Although the GIUK Gap has become a strategic symbol of NATO’s efforts to contain the Soviet Union at sea, the Gap has an intertwined history and long-standing influence over British strategic thinking.
The Soviet Union and its main successor, the Russian Federation, are only the latest competitors that constantly remind the governments in London of the relevance of maintaining relative control of its maritime backyard.
The open waters of the Northern Atlantic Ocean between the landmasses of Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom form the so-called “GIUK Gap”, a naval chokepoint that historically bears a particular relevance for the UK’s strategic approach to continental powers of Europe, particularly in regards to Germany and Russia. During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) put the gap at the centre of its submarine strategy against Soviet incursions into the Atlantic. For the UK, the relevance of the GIUK Gap went beyond containing the Soviets.
Historically, “minding the Gap” was essential for any British attempt to establish an effective blockade against the majority of the land powers in northern Europe. Britain’s geographic position, naval primacy, and control of Gibraltar at the entrance of the Mediterranean Sea granted that only France, Spain and Portugal could not be easily blocked at a naval chokepoint by the Royal Navy. During the Cold War, Turkish membership of NATO secured that the organisation had control over an additional strategic area – the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Strait – aimed at containing the Soviet Union outside the warm Mediterranean waters.
GIUK Gap significant during WWI and WWII for naval blockades and submarine threat
In the first half of the twentieth century, the area currently known as the GIUK Gap grew in relevance as the First World War unfolded. Although Imperial Germany could not achieve naval supremacy or significantly cripple the Royal Navy, the commerce raiders of the Kaiserliche Marine could attempt to break from the British blockade through the northern waters between the British Isles, Iceland and Greenland. Decades later, during the Second World War, the gap became widely used by military vessels of Nazi Germany.
The threat posed by the Kriegsmarine’s submarine force against the sea lanes that sustained the British war effort grew after the German conquest of Denmark and Norway in April 1940. The latter, in particular, had some of its naval facilities in the North Sea redesigned or built to serve the Kriegsmarine. A few days after the fall of Denmark, Britain reacted by occupying the Faroe Islands, a part of Denmark that Germany did not take. Meanwhile, Greenland’s officials sent a request for protection to the United States, which the American Administration accepted.
British Government occupied Iceland to secure the GIUK Gap, despite the fall of France providing a new option for Germany
Following increasing worries about Iceland’s neutrality and the possibility of German submarines using Reykjavík’s harbours, the British Government elaborated an operation to occupy the country, eliminating the enormous strategic risk that a German-controlled Iceland could present to the Allied war effort. In May 1940, Operation Fork resulted in the British occupation of Iceland. Thus, displaying the strategic relevance of the region, within two weeks after the fall of Denmark and Norway, the UK and the United States secured the remaining components of the GIUK Gap: Iceland and Greenland.
The fall of France in June 1940 gave Germany a new option of access to the Atlantic Ocean. Despite that, the northern routes remained crucial in the war at sea. An example of the Gap’s usage by the Germans is the short escape into the Northern Atlantic Ocean by the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in late May 1941. The naval engagement between the two vessels of the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy, resulting in the sinking of the already battlecruiser HMS Hood, became known as the Battle of the Denmark Strait and occurred near the GIUK Gap.
In the following three days, the resources spent by the British Government to sink the Bismarck demonstrated how the loss of the mighty Hood had affected the Government in London. Additionally, and most importantly, German military vessels could not venture into the Atlantic and threaten British supply lanes and other assets without fierce opposition. Therefore, the order to “sink the Bismarck” is also directly tied to the British insecurities of a scenario where the Kriegsmarine could not be contained within the natural boundaries of the Gap.
During Cold War, GIUK Gap’s strategic importance grew for NATO to monitor Soviet presence and prevent Atlantic access
During the Cold War, the GIUK Gap’s relevance only grew. Besides the traditional centrality to Britain, most of the NATO members recognised the strategic importance of the Gap in its Northern Flank. For NATO, the GIUK Gap involved two main issues: monitoring the Soviet presence in the area and, if the Cold War turned “hot”, preventing the Soviets from breaking into the Atlantic. In short, any attempt at a naval blockade on the Soviet Union required control over the Gap. According to Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Northern Flank was a “theatre that came to be seen by both sides as second only in importance to the European Central Front”.
In the 1950s, concerns about the increasing Soviet fleet of submarines and new surface vessels designed for the North Atlantic reinforced the perception that the GIUK Gap would play a crucial role throughout the Cold War. Throughout the 1950s, the United States implemented a passive sonar system (Sound Surveillance System, known as SOSUS) that could track Soviet submarines approaching the GIUK gap. As other new systems were delivered, including Surveillance Towed Array Sensors, the SOSUS became in the mid-1980s the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS).
