In his article “How Russia’s Naval Rearmament Has Gone Unnoticed”, Ian Proud delivers a scathing assessment of the Royal Navy, declaring that it has been “reduced to a small regional naval power, able occasionally to deploy further afield.”

It’s a dramatic claim — and one that’s simply not borne out by the facts. While Proud is right to highlight issues around readiness and resourcing, his conclusions suffer from selective framing, omission of key context, and a fundamental misunderstanding of what defines modern naval power.

This article was edited on the 6th of May 2025 to include the rebuttal from Ian Proud (shown below) and to clarify that we made an error regarding the original reporting not mentioning an allied contribution to the Carrier Strike Group.

Take it from the experts – a rebuttal

Let’s be clear: this is not a puff piece. At the UK Defence Journal, we’ve routinely exposed serious Royal Navy shortcomings — including long-standing availability problems with Type 45 destroyers, under-strength submarine fleets, and the glacial pace of shipbuilding. We’ve published exclusive stories on HMS Daring’s prolonged layup, Astute-class submarine delays, and the uncertainty around amphibious capabilities.

But factual scrutiny is very different from fatalism. Ian Proud’s central thesis — that Britain’s Navy is no longer credible on the global stage — is not just flawed, but actively misleading.

It’s also worth noting a small but telling detail: Proud refers multiple times to “HMS The Prince of Wales” — an incorrect rendering of the ship’s name. The correct title is simply HMS Prince of Wales. While this might seem minor, accurate naming is a basic standard in defence writing. In a piece that questions the Royal Navy’s seriousness, such slips — however unintentional — subtly undermine the article’s authority and suggest a degree of detachment from the subject matter being critiqued. Let’s continue.

“Half the Fleet” Gone East?

Proud writes with obvious disdain for the recent Indo-Pacific deployment of Carrier Strike Group 25 (CSG25), stating:

“Almost half of Britain’s fighting ships embarked from Portsmouth and Devonport to much fanfare. When I say half of the ships, I mean, specifically, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, and 1 attack submarine. That’s right, four vessels.”

This is not only hyperbolic — it’s factually questionable. The Royal Navy has over 60 commissioned vessels. “Fighting ships” is never defined, but even if one restricts the count to major surface combatants and submarines, four ships do not represent half the fleet.

Moreover, Proud fails to mention that the UK’s carrier group is not operating alone — it’s joined by frigates from Spain, Norway, and Canada, and supported by Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and NATO partners across the region. This is a coalition operation. That matters, because it’s perhaps the point.

CSG25 isn’t just about hardware; it’s about power projection, alliance leadership, and deterrence. Britain is one of only three countries in NATO with a carrier strike capability of this kind. Calling the deployment a hollow gesture — simply because other vessels remain in dock — ignores the strategic significance of sustained, long-range maritime operations, something Russia finds incredibly difficult to do, by the way.

Proud claims:

“The Royal Navy now has only one destroyer, two frigates… to defend British shores.”

This assertion appears to refer to ships available on a single day, not the fleet’s actual composition or typical operational posture. Vessels rotate in and out of maintenance, training, and deployment — a basic function of readiness cycles in all modern navies. A more honest assessment would note that the Royal Navy operates:

  • 2 Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers
  • 6 Type 45 destroyers
  • 8 Type 23 frigates
  • 4 Vanguard-class SSBNs
  • 5 Astute-class SSNs
  • Numerous OPVs, minehunters, and support vessels

Yes, some are in extended refit. Yes, fleet numbers are tight. But to reduce the Navy to “one destroyer and two frigates” is not only factually questionable — it borders on disingenuous. It erases the work being done in the Gulf, in the Pacific, in the Atlantic, and under the waves by the nuclear deterrent that Proud barely acknowledges.

Proud does refer in passing to the UK’s strategic submarine force:

“…not including the nuclear missile submarines that are Britain’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent.”

This line deserves more than a footnote. The Royal Navy’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) has been operational since 1969 without a single gap — a feat only matched by the United States. These submarines guarantee national survival in the worst-case scenario and are a critical part of NATO’s collective defence posture.

