Delivering the Ajax programme will be a significant challenge for the Ministry of Defence because of failures that have led to delays and unresolved safety issues, according to the National Audit Office.

The MoD has a £5.522 billion contract with General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) for the design, manufacture and initial in-service support of 589 Ajax armoured vehicles.

What is Ajax?

Ajax is supposed to be an armoured fighting vehicle which should provide the Army with its first fully digitised platform. It will be based on new technologically advanced sensors and communication systems which would transform the Army’s surveillance and reconnaissance capability. The vehicles form an integral part of the Ministry of Defence’s vision for digital integration across land, air and sea domains, allowing real-time information sharing and connectivity with other capabilities, such as Lightning II jets.

On to the report

“At December 2021, the Department had paid GDLS-UK £3.167 billion. At this point, GDLS-UK had designed the vehicles, built 324 hulls, and assembled and completed factory acceptance testing of 143 vehicles. The Department had received 26 Ajax vehicles, as well as associated training systems and support. The Ajax programme has encountered significant problems and the MoD does not know when it will be delivered. The Department’s initial planning assumption was that the vehicles would be in service in 2017. It subsequently set an initial operating capability (IOC) date of July 2020, which it then pushed back to June 2021, but missed. Concerns about excessive noise and vibration levels remain unresolved, and the MoD has not yet set a new IOC target date. It has no confidence that the April 2025 target for full operating capability (FOC) is achievable.

The delays will have important operational impacts for the Army. The Army’s plans rely on delivering a network of digital capabilities by 2030, centred around Ajax, Boxer and Challenger 3 armoured fighting vehicles. However, the delays to the Ajax programme mean it is not clear how the Army will achieve its planned restructuring by 2025. The MoD transferred financial risks to GDLS-UK by agreeing a firm-priced contract to deliver the Ajax vehicles, but this may not protect it from further expenditure. Ajax will be delivered late, leaving the Army to operate with ageing armoured vehicles, which are expensive to maintain.”

The report goes on to say that the MoD’s original requirements for Ajax were highly specified, and its management of design changes has led to disputes and delays. Around 1,200 capability requirements were set, making Ajax more complex than other armoured vehicles.

“The MoD and GDLS-UK did not fully understand some of the requirements, which led to many changes to the design specification. This caused disputes, and the time taken to agree design changes contributed to programme delays. The MoD and GDLS-UK did not understand the scale of work or technical challenge, which meant that sufficient contingency was not built into the programme schedule.

Milestones were missed because it took longer than GDLS-UK expected to undertake design work, complete testing, resolve defects and manage supply chain disputes. GDLS-UK told the NAO that this was because the MoD’s standards were not fully defined and subject to change. However, the Department repeatedly found GDLS-UK’s safety documentation insufficient.”

The report concludes that the MoD has not managed the programme effectively.

  • It did not establish effective governance arrangements or the necessary resources to manage the programme.
  • There were multiple lines of reporting and complex assurance arrangements; insufficient senior management time; a high turnover of senior staff; an under-resourced programme management team; and an ineffective programme board.
  • The MoD and GDLS-UK reset the contract in 2018, but this did not resolve the programme’s underlying problems.
  • The MoD knew of noise and vibration issues before soldiers reported injuries but was not aware of the severity of potential problems.
  • Reporting of issues identified in trials was limited and slow, meaning that safety concerns were not shared or escalated by the Army or Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S).
  • The Army’s trials team began reporting injuries from July 2020, but one month later the Army and DE&S signed off safety documentation that said, with some limitations on use, the vehicles were safe to commence training.
  • The MoD is taking steps to resolve the noise and vibration issues, but they continue to represent a significant risk to the programme.
  • It is not yet clear whether the programme’s issues are resolvable. It is a year behind the revised 2021 schedule, trials involving Army crews have been stopped, and safety issues remain unresolved.

Report conclusions

The Ministry of Defence expects Ajax to improve its armoured vehicle capability significantly. So far, it has insisted that GDLS-UK will deliver 589 Ajax vehicles for the agreed contract price of £5.522 billion. But the in-service date has already increased by four years and the Ministry of Defence does not know when it will be able to start using the vehicles.

The programme continues to face significant problems and there is not yet agreement on the causes of critical safety issues or how these will be resolved. There are other technical issues which still need to be addressed and wider problems in developing the enabling capabilities that will allow Ajax to achieve full capability. These problems mean that the Department has not demonstrated value for money on the £3.167 billion it has spent so far through this contract.

The Ministry of Defence’s and GDLS-UK’s approach was flawed from the start as they did not fully understand the scale or complexity of the programme.

“A series of programme management failures have since led to missed programme milestones and unresolved safety and technical issues. The two parties remain in dispute over unresolved contractual, safety and technical issues. The Department faces a significant challenge and difficult decisions if it is to deliver the programme, with a risk that the problems might prove insurmountable.”

To deliver value for money from the programme, the Department must introduce the capability that it set out to achieve, without costs escalating or further delays in introducing the capabilities. We have seen similar problems on other defence programmes, and the Department must ensure that it learns lessons to prevent a reoccurrence of failings across its £238 billion equipment programme.

You can read the full thing here.

George Allison
George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison
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286 COMMENTS

  1. Ineptitude of procurement, Army and management. Quite frankly outrageous. Its about time someone stuck their neck out and cancelled this bag of bolts.

      • GD who integrates the whole vehicle and builds the Ajax hulls is an American company. LM who builds the trurrets is an American company.
        Who do you think is getting a medal?

        • Thank you. I don’t ‘think’, I understand something that has slipped your attention. Senior Civil Servants and H.M. Forces higher command receive automatic awards in the New Year Honours and H.M. Queen’s Birthday Honours. Read the Lists beneath the Actor’s, musicians and sportspeople and you will discover something that may be to your interest. A neighbour who served (16 years) was subject of nasty racist bullying told me the issue was only taken seriously when his G.O.C. realised ‘his knighthood was disappearing over the horizon’.

    • Exactly.

      I’ve heard a few people suggesting that our soldiers should be able to put up with a bit of noise and vibration. In failing to highlight the issues or indeed suppressing the results of testing suggests that the army thinks the same too.

      The reality is that no one travelling in these vehicles for any length of time would be operating at anywhere near their best. On top of the soldiers deserve not to exposed to unnecessary risks.

      • Could you imagine if this vehicle went into service, the number of compensation claims against the MOD would be huge. Are people have a right to know that what they are expected to work with is fit for purpose, the Army need to get a grip and understand this.

        • There was the hearing loss bonanza in the late 80s early 90s. A entire little industry grew as a result. It cost millions, in the end legislation was created to put an end to it. Damages for this could be so much worse.

        • Ironically it is the possible compensation claims that will force the MoD to ditch this programme. It reminds me of a bridge to far … they had intelligence that there was a strong German presence in the area but they had put so much into the operation they just carried on regardless. It is the same with Ajax, they have programmed it in and now no-one has the courage to stop it.

          • The MoD is trying to fix this programme – £3.2bn has been sunk into it. The army desperately need Ajax to be fixed and brought into service. There is no Plan B and no money for a Plan B.

          • You have made my point. Ditch it and get a refund from the US manufacturer. Do not accept this substandard platform. It is more danger to the crews then a foe. There are several proven alternatives in service. Stop this money pit and buy something that works.

        • Who in the Army does not understand this?
          The vehicle is not in service because everyone does understand that it is not good enough, that it damages health.

        • My goodness! That is totally unacceptable. I worked on the testing of a number of vehicles for the MoD, as they were fitted with our engines. We had specially moulded, in-ear protection, plus top of the line head sets. They made things much better, but I don’t remember hitting 117dB. This level of noise, even using a similar phased noise reduction system that I once saw put forward for RAF Jaguars, would be debilitating in normal operation. Add the severe vibration that has been part of this, and you are asking way too much of our crews. Put these crews in real combat and they will be fighting fatigue before they ever fight the enemy.

          Surely, they must be able to isolate the major cause / causes of this vibration and use tried and tested vibration damping techniques to reduce it to a safe level. If it’s not fixable, we need to drop this thing and try and get our money back, or some of it. We can buy suitable vehicles off the shelf, as mentioned. We need to make sure that our crews are never subjected to this level of risk from their own equipment.

          It looks like we have to find a way to ensure that all the people involved these procurement processes have long experience of the requirements.

