Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a year ago, most of the fighting has been on land. However, there has also been a less visible – but nonetheless crucial – maritime dimension to the war across the full spectrum of tactical, strategic, economic and diplomatic considerations.
After land troops crossed the Ukraine border on February 24 2022, the Russian navy quickly secured control of the northwestern Black Sea.
This meant it could contribute to the air campaign against Ukraine by launching cruise missiles from the sea. This diversified Russia’s attack vectors, thus increasing the chance of penetration by overwhelming Ukraine’s air defence systems.
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This operational control gave the invaders the ability to threaten the important port city of Odesa with an amphibious assault. The prospect initially required Ukraine’s war planners to divert resources away from the main fronts in the east and north around Kyiv. It also enabled Russia to deny Ukraine access to and from its own ports, which resulted in a de facto maritime blockade of Ukraine.
Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help their readers understand the big issues. You can also subscribe to their weekly recap of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.
But Russia failed to translate this early dominance into strategic effects by opening up a new front in Odesa. This has been attributed to the navy’s subordination to the objectives of Russia’s land forces, whose focus was elsewhere.
For its part, Ukraine was without an operational navy able to directly engage the Russian navy at sea. Its position was made all the more insecure due to the inability of its western allies to intervene at sea – because of the closure of the Turkish Straits and the risk of escalation in the case of any direct involvement of Nato ships.
But despite all this, Kyiv managed to undermine Russia’s naval dominance by demonstrating innovation and initiative.
Sinking the Moskva
Its first major victory was sinking the cruiser Moskva on April 14. In addition to the prestige of sinking the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, this exposed the shortcomings of Russia’s air defence onboard its surface ships.
The sinking of the Moskva demonstrated that the Russian navy could not operate safely in the vicinity of Ukraine’s coast, due to the threat from anti-ship missiles – both the Ukrainian-developed Neptune and western-supplied Harpoon missiles.
The Black Sea fleet surface ships have needed the protection of Russia’s naval air force, mainly land-based in Crimea. This limited their operational range to about 20 miles in order to benefit from full air support.
Another notable success was when Ukraine regained control over Snake Island, a small but strategically important outpost in the Black Sea (about 70 nautical miles south of Odesa) that had been taken by Russian forces in the opening days of the conflict.
Ukraine’s creative opportunism
Things began to move faster in August as Kyiv launched counterattacks, especially in the south. As part of this shift in momentum, Ukraine adopted a bold strategy of harassing Russian naval assets. This included an attack on the Black Sea fleet’s air arm at the Saky airbase in Crimea on August 9, followed on August 20 by a drone attack on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.
Maritime drones were then used on October 29 to target Russian warships in Sevastopol, highlighting the constant state of insecurity of the Russian navy, which was put in full “defence mode”.
In practice, with its surface fleet “hiding”, this reduced Moscow’s ability to plan for an amphibious assault on Odesa. It also limited its ability to strike from the sea, and restricted its initial geostrategic objective to control the southern coast of Ukraine from Crimea to Transnistria.
Importantly, it also affected the overall conduct of the war by enabling Ukraine to move its counter-offensive closer to Crimea.
The maritime supply chain
But with its limited navy, Ukraine has not been able to secure control of the sea. Moscow remains able to prohibit civilian traffic to and from Ukrainian ports, by making it too risky for shipping companies to operate outside the remit of the maritime corridor for grain exports – a deal brokered by the UN and Turkey, and agreed on July 22.
Russia’s denial of the northwestern Black Sea has been enough to prevent the shipment of grain and other agricultural products. This has led to increased food prices, hurting many developing nations. But Russia’s own lack of control over global supply chains has also contributed to the effectiveness of sanctions targeting its military-industrial base.
All major shipping companies bar the Chinese have suspended their operations to and from Russia. But this significant collective effort has come at a cost to shipping companies. Declining trade with Russia and the ban on Russian flagged, owned or operated ships has also affected business in western ports.
Seapower and global leadership
Despite reports that a new Russian offensive is impending, naval power is not expected to play a major role as it is unlikely that the Russian navy will consider opening a new front around Odesa. But the longer a war lasts, the more likely it is to be won by a coalition of maritime nations that can control the global supply chain.
Well aware of this, Russia stressed in its July 2022 maritime doctrine the need to consolidate its sea power. But it’s not clear how it can do this, given the current difficulties facing Russia’s naval-industrial base.