Their significance cannot be brushed aside just because they don’t fit the “seaworthy” surface fleet narrative Proud wants to advance.

Russia’s Rearmament

The article presents a daunting tally:

“Since 2011, Russia has taken delivery of 27 submarines, 6 frigates, 9 corvettes, 16 small missile ships…”

There’s no denying Russia has invested in naval recapitalisation. But the vast majority of those hulls are small missile ships, patrol boats, and coastal corvettes — vessels best suited for the Baltic, Black Sea, and Arctic, not blue-water power projection. Many lack the range or logistics support for sustained operations far from home.

And many are based in vulnerable, constrained environments like the Black Sea, where Ukraine has demonstrated that modern coastal defences can bottle up Russian vessels with increasing success.

By contrast, the Royal Navy may have fewer hulls, but its ships are designed for long-range, global operations, with carrier air power and allied interoperability at their core. Quantity has a quality of its own, Proud reminds us — but so does strategic depth.

Misjudging Modern Naval Power

At one point, Proud claims:

“Today, there are only three global naval powers: the United States, China, and Russia.”

This is a remarkable statement. Russia lacks a carrier strike capablities, extended blue water deployment capabilities and global basing. Britain, by contrast, is one of the only navies in the world with:

  • A carrier strike capability
  • A nuclear ballistic missile force
  • A global basing footprint (Gibraltar, Bahrain, Singapore, the Falklands)
  • Regular combined operations with US, French, Japanese, and Australian forces

Calling Britain “regional” and Russia “global” reverses the definitions of expeditionary capability and strategic endurance.

Procurement Problems, Yes — But Not Paralysis

Proud writes:

“The increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP will mostly be swallowed by the MoD’s bloated procurement programs that are typically delayed and always over budget.”

There’s truth here — procurement has been a persistent headache. But he ignores what’s being funded: the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, the Type 31 general-purpose frigate, Fleet Solid Support Ships, DragonFire directed energy weapons, and of course, submarines.

The National Shipbuilding Strategy Refresh and the formation of UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) are tackling these issues, imperfectly but actively. And despite delays, the UK is one of the few nations with an ongoing naval construction pipeline across multiple ship classes.

There’s no denying the Royal Navy is under pressure — from stretched resources, ageing platforms, and recruitment gaps. But it is also modernising in earnest:

  • Manpower is growing again after years of decline
  • HMS Glasgow, the first Type 26 frigate, is fitting out
  • CSG25 is demonstrating multinational power projection across half the globe
  • Directed energy weapons, UAV integration, and AI systems are being trialled and tested

The Navy’s strength lies not in volume, but in persistence, precision, and partnerships. That’s what Proud overlooks.

Proud’s concern that a U.S. pullback from NATO could overburden Britain’s naval resources is not without merit, however, given uncertainties around American commitments in 2025. However, this scenario underscores the Royal Navy’s critical role as a NATO linchpin, not a reason to retreat to the Atlantic. The Navy’s ability to lead multinational operations, as demonstrated by CSG25 and joint exercises like Steadfast Defender 2024, positions it to bridge gaps in alliance burden-sharing.

With two aircraft carriers, a modernising frigate fleet, and interoperable platforms, Britain can sustain NATO’s maritime presence in the Atlantic and beyond, even under strained conditions.

Realistic, Not Resigned

Proud concludes that:

“Britain would be better placed keeping its handful of ships in the Atlantic.”

That is not how security works in 2025. In an interconnected world, forward presence and multinational engagement are essential, not optional. The Royal Navy’s Indo-Pacific deployments aren’t vanity projects — they are a recognition that British and allied security are shaped on the high seas, not just at home ports.

To summarise: the Royal Navy is not without issues — we’ve reported on many of them. But to call it a shell of a service while praising a Russian Navy hemmed in by geography and beset by sanctions is, frankly, a misreading of both power and purpose.