          • There is unlikely to have been a great issue with the MoD Requirements Manager – they are experienced army officers, with operational experience, who know what the army require.

            The fault lies elsewhere.

      • The risk register for the project would have had noise as an issue. Some idiot would have said mitigate it with active noise cancelling headphones.
        That doesn’t fix the issue… It ignores it and brings in another layer of mitigation complexity.

        Noise and vibration on RN warships is also an issue. At least they have done some thing about it. A prime example being the 30mm gun. The new remote mounting takes the gunner off the mount so not exposing them to the 180+ dBs of noise from each round. That level of noise cannot be mitigated… They tried and failed… My partial deafness is proof that in ear foam plugs, peltors and antiflash hood over the lot didn’t work!

        • A .357 in a space enclosed on 3 sides (no roof) is bad enough a .45 with a borderline unhealthy load of Red Dot might be OK with ears on but you can still feel the push in the chest. I can’t imagine being near a 30mm discharging..

          • They do on a CR2 firing its 120mm. That’s 180Db at the muzzle, no f*ckwit is going to stand there! The AJAX 40mm is behind closeout panels unlike a CR2 CHARM.

      • the issue is that it creates white knuckle, from the vibration, now if you operate a air jack hammer all day. and dont wear special gloves you may get this on your 2nd or 3rd day. Ajax is 6 hours. and talk about a rattle, Some WW2 tanks are more quiet. it really is a SHAKE RATTLE AND ROLL. never heard anything like it, always sounds like its about to break.

      • Those people you have listened to – are they ex-soldiers or NVH specialists? I travelled in tracked vehicles from 1975 onwards – and the noise and vibration were terrible. Crown Immunity was repealed decades ago – vehicles that injure your health are not acceptable.
        The CO of ATDU suppressed nothing, even if those higher up the CoC did.

      • It might come to that ut the problem it does not fit the armies requirement. Again was designed from the outset with a sensor suite etc.

          • A few years ago ATDU had a CV 9030 on trial for a couple of weeks and it looked “right”. What do the European users say about it as it has been in use for several years far longer than Ascod on which Ajax is base. The trial Ajax/Ares seemed to be always breaking down.

          • Think the torsion bar on rear road wheel is causing problems as saw the wheel being dragged back by the track and jumping forward as it was marshalled in and out of ATDU in front of DSG !

          • Yes that is exactly what we should do buy CV90 a proven platform and upgrade the sensors if required. Ditch the flawed AJAX.

        • The recce variant of CV90n is used by Norway – it will clearly have a sensor suite. I don’t think the army rejected CV90, think it was the politicians who had fallen out of love with BAE Systems.

        • It fitted the Army’s requirement perfectly.
          However, a General is on record as saying he would never order anything from BAE.

          • Who was that General and why did he say that? I don’t recall serious problems with army kit from BAE, not that MoD has ever bought much army kit from BAE, but did from the companies later swallowed up by BAE (VDS, VSEL, Alvis, GKN, RO plc).

            I think the issue with BAE was with Nimrod AEW and then MRA4, neither of which were army kit!

  3. There was no need for this program ever to be so complicated to begin with.
    They where not designing a stealth fighter or trying to prove new concepts. Any idiot should have had the brains to select the most capable and modular base vehicle available and ensure it could be upgraded over time.
    CV90 could have been in service 10 years ago and undergoing its first midlife update around now to mk 4 standard, all at a fraction of the program management cost and bureaucracy. We have literally spent billions on program management functions who do nothing but over complicate and botch the whole project.
    If the money we did spend on R&D with BAE to prove the CTA cannon may as well have been thrown in the bin when the mod went and selected LM and prime contractor. These investigations are another waste of money when they refuse to state the obvious incompetence and likely corruption involved.

  4. an utter farce, it needs to be scrapped and something purchased off the shelf: Of course, no one will be disciplined as a result of this cock up.

        • There was more going on with MRA4, which didn’t work, couldn’t get its arse off the runway as it was to heavy. and only with Boeing involvement did it develop into the P8.

        • BAE said new air frames should be used, the Government insisted on refurbing old comet corroded ones which were hand built, this caused problems with wing and interior fitting !

          • You are absolutely right. Specifically it was HM Treasury that insisted on re-manufacture.

      • Currently the project is at risk, and any moneys paid, will be paid back that allready been agreed as its that much of a shit box

      • This is a money pit for a flawed platform. We need to cut our losses and buy a proven system. This farce must stop MoD should grow a pare and scrap it.

        • My concern is that they are (sort of) fixable. These things have dud written all over them. Even if they solve the current noise & vibration issues, they are unsuited to the roles envisaged. Every day they delay cancellation, means more dud’s created.

  5. The parent company, a huge multi national, needs to get involved big time to sort the mess one way or another-delivery pdq or a major refund

  6. Unbelievable that this type of fiasco is still happening and being allowed to happen time after time after time. Will they never learn or get proper governance in place or someone made fully, legally accountable for i.e. a Minister.

    The waste of taxpayers money that could be used for other purposes is unforgivable. My thoughts bin it, take GD to court and recoup as much as possible and buy CV90, Lynx etc. something useful, proven, actually in production and in use by multiple countries. Problem is MoD’s changing requirements will be the reason why it is in the state it is in and why GD will have a get out of jail card.

    Awful that the national capability to be able to produce such an item has been allowed to virtually disappear.

    I’m on one now but this stuff really is beyond a joke.

    • “Problem is MoD’s changing requirements will be the reason why it is in the state it is in and why GD will have a get out of jail card.”

      You’ve hit the nail on the head there. Even when the proverbial hits the fan, I highly doubt there’s much in the way of legal recourse for these very reasons.

    • I totally agree. But, I can imagine the army buying a fleet of cv90s and then insisting on retro-fitting a 30mm cannon and minigun (thus lengthening the rollout and creating unnecessary complications).

        • CV90 has a 40mm version. The more sensible Bofors rather than CTA (at least you can afford to fire it). Why does a Recce vehicle need a CTA 40mm? If you meet something unexpected that a 30mm or regular 40mm (not the shorter Aden 30mm version) can’t handle, then use a ATGM & run for it. Didn’t fit one? Sell a few CTA rounds & you can afford one.

          • I agree that it is right to challenge need for a CTA 40mmm on a recce vehicle. We conduct recce by stealth and not recce by fighting (as the US and Russia do). We need a recce vehicle to be low profile/low-emission, agile, impervious to bogging in, equipped with excellent sensors and comms – and to have a self-defence weapon in case of position being compromised. Recce does not duel with enemy but fires a few heavy-ish rounds and bugs out if discovered.

            A Strike vehicle might need a 40mm to deliberately kill enemy light and medium armour. But it should also have ATGWs to act as a Tank Destroyer to take out enemy MBTs at long (4000m plus) range. That would be a different vehicle to a recce vehicle.

          • Was reported that CTA40 round was very expensive ( Nicholas Drummond and barrel life less than 1000 rds ! A10 round $136, Apache round $100 the Government did not want to release the cost ” due to contractual reasons !

          • 40CTA is so expensive, gunners will only be allowed to fire a maximum 5 live rounds per year.
            HE- £250 per round
            APDS – £1,000 per round

  7. If the Ajax programme was working as intended, exactly what advantages is the design supposed to offer over CV-90?

    • That it wasn’t a BAE product….. only reason it was procured, pure political decision. Meanwhile BAE land systems armoured vehicles are used the world over.

    • Ajax is a scout and reconnaissance vehicle based on the hull of the ASCOD, whilst CV90 is purely an infantry fighting vehicle. There is currently no production variant of the CV90, that could do the same role as the Ajax. Unless BAe resurrected the CV90 scout they proposed for the Ajax role, that lost to General Dynamics ASCOD SV prototype.

      Of the tracked IFV style vehicles currently available that could do the Ajax role, there isn’t many off the shelf. There is the M3 Bradley, it does not have the sensor or the network capability of Ajax. There is a Lynx scout demonstrator vehicle that was proposed for the Australian Land 400 program and the German Army were talking about a heavy scout version of the Puma, but nothing has progressed any further. Both Russia and China have specific scout versions of their BMP and ZPD series. Most countries use wheeled vehicles for this role, for example France with their Jaguar EBRC 6×6.