So while the war’s maritime dimension is limited, it still demonstrates that Kyiv has the capacity to seize opportunities created by Russia’s weakness at sea. And in a lengthy war – as in other lengthy conflicts – this could eventually tip the scales in Ukraine’s favour.
Basil Germond, Professor, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Before the war most of the black sea states were frightened by Russia’s amphibious capability. Now less so. Russia really needed those 2 Mistral class Lphds to effectively prosecute the southern Ukraine coastline and potentially land a large marine force to outflank Ukraine’s defensive lines.
Without lphd or any decent sized landing ships, the maximum lift capability of the black sea fleet, even though reinforced pre war by units from the Baltic and northern and Pacific fleets was still only about 3000 troops. Not enough to hold and repulse a counter attack.
Most Russian amphibious warfare ships are in the 3000-5000 ton class and capable of lifting 300-500 troops and around 12-16 armoured vehicles. There were 6 present in the black sea pre war. But several were damaged and the entire flotilla have been pulled back to Sevastapol
I think the Ivan Gren class have increased size and displacement in the latest build, but even if they commission a little early, they can’t get into the Black Sea as they are built on the Baltic and Turkey isn’t going to let them in.
I can’t see Russia being able to accelerate build of the Ivan Rogov assault ships in time, but at least they are being built on the Black Sea. We’ll have to wait to find out. They were laid down in 2020 for commissioning in 2028/29, that’s pretty slow and war has a habit of accelerating things.
Just like any warship now trying to operate near or close to a peer or near peer enemy coastline, troop landing ships would be extremely vulnerable to AShM, as the Russians found to their cost with the Moskva. In this situation I suspect that landing large numbers of troops on a hostile shoreline has now been consigned to history.
Strangely the author did not mention what was and still is arguably the most effective defensive measure deployed in the Black Sea by the Ukrainians, mines.
Tend to agree with you and this is reflected in recent US assessments about littoral operations that has pretty much put their build and planning for such operations into something of a confused mess. Ukraine has only emphasised the doubts about their ships ability to operate and defend themselves in such situations and I suspect the traditionalists are finding it difficult to defend their position in promoting the idea that such a long standing strategic capacity is still as operable as it has been post war. But being a Pacific power with a long range perspective in a very large ocean they can hardly reject the strategy they will need to look for answers to somehow minimise threats. No clear answers however on how best to address that so ways to prevent the establishment of such defences or quickly nullify before full operational effectiveness where possible might take priority in an expansive or yo yo-ing conflict.
Yes, the US Marines deleting the Abrams seems to be a good indication of their thinking. The Chinese would be mad to try and cross to Taiwan.
Even ATGM must be a threat to close-in ships.
Image a few 155mm at d day firing SMArt rounds. Going over an open beach now a days against any kind of peer threat is suicide.
The PLA and PLAN would get wiped out in Taiwan.
I swear I heard moskva was alongside in sevastopol undergoing repairs !
Exactly the Russian navy is just as bad as when they were defeated by the Japanese in Tsushima May 27-29 1905 when instead of going down by the Suez, they went around the north and dozens of the men and ships froze. Only to get defeated by the Japs as soon as they arrived!😀
No, they did not go round the North – the main body of Rozhestvenski’s fleet went round the Cape of Good Hope, and a second smaller squadron under Admiral Nebogatov folloed through the Suez Canal.
That Russian fleet came around the south mate, not via the Arctic ocean.
Oh sorry my mistake!😅😁
Remember when certain people used to scream high heaven that russian ships were the best in the world due to them being littered with every weapon under the sun. How’s that working out for them now.
What happened to that ex MP who took pleasure in promoting the ‘glorious powerful beauty’ of Russian ships in photos and deriding our own by comparison ‘like’ a Putin stooge? That said their latest frigates may be a lot better, if thankfully few in number, even if their hypersonic missiles may, or by some evidence may not be all that they seem.
The only 2 russian loving politicians I can think off the top of my head are George Galloway I believe and Alex Salmond both pretty irrelevant now.
The only thing I like about the old soviet ships was the red paint job, quite liked the look of them.
Alex salmond? I don’t think he is a Russian fan boy
He used to have that show on RT which drew a lot of criticism as being the foreign mouth piece of Russia. However I never listened to it or done much research in whether he was pro russian on it. So I might be wrong, quite happily be corrected.