The Royal Navy remains:

  • A convening power
  • A nuclear-armed deterrent force
  • A platform for allied cooperation
  • And a globally relevant military service

It may need rebuilding. But it is not irrelevant.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

140 COMMENTS

  1. It has to be said that it is absolutely true that RN is paper thin on surface escorts and submarines as some truly awful past decisions were made.

    And that view can be obtained by comparing ‘Robertson’s numbers’ from 1997/8 with current numbers. That is hard published HMG fact based on a proper analysis.

    It is, as you say, also true that T26/31 and FSS are funded and in build. But that doesn’t do anything for the tiny SSN numbers we now have.

    It also does nothing to rebuild the fleet to ‘Robertson’s numbers’ which are the real required force levels to persistently undertake the full range of real required taskings.

    I agree that describing Russia as a surface naval power is pure comedy as RN could take out its surface fleet in an afternoon. However, Russia does present a submarine threat and traditionally it was RN’s main task to deal with that and the mass doesn’t exist to do that.

    However, set against that there is a wider distribution of platforms such as P8 – so it is not a simple linear analysis.

    • The RN is very capable and would certainly constrain and hurt the Russian navy in the N Atlantic but I fail to see how the RN, today, would take out the Russian surface fleet in an afternoon.

      NSM is good but has range limitations and the RN lacks mass of NSM across the surface fleet.

      F35 with Paveway would have a very difficult time against Rus navy air-defence assets due to having to get well within IR tracking range to deploy PW IV

      Astutes are great but can’t be everywhere.

      • I think you are overlooking the other roles and modes that other missiles can have.

        You don’t necessarily need a specialised AShM to take out a ship. Any old missile that hits the primary radar or the bridge or magazine will do the job. The target is then crippled and then be finished off with helicopter launched AShM.

        So the priority is actually any *accurate* package delivery.

        There are 11 sets of eight NSM announced and it is likely that they will equip the T45s and T31s but it is possible they will be rotated to deployed ships.

        • Suspect the Russian sub fleet may have a lot to say about the ability of the RN to get close enough to use CAMM or even helo launched Sea Venom.

          Based on what’s been said in this thread there is no need for new Ashm or an increase in hulls numbers. Wiping out Russian fleet in an afternoon as-is is all that’s required.

          Beware arrogance…the greatest risk!

      • We wouldn’t be able to take out the Russian Surface fleet in an afternoon, but that’s because they’re too spread out.

        Realistically the largest fleet the RN would face is the Northern Fleet, which consists of:
        -Kuznetsov, which is probably never going to sea again.
        -1 Kirov Class Cruiser
        -1 Slava Class Cruiser
        -3 Udaloy Class Destroyers
        -3 Admiral Gorshkov Class Frigates
        -7 Corvettes (mostly small 1970’s era Grisha class)

        Calibrate this with a reminder that 1 of the Slavas was sunk by the Ukranians with a pair of Neptune ASM’s (which are more analogous to Harpoon) from shore, and yeah I think the RN could clean that mess up in an afternoon. After that we’d have to sail to the Baltic to take on the 1 Frigate and 26 Corvettes the Russian Baltic fleet has, but given that, with the exception of the 4 Stereguchy class Corvettes, those 26 vessels have little more than Manpads in the air defence role, even Paveway IV should deal with them.

        • I’d leave the Russian Baltic fleet to the Swedish, Danish, German and Finnish navies. All capable of defeating the Russian Baltic fleet easily.

          • In fairness the Baltic Fleet will probably be nulified by the various Air Forces, rather than the navies. Given the nature of the Baltic and the lack of SAM’s on the Baltic Fleet.

        • Understand the make up…issue is the Russian fleet as a whole would keep the RN surface fleet at arms length, primarily through use of its capable sub fleet. Intel from sub fleet fwd to longer range surface missiles would be problematic until such time as the 1 or 2 astutes that may be available have cleared the area. That won’t take place in an afternoon.

          If we truly believed that todaythe RN could eliminate the Russian surface fleet in an afternoon …then no need for an increase in hull numbers etc. Why spend 10’s of billions on such overkill? A steady drumbeat of 20 year replacement cycles would suffice.