      The sensors and networking capability would make the Ajax the World’s leading heavy scout vehicle. Yes, smaller and lighter vehicles would have some of the capability. But the armour capability is a significant step beyond Warrior’s and CV90’s Stanag level 4/5, hence the weight.

      • Thanks for that explanation.
        So in essence not necessarily a bad decision – just poor management of the whole process after the decision was made ?
        Although of course wanting an all singing all dancing product in the first creates its own problems which need continuous handling
        Class leading products need class leading management processes ….. and fault in that process is what appears to have happened here?

        We could go round in circles- as I’m sure many have done in the past and will continue to do so.
        How long do they keep on flogging this – and how long before those class leading functions are in situ elsewhere.

        • As far as I can find out, the “prototype” version of the ASCOD SV was better than the CV90 SV prototype. But I have yet to find specific reasons for why it was better and why it was chosen over the CV90.

          It comes down to very shoddy project management but also very poor quality control. Were the desk officers at Abbey Wood just told to get on with it and stop rocking the boat? As the vehicle was desperately needed to replace CVR(T). The NAO report just says failings in management, it doesn’t name and shame, perhaps it should?

          • Dont quite understand your comment? Are you saying the project shouldnt have been micro-managed correctly,whch I disagree with or are you saying the product itself was trying to be all things for all people and that again its the army (in this case) wanting ‘the best for the best’? In which case yep I agree that underlying ‘ethos’ has caused many problems.if we had a bigger army then fine – or if it truly was going to be the best thing since sliced bread we could have looked to export it – in this case neither appear to have happened.

      • But without retaining the warrior, limited numbers of Challenger 2, do we really need so many Ajax in the recce/command variant? Would it not be better to use the money to invest more in the strike variant.

      • Norway bought a recce variant of CV90.
        I don’t see that recce vehicles need to have awesome levels of armour protection, if we continued to conduct recce by stealth and not adopt recce by fighting.

          • Davey, This is all I have:

            From BAE website: “We were awarded the contract in June 2012 to upgrade and deliver a total of 144 CV90 vehicles to the Norwegian Army. The first CV90 IFV, an infantry fighting variant, was delivered in February of this year.
            Under the CV90 contract to Norway, we will deliver five vehicle variants, including 74 infantry fighting, 21 reconnaissance, 15 command, 16 engineering, 16 multi-role and two driver training vehicles. The multi-role vehicles are designed to undertake different functions, including mortar carrier and logistics roles”.

            From Wiki: “The recently upgraded CV9030N infantry fighting, command & control and reconnaissance vehicles for Norway are known as CV90 MkIIIb, and this is the most advanced variant currently in service.[27]

        • Managed to find this:

          The recon variant has a Vingtaqs II Optical mast, which is customizable with different electro-optical sensors, thermal cameras and radar. It can be extended 6 meters into the air and has a range varying from 31 kilometers to 18 depending on the configuration. It also includes laser target designation capabilities. However, its modular nature allows it to be changed into whichever other variant is required by replacing the mission module.

          The vehicle is based on the upgraded Mk3+ version that became the Mk4. So it has the bigger engine, band tracks and better armour. It comes with a deployable drone, something the Ajax currently doesn’t have. So perhaps it could be a worthy replacement.

          • Thanks Davey, that looks to be a good spec – very impressed with the 6m mast height, and the deployable drone.

  9. Re: “there is not yet agreement on the causes of critical safety issues or how these will be resolved”

    Get a set of independent engineers, with expertise in AFV to diagnose the problems.

    If possible fix the current stock of built vehicles

    Design and build and test new prototypes.

    … Just get on with it or scrap it

    • That solution might not be enough; it would vastly increase costs. Scrap, sue and sack. Just look at what Ukraine is doing to armoured formations!

    • Agree, stop wasting more money, time and resources. Even India is being offered the CV90, according to article on Janes today as an IFV. The British Army shouldn’t have to put up with second rate crap. If the Boxer recce is good enough go with that.

        • Exactly. I like the South Korean K21 as it is 25 tons. At a recent Mid East Arms fair, the 3.5 ton Calidus CLS LRV-20. Two can fit inside a Chinook. Ideal for Special Forces.

        • No. Ajax is the wrong vehicle for recce – too big, too heavy, too expensive, too noisy.
          It is also undergunned to do a good job of ‘Strike’.
          Why do we want 589 of them?

      • Original CV90 is old (as is original Boxer) but both have been updated over the years.
        There is a CV90 recce variant – Norway has it.

  11. Can someone just clarify as Im a little confused :
    Was this report supposed to make a decision on whetehr to continue with this or not –
    I thought it was but apparently not?

    • Hi grizzler,

      No the NAO does not and cannot tell a Department what to do. They are independent auditors. It can only tell them when and how they have got it wrong and make recommendations on how to do it right.

      It is then up to the Department to act on the recommendations but thanks to MoD’s high rate of staff turnover, or career development as it is called in house, lessons are never learnt it seems.

      I can only think how disheartening it must be for NAO auditors heading off to audit MoD procurement… same old same old every time.

      Madness.

      CR

    • It’s on a knife edge and it could go into service, or be dumped in the bin at this point…

      Meanwhile hundreds of sub standard hulls have been built in Spain and they continue to be welded together on the production line ….

      Someone please make a decision before all the hulls are built and parts ordered …. the whole fleet existing as a massive pile of parts in fact!

      Are we going full Nimrod MR4A on Ajax?

  13. Plenty of options on the table wheeled or tracked. As I said at the time, it was a big mistake not to purchase the Leopard 2A7+ MBT as well.

    “EUR 13-15 million

    According to one of the reports that have been issued by the German MoD a few years back, a single Leopard 2A7+ MBT has a price tag of EUR 13-15 million. The package procured by the Hungarians is quite expansive, including the equipment for an MBT battalion and artillery squadron, with relevant support assets included.”

    PSM presents the armoured infantry fighting vehicle PUMA S1 with enhanced capabilities

    http://www.psm-spz.de/index.php?id=home&L=1

    https://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/systems_and_products/vehicle_systems/armoured_tracked_vehicles/index.php

    • Let the Germans get these with their new €100 billion defence plan. They need to get their own house in order. I wouldnt want to be beholden to Germany for anything. Buy British…so yes that means cv90 mark 4.

      • Boxer is like the only good thing that happens to the British Army right now (since the Germans fixed the SA80). So buying more German equipment is actually a good plan.

          • H and K copied the multi lugged stoner type bolt a direct derivative of the bolt used in the AR15/ M16 / AR18. Maybe they just dreamed up the same solution ?

          • Outside of the name change of the HKM4 to HK416. Colt had no cases against H&K and Bushmaster and they even lost the lawsuit against Bushmaster, while H&K settled the case with the name change.

        • Boxer is old and the standard version is just a wheeled APC – we moved on from those when we scrapped Saracen!

          Less flippantly, we are giving up a well-liked and proven IFV (Warrior) that was just about to be upgraded – to spend a lot more money (probably) on a mere APC, unless the MoD deign to pay even more for all Infantry section Boxers to have a turreted cannon.

          • Like I said Boxer is the only source of good news for the British Army those days.

            It’s okay for the UK to buy German. You will survive it.

          • Boxer is not good news if we receive the standard unturreted version with no cannon and if it cannot keep up with Challenger3 because it gets bogged in. We moved away from APCs and opted for IFVs from 1984.

    • I would like to learn there was a’basic idea’ ever. This sentence from the report seems to be damning:

      GDLS-UK told the NAO that this was because the MoD’s standards were not fully defined and subject to change.

      • It is an easy excuse to wheel out.

        Looking at the NAO report it smells more like GD-UK signed up to something they didn’t understand that was quite well specced. Then did their upmost to muddy the waters particularly around things GD-UK could not deliver on.

        So I would say the reverse actually. GD-UK did their best to unpick the spec.

        It is clear that the desk guys at Abbey Wood did reject quite a lot of the GD-UK documentation on H&S grounds. Strange, that post Hadden Cave this was allowed to roll on. Why? That alone should have halted it?

