system based on a U.S. SLBM and that if a breach in trust occurred the UK would have to either develop its own SLBM program or work with France either of which would be profitable expensive and difficult. The article does not anywhere state that “operational Independence” is compromised only that “independence” is comprised and I think within the context of the article it is clear that they are using “ independence “ in the wider term and not the clearly defined term “operational independence” that they never mention.
I would say it’s a pretty reasonable reading of the long term challenge if the UK and US strategically part ways,which at present is a realistic risk.
There is another very good article about our deterrent that can be seen on YouTube by Mark Felton who is a very knowledgeable and unbiased individual. It makes for uncomfortable viewing given the current attitude of a certain individual.
Whilst certain discussions must remain secret I would like to think we are considering our options in the longer term with regards to all aspects of our military procurement. With regards to Trident a purchase of missiles and there maintenance and storage in the U.K. would take time and a lot of money to achieve. A cheaper option would probably be to maintain the status quo but ensure a nuclear option is delivered from the future cruise missile being developed with France. A least then we have a fall back option if things really do go off the rails with the US.
All this just proves that an over reliance on any other nation is not a great idea.
One point not mentioned is that the agreement that gives us access to Trident is associated with the agreement that gives America access to Diego Garcia, Akrotiri and Wideawake. If The US decided to stop giving us access to Trident missiles then you could pretty much guarantee that we would force them to withdraw from Diego Garcia and Wideawake and would no longer give them access to Akrotiri.
I can’t imagine this would be something the US would really want (Diego Garcia currently full of B2s…) But it is perhaps also a reminder why we should not mess around with BIOT. It’s strategically vital.
The problem with this debate is that people are being ambiguous with their claims. Let’s be specific. Maintenance is done in the US soley for saving costs. The UK could easily maintain it independently should it wish e.g give MBDA a contract to do it. Proof? The missile is composed of various subsystems, and these share much of the same technical concepts as missiles the UK manufactures. There is no magic fairy dust sprinkled on the missiles in the US. The limiting factor for the UK would be when the US decommissions its Trident IIs in several decades at which point the UK would need to procure a replacement. Can the UK analyse and maintain….
Mechanical gyroscopes? Yes
Solid fuel motors? Yes
Composite aerostructures? Yes
Force structures reflecting the changing US relationship
1. More strategic warheads at sea. 48 is fine but a bit on the low side. Given one SSBN at sea and assuming some missiles fail, 80ish is probably a better number to aim for e.g 12 missiles with 7 warheads ~84 total. A high alert level could also be introduced in which a second boat is kept ready to go to sea with an additional 84 warheads. The second boat would have the same target list as the first, but with targets offset by ~0.5km or so. This creates a near certainty that Russia will lose all of its largest cities which is an unacceptable loss. There is no benefit to targeting military forces in Russia as there would be no country for them to defend anyway. To be very clear, the additional numbers are not required to cause the damage, they are required to ensure that the damage is the best case scenario for Russia. We want to DETER not DESTROY. It’s a question of probability.
2. Tactical nuclear warheads. The UK could manufacture additional warheads and either deploy them as freefall bombs or join the French ASN4G programme. Given the short time frames freefall bombs are probably the best option. The purpose of these tactical nukes would be to deter Putin from using his own tactical nukes against Europe, and so constrain him to his conventional forces which are insufficient for offensive operations against Europe. The ASN4G is more survivable but its a bit irrelevant as they are non-strategic. Much more important would be keeping three F35 or Typhoon on a nuclear QRA so we are never tempting Russia with an opportunity to make a poor decision. These could also be used to forward deploy to Germany etc if the US withdraws from NATO, but in this case the numbers manufactured would need to be higher e.g 80+. Again, freefall bombs would be easy to integrate in the latter scenario, whereas the ASN4G would need lots of flight trials given its size and dynamics, and cooperation from the US if using F35 etc.
Remember, the best way to win a war is to prevent it. There are no winners from nuclear wars. For our part we can help to achieve peace by not tempting our opponents into war.
If they’re from Bradford I’m surprised they know the difference between a loom and a Trident missile. Perhaps they should stick to the textile industry and leave defence to people who know the slightest about what they’re talking about.
Snowden already mentioned that US has literally hacked and have sleeper software in enemies and allies wean and infrastructure.
I mean, it’s USA you are talking about if by now it’s not clear that they do not have allies only travel buddies until it’s convenient then I don’t know what will make people wake up!
Agree totally, having worked with American’s in the early 2000s!
Good job for always cutting through the BS of these articles about Trident, between ScotNats, some of the usual self-loathing metropolitan class, the sorry FBPE crowd and good old clickbait
How does George’s arsehole taste Joe? Give Daniella a go too, don’t be selfish! 💩😂
Hmmm. How can you be so sure? With your degree from a decidedly second rate university… Who knows what they’ve really programmed into the software.
There is no kill switch? Did you write the missile guidance and control software? Have you had access to the source code and walked through it? If not, there is no way on earth that you can know.
I’ve worked on weapons system, and on much more trivial software projects of far less consequence, and have been surprised to see just how many trapdoors, timebombs and “kill switches” are to be found—and not all of them were introduced intentionally!
If I were creating and supplying an enormity such as Trident, even to a “trusted ally”, I’d be very careful to ensure that it couldn’t ever be used against me and mine. I’m absolutely certain that the Americans will have done just that.
Spot on. We have no way of knowing, but it would be irresponsible for a nuclear weapon state to supply the world’s most sophisticated delivery system without a kill switch, no?
They use fixed logic not software. Verifying that logic will be a significant part of the project. It’s a safety issue if nothing else.
“If I were creating and supplying an enormity such as Trident, even to a “trusted ally”, I’d be very careful to ensure that it couldn’t ever be used against me and mine. I’m absolutely certain that the Americans will have done just that.”
The only country we know for certain it CAN be launched against is the US.
Good article, that clearly sets out the reality of our nuclear deterrent. There are far too many misleading articles on this subject. I read one that said we needed American satellite data to target the missiles ? Some confusion there with Ukraine I think.
Yes they can and always could.