In the early years of the Cold War, NATO’s naval strategy for its Northern Flank consisted of putting Moscow in a defensive position. This strategy was based on the assumption to take the war to the “source” of the Soviet naval power, beyond the Norwegian Sea, more specifically on the Kola Peninsula. Aircraft carriers would play a vital role in these early plans. Nick Childs notes the nuclear dynamics of the region, for in the first years of the ballistic-missile submarines, the technology allowed only a strike range that demanded Soviet submarines to break into the Atlantic through the GIUK gap to be able to threaten American targets.
GIUK Gap remained strategically relevant during Cold War for Soviet naval push in Northern Atlantic, with NATO shifting between offensive and defensive stance
Even the more capable Yankee-class submarines armed with the RS-SS-N-6 Serb missile had to cross the Gap until the new generation of weapons in the 1970s could end that need. However, even with the advent of new and more advanced weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, the gap remained relevant due to the persistent risk of a Soviet naval push for the Northern Atlantic – seeking to eliminate NATO naval formations, for example.
From the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, the United States, Britain, and other NATO naval powers shifted back and forth their unified approach to the Soviet threat in the Northern Flank from an “offensive” stance – with plans to actively bring the war to the Norwegian and Barents seas if conflict broke-out – to a “defensive” position, which saw the GIUK gap as a barrier to contain the Soviet Navy outside of the Atlantic. In the 1980s, backed by new Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities and confidence in its technological lead, NATO returned to its offensive positioning, pressuring the Soviets to compete again with the West in the naval field or surrender the initiative within the area north of Norway.
Britain increasingly employed the Royal Navy as a service focused on anti-submarine warfare during this period. Unsurprisingly, by the early 1980s, the Royal Navy was a leading force in anti-submarine warfare. In this context, even assets that could be seen as a “power projection” or expeditionary platforms were designed to enhance the anti-submarine capabilities of the fleet at the expense of the expeditionary approach.
Having lessons from the World Wars, Britain had long recognised the GIUK Gap as the gateway between the northern European waters and the Atlantic and beyond. For the British, the Gap had an additional feature that reinforced the necessity of controlling this sea lane. In addition to the “blockade” that effective control of the GIUK Gap could impose on countries of Northern Europe, its geographic position meant that for Britain, the gap was within the immediate surroundings of the British Isles. In other words, the GIUK gap is part of the British “back yard” maintaining a military presence and surveillance was not a choice but a necessity.
Britain’s commitment to the GIUK Gap led to lack of long-term strategic thinking
Britain’s commitment to this area proved not to be without drawbacks for its position elsewhere. The Falklands War displayed strategic miscalculations within the British Government, which had been neglecting expeditionary capabilities since at least the late 1960s. As Lawrence Freedman argued, when the war in South Atlantic broke out, its expeditionary nature was precisely the kind of conflict Britain was the least prepared to wage. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this issue is more a problem of lack of long-term strategic thinking – which generally occurs when a government allows the Treasury to dictate most of the Defence Policy – than an error of assessment by officers on the GIUK Gap’s relevance.
The lessons from the Falklands War influenced the retention of capabilities that otherwise would have been removed from service by the questionable 1981 Defence White Paper (also known as the Nott Defence Review). However, the end of the Cold War, less than a decade after the conflict in the South Atlantic, propelled the return of expeditionary forces to the centre stage of British strategic considerations. Attention shifted elsewhere after the end of the Soviet threat. Thus, in the 1990s, the GIUK Gap declined in relevance for Britain and other NATO allies.
The Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation, had a fraction of the Soviet naval capabilities. Although the decline of Russian naval forces was severe, the reduction in military assets was not one-sided. The leading naval powers of NATO entered a period labelled “the Peace Dividend”, performing cuts and budget reassessments for the new strategic reality of the 1990s. Surface vessel numbers suffered as the Peace Dividend spread throughout the Alliance. In the mid-1980s, the navies of the US, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Canada, Spain, and Norway had approximately 234 operational frigates.
One decade later, that number had fallen to 172; by the early 2010s, it dropped below 100 commissioned frigates. Over time, the decline of frigate numbers is a strong indicator of changing priorities and threat perceptions. More importantly, it signals a weakened overall ASW capability. It is worth noting that NATO’s leading military spenders increased the capabilities of its units since the mid-1980s. Still, the reduced numbers present questions when facing growing rivalry with other major powers.