        • It’s an example of incredible specs but it just can’t get the basics right. I re-read this old Wired article https://www.wired.co.uk/article/british-army-ajax-tank – seems to me like a classic example of bloat. In order to satisfy the spec requirements it’s taken a light/medium weight chassis and turned it into a medium/heavy weight chassis. It’s become a much heavier vehicle… but, weirdly enough, it’s supposed to replace the lightweight Scimitar. That strikes me as a paradox. Clearly there’s loads of brilliant stuff going on with the digital networking and targeting systems but maybe it should have gone on a larger chassis in the first place? I don’t know who’s to blame the MoD, or the manufacturer, or both, but as an outsider looking in on this project using public information I’m struck by the fact that I don’t understand the overarching logic behind this procurement. It all seems a bit contradictory to me. The result is a spec requirement that could never deliver on its promise… even if the vibration / sound is was solved. Is this a scout vehicle with digital networking to send data back to the artillery (couldn’t a drone do this?), is it an IFV that’s designed to engage with the enemy? I have to admit I’m still pretty confused.

          • Ajax is not an IFV – it cannot take an Infantry rifle section of 8 men – it should be operated by the Royal Armoured Corps. Warrior is our IFV – pity they are going to scrap it and not upgrade it.

            Ajax is a recce vehicle to replace 50-year-old CVR(T) Scimitar – in that role it should not engage with the enemy except if spotted and then fires in self-defence as it extracts. It is a digitised platform and transmits data from sensors in real time to enable planning of strike missions.

            It was then given a poorly defined Strike role as well – this turns it into an offensive fire support platform. Not a good idea to mix very different roles.

          • Thanks, that makes sense. Sounds like a case of shifting goalposts, which couldn’t have helped the project.

      • I understand MoD changed the Requirment only once, in 2016. That is usual with a long gestation project. GDLS-UK being a new,inexperienced company probably could not cope with a change.

  15. GDLS-UK told the NAO that this was because the MoD’s standards were not fully defined and subject to change.

    Issues that have sunk so many projects I can recall going back half a century or more.

      • Hence professional providers, not Army desk sitters on a 2-year rotation. This sort of thing doesn’t happen often in Industry. You have highly qualified teams of procurers and project managers working towards the targetted outcome. Yes, you will have to pay them more, but it will save billions in the long run if the past is anything to go by.

        • Ian, you seem to want to solely blame the army desk officers – and suggest that all Land projects fail because of the 2 year rotation of army officers. Plenty of projects (majority) succeed. My own project at Abbey Wood succeeded. I am not sure why you suggest a lack of professionalism – army officers going into procurement posts are trained.

          Blame also lies at the door of politicians, civil servants, Treasury, and Industry.

          • Hi Graham, sorry, I am not looking at laying sole blame at the officers’ desks. There are many other areas that need to be pulled up.

            I remember my time in, the 24 months on rotation wasn’t as “productive” as it would be in my dept today. Okay, one may have done a course or two prior to moving to a new desk. However, the issue is entirely down to an unfamiliar brief, together with an ultra-complex projects,

            Regarding my earlier post, we must go with professional purchasers, get them working with the senior officers. Just make sure that the senior officer cannot go off on one, order something akin to the Ajax project, then leave on their next rotation and letting the next senior to pick up the pieces.

            A more formal system of purchasing, along-the-lines of the standards that organisations such as EIPM, who conduct International strategic projects every week.

            That’s all

          • Thanks Ian, I was in the army some time ago (1975-2009). In the early part of my career, officers who went to staff college first did Div 1, 2 or 3 technical course at RMCS (Shrivenham) – which was a good grounding for a procurement job and the 1-week takeover was useful, but there was still more to learn. Of course some staff officers did not get formal staff training.
            Then everything changed with the tri-service staff college and an era of staff training for all – don’t know much about that though.
            The civil servants at DE&S stay there for years and develop some good skills, although it is fashionable to knock the commercial (contracts) officers, mostly unfairly. The civil servants are the professional purchasers.

            I did not see that any one senior army officer ordered the Ajax family of vehicles, cocked it up and left quickly on his next posting (do they call this a rotation now? – not heard that term). No one person places a complex order.
            Most procurement projects run alright, but the cock ups seem to happen with just a few of the biggest projects.

    • What I don’t understand is how these things got to post production acceptance trials. All this should have been sorted at pre production trials. You don’t build hundreds of the things, you build a handful. You get the handful working as expected & then build the rest. They are currently building them as if nothing is wrong with them. Stop! Every one you build is one more to rectify. If it turns out that the fix is not retro, then what?

    1. The programme continues to face significant problems and there is not yet agreement on the causes of critical safety issues or how these will be resolved…..so try some options and see what works.
    2. There are other technical issues which still need to be addressed and wider problems in developing the enabling capabilities that will allow Ajax to achieve full capability…..adopt a best endeavours approach and deliver something which while being imperfect but delivers the top priority requirements.
    3. These problems mean that the Department has not demonstrated value for money on the £3.167 billion it has spent so far through this contract….no kidding!

  17. What a bargain, only £9.2 million per vehicle.

    Could have brought 1,300 CV90 for the same money and actually do the role that the ajax cannot.

  18. Stop throwing good money after bad. Even if Ajax gets fixed, we’ll have more unexpected costs down the line because we’re going it alone. Given the situation, exports don’t have a hope to offset that.

    To lower risk, just have CV90s built in Sweden. They can buy something of equal value from us if they don’t already. There’s an extra £10bn given to Army Command in the ten year defence equipment plan to dig us out of this hole. Spending a couple of billion over the coming years seems a price worth paying, relative to the monumental waste of Ajax. We could even probably buy 600 CV90s just for what’s left of the fixed price contract for Ajax.

    Meanwhile we get the higher value support contracts sorted within the UK, and the UK gets to build Boxers.

    CV90 or Lynx may not give all the bells and whistles the Army want, but clearly nor will Ajax. You can add an active protection system to CV90 (the Dutch are), but it’s not ISTAR if your vehicle never gets out of the factory.

    • Pointless buying a unique vehicle in small numbers because supply chain and part costs are not good value for money when you have struggling defence budget. CTA 40 is the same , expensive when more reliable and cheaper bushmaster is available ! Both products had excessive hype which is suspicious !

  19. £3.167bn flushed down the toilet. No one involved dismissed or disciplined. If defence does get an increase in budget the same people involved with this will be in charge of spending the increase. £3,167,000,000. 😡😡

    • Army procurement did get an increase: nearly £10bn extra in last week’s defence equipment plan, while Shipbuilding went begging and Air Command was cut by £3.4bn

      • More money they can piss down the drain, trying to procure ultra complex vehicles they have not even designed the specifications for…..

        • Summed up beautifully there Jonathan!

          For their next trick, watch spell bound on the edge of your seat while they magically make billions more disappear on Puma replacement!

          Get ready for talk of “critical national capability” and “world beating British helicopter” as more money is pissed away into an Italian owned helicopter factory, assembling Italian supplied parts kits into eye watering expensive Italian Medium Support Helicopters!

          As per usual, all spin, smoke and mirrors!

          • Italian owned helicopter factory, assembling Italian supplied parts kits into eye watering expensive Italian Medium Support Helicopters!

            What you talking about? there are more than thousand of that AW line 139,149,169,189 over the world.
            They are in use the HM Coast Guard in UK and Falklands.

          • And your point is Alex? A bespoke Leonardo offering, taking into account all the UK specific modifications that will be implemented
            (because the Mod just can’t help itself), it will be a “unique” Helicopter, you just know it!

            Then setting up production line…

            So yes, late and horrendously expensive!

      • Is that right? Wow that is not good. All the services are in need of equipment cash and I doubt any could afford to be cut. I really hope the cash isn’t coming out of planned programmes.

  20. Brilliant. Here we go again. Twenty years of incompetence and now the army can look forward to a handful of refurbished tank, Recce vehicle that doesn’t work and a wheeled APV armed with a pop gun that now has no protection. Look at what’s happening un the Ukraine against armour and we have a recipe for yet another procurement disaster. When will we learn?

  21. So contestants, before you are a hull, an engine, a turret, some wheels and tracks, some computers and some wires. Your challenge is to assemble an army reconnaissance vehicle. You have 3 months starting……now.
    Give JCB a try.

    • Just ask BAE to build the recce variant of CV90 that Norway has.
      JCB would give you some sort of earthmover.

      • Bit tongue on cheek but you get my drift.
        My preference would be to see Ajax succeed and WCSP re-instated. My understanding is that the 40mm CTA cannon gives these vehicles the hitting power of a light tank; that if we end up with vehicles like CV90 which mount 30mm cannons or Boxer with perhaps no cannon at all then we have to juggle weapons / versions / mortars / missiles.
        If we do drop Ajax and WCSP then your idea has merit. The army gets the tracked solutions it prefers and their ought to be no problem fitting all the electronics into a proven IFV.