          Reality is Russia will be learning from Black Sea experience and evolving / adapting. RN..and MOD cannot afford to get complacent or arrogant.

          • I mean a Astute carries about 30 Torpedoes and Tomahawks. As long as the Northern Fleet is sailing in one formation and an Astute or two catches them? That’s the Northern Fleet gone in an Afternoon. I’d also point out that the range of NSM is considerably higher than the range of a Russian Heavyweight torpedo.

            Also I don’t think anyone is saying that we need a lot more surface to surface combatants, unless I’ve missed something? People are asking for more ASW specialists, and Anti-Air Warfare specialists.

            Russia will be learning from the Black Sea? Sure. The lessons they’ve learned is to hide in port as far from the Ukranians as possible. That’s a great target for Storm Shadows.

          • every time I hear the words ministry of defence, I get twitchy it shouldn’t be renamed the ministry of disaster

        • I don’t think it’d even be necessary for the RN Escorts to risk going up there.
          I understand Russia has its Bastion concept of keeping its fleet back in the Barents and Kara seas, protecting its SSBN, while using subs, aviation, and missiles on the offensive.
          Airpower and SSN, including our Carriers and the RAF, f F35 had a proper ASM, could deal with the surface fleet, I’d not risk our escorts up there.
          Which is one factor when I’ve often suggested an ASM on ships isn’t the be all and end all, when aviation and SSN are the ship killers.
          Back in the 70s Cold War our Fleet Carriers had a NATO role going on the offensive towards the Kola, they’re not just pointless expeditionary assets like some make them out to be. I assume they have a similar war role today.

          • a big hole that shouldn’t be there assuming intelligence shows that th paper tiger that is the russian navy NATO forces will already be in place to anahilate the russian force in just hours (depending on the weather)!

      • The RN has a lot of CAMMs and they are actually useful in ASuW..a Mach3 100kg missile is going to make a mess of whatever it hits, it’s a lot of kinetic energy.. warships still tend to engage within the radar horizon.

        Then you have a sea venom armed wildcat…the RN have killed more surface ships than any other navy in the last 50 years mainly on the back off small ship flights armed with short range anti ship missiles.

        The asutes Cannot be everywhere.. but you would guarantee one would be in the Norwegian Sea area killing the Russian navy.. and a nuclear submarine can transit profoundly quickly into an area.

        In reality if the UK needed to it could get an Anti ship missile on typhoon very very quickly as most of the integration work has already been done.

    • two big aircraft carriers don’t make a navy a decent one has the ability to operate in any maritime issue from intervention or force the U.K by selling the Ocean and now taking the albions out of service has lost the ability to operate the royal marines in the role they exist for.reckless, irresponsible management of the national ability to protect itself and others, by slashing budgets and the procurement of abject rubbish is where the fault of EVERYTHING LIES at the MOD.

      • The Role they exist for? Given the move away from Battalion or Brigade OPS by UKCF, that’s a bit of a stretch.

        • every time I hear the words ministry of defI get twitchy it shouldn’t be renamed the ministry of disaster the argies were.buut I get your point

      • Recent forward presence prior to Highmast: chiefly the B2 Rivers, Lancaster and a Hunt class or two. Protector and Scott are out there too, although I wouldn’t say Scott has a presence tasking. We also see occasional deployments of a Bay or maybe Argus outside the European theatre.

        It’s not enough but it’s something. It would be better if we had frigates and destroyers to spare for distant jaunts, but we don’t.

    • every time I hear the words ministry of defI get twitchy it shouldn’t be renamed the ministry of disaster the argies were.buut I get your point

  2. The SSN problem could be quickly improved if they just stopped fannying around with the dry dock issue!

  3. I disagree with a lot of the authors optimism.
    Proud is probably not far off the mark with available warships. The government and admiralty include pointless vessels armed only with small calibre machine guns or no more than 30mm cannons. Seriously what are they going to do against any missile or medium or large calibre gun armed ships ?
    There’s always losses in war,these ships in deep refit would take months to be ready so counting them is misleading. The grandstanding of the type 26 is again misleading,the first ship is years away from being ready never mind the rest of the class. If the carrier group was destroyed what would that leave at sea ?