The reduction of assets designed for ASW operations was in line with the motto of NATO in the 1990s: “out of area or out of business”. This rationale meant that expeditionary forces would be the priority of the Alliance’s major members. In Britain, attention and priorities gradually shifted from the Euro-North Atlantic area to include other regions, particularly the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. In the years 2000 to early 2002, during the British intervention in Sierra Leone’s Civil War (1991-2002), the South Atlantic and Western Africa momentarily became the centre of Britain’s military efforts in the western hemisphere. The intervention vindicated once more the expeditionary concept, displaying the relevance of the retention of high-readiness capabilities.
Meanwhile, in 2001, Britain, as part of a coalition led by the United States, deployed forces to invade Afghanistan. Two years later, the invasion of Iraq occurred. In short, the late 1990s and early 2000s were marked by the consolidation of the expeditionary approach. Britain was one of the most enthusiastic countries to adopt the strategic reorganisation of its armed forces into an expeditionary model.
Since the mid-2000s, Russia’s reassessment of its capabilities and revisionist foreign policy led to increased concerns about the GIUK Gap
However, since the mid-2000s, the first signs indicating that the expeditionary or “out of area” vision should be combined with the traditional focus on ASW and high-intensity warfare – that characterised defence policies of NATO members during the Cold War – appeared as Russia began reassessing its capabilities and adopted a revisionist foreign policy. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, leading to a new antagonism between Moscow and NATO. Initially, the Alliance’s response to Russian aggression against Ukraine concentrated on reassuring the Baltic and Central European member states, focusing on land and air warfare capabilities.
However, since 2014, NATO has acknowledged that its Enhanced Forward Presence strategy must be backed by a credible naval force sustaining the transatlantic reinforcement plans that would be triggered in case of open conflict. Moreover, Russia’s increased submarine capabilities and hybrid warfare tactics returned the GIUK Gap and ASW back to the centre stage of the naval strategic considerations in the European theatre.
Concerns about a new “Battle of the Atlantic” were among the reasons that led the United States to re-establishing its 2nd Fleet in 2018 after only seven years since it was deactivated. Pentagon spokesman Johnny Michael stated that “NATO is refocusing on the Atlantic in recognition of the great power competition prompted by a resurgent Russia”. That same year, a US Navy carrier was deployed into the Artic Circle for the first time in more than two decades.
Extended carrier deployments of the US Navy occurred in European waters for the first time in years, especially in the Northeast Atlantic. In 2018, the United States, aiming to base additional maritime patrol aircraft near the GIUK Gap, refurbished its facilities in Keflavík, Iceland.
Three years earlier, in 2015, Britain had published its then-newest Defence Review. The British Government had decided to partially amend the decisions of the previous 2010 Review, indicating that the age of budget cuts was over and leaving open the possibility of expanding the surface fleet of the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, the growing state-based threat displayed by Russia’s annexation of Ukraine did not result in significant changes in the fortunes of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.
The 2015 Review is characterised as one attempt to mend unnecessary mistakes committed by its predecessor – the 2010 Review – while still avoiding adopting significant policies that would provide the amends to those strategic errors. Commitments included small increases for the Royal Navy (an additional 400 personnel) and Royal Air Force (300 personnel) and the maintenance of the 82,000-sized regular British Army backed by 35,000 reservists.
One of the highlights of the 2015 Strategic Defence Review is the decision to eliminate a capability gap left by the retirement of Hawker Siddeley Nimrod in 2011 and the scrapping of its planned successor, the Nimrod MRA4. The British-built and developed Nimrod was a maritime patrol aircraft designed mainly for ASW operations. Nimrod’s secondary roles included maritime surveillance and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). In other words, the capabilities offered by the Nimrod were central in sustaining relative control of the GIUK Gap. Shortly before the British Government decided to retire the Nimrod without a successor, the National Audit Office that “the maintenance of the integrity of the UK through detection of hostile air and sea craft would be compromised” if those assets were retired and the successor programme cancelled. Despite the risk to national security, the British Government advanced with its plans and the Nimrod and its successor were scrapped and cancelled, respectively.
The lack of suitable aircraft left Britain with a new challenge when trying to detect Russian submarines, not only when they crossed the GIUK Gap but also in other areas. Another direct consequence of the Nimrod retirement was the strain on the Royal Navy’s frigates as they were expected to cover the gap left by the 2010 Defence Review. A display of that capability issue was seen in late 2014 through the joint deployment to RAF Lossiemouth of four French, American and Canadian maritime patrol aircraft to attempt to locate Russian submarines near the GIUK Gap. Following these events, the 2015 Review committed to purchasing nine Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.