        • The CV90 has been delivered with different cannons 30, 35 and 40 mm, Sweden uses the 40 mm with the Bofors 3P ammunition.

          • Thx. I’ll have to dip out here as I’m not knowledgeable on the pros and cons of 40mm cannons and ammunition. CTA etc.

  22. The question is if the hulls have been built could they be used for something else ? Something simple like an infantry fighting vehicle, we do need some of those.

    • Perhaps JCB could put a bucket on the front and and arm on the back, then paint them yellow!

      Digger and on site tea break shed, all in one nifty package…..

      • Not only will JCB have the fastest digger in the world, they would have the most armoured digger in the world…is your building site like a war zone……call JCB…..need to compete in a rally and dig holes….call jcb.

        • JCB good design and quality control backed up by great global parts service. They have recently designed working hydrogen engine as batteries not suitable for heavy plant !

          • They also made the fastest tractor in the world…which quite frankly is just cool beyond cool. JCB as a company have a bit of a humorous side, they hold 3 land speed records and have done loads of stunt shows. Got to love JCB, proper British make stuff company.

    • GD did submit a version of Ajax to Australia’s ongoing IFV competition. It was rejected as ‘not fit for purpose’. So, no.

  23. So this report is nothing new, we are still waiting on an assessment of the issues and their resolution. In the meantime there isn’t much point commenting. Fingers crossed they resolve them as Ajax could be a great platform.

    • The report makes sad reading. No one knows what they are doing or where the issues are or how to fix them. To start I would separate the kit and the vehicle. I looks like they may need to work out fixes, build it, test it, then start production all over again.
      New delivery date 2030 at earliest and vehicles delivered down to 350 for the same contract price.

    • Government report was released 117 db noise, problems with track tension and sprocket interface, engine mounting issues, variations in bracket location and some hull dimensions due to poor fabrication !

      • I’m no engineer but can’t these issues be fixed? The idea of Ajax, it’s systems etc is far beyond anything else out their for a recce vehicle. It would be a real waste and shame to just bin it. We’ll see I guess. Problem is what else to buy. Many on here keep saying CV90 but there isn’t a current recce version that we’d want. The US haven’t developed theirs yet and other offerings are just CGI images at the moment or glorified IFVs.

        • Not really a cheap solution for bad hulls , if they are indeed different side lengths the tracks would pull to one side. Engine mounts could be changed to hydraulic ones. No good fitting hydro-gas suspension if hulls are not accurate as it would still have alignment problems. All bowman cables could have screen like coax cables to keep out stray RF. Rubber tracks are supposed to reduce noise by 13.5 db

        • We could look at the CV90 recce variant the Norwegians have and see if it will meet 90% of our remit. If so, buy it and upgrade to close out capability gaps.

      • The poor fabrication will be down to GD – no getting away from that.

        If you build something out of square then it is no surprise that it will vibrate.

        More the question is what happens with a perfectly square hull with all the bits perfectly aligned? Does that mitigate the vibration?

        • This maybe well be the next step. I’m no expert in this field but with all the computer design testing etc I would of thought these problems would have been known.
          It’s sad. It’s a recon asset. It should be quiet, fast, easy to deploy and have ability to go anywhere. People may have to sit in it for a few days feeding back info on movements etc.
          It should be fixable but that may involve starting over with the building.

  25. Don’t understand why one of the major automobile manufacturers hasn’t been brought in over this one. They have decades of experience in engineering out noise, vibration and harshness issues.

  26. Lots of comments saying “just buy CV90.”

    Am I right in thinking CV90 would need to be modified to fit the requirement? And if so how is that better than working with what we already have? Seems we need to spend the money to make it work or perhaps change requirements to something that can be achieved.

    • If CV90 needs modifying to meet the requirement, history would simply repeat itself. The problem is that the MoD chooses something, that would work perfectly off the shelf, then starts messing around to meet its allegedly unique requirements. Then , once the design changes have been made, it changes its mind. And so on, and so on.

      • That I’m afraid isn’t quite correct. At the time the specifications were made only the M3 Bradely was available off the shelf. Most other countries used wheeled vehicles or as per Gemany the Wiesel “microtank”. These were little better than the CVR(T) in regards to its sensors and radios. The Army quite rightly wanted a vehicle that was significantly more capable with “today’s ” technology and with growth potential. The vehicle had to be able to do the CVR(T) roles of reconnaissance and force protection. The 30mm Rarden cannon was found to be wanting in Afghanistan, as its HE shell didn’t pack enough punch. It was also feared that the vehicle will be facing more modern IFVs such as BMP3s and ZBDs. Which were believed to be more resistant to 30mm AP rounds frontally. The 40mm CTAS was chosen as it had much better AP performance and its HE shell contains nearly twice the HE content.

        Yes, General Dynamics used the ASCOD as the basis of the scout vehicle. But the prototype used a modified hull and a new Lockheed Martin development turret. It did not have the additional modular armour fitted. BAe also submitted a heavily modified CV90, where only the hull looked the same as the standard vehicle. As Bae had a new turret design to incorporate the CTAS 40mm autocannon plus additional sensors.

        The Ajax bears very little commonality with the standard ASCOD, the hull is similar, but is not interchangeable. In essence it is a brand new vehicle. The design specifications for the scout role were settled fairly early on. As it had to incorporate Bowman as the back bone for the audio and data communications. Where are the sensors would have to feed into it for broadcasting and receiving.

        The issue came when they fitted the full weight standard armour to the chassis rather than the hollow paniers the prototype vehicle used. Clearly General Dynamics have messed up royally, as they did not take into account the additional weight and how this would affect the tracks, road wheels and suspension. This really isn’t a DE&S problem, but the manufacturer’s. DE&S should have invoked the penalty clause for failing to deliver the vehicle as specified. Why they haven’t done that is the mystery and is probably due to big boy politics.

        Would the CV90 had been any better? I suggest it would, as BAe would have brought in people from Sweden to oversee the production line who had experience on working the CV90 production line. Would the vehicle have been able to cope with the additional modular armour? Again, I would like to think they could as the CV90 has been gaining a lot of weight after every variant upgrade. There has been a major failing in both General Dynamics product quality control and how the vehicle has not met the customer’s requirements.

        It is now incumbent that DE&S make sure the vehicle is accepted as specified and meets the heath and safety guidelines. This means someone there will have to grow a pair. At no point should the UK taxpayer foot the bill for fixing General Dynamics cock up!

        • Again thanks for that insight-interesting thoughts.

          So the questions I have are :
          Why didnt we buy the M3 Bradley – was that cost or was that lacking in other areas?
          Can we not fit Bowman into the Mk4 CV90- if the rest of the vehicle works as we want- or would there still be armour and compatibility/size issues to work out?
          Are there now (years later) other off the shelf option that shoud be considered?

          Trouble is there is a tendancy for people to keep on going with the flawed choice design because of all the monies/time spent on it- and so they don’t lose face.
          Now is the time to make thise decision hard as they may well be- but it seems thats still not happening.

          • That’s not the full story. CVR(T)s we’re expected to kill opposing recce vehicles. Ajax if it ever comes into service, will be expected to do the same. Reconnaissance by stealth is still a priority. But if compromised or it sees an opportunity in its favour. The 40mm CTAS is not there just for show. Otherwise the Army would have purchased something like a Ripsaw.

            From what I understand Ajax will be used for more than just reconnaissance. The Army are going to use it as the fire support platform for Boxers. Which is a mistake in my opinion.

          • Scimitars were expected to kill enemy recce vehicles if their position was compromised, but surely not as a matter of course, otherwise they wouldn’t be doing recce by stealth. The 30mm RARDEN was essentially a self-defence weapon. Clearly outdated as a weapon, MoD thought 40mm was the way to go, although not many other nations have followed suit and liked the compact CTAS rounds as convetnioal 40mm rounds would take up too much storage space. It is not for show, but surely in its original guise as a recce vehicle was still a self-defence weapon if location was compromised.
            The ‘Strike’ label was applied later. Ajax then had 2 quite different jobs to do. I don’t think that’s a good idea. I also think that a 40mm cannon is not best for strike if you want to take out armour at long range as part of that mission. CVR(T) STRIKER was a real strike vehicle – and sadly has never been replaced.
            Even worse is to use Ajax as fire support for Boxers, as you say. Just points to the fact that Boxer is no IFV and deosn’t have a cannon, unlike Warrior. So an ijnfantry platoon might have 4 wheeled Boxers and 2 tracked Ajax – what a muddle. A very expensive way to get just 2 cannons into an infantry platoon rather than the 4 they have today.