      • Yes, on the vessel. But that vessel does not act in isolation.
        Plus on the Carrier varied ESSM.
        Plus on the Carrier an Air group of F35 with ASRAAM and AMRAAM.
        Plus T45 escort/s with Sea Viper, CIWS, ESSM and Wildcat/Martlet.
        Plus T23 escort/s with CAAM, ESSM and Merlin & AA.
        They are actually the best defended airfields we posses.
        The Invincible’s had Sea Dart and it was deleted to make more room.

          • Electronic Support Measures, I think, not ESSM.
            The T45 carries signals intelligence kit in a similar vein to Rivet Joint, and similarly little is known about exactly what it does.

          • Hi SB.
            I was referring more to the ECM side whdn i mentioned ESSM.
            The T45 SIGINT capability you mention is SHAMAN.
            The FIC / FIXG at Collingwood deal with that side of RN Intell. ( Leydene Building )
            They are a modern day version of SCU Leydene at the old HMS Mercury, if you want a bit of background info.

          • My daily reminder that I don’t use the word ‘gubbins’ enough!
            Does the T45 have offensive ECM, then?
            Or more in the manner of spoofing ASMs?

          • Hi SB.
            No idea re offensive.
            I was adding the ECM, ESSM as I called them, to Jay’s comment at top that QECs “only” have 3 Phalanx, when RN ships have other defensive tools in the armoury.

        • to have a forward presence you need assets to place there.untjl the glacial place of building is addressed properly we’re stuck where we are.

  4. Such humour and ridiculous article from a guy like Ian who really do not know anything about military field, not a single truth. Even a thousand frigates will be totally destroyed if it not have other systems support or opponent mighty carrier group have enough supply and ammunitions. In fact, there is only three global sea power, US, China, UK. And only three countries have enough suitable oversea military bases for global presence which is US, UK and France. Russian navy without their SSN will be beaten by Italian navy without doubt.

  5. Believe your own opinion however it is dangerous trying to convince others.
    The Navy is a thinned out fleet expected to the government’s foreign policy that we are a global force.

      • Proves nothing of sorts.
        Only US and and eventual upcoming China have it. You are only a global force when you can deploy carriers in any place of the world 365 days per year.

        • The Royal navy has two carriers and a global network of bases so it can deploy anywhere in the world 365 days of the year. Or do you mean deploy every where in the world 365 days of the year?

          Because even the USN can’t do that.

          • Haha. No ships, sailors, pilots, aircraft for 365 days operating.

            RN is at maximum a raiding force.

        • China haven’t sent one of their new carriers to the Indian Ocean yet, and are unlikely to ever maintain one there permanently.
          They don’t have the same network of useful allies the US have in being able to keep CSGs out in Japan or the Red Sea for months on end.

  6. The truth as always lies between the two positions. The Royal Navy today is the smallest ever in terms of hulls, albeit with better capability. There is a building programme , a painfully slow one that will deliver 13 new frigates by 2035, by which time the T23’s will be exhausted. Two more Astute’s also to come. Apart from that there is nothing in the pipeline, at least not with construction underway.
    It IS true that the R.N. has a global capability, but again one carrier with 18/24 F35’s being deployed every five years is not a global capability to test the likes of the Chinese. If we are to be a true global power it requires the U.K. to form with allies a permanent naval force in the region. Can we do that?
    We now have, after the sale of Albion and Bulwark, no real amphibious capability, but Australia does and so does Japan. Future partners?
    Manning is improving but a hundred people here and there is not sufficient to bring out the truth strength of the ships we have available, certainly not in times of conflict. Could we “do a Falklands” No, we couldn’t. Sierra Leone?
    Five more T31’s would improve global reach, even if as the come into the fleet, the Rivers have to sacrificed. Also more aircraft, manned or unmanned, otherwise two carriers capable of deployment will not happen.

    • It never makes any sense to rate a blue water navy on hulls, gross tonnage is what matters.

      If you considers hulls then North Korea and Iran are the undisputed navy hegemony of the world closely followed by the Somali pirates.