The first P-8 Poseidon arrived in the UK (Kinloss Barracks, Scotland) in February 2020 before relocating to RAF Lossiemouth in October 2020. Boeing delivered the last of the nine P-8 in January 2022. However, even though the P-8s are capable and modern assets, the capability provided by only nine Poseidons can be questioned, particularly for the UK’s geographic position and global ambitions. It is worth mentioning that Anglo-American cooperation with Norway, another P-8 operator, is underway. Cooperation with other nations is a way to counter criticism regarding the number of purchased aircraft while improving interoperability and expanding joint capabilities.
Since the renewed tension with Russia, Britain, the United States, and others recognised the threat posed by that possible enemy to NATO’s sea lines of communications. In this case, the UK’s stance is further complicated by its position as an insular nation. Additionally, a significant amount of the undersea cables of communication of continental Europe passes through the British Isles before linking with the United States (and vice-versa). Hence the relevance of the GIUK Gap for the security of the sea lines of communications above and underwater. Concomitantly, the Allied Maritime Command of NATO has reoriented its training towards ASW. The Allied Command’s objective is clear: rebuild high-end anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills while supporting new defence policies centred on ASW. Support comes through the joint exercises gathering member states with high-level ASW skills alongside others attempting to rebuild or increase that capability.
In Britain, beyond the plans for expanding the size of the frigate fleet from 13 to 18 through the planned Type 32, a new question on the size of the submarine force is gaining ground within the ranks of the Ministry of Defence. In September 2022, the Defence Secretary asked the Royal Navy to study the balance between the surface fleet and submarines.
This decision follows the recommendation of the Defence Committee dating from February 2022, which stated the Government “should explore increasing the size of the of the attack submarine fleet as part of the Astute successor programme, Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR)”. Another issue raised by the Committee was “the availability of attack submarines and destroyers, and the lack of Fleet Solid Support shipping”. Within this context, Ben Wallace, Secretary of State for Defence, summed up the British position: “We’re planning on growing our surface fleet, but is our sub-sea fleet big enough?
If it isn’t, do we trade one off against the other [or] do we find money from elsewhere?”. These questions and concerns are the results of an increasingly unstable international system and several rounds of cuts performed without adequate reasoning and strategic planning. The international scene has changed significantly since the 2010 Defence Review. However, capabilities lost take time to recover.
Despite the possible parallels traced with the Cold War, the Russian Federation of the early 2020s is not on the same level that the Soviet Union was at its peak. In 2022, following the 2014 Annexation of Crimea, Russia attempted to duplicate the 2014 events by furthering the cause of a “Great Russia” – once again – at the expense of Ukraine. The outcome of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict remains open. Still, it is proving to be a series of disastrous displays for the Russian military and political prestige, exposing the fractures and structural problems that the military reforms of the late 2000s and 2010s did not solve.
Additionally, the eruption of violent confrontations derived from delicate long-standing disputes between countries regarded by Moscow as its spheres of influence has occurred since the invasion of Ukraine. The clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan throughout 2022, culminating in confrontations from 14 September to 20 September 2022, can be pointed out as one example.
The perceived inaction of Russia in preventing the previous bloody border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan between 12–14 September 2022 might have led to the emboldening of the parties involved in the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border dispute. These clashes were marked by the lack of Russian military involvement, while politically, the reassurances coming from Moscow did not please its partners caught by the renewed conflicts. In short, although Russia is a significant military power, its current position seems more delicate than Moscow desired when deciding on the offensive against its neighbour in Eastern Europe.
The GIUK Gap remains relevant as a chokepoint for the Russian Navy
However, as the war in Ukraine shows, NATO has to remain vigilant, and the era of the Peace Dividend is long over in Europe. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the alleged potency of modern Russian submarines has increased significantly while Western advantages in relative detection ranges have narrowed. Concomitantly, the Alliance’s ASW has been suffering a direct consequence of the decline in the numbers of operational submarines and other ASW-oriented vessels: the “erosion of operator skills”.
Therefore, as the IISS argues, one of the changes since the Cold War era is that rather than focusing on large numbers of enemy submarines dashing across the GIUK Gap, the current scenario is marked by “small numbers of high-capability assets seeking a strategic advantage”.
Moreover, despite several challenges, Russia continues seeking a “blue-water” naval capacity, meaning that the GIUK Gap will remain relevant despite the growing capabilities of long-range precision strike weapons. Another point contributing to the continued relevance of NATO’s Northern Flank and GIUK Gap is the disposition of the Russian Navy.
Based on the Kola Peninsula, the Northern Fleet is the most capable Russian naval formation, bearing the assets considered the pride of the Navy, especially within the submarine force. Thus, the Gap remains a crucial chokepoint as long as the Russian Navy tries to venture outside the Barents and White seas. Nevertheless, environmental changes in the Arctic sea ice may alter that scenario. Even if new maritime routes were established after reductions in Arctic sea ice, enabling easier deployments to Asia, Russia would still need to cross the GIUK Gap to access the Atlantic easily.