          • Part of the recce troops job was to conduct counter recce sweeps. This is where a platoon of three to four CVR(T)s would sweep an area deliberately looking for enemy recce units. This was so that the enemy could be located and fixed in position, then artillery/air support would be used to neutralise it. If the platoon leader decided they could overmatch the enemy then they would fix and kill the opposition.

            The expected opposition in a Cold War scenario would generally be equipped with BRDMs, BTRs or BMPs. Unless they were doing recce by contact, then they’d include MBTs. Both the low velocity 76mm of the Scorpion and the 30mm Rarden of the Scimitar could easily defeat BRDMs, BTRs and BMPs.

            The true stealthy scout vehicle was the Fox, though its role was taken over by the CVR(T)s. The CVR(T)s were designed to stop 14.5mm AP rounds. Though if angled correctly could also stop 30mm AP with a bit of luck.

            The issue with the CVR(T)s is their really small size in part dictated by the constraints of requiring air portability. This meant adding more up to date systems was very problematic as there wasn’t the internal volume. But if the Army went down the evolved CVR(T) route with the Stormer chassis and adopted the Stormer 30 recce vehicle when offered perhaps we would not be where we are today. But then that leads down the disgraceful road of all the failed attempts of replacing CVR(T) with the TRACER, MRAV and FRES debacle.

            Ajax is a bit like the dead albatross. The Army have been shackled by the decision to buy 300+, but we don’t have the heavy armour to complement it anymore. With the down sizing of the Army this compounds the problem. As almost a plan B option, they’ve decided to mix it in with Boxer, to provide fire support. Which is a bad decision on a lot of fronts. Not only will Ajax need to be transported to a conflict zone rather than self-ferry like Boxer can. But Boxer is also going to get there a lot sooner. Not only that, the 40mm CTAS, agreeably a better weapon than Rarden, is still too small to deal with MBTs. Plus the Army are not going to fit a ATGM to Ajax, which might have made it viable to counter a few MBTs.

            Instead the Army is now stuck with the decision to go light, but with mixing wheeled and tracked. They should be looking at what Australia and Lithuania have done with their Boxers, fitted it with a capable turret mounting an autocannon and ATGM. That can do both a reconnaissance and IFV role.

            To beef up the light strike brigade combat team or whatever buzzword they are currently using. Is a version of Striker but on a Boxer chassis. Equipped with preferably Brimstone. This will give direct fire support to infantry in the anti-tank role, but also against hardened targets and targets beyond the forward line of contact.

            What is the answer? It is quite simple but expensive. Remove Ajax from the support role and fit a capable turret as per the Australian or Lithuanian versions. Include a Brimstone carrying version of Boxer for fire support. Beef up the numbers of Challenger 3 so that Ajax can fully support it. But also reinstate the Warrior sustainment program. Or bin Warrior and purchase an off the shelf replacement. So that the Army has a fully mobile light brigade supported by a fully equipped heavy brigade. (Not to mention key enablers like arty, air defence, engineering etc).

          • Hi Daveyb,
            Just to clarify, the “Fin” round of the CT40 can overmatch 4″ + of RHA at 1500m. The ability to put 3 rounds into the same spot can overcome reactive armour. Mobility / mission kills are a distinct probability on an MBT.

            APFSDS-T CHARACTERISTICS
            DIMENSIONS 65 x 255 mm
            AMMUNITION MASS 1900 g
            PROJECTILE MASS 550 g
            INITIAL VELOCITY >1500 m/s
            ACCURACY 0,3 mil
            PERFORATION 140 mm RHA at 1500 m
            EFFECTIVE RANGE >2500 m

            cheers
            Ian M.

          • I agree the gun is much better than the Rarden in effectiveness. But having a probability of a mission kill against a MBT is ok, but still not brilliant. If the turret included a ATGM such as a Javelin, it would be much better.

          • I follow that mostly, but why would Ajax support CR3? If it is in recce mode it is well ahead of CR3.

          • Yes Ajax will be advancing ahead of an armoured formation. But they will also be used to protect the flanks.

          • Ajax will certainly be out front in the recce role, and may be used on the flanks – but I don’t see that as ‘supporting CR3’ – they are not in intimate contact.

          • The flanks are where the mbt’s are most vulnerable. Most of the Russian armoured loses in Ukraine in direct fire mode (rather than top attack), are from the side & are not coming from other mbt’s. All that frontal arc armour is for nought if the enemy is not in front of you.

      • BAE seem to have produced a 120 mm CV90 tank prototype for the swiss to evaluate without major issues and the Warrior 2000 prototype was designed in record time 9 months from warrior design. K21 redback produce in ten years, developed from k200 series! Perhaps expertise was left with Chrysler who designed Abrams !

    • Standard CV90 is an IFV however there is a recce variant – it has been developed and maanufactured for Norway.

  27. What is never made clear from any of these reports is exactly what the problems are? We hear of vibration and headset ineterfence, is it an electrical problem or a mechanical one? Can the chassis not cope with the extra weight of the turret? Is it the vehicle or the turret or both?

    If it is mechanical, e.g. engine mounts, gearbox, lack of suspension travel etc. issue then dump the GDLS Ascod vehicle and use something else, there are plenty of choices.

    If it is the turret, then there are no off the shelf recon alternatives, bar the Nexter one used on the Jaguar. Assuming that most of the money has been spent on the turret, i.e. the sights, software, digital connections and associated commander/gunner positions, you would hope therefore that significant parts of the project are saveable and not flushed down the proverbial. Indeed, given that the turret casting is a Rheinmetal Lance maybe getting LM to finish developiong that properly (or give it to Germans) and then mounting it on a Lynx might just be the best all round solution?

  28. Sadly I feel entirely vindicated in my moans about about requirements setting…

    “The report goes on to say that the MoD’s original requirements for Ajax were highly specified, and its management of design changes has led to disputes and delays. Around 1,200 capability requirements were set, making Ajax more complex than other armoured vehicles.”

    and staff turnover…

    “There were multiple lines of reporting and complex assurance arrangements; insufficient senior management time; a high turnover of senior staff; an under-resourced programme management team; and an ineffective programme board.”

    More than £3billion and it doesn’t work with another £2billion at least at risk, and what for? Very likely nothing. The MoD processes and specialist procurement training, particularly the Army’s, need dealing with and if necessary past encumbents dragged before an enquiry board. I’m not one for witch hunts but I could make an exception in this case to serve as a warning to the next generation of would be incompetents!

    Damn, this debacle makes me soooo angry. Aaaaagh!

    Idiots

    CR

    • Hi CR
      This is why we should buy off the shelf
      P8.. Apache.. now perhaps Blackhawk , a proven Self Propelled Gun.. ….. don’t change the spec
      Thanks Ian

      • Blackhawk? Why should we buy that? It is an old design (1972) and the in-service Wildcat design is 30 years newer.

  30. How on earth have things been allowed to go so wrong? It’s not rocket science it’s building an amoured vehicle which we’ve been doing for years.

    This whole situation is frankly baffling.

    • Perhaps we shouldn’t have got an American company to set up a brand new subsidiary thus creating a company with no experience, to then find some premises (a fork lift truck factory was found in Wales to curry favour in a high unemployment spot), then to recruit a workforce who had probably never seen an AFV before let alone build one.
      Then to take a very old design (ASCOD) and bastardise it, adding a huge amount of weight, to have the hulls made in an entirely different country (Spain) that company seemingly unfamiliar with the comprehensive use of jigs, then to have the MoD force a weapon system that fires rounds 5 times the cost of any other cannon shells, then to have the turret made in another town by an entirely different American company……….

      …..and why do we need as many as 245 Ajax recce vehs?

    • The Redback isnt Australian matey. Its a south korean ifv that Australia has ordered and named Redback. Agree looks decent. Probably one of the best IFV s around.