      On a tonnage bases(discounting Russian rusting hulks) the UK compares very favourably on a global basis in third place with around 865,000 tonnes which is an Increase since the year 2000 when it had 700,000 tonnes (ref council on Geo Stratgey)

      • Personally, I think the opposite is true. Nobody is going to say “let’s put 10,000 tons in the Med” They are going to suggest a detroyer or frigate. In other words one or two ships, ie hulls. We can only be where we have a “hull” available.

        • You can think what you like mate that’s your right but the global strategic community and the vast body of naval doctrine disagrees with you.

          Tonnage has always been the measure of a modern navy.

          Tonnage is the reason the USN is a globe spanning blue water super power and China is still a regional green water navy even though China has many more hulls.

          ENATO has more hulls than the USA, more submarines as well but no one would pretend that European NATO is anything like as powerful at sea as the USA.

          • Calling the PLAN a regional green water navy clashes with their recent deployments beyond Australia, their significant carrier fleet and their massive auxiliary fleet. They also have a growing network of overseas bases.

            If the RN is a blue-water navy, the modern PLAN certainly is as well.

          • So we should congratulate the Tories for increasing the size of the Royal Navy. I understand now. Although we had more ships and submarines in 2000 the navy has actually got bigger since because of tonnage. Ironic really.

          • This is a complete load of bollox. Tonnage? You don’t know what you are talking about

          • The PLAN still doesn’t have much of a developed carrier fleet it’s largely experimental for now and its SSN force is lacking. That will rapidly change but it’s still a very long way from challenging the US and it’s hard to see how you can become a true blue water navy without global basing which it also still lacks.

          • China is not a green water navy..it’s a blue water navy that focuses on the pacific..which is half the planet..it’s a very European view to say because China does not spend a lot of time in the Atlantic it’s not a blue water navy.. it has a hell of a lot more ships deployed away from it than the European blue water navies… it’s just they are either in the pacific or the Indian Ocean.. infact china has a permanently rotating surface action group in the western Indian Ocean.. which is three ships two major surface combatants and one support ship.. that is replaced every 6 months with a new 3 ship surface action group..but one directly replaces the other so for most of the year china will have 2 surface action groups either in the western Indian Ocean or making its way to or from the western Indian Ocean.. it then now also seems to have semi permanently set up a small surface group based in the eastern Indian Ocean. It every year sends a surface group or single down the South Pacific chains, it also sends each year a single deployment to east Africa and Northern Europe and its deployed a carrier battle group out way past the second island chain.. which was a 4000mile round trip CBG deployment.

          • Actually the USN did a very good piece around the fact tonnage was an illusion and actually what matters is numbers and that in 28 major naval conflicts 25 times the victor was the side with the advantage in numbers..

            A 100,000 ton carrier is needed to provide air cover, it does not replace 10 major surface combatants. What it does is that it allows those 10 surface combatants to operate in or close to enemy air cover by providing the cover. but if the carrier and 10-surface combatants was fighting 20 enemy peer surface combatants that were already under their own air cover.. its essentially buggered and that is the situation the USN is essentially looking at facing in the western pacific… yes because the U.S. has carriers it can fight away from home.. what it does not do is magically make its 90 major surface combatants worth 180 major surface combatants.

      • The tonnage is massively flattered by two huge carriers and four large fleet tankers.

        Now we have lost
        Two Albions – which are quite big ships
        5 T23
        2 smaller tankers

        • Yes that’s why navy’s are measured in tonnage, big ships are much more capable and their level of capability increase as the cube of their displacement.

          5 river class OPV’s are far less capable than 1 Arleigh Burke class destroyer for 10,000 tonnes of displacement.

          • Jim – it doesn’t work purely like that.

            On you argument HMS Massive, a Death Trap class carrier, converted from an ex-BP tanker to a design by Max Hastings: using a load of old ISOs welded to the deck is a better naval ship than a QEC? Simply because it flies, The White Ensign?

          • I’m not the one coming up with measuring navy’s by tonnage. Every historian, naval treaty and strategist since the 19th century did.