In conclusion, growing tensions between the nations wielding great power have propelled the GIUK Gap back to centre stage. The Gap will remain an extremely relevant passage connecting most Northern Europe to the Atlantic and elsewhere. Competition in the area is also leading the Great Powers and their allies to seek the strengthening of ASW capabilities and skills. The technological advancements within the field have increased the deployment of autonomous and remote systems alongside the ever-more-capable modern submarines. For Britain, the Gap is part of its direct strategic surrounding, its prioritisation within Defence Policy is not an option but a necessity.
Reinforcing its relative control of the GIUK Gap does not need to lead to cuts elsewhere, for the lesson taken from the debate about the size of the submarine and frigate fleet – and the size of the Royal Navy as a whole – is clear: recovering capabilities is not as easy as giving them away.
The gap between material demands, Government statements, and actual forces can expose any nation to serious security threats, particularly countries that regard themselves as bearers of global interests and power.
The UK can also control choke points at Dover & Gibraltar. Shore based NSM batteries would be the most obvious choice.
I’d rather see improved ASuW capabilities for our F-35b. More flexible.
yes. just yes. GIUK gap , channel , gibraltar, all in all probably costing £300m
Gib should still be a fortress any retiring artillery gun should be retired to one of the gun galleries that still exist ditto rapier systems. This could be done by stealth the Spaniards don’t need to know the gibraltarians would be more than happy.come on MOD, get your fingers out of your asses and make the most of what we already have.
Forget about the T 32.
££££? Not going to happen
Who would be tasked with operating them? In1982 Glamorgan was almost sunk by a shore based primitive Exocet system scapa flow still exists as a perfect place for possible future options. I’d consider a couple of land based NSM systems in gib and the falklands.after numerous retirements of Exocet carrying ship we must have many systems in storage somewhere.
There was (briefly) an Exocet battery in Gibraltar in the past. Shore based anti ship missiles, would probably be operated by Royal Marines, I would guess.
Or perhaps reinstating Winnie and Pooh at St Margaret’s at Cliff.
“lack of long-term strategic thinking – which generally occurs when a government allows the Treasury to dictate most of the Defence Policy”
I’m looking at YOU HMG. And will we see any different with a likely incoming Labour one?
I always enjoy Mr Tossini’s excellent articles, this was a rather long one!
If you forget your past you’re damned too repeat it at least Sousa is still up and running but no longer in Bermuda the old Ikara Lesnders did a grand job but yet again we’ve taken our eye of the ball
Yep 👌.
sad they retired the ikara leanders (batch 1’s) early in the 80’s
The places that they were mounted in were converted into swimming pools.
Morning Mate – “The GIUK Gap remains relevant” – brought a smile to my face. Cold war ended 1990 and here we are in 2023 same old, same old. I’m hoping Team Labour are reflecting on current events and pledge to keep 2,5% of gdp for defence spend.
Hi mate.
Me too, though I’ll believe it when i see it with them, many of their MPs just a few years ago wanted Corbyn in.
As far as I’m concerned no mainstream party gives defence the attention it deserves.
“As far as I’m concerned no mainstream party gives defence the attention it deserves.” Very true! My issue with Labour is that they seem like two parties in one. I can see common ground with Starmer, but not with Corbyn- and it’s hard to keep track of how the two sides ebb and flow. I know the same could be said with the Tories a bit, but they mostly don’t seem to be as far apart as the two poles of Labour. My hope would be that the Labour government view the defence budget as a job creation opportunity for… Read more »
Where did this political rubbish come from if we’re going to turn this platform into a political one, we should all logout and Go to bed.i love the way this site is set up and operated, let’s not spoil it with biased political diatribes
Well said Andy☝
too true Sir!
And won’t, unless we’re drawn into another American ‘adventure.
And haven’t for too long
labour will make no difference to the current state of the u.k armed forces, a leopard can’t change its spots and labour will double the size of the £ black hole in the defence budget. They’ll make it worse there’ll be no money so all well see is chopped down orders and further shrinkage
If the French can commit to a rise of spending at 4 percent, so should we
Long term strategic thinking is what’s is currently collapsing Russia and China. The most dangerous phrase ever uttered is “I have a plan”. Britain built the world largest empire on 400 years of opportunism, Japan had a plan for an empire and got glassed and occupied three years later. We do have a long term direction and it’s always been make everyone democratic so they stop coming up what long term plans.
It’s working really well because our only two real enemies are currently collapsing in to oblivion and almost every country on planet earth is on our side.
My late father served at a radar base covering the Greenland-Iceland gap during WW2.