Spy wrote:
Could that be Lib dem Mike Hancock , who was MP for Portsmouth South from 1997 to 2015. Hit the Headlines when his Aid (25-year-old Katia Zatuliveter) was set to be deported in 2010 for been a Russian spy. That resulted in him been looked at especially his seat on the defence select committee from 1999 to 2011 where it was revealed he asked many questions regards the UK military such as:
17 June 2008,
On berths, if he will list those berths with safety plans in place as specified in the Radiation
6 September 2010
“To ask the secretary of state for defence what the running costs were of the ballistic missile submarine fleet in the latest period for which figures are available, expressed in cash terms.”
26 October 2010
“To ask the secretary of state for defence if he will publish a full historical inventory of the UK’s nuclear arsenal.”
“To ask the secretary of state for defence by what date rim-sealed containers for storage of special nuclear materials at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston will be replaced by new, long-term storage containers.”
27 October 2010
Hancock: “To ask the secretary of state for defence if he will publish an update on the quantities of (a) plutonium, (b) enriched uranium and (c) other special nuclear materials that are outside international safeguards.”
After she was read the riot act , he defended her saying she wasn’t a spy and he would take this further, however when it was revealed he had been shagging her for 4 years a bloke 39 years her senior, she had before him shagged a NATO official, a Dutch diplomat and a senior UN official. So she appealed and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission found in her favour in Oct 2011
There’s a load more crap on him regards his Russian links, with questions made about how many visits he had made to Russia which he never revealed (As all MPs have to) he claimed he didn’t know as he had lost his passport. Bloke lost his lib dem whip in 2014 and lost his position in the 2015 election.
Was it John in Mk ?
No, I never fancied a career in politics. Thinking of applying to our local parish council tho’.
Russian weapons and sensors on ships are basically the equivalent of 1980’s western ships.
Look at what a modern navy costs. Russia’s navy can only continue to shrink.
China has spent 100s of billions to build up its navy. Russia can’t compete. Hopefully soon they realise there a regional power with nuclear weapons the better.
I think Russia’s UN seat should be rotated through every country that came out the Soviet Union. 1-24 month terms. The UN can figure it out.
If the USA collapsed the UN seat wouldn’t automatically go Texas.
It also doesn’t help that they are desperately trying to keep there carrier and battlecruisers afloat for prestige. On a logical point it would just be better to scrap them and spend the money on other stuff.
Tbh the Security Council should just be abolished now, but I doubt that will ever happen.
Perhaps getting rid of the veto ability of the 5 permanent members would undo the constant blockage the UN has. The 5 can keep permanent seats but will have the same voting power as the rotating members.
Or if a member is involved in what’s being voted on they aren’t allowed to vote
Yes I agree, the problem being that the 5 veto powers generally have there fingers in what ever current problem is happening in the world. That’s on both sides as well, plenty if times the UK, US and France have used there veto powers when ethically we shouldn’t have.
In the days of sail, it was said that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort”. But with short range weapons, naval blockade was still effective. With modern longe range guided missiles, surface ships will be forced to stand well out to sea, making naval blockade much more difficult to enforce effectively. Amphibious assault from the sea looks likely to be even more questionable, unless total control of the air has been secured first.
If this is right, are the UKs amphibious assault ships still of much use?
“.
Not really I think they are being replaced
Its amazing to think that so-called obsolete weapons like the Neptune and Harpoon have effectively denied the Russian Black Sea Fleet freedom of operation. Even anti-tank guided weapons have shown how effective they are at knocking holes in ships, especially when Russian gunboats got too close to Odessa.
The whole concept of littoral combat will need rethinking, it isn’t so clear cut for the ship anymore. If it doesn’t have a decent multi-layered air defence system. Then it will likely get hit by coastal defences. Plus if it cannot detect or track a small UAV, then its likely to be subject to artillery and perhaps ballistic rocket attack.
Which makes its doubly hard for amphibious operations. Aside from the USMC and USN that can blanket an area to deny a counteroffensive. The UK’s RM and RN do not have that luxury. There has been a more progressive leaning to using are marines for commando raids. But how effective is a RHIB at defending itself against an ATGM? I would suggest not very, the RHIBS will need a form of defensive aids systems.