          • Jim naval treaties restricted tonnage as part of a mix or restrictions to type, number and tonnage.. pure tonnage has never been a measure.. an Albion is 20,000 tons of expensive commissioned warships.. it would be dead to any one of chinas 70+ type 056 1500 ton corvettes. Do you think on its own a 10,000 ton Burke could fight of and win against 7 type 056s in restricted waters…. no it would lose..because it would end up a within radar range 20km knife fight and numbers would count.

            Context matters as does the mix of capabilities and requirements…the single most powerful and most expensive navel platforms ever build and SSBNs and they are functionally useless in war or for any military operation.

        • The 2 x Wave class were 32000 ton and capable of delivering 16000cums of F76/F44 fuel. A great loss and not replaced. To be a global Navy you need supply lines with ships and people. The RFA needs to stop relying on its present recruitment plans and Civil Service dogmatic nonsense and use commercial recruitment and grow. If they are allowed to do this the RN would then have a global potential!

    • Christ, please god not more T31 (pointless) class. The RB2s are doing a great job and anymore T31s will quite simply be there for numbers only rather than meet a requirement. Rather keep the RB2s and build more T26s/SSNs, but no more light frigates. If you want to keep Babcock busy get them to build a semi autonomous MHC/ASW Sloop class.

  7. I think one is over optimistic about the RN . Yemen is a perfect example of the RN no longer fit for purpose . I view Yemen as a defining moment , more so than Iran in the Gulf a couple of years ago where uk barely able to provide one ship. Yemen is the first time in hundreds of years where the RN has been unable to provide protection for UK shipping and vital trade . The UK was barely able to provide one ship for the Yemen with gaps in between. For the UK to protect its critical strategic interests abroad such as The Antarctic , Falklands , Ascension , St Helenas Islands to name a few as well as safe passage for UK commercial shipping through the Gulf and Suez the uk will require at least another 6 ships ontop if existing numbers .

    • Is it the RNs job to protect an international shipping lane… no it’s the international communities.. and that is what has happened.. to expect the RN to be able to protect every ship passing the Red Sea that may stop in a UK port is a ridicules proposition to be honest.. and not something it could have done on its own at its Cold War hight.

        • One could argue that not even its AAW ships had very effective AAW on their own outside of a supporting surface action group..

  8. Also there are several nations around the world expanding there naval presence and the uk is serious falling behind the new wave of nations . China is already entering the Mediterranean, Caribbean and the North and South Atllantic . It will be only a couple of years before China has a Permanent base in the North or South Atlantic. Somewhere in West Africa. I believe China is also pursuing one of the islands off Africa as well as the Carribean area. Then the UK will realise yet again what we already know , that the UK and Europe are short of frigates and destroyers

    • You said there are several nations expanding naval capabilities but you only mention one. Who are the others?

      Europe has 116 major surface combatants and its numbers are growing.

      How many do you think it needs to deal with China in the Atlantic?

          • When you look at the USA’s 85 major combatants then you realise how significant an RN of 30 combatants would actually be.

          • Agree, 30 surface combatants would give us the largest fleet in the Atlantic given how much of the USN is in the pacific and headed that way.

        • And Saudi Arabia’s multi year bombing campaign didn’t make a dent in them either. It’s almost like the Houthi’s, after a decade of Asymetric Warfare against an opponent trying to bomb them into the ground, know a thing or two about surviving long range strikes. But you know… facts and all that… difficult I know.

    • China has observed and taken note of how Britain created a large empire and controlled world events for 2 centuries: industrial dominance in manufacturing and telecoms, deep cultural and diplomatic influence through educational establishments and embassies, trade, foreign naval / military bases and a large and powerful navy. The Chinese are quick learners.

  9. Well said George, the Royal Navy force of the late 70’s and 80’s often seems to be held up as some benchmark of what a “proper” navy should look like however that royal navy was relegated to a regional navy primarily based on a single role of anti submarine warfare in the North Atlantic.