It is such an obvious point that even a non military person like me can see it. Why can’t HMG?
Shaun, my father was also in Iceland for part of WW2, serving with the West Riding Regt as part of 49 Bde. They were originally part of the 2nd wave into Norway, but after its fall, got dumped on Iceland whilst all the troop ships steamed south to Dunkirk
The type 14 frigates were excellent inAsw in the cod wars which shows you don’t need Asw ships the size of cruisers to carry out the job.
There does appear to be some sort of review.of the adequacy of our submarine fleet. Not sure what it could suggest, given the build constraints at Barrow. The Russian submarine fleet is the biggest naval threat to the UK but with a maximum of 8 ASW frigates and 7 Astutes, we might struggle to contain them. There is a quite detailed account of how warships hunt submarines on The Drive website written by a retired USN submariner. I assume there is more that remains classified but it is clear that using multiple platforms increases the chance of success. So numbers… Read more »
We wouldn’t be dealing with them alone that’s why we have NATO. On numbers needed for successful prosecution of subs shipborne helicopters particularly Merlin have improved the equation.
We have never dealt with them alone, the vast majority of ASW ops have always involved lots of nations supplying assets to get a NATO asset in place to track a ‘foreign’ SM.
We have always used helicopters in our ASW ops, Merlin is just the latest version, unfortunately we don’t have nearly enough, especially vas our Wildcats are not equipped for ASW work unlike when we operated Lynx.
We’re thinking in different timescales with ‘always’ I was thinking pre Wessex HAS. On Merlins no disagreement we need more. On a NATO v USSR/Russia threat level I think we are in a far stronger place than we were in the 80’s for example but your knowledge of that is massively greater than mine.
Wildcat like Lynx carries Torpedoes for VECTAC. It has a better radar and better optics. So it is better than Lynx. RN Lynx could never dip but it could chuck sono buys out of the door for the received info to be processed onboard a ship. You can do the same with Wildcat.
Don’t disagree that Wildcat is the better aircraft, but ours aren’t fitted for ASW work other than carrying Stingray, unlike Lynx which was.
The point I was trying to make, albeit badly, is that we don’t have enough ASW assets these days. Drones might well be the answer, but not just yet it appears…..
RN Lynx was never fitted with ASW sensors…except for a couple that had MAD for a very short time in the 70s. Its always been a Pony for VECTAC
Well I never, everyday is a school day! Always thought that they carried something like 195 and or sonar buoys!!!! Especially as the T22 carried 2 x Lynx for ASW Ops.
Cheers for that, will amend my thinking on the subject. 🤔
Nato is very valuable but I do wonder if there is much strategic thinking nato wide as a country shrinks or gives up a capability.
Like when the RAF got rid of Astor. Would there be talks before hand within nato to see how big an impact this will have and what other resources will be left to fulfil that role.
I’ve not much knowledge of how nato actually works beyond the basics.
I’m sure there’s consultation but how far and how deep is way beyond me too.
The normal justification for a reduction of the forces is the replacement is so many times better. In the world of ASW aircraft the uk has went from a large nimrod fleet to a small Poseidon fleet. I don’t know if they are several times better at detecting vessels at a much longer range so 1 aircraft can replace several older aircraft. Again the same with the ASW capabilities on the frigates and submarines. As forces have reduced the presence has gone down. In an area where an enemy ship/boat had a high chance of seeing a RN ship now… Read more »
You are correct in that numbers do matter in ASW warfare. Back at the height of the cold war(late 80s), we had approx 12-15 SSNs. 10-12 SSKs ,14 T22 ASW frigates and approx 20 Nimrods all focused on ASW ops. Yes the old Soviet Navy had many more assets too, but so did the rest of NATO. SM hunting is a slow game, lots of water to search, so the more assets you can use the better your chances of success in finding them. It’s generally far easier to keep an eye on them when they leave the Kola then… Read more »
Deep,
Relaying some interesting and hopefully welcome OSINT, courtesy of H. I. Sutton, an acknowledged US-based source: SSN(R) is slated to include a VLS, in order to facilitate interoperability w/ current/future USN weaps. AUKUS is beginning to yield results. In about 10-12 yrs., there should be damned near an assembly line to mass produce this modular sub class. 🤔😳😉
Cheers, a interesting article, he writes some good stuff on all things SM.
Yes, totally agree that it’s needed, allows for a multitude of weapon options in the future, which might just be required.🤔
I agree the 12 SSN and 12 frigates with tails are numbers needed as a minimum really.
It’s not going to be that long before Chinese subs start popping up all over the world.
I read an article on the war zone the other day about HMS swiftsure went to investigate the new soviet carrier Kiev in 1977 up north. It got through the escorts and went directly under the carrier close enough to take pictures of its props and rudder!