We will still need the capability of getting heavy vehicles, stores etc on to a beach. But if we look at The Mk10 LCU with its miserly 10 knot top speed and the Mk5 LCVP at 25 knots. Both would now be considered easy targets, unless the coastline was bereft of defenders. We need to think out of the box, on how to get troops and materiel on to a beach that may or may not be defended. Perhaps something along the lines of a NARCO drug-runner.
A semi-submersible landing craft. That has next to no radar signature and can approach a beach from the horizon without being seen and without leaving a tell-tale wake. Then can pop up out of the surf for a stealthy approach to the beach.
If the landing area is contested, then the assault must supress the defenders ability to shoot, which should be a combination of air support and naval support. For a full on amphibious task group with a carrier in attendance its not such a problem. But for a small raid without a carrier it will be. This is where the “mothership”/littoral strike ship and its support vessels must be able to provide the assistance.
Time for some fantasy fleet stuff. The obvious choice to provide support for the littoral strike group would the T31 general purpose frigate. Its 57mm gun will be able to provide harassing fire. But it doesn’t have the punch to knock out fortified positions. In the current financial climate its unlikely to get replaced with the larger 5” gun that the T26 is getting. The ship will be required to provide air support through a VTOL UAV such as the Schiebel S100. The UAV can then provide over the horizon search and targeting. But if the enemy has a SAM system, then it requires taking out first. But to remain in the air the UAV or manned helicopter must be able to detect and pin point a SAM system.
Apart from the NSM the ship is getting, it will require a cheaper and more plentiful system to use in the assault/raid. There are a number of off-the-shelf systems that could be used range from the Switchblade 600, Brimstone and perhaps Spear 3. The Switchblade has an endurance of 40 minutes and can be used for reconnaissance, but can also do top attacks against armour. Brimstone doesn’t have a loitering capability but it can be used in a swarm to take out multiple hardened targets. Spear 3 would also be a great option, as not only can it loiter, but it can also attack targets further inland. If the Spear-EW is used it can mess with the enemy’s radars, leaving them open to a precision strike from standard variant.
For the ship to remain safely behind the horizon, then Spear 3 is the obvious choice. Spear is slightly wider in diameter than a standard CAMM, but slightly smaller than CAMM-ER. It is also just over half the length of a standard CAMM and weighs nearly the same. This in theory means that it could fit in a standard CAMM launcher space, fired by the soft launch system, but include a rocket booster to get it up to speed before the turbojet takes over. Which means the ground launched one would have a similar range to the air launched version.
For a T31, a vertically launched Spear would occupy the same footprint as a CAMM. So it could in theory be packed together tightly. It could be used against both sea and land targets that don’t warrant the the use of the NSM. But for the support ship, a half size iso could be used to house a cluster of Spears, Thereby providing a significant readily available amount of firepower. Especially if a Wildcat and a couple of S100s provide overwatch.
Simples!
You’re got me sold on the idea Davey, now forward it to Whitehall mate….
I wonder if a navalised HIMARS system would be a viable solution for the Bays and Albions. Even t31 perhaps.
Didn’t the USN or USMC trial this already? Seems like a no brainer especially with PrSM soon to come into service
I thought I read something about that although I think they more or less strapped down an existing wheeled launcher, I was thinking of something more permanently fitted., of course how viable it is to reload, especially in a pitching seaway could be an issue.
Yes, this was done a Wasp class LHD. The HIMARS was strapped down to the deck. It then did a fire mission. However, the firing mission was conducted when the sea was dead calm.
You would have modify the M30 rockets, so that they can compensate for the ship’s movement. You could make the launcher stabilized. But why bother when you can just vertical launch the rockets, then let the rocket stabile itself. Which then gets rid of the costly and maintenance heavy launcher.
Why not just put S3 in a converted container, isn’t that the idea for this concept? That way you keep the CAMM farm intact for what it’s designed for.
Must be various other options open to interpretation which might/might not work? We can only hope that variations have been looked at, and we are putting our best foot forward.
Thoughts would be that S3 would be an addition to, rather than replacing some of the CAMM. There’s plenty of space in the T31 for additional launchers.
For me the issue would be range. You want to keep the ship safe, so it must operate beyond the horizon. So we talking at least 20 miles from a beach. So yes, you could use Brimstone, by that means you won’t have a deep strike capability beyond the beach. That’s why I think S3 is the best option.