      • Australia has not actually ordered it. It was designed by S. Korean company Hanwha, better known for its K9 SPH (which Australia has ordered), expressly for the Australian IFV competition (hence the Australian name). The competition itself is over, but no decision announced yet between Lynx & Redback. However wins will manufacture in country using Boxer (Rheinmetall) or K9 (Hanwha) production facilities. One thing of note: it was developed from the 26t K21 IFV (in less than 5 years) & weighs 42t, but uses the running gear, suspension, engine & transmission from the 47t K9 (at least the Australian version there of). Something perhaps GD should have thought about in going from ASCOD to Ajax.

  32. 3.167 billion dpent and all they have to show for that frankly ridiculous sum of money is 147 vehicles that are assembled but cannot be used except by deaf soldiers who also dont mind their bodies being vibrated into a puree.
    Get a refund…as much money back as you can and pump that into either cv90 or boxer variants.
    We probably could still get better and more vehicles as the unit price of ajax nearly 10 million each is massive. I know that includes total programme costs so tooling, training, spare parts, etc etc but even so you do have to look at what those costs are delivering as a unit price. Ajax must be the most expensive IFV/ heavy scout vehicle in the world.
    Oxymoron heavy scout isnt it? A 40+ ton scout vehicle. Wtf? They do know cvrt which its replacing weighed what 7 to 14 tons and sacrificed armoured protection for mobility/ air mobility.

    • Ajax is not an IFV – it is a recce vehicle to be used, not by Infantry but by the Cavalry.
      But you are right that it is too big, too heavy and too expensive.

  33. I should be saying that GDLS looks like it is going to win the US Army light(medium) tank competition, so lets switch from Ajax to the new Medium tank, but as the UK MoD has blown £3 billion+ with precious little to show for it, that is unlikely as most of the budget is wasted. Why are these idiots who waste billions of taxpayers cash, not named, shamed & jailed?

          • The Recce role is more likely to be done by drone. A medium tank is probably more useful to the Army, in its armoured formations.

          • We have not so far conducted recce exclusively by drone. They have their limitations (narrow field of view, limited endurance, possibilty of being brought down or data link (up or down) interfered with).
            The last time the army had medium tanks was WW2. We need MBTs and Tank Destroyers (similar to CVR(T) STRIKER or a similar Brimstone-equipped vehicle).

  34. How much does the Ukrainian conflict affect our future plans, ie. armoured vehicles v anti tank ??
    Seems to me,a well trained and highly motivated force with modern anti tank missiles can cause serious damage.

    • True, but if you were the poor sod riding into battle, you would want a bit of firepower & protection around you.

      • If your role was to conduct recce by stealth you want a low-profile, agile, quiet platform with excellent sensors and some self protection capability.
        You shouldn’t need a 40mm cannon and 42 tons of armour.

    • Everything on the battlefield from the dismounted soldier to the IFV, tank, artillery piece, truck or helicopter has a counter – or more usually very many counters.
      You don’t scrap a capability because there exists a counter-system or you would not have an army at all.
      Better protected systems have fewer effective counters so there will always be the need for well protected equipment.

  35. I would be interested to know what all those “special specifications” were that we needed.
    I can understand that we wanted a secial gun, and the comms and sensor kit is obviously going to be British military specific. But that requiremetn is common to any nation’s purchase of an existing design, and really only means you need to make sure the right connectors and slots are in place.
    What on earth did we decide we needed for a tracked scout vehicle that cocked up the design that much?!

  36. so essentially the Army are looking to pay pretty much the same money that the RN payed for two carriers for a few hundred armoured vehicles that incapacitate our own soldiers if they stay in them to long…that’s not great.

  37. This is what happens when you cut too much top brass. Too few generals senior civil servants and project team members with too little time to properly govern and deliver the project. Advocates of cutting senior managers know too little about the value they bring or what happens when they are not sufficiently resourced.

    However, it also shows what happens when requirements are not properly defined, are subject to change, and unrealistic.

    • It’s the turnover of staff on such a complex program that I found difficult to understand. I’m not to sure why the payments were agreed so badly also. It should be you get paid for meeting certain mile stones. If this was done it has been front loaded far to heavily.
      If the issue is the weight and they will work as required with weight removed, it may be a case of stripping the add on bits and putting these into service as a quick fix. Obviously don’t build anymore than the few hundred already built. Then actually fix the issue if it can be and test it extensively. Basically batch vehicles that can be refitted without massive effort.
      Until they actually report what the issues are and how they can be sorted it’s all speculation. This report seems to go into what was done wrong but not if it can actually be sorted.

    • Its not the numbers it is the quality. One good RN Captain, given the job of bringing Polaris to the UK. He stayed until the job was done. While he reported progress to the high ups, they let him get on with it. No waiting for months, everyone stood still, while the minister dithered. As a result, in service, working, on time & budget.

    • It is very common for a long gestation project for some requirements to change. I believe that only happened once for Ajax.

  38. Why the hell is this still ongoing? I assumed the lawyer bought in around last December was to go through the contract and confirm that GD bore the responsibility of all costs. I was hoping to hear of the entire thing being scrapped by now. Seriously, who needs to be shot to make that happen?

  39. Drop Ajax. Build a UK BAE factory for CV90 to start replacing Warrior and in the meantime purchase a scout CV90 variant from abroad to fill Ajax role.

    • Maybe both parties can cut to the chase and get MOD and GD UK to accept 50/50 liability and get on with a replacement asap. What a pack of idiots running and ruining this project! A national disgrace. The Defence Minister needs to kick someone’s butt over this. Too much precious money, resources and time wasted. The Army deserves better! Vehicles needed asap plus everything else that’s running late. Stop wasting UK taxpayers money!!

    • Australia already has a scout configured Boxer. The ability to re-role by changing the removable module is the main feature of the Boxer. So a suitable replacement vehicle is already in production. Aquire or build a scout module & job done. Module turns out a bit of a dud? Throw away & build another. The vehicle itself works. As DaveyB mentioned, most other armies use wheeled scouts. Personally I would rather a wheeled scout that works than a tracked one that doesn’t.

      Three of the best IFV’s out there are the CV90, Lynx & Redback. Ajax is unusable as a scout & doesn’t cut it as a IFV (when offered to the Australian tracked IFV competition, it was rejected as ‘not fit for purpose’). Stop spending money on something that doesn’t work & spend what’s left on something that does.

      • Ajax is not an IFV, and should never have been offered to Australia, who duly rejected on the grounds that it did not have enough seats! Duuuugh!
        Are you muddling IFVs with scout (or recce) vehicles?

        We need an IFV to keep up with the tanks – options should be Warrior with WCSP upgrade, CV90 and maybe Lynx and Redback.

        Scout – we need a Ajax (with bugs ironed out) or a CV90 recce variant but could go for a wheeled option.

        Strike – Ajax does not pack enough punch – we need a successor to CVR(T) STRIKER.

          • I have a horrible feeling that they won’t. The extra money for Defence went some way to closing The Black Hole (BH), but there are still some unfunded aspirations. MoD would not want to add to the BH.

        • I suggested that there is a perfectly good wheeled option for a scout (recce) vehicle in the already being built Boxer. The design work has already been done & CRV Boxers exist (just not in UK).

          What I was trying to say otherwise is that Ajax is unusable as a scout vehicle & there is little else it could or should be reused for. You can’t easily turn it into a useful IFV (that I can see) & appears underwhelming in a strike role. You could of course use the hulls for target practice.

          If you want a CRV then Boxer. If you want an IFV, then CV90, Lynx or Redback. If you want more punch then fit a 105 turret from the likes of CMI to CV90/Lynx/Redback or Boxer. ATGM should be fitted regardless.

          • DJ, thanks for the link to the Boxer CRV – I saw the corporate video and it looks fine at driving in Australia in the bright sunshine on dry mud and prairie grass and negotiatated some deep puddles too. Not sure what sort of sensor and comms package it has.
            However we have spent £3.2bn so far on Ajax and the pressure is on for GDUK to do the fixes. Today it is unusable as a recce vehicle but we have not seen the fixes yet.

            I agree that you cannot turn Ajax in its current state into an IFV – it won’t take a rifle section of 8 troops plus crew…and you would still have to buy a recce vehicle fleet if you could.

            Strike – I have yet to see a MoD definition of Strike. I would suggest it should include the destruction of light and medium armour and strongpoints at long range (4km plus). Ajax can’t do that, as you say. By my definition, it is not capable of doing Strike.