Balls of steel pulling that off
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/how-a-british-submarine-spent-hours-under-a-russian-aircraft-carrier
Yes, an interesting piece, just surprised that more tales like this haven’t surfaced before now. Our SMs always had the option to conduct ‘underwater looks’ as and when the situation allowed. Always had two upward looking camera systems mounted on top of the fin to assist with this. Unfortunately it’s a manoeuvre that we are no longer allowed to conduct without express permission from on high. Apparently it’s to dangerous!!!! Although we do conduct the odd ‘look’ when playing with our own WS, if conditions are favourable. Last one I did was out at Autec on a T23, pristine conditions… Read more »
RAN has also been doing the same thing re Russian East Asian ports. A very long way to go to do something US doesn’t seem capable of doing. Niche capabilities are often regarded as unimportant till suddenly they are the only game in town. Excellent article btw. Choke points are an interesting topic. Despite all the noise, look at who directly or indirectly controls the major maritime checkpoints. GIUK is actually controlling by UK,US & Canada. Baltic by Denmark/Sweden/Norway. Mediterranean, by UK, Spain & Morocco. Dardanelles by Turkey. Suez by Egypt, but UK & US control the Red Sea. US… Read more »
And of course the northern route is the shortest for Chinese submarines as well. Could be a hell of a lot of undersea threats heading out of the GIUK over the longer term.
See there’s something of a left-field report on Xavier Vavasseur’s site about T23s to Turkey as an ASM stopgap. Seems an unlikey development, although they would end up in the Black Sea…..if I were inclined to Machiavellian thoughts.
Bravo.
It would be nice if the Defence Select Committee had some teeth. They can write a rather stern report and try to embarrass senior brass or ministers during questions. But that’s about it.
The UK’s defence policy should be multi-party, that is then agreed by all parties. Which would then stop the constant reviews every time a new party gets in to Government. Which means the military can then build some consistency and better long term planning, especially equipment orders. Doubt it will ever happen though!
lots of nations trade in warships on a regular basis for submarines, more than other types of vessels India, Korea e.t.c have been happy trading for Russian kilos the Uu.k shouldn’t be so techno snobbish we’ve got type 23’s scheduled for retirement there is a whole class of swift sure and Churchill class currently clogging up rosyth and devonport.all these are potential cash cows.if Australia wants nuclear Ssn’s then, our retired Ssn’s present a great opportunity. To be used to benefit the current fleet.the six Australian Collins class boats have had lifex refits and are expected to operate until 2030… Read more »
Subs pressure hulls have a limited hull life dictated by dive cycles. Also the original nuclear reactors would be nowhere near modern safety levels. They were permanently shut down with no thought that they could be reactivated as they were EoL. Anything that has been sat around in sea water for that many years would be in a dire state. Whilst they have not been dismantled a lot was stripped from them to make them easier to inspect and maintain. The accommodation on them will be, by modern standards, horrendous and as the hulls are quite small there won’t be… Read more »
Probably safer though….
Anything is safer than a Russian ship or nuclear reactor…..the real problem is if one of their nuclear powered scrap heaps gets sunk.
Whilst I am very glad to read opinions and new versions if conflicts, battles and wars you have to check their copy first. Getting these people to give you free content is one thing but the editor is responsible for the thing making sense.
2/5 for SPAG but at least you have woken up after your December holiday…
What’s wrong with it. Any particular part?
The last part about government statements and the defence security arrangements is particularly concerning. The forces aren’t able to deploy what they did in say 2003 and to promise countries the Uk forces are going to be able to say provide a substantial force to Japan is a bit silly. It can deploy some assets but that may leave vulnerably else where. Say China went for some Japanese islands and the Japanese called on the uk to help. Then Russia went for part of Finland at the same time and they begged for a division, air assets etc. The carrier… Read more »
Finland has friends in the Baltic nations; Sweden, Norway and Denmark so that’s plenty to stop the Ruzzians. They did that on their own in the Winter War, and Ukraine has confirmed that national defence is a powerful motivation.
If Russia and Finland ever went to war it would be the Russians begging for help. 😂
Oh yes I agree I just wonder what is actually meant in these defence pact/agreements the Uk has done with some countries recently.
Are they quite loosely worded or do they actually commit to lower and higher numbers of help that will be provided.
I’m going to assume they are loose out worded. Like the government can say we stuck to the agreement of help when really they sent 2 helmets and a ration pack.
That’s way over my head what each side has committed to. But there’s lots of assistance short of Tanks, Ships and Planes like munitions, logistics, intel etc. Imagine what would we expect or want from say Japan in the event of us finding ourselves in a war.