Just wondering if it would be possible to leverage something out of the army Land Precision Strike requirement that may just fit the bill -80+ km range?
Basically it would be a boosted vertical launch S3 type arrangement I believe. Of course would also depend on the Pongo’s actually going ahead with the system.
You could use Spear 3 with M270/HIMARS in theory. The M30 guided rocket is 3940mm long and has a diameter of 227mm. Spear 3 is 1800mm in length and 180mm in diameter. Which means it would fit in a standard M30 cannister which lots of spare volume. Where it has 2140mm of length to play with. Which could be used for a booster rocket motor, similar to the GL-SDB.
When air launched Spear 3 has a purported range of 80 miles (130km). Though I would guess that is dependent on the height and speed of the aircraft when released, along with the missile’s flight profile. The additional rocket booster would make up this shortfall when ground launched. It will likely add a lot more additional range when fired ballistically, then drop down to a low level attack profile. A range that is significantly further than the GL-SDB could achieve.
This would give the Royal Artillery a long range precision fires weapon system as an off the shelf modification. Though there could be scope to use the additional unused 47mm of diameter, for a scaled up version of Spear which has a bigger warhead.
The problem is that in an exchange of similarly capable missiles, surface warships can’t hide. Land based systems can operate from cover or from highly mobile platforms. So the odds are in favour of land based defence.
Stealth boats, like the US Sealion, would only be viable to land small numbers. Helicopters
have limited range though tilt rotors could transport larger numbers from a bigger distance to attempt to secure a safe beachhead.
But the only way to reduce/destroy in depth defences would be by gaining air dominance with aircraft initially launched at a safe stand off range. For any large scale amphibious assault, only the USA as you observe, has the capability to do this.
With modern intelligence gathering systems ensuring that virtually nothing of any size can hide or move unnoticed, combined with long range AShM there is no “safe stand off range” as you put it. Carriers are as vulnerable, if not more so due to their size, as any other ship.
I don’t think its as clear cut as that. Which is where it will become more vital to control the local air space for overt amphibious operations. If you can have a UAV that can provide some local air superiority, you will have the advantage. As it can be used to deny the airspace to enemy UAVs and even manned aircraft. Leaving the enemy to guess where your ship is, unless they have real time satellite coverage, especially if you are sailing 50 miles or more from the coast.
All radar guided anti-ship missiles have a relatively basic radar, that is low powered (cheap) and also has a small field of regard (view). They do have a hunt mode that uses a pre-programmed search pattern, but it is limited to the radar’s field of view, so if you are outside of this basket, a ship will go unnoticed. Similarly if they don’t have a data-link back to the operator. It will have to rely on the ECU’s processing to discriminate its target from decoys and clutter. So firing blind is not guaranteed to find a target, that you know is somewhere over the horizon. Plus as the missile is constantly stating where it is. The ship’s ESM will detect it, before the missile can see the ship. Meaning it has a better chance of knocking it down.
As the war in Ukraine is constantly showing, UAVs have become critical to a mission’s success, be that on land or at sea. Therefore, the RN need to stop fannying around and get the Schiebel S100 in larger numbers for its general purpose frigates and OPVs, where each should have at least 2 of these UAVs. Used as surveillance drones, or one is used as a weapons carrier. Leaving the manned helicopter for other tasks or as a force multiplier.
For a littoral strike group, they will need something larger then the S100. It will require UAVs that can be used for close air support (CAS) as well as provide local air cover, by means of IR guided air to air missiles (eg ASRAAM). The Reaper would be an ideal candidate, as it has the endurance and a large payload. However, it cannot be recovered by an Albion type ship. So the UAV must be a vertical take off and landing aircraft.
To my mind there is only one aircraft that could fit the requirement. This is the Bell V-247 Vigilant which was proposed for the USMC MUX program. Although the program was cancelled as the requirements snowballed. THE USMC are still looking at the aircraft for CAS. This is not a small aircraft but when folded up has a similar footprint to a Wildcat. Though both the Albion and Bay class don’t have dedicated hangers which is a problem for storage and maintenance.
If you can provide air superiority, then you can use slower craft to do the assault with less risk. Though I still like my idea of a semi-submersible raiding craft.