            If we use Ajax hulls as target practice – at £3.2bn in total they would be the most expensive targets ever, especially as there are only a handful of hulls available.

            We should have:

            1. Bought a recce vehicle from a decent company, BAE’s CV90 recce variant (as supplied to Norway) or possibly ARTEC’s Boxer CRV – if it was doctrinally acceptable to have a large and heavy vehicle.
            2. For IFV, we should have splashed out on CV90 or Puma – or fitted WCSP upgrade to Warrior ( a more economical option). Stay with tracked option.
            3. For Strike, we should have bought a successor to CVR(T) STRIKER (a ‘Tank Destroyer’ with long range ATGW) of which there are several on the market – it could be wheeled or tracked.

          • While Puma would have been an IFV option at the time, you would probably go Lynx instead of Puma now if going German.

            For a ‘Tank Destroyer’/ ‘Assault Gun’, CMI 3105 turrets have been tried out on various vehicles, including Boxer, K21, Hunter etc. Has the added advantage of a secondary SPH ability (out to 10km) as the barrel can elevate to 42 degrees.

  40. Just please get rid of this cursed project, cut losses NOW, buy off the shelf, CV90 proven and could set up some manufacturing in the UK

  43. It’s high time procurement is taken out of the hands of the Army (and most government depts too!).

    “MoD does not know when it will be delivered. The Department’s initial planning assumption was that the vehicles would be in service in 2017”. This is shocking, it appears the procurement team put a dispute notice on an issue and leave it.

    To have paid 65% of the cost already and to only have defective platforms is simply not good enough. Yet, there’s plenty of people out there who are really good at procurement. Is it not time a root-and-branch review was held, whereby they pay the right money to get those professionals who deliver big money projects on time and on budget in?

    • The Army as a corporate organisation does not do procurement – no individual Service does. Multi-disciplinary teams in DE&S do military procurement – mostly they get it about right, but not in this case. Blame also falls to MinDP and Industry (especially crap Industry).

  44. Why can the Army not just buy CV 90 or some other off the shelf vehicle. Then remove all of the comms, surveillance systems, weapons, control systems and computers from the existing Ajax vehicles and put it in the new vehicles… Surely its just Plug and Play??? …

    Yes I am being Sarky

    Seriously, if you get the early systems of systems integration wrong during a project it becomes systemic and infects everything you do from that point forward. That has clearly happened with Ajax. They (Everyone involved with the project) got it wrong early on, ignored the issues and hoped that it would go away without affecting the overall project end date.

    The solution now?
    There probably isn’t one.
    In the long run it’s probably going to be easier and less expensive over the life of the vehicle (25+ years of maintenance and upgrades) to bin it now and start again.

    3billion spaffed and no serviceable or useable systems.
    That is money that could have been spent on any of the below…
    1x Carrier
    2 X Astutes
    5 x Wedgetails
    12 x P8s
    20+ F35s including the extra base support for them.

    That’s just big ticket items I know the approx cost of… You could also include better Accom, MQs, manpower and retention…

    In the next years Ajax and FRES will become required reading on how not to do Project Management.

    • Not required reading in the MoD. Bad project management starts with bad project planning. The Grey Report 2009 on defence procurement was accepted by parliament and the MoD, but all the BS it lists can still be seen in the current defence equipment plan.

      That the programme office for a £6.3bn project, had at one point only 2 of the 8 posts filled, suggests two things: project management is undervalued, and that the issues stem from higher up. Hiring project managers at less than £40K pa to relocate isn’t going to be easy. Bristol perhaps, but Barrow, Yeovil or Merthyr Tydfil?

      The current estimated cost of the programme is at £10bn to completion. How can they estimate that if they don’t know what’s wrong? How can it cost more now to complete (nearly an extra £7bn), than it would cost if we just started from scratch?

    • Mate, I fear it may get worse! When FRES (Ajax) was specified. It was designed with an open architecture databus, but built around the Bowman system. As you know Bowman has its quirks. But by and large it’s pretty reliable. It can do both audio and data comms.

      But the big issue I’ve got with it, is that Bowman’s now nearly 15 years old. Comms has come a long way since, especially on bandwidth and throughput capabilities. By the time Ajax comes into service. Bowman’s replacement Morpheus should be coming into service. From what I remember Morpheus is an evolved version of Bowman. But will it be able to cope with the amount of data Ajax is supposed to generate and will Ajax incorporate it at build? Or will it be a modification that needs fitting later on? Apparently General Dynamics won the Morpheus phase 1 bid and have been paid £330M, to do the work.

      Watch and shoot, I think is appropriate!

      • Hi DaveyB, I’ve been reading your posts which are mostly accurate and interesting but I must correct you on one fact. Whilst the AJAX architecture is of an “open” design (in fact there are several separate networks) it is not built around Bowman, it interfaces with the Bowman comms architecture in order to relay data onwards.
        cheers
        Ian M.

        • Yes I agree. What I was trying to get across is Bowman is the primary means of communicating with the tank and the outside World. The system is due to be replaced by Morpheus within the next 5 years. Which is about the same time Ajax is supposed to be coming intro service.

          How easy will it be for Ajax to be updated with Morpheus? Was Morpheus taken into account when Ajax was being specified and later built? If not, each vehicle will then need to go through a modification program. Incurring more cost and delays.

          Bowman has its operational quirks and I am hoping Morpheus will sort out these issues. However, its data transfer rate by today’s standards is very low (still better than Link-16 though!). Being a data gathering vehicle, it will need a robust method of transferring this data between vehicles and back to command. I am hoping that the Army had the foresight of designing Ajax so it could easily be updated with Morpheus. Otherwise….

          • Hi Davey, AJAX essentially has a commercial style open architecture, protected of course. This enables a plug and play system in essence, although it’s never quite that simple in real life. You are correct, an AJAX platform can generate a huge amount of data during an operation, so off boarding this is a priority.

      • Bowman is good but as you say it has its querks. One that wound me up is the need for individual GPS receivers for each set so it can accurately get the time for crypto sync etc… The upper deck was littered with little white mushroom receivers. If Ajax is the Sam they will cover everything.
        Data through put was never really an issue when we had people ashore we got the live feeds OK. For most of the rest of it we used satcom anyway.

        Morpheus… What could possibly go wrong with GD involved.. …

  46. What is it with the MOD ?

    They are doing large projects all of the time, surely they must be building up some project knowledge ….somewhere….are are they a bunch of time servers moving from one promotion to the next.

    What I find strange is that this system managed to gain acceptance for production. It all reeks of some management type pushing for a quick delivery, and so short-cutting various processes. That person probably got his bonus and promotion and has moved on, denying all responsibility.

  48. The noise in headphones issue, should easily be solved, unless the electrical design of these vehicles is so bad that it needs a complete redesign (if noise is getting into the headsets where else is it going and what does that say about the electrical design).

    The vibration issue is more complex and implies a serious fundamental design problem, but considering the paucity of information and the very broad brush pronouncements of the NAO, there is not alot for people to go on.

    • I thought the noise in headsets was just poor noise shielding against firing and transport noise rather than electrical noise in the headsets themselves. I suppose it could be both. There are complaints about the Combat MkII headsets in other armoured vehicles too.

      We are told

      … noise and vibration issues are caused by the track, suspension and running gear; the engine and its mounting in the vehicle; quality issues; and the performance and integration of headsets used by crews.

      That’s quite a list.

  49. The General Feedback for a engineering source, that it will never fly due to its fat arse and over weight. someone took the winning design and changed the brief.

    This source also states it needs a new chassis and hull, and that a Bradley designed in the 80s or the Warrior currently, struggling along is a better option.

    As Ajax is basically a mess. with to many apprentice design engineers who have tampered with it.

    expect it to be dumped and scrapped and the money repaid.

    willys jeep is better option currently

  52. At the risk of looking silly I would ask those with experience ex builders or operators of challengers and examine the tracks and them of the Ajax. They are different designs. Could this be the fault ? I assume, if the vibrations came from the engine, it would be a relative easy fix. Good quality top of the range headsets in single engine aircraft reduce similar noise levels down to hardly audible engine noise. What I see tank crew using looks very robust but not of great quality in terms of noise reduction

    • The tracks are TR40 type made by Cooks Defence who also make the heavier duty Challenger TR60 ones , being a similar design I would not think they are the source of any problems !

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