I could see the gaps being plugged with long-endurance drones. Or allocating more funding to a platform that can loiter for days, for example, the Airlander platform. I do understand that astute or a frigate can patrol for long periods, but if you want manned surveillance, the Airlander could be more cost-effective. Or, go that one step further and have Airlander automated. (Link)
The loitering drones / satellites can play a great role for surveillance. Some how integrating that with the large numbers of civilian population that would enjoy spending time watching for something. How the security levels would work and pay for services provided is another matter. Probably computers could do some of the filter work to find points of interest.
So should the west keep trying to get such an overmatch that it becomes extremely difficult for any potential enemy to stand a chance. It’s costly but maybe worth it. If ever possible.
One thing that has always struck me as important is that the Scottish ports such as Greenock, Faslane and Invergordon are vital to the defence of the Gap. A future ‘independent ‘ Scotland might be under a lot of pressure from various foreign powers (I’m being deliberately vague) to allow the security of the Gap to be compromised.
Is the SOSUS array still there or has it been decommissioned?
Well under both tory and Labour governments, the rot set in and now the back door is vulnerable ,who’s fault ?the stupid people called politicians ,lack of submarines, asw ships ,aircover well putin has done us a big favour and shown the shortcomings of British leaders (a cabbage could do better),get the material and people in place or else bye bye Britain
SOSUS is now IUSS . The largest UK contingent of military personnel in the USA is at Dam Neck Virginia where the IUSS (Son of SOSUS) data is processed. As it was in the cold War , sensor info is used to get Air , Surface and Sub Surface assets into the area where Russia subs are operating to track and prosecute them. Nowadays better tails on Ships and Subs also help to localise contacts. By the way there are plenty of other sub sea arrays dotted around the world monitoring other oceans and choke points . Yes there are… Read more »
Hi GB, I would just like to point out that reduced numbers of threat subs does not necessarily mean you can reduce the number of defenders / hunters because the threat subs can still choose their route through the Gap. The most of the Home Fleet was needed to cover the entire Gap to prevent just two ships, Bismark and Prinz Eugen, from breaking out (although they were not all at sea at the same time, they were committed). Whilst I accept that it may be possible to reduce frigate numbers because of vastly improved capabilities I am not convinced… Read more »
Now , unlike WW2 we have the means to identify and localise things in the Gap with IUSS.
CAPTAS type sonars (LF VDS and passive) can get below the thermocline as can Sonobuoys. More FF is always good but Ivan isn’t going to do a red storm rising anymore . It simply doesn’t have the assets .
This is why T31 is the wrong ship for the RN as it has non-quietened engines and no ASW sensors. If T32 is based on T31 then it will be the wrong ship as well as the diesel only powerplant is a handicap in ASW operations. While UUV’s and UAV’s may help in future, the fitting of hull and towed sonars with quietened machinery and an electric drive on the T26 shows that those things are still viewed as relevant on ASW platforms. While T26 is excellent for ASW it will make up only 40% of the escort fleet which… Read more »
Might struggle? We WOULD BE TRASHED in fantasy land I’d like to see if the submarines clogging up Devon port and rosyth, could be reconfigured and maybe in a few places reactivated. I have the original set of the swift sure convert th. To conventionally powered vessels class schematics even my limited engineering knowledge can see the options of cutting one aft of the ‘fin’and having sufficient space,if not time or money to convert them plus they’re already built again thinking out of the box, a swap with Australia the next retiring Trafalgar submarine for one or more of the… Read more »
If a 22 years veteran can come up with ‘dotty ideas, why can’t the admiralty?
There is no money. It,s simple. British defence budget is always overstretched.
Too true, our global pretensions are not matched by our defence budget. Other European NATO members can spend 2% of GDP and field considerably larger air and ground forces than we can. (And, in the case of France and Italy, near enough match the number of RN hulls). They have one advantage – they are not paying out £45 bn for independent nuclear deterrent subs and Astutes or £14bn for two carriers and their air groups. That is a major hit to our equipment budget and the army and RAF are suffering accordingly. If we want to have these high-end… Read more »
great post Cripes, liking your commentary .
The UK in land. sea and air defence believe that quality will always prevail over quantity – That is blind thinking IMO.
RN With Type 26 and Types 21 and 32 could be huge just by keeping the Duke Class – Cheaper to maintain hulls than build new ones.
How can we help NATO defend Europe and defend ourselves. We could not.
My understanding is that the Russians did not intend to perform a mass submarine breakthru of the GUIK in case of war, to attack American re-supply convoys.
So the NATO strategy was based on a flawed assumption.
Forget about T32 design and build a conventionally powered submarine to even up the numbers, something that is fast to build