    Its ships were largely cheap and nasty low end even by the standards of the time. It struggled to deploy to the south Atlantic to conduct a medium sized out of area operation and was very lucky to get away with it which in no small part was due to the bravery and sacrifice of its crews.

    Given that it was facing off against a Soviet navy with up to 400 submarines, many of them nuclear, it was not even very large with just 50 surface combatants and 20 submarines.

    The Royal navy of today has an all high end platforms, many of them amongst the best in the world, Astute, t23/26, T45 and a much more balanced fleet than the 80’s.

    It’s aviation capability is now approaching a level beyond anything it had during the Cold War with two fully operational super carriers operating a genuinely world class fast jet as opposed to an assortment of war time emergency builds and refits or a cheap a cheery through deck cruiser force with little in the way of organic air wing capability.

    Certain commentators love to measure the navy and the UK in a vaccum or failing that some illusionary rose tinted vision of the past (when men were men, beers were cheap and Britannia ruled the waves)

    The reality is in comparison to our only local threat (Russia) the UK is in a massively superior position relative to where it was in 1990 or at any time during the Cold War.

    The only other conceivable major adversary is tens of thousands of miles steaming away and surrounded by other allied navy’s.

    Clearly there are loads of problems and areas we need to invest more in but that’s always been the case for the Royal Navy. The navy of today is in a pretty decent position compared to many parts of the pst and with a bit of extra sustained investment can get to a really good place in the next ten years.

    • I’ve made the point many times before that the RN of the ‘70s and ‘80s had a huge number of poor hulls that had some highly dubious equipment fitted and were too small to upgrade and there were too many hulls to be able to afford to upgrade them!

      So yes, the new hulls are all vastly superior but there are not enough of them.

    • ” It struggled to deploy to the south Atlantic to conduct a medium sized out of area operation and was very lucky to get away with it ”

      What a load of preposterous and opinionated rubbish. You will be telling us next that you were a Royal Marine tabbing across East Falkland next.

  10. Exercise Med Strike is currently showing what eNATO navies can do if they need to. It’s impressive, but perhaps in the wrong place – Russia doesn’t have any Mediterranean or Near East ports to operate out of so it’s difficult to see how they could be a strategic threat in those areas.

    Russia is more of a threat in the far north, but presumably ‘Med Strike’ could equally be ‘Arctic Strike’, with the French instead of the Italians. That still leaves Italy and Spain guarding our southern flank.

    Ian Proud’s disdain for everything British shines through in all his writings. George is right, in a few years the RN will have a high quality, modern fleet. More generally, eNATO will be much more powerful than it currently is. Until then, we’ll bumble through. DON’T PANIC!

    • “ It’s impressive, but perhaps in the wrong place”

      Hmmme well there’s that think about getting people to participate??

      So make it local and at a nice time of year?

    • Russia *had* a Mediterranean port and fleet until very recently, and it still has a Black Sea fleet, and still has allies in the Middle East, notably Iran.

      • Yes but in reality the Black Sea fleet will almost always be nullified by the geostrategic picture.. it cannot leave the Black Sea if nato does not want it to..

  11. Is he wrong though? The RN could not deploy a force like this in both the Pacific and Atlantic simultaneously. Or in both North and South Atlantic which is possibly more important to us. Its a choice of which region the force is deployed in. And even this force needs allied support, we simply don’t have the hulls to support it unless we accept it reduces availability elsewhere. So is he really wrong?

  12. George is right.
    The RN remains somebody amongst the worlds navies with capabilities few other nations have.
    It is just far, far too small.
    I’m always amused when Trolls here surface and deride the RN. I then often ask, out of 195 nations, name those with better? There are some, but not many.
    We are no longer a superpower, we are a medium sized world power, and there are several of those.
    Name the nations who can do a CSG25?

        • I did not include Italy mainly for the limitations of its carriers essential it’s only ever going to be carting an airwing of 1 squadron at best effort.. where as the UK, France and Chinese efforts can put in 3 squadrons. although you could say 1 squadron of 5th generation aircraft are worth 3 fourth generation squadrons… so maybe we should include Italy.. simply because of the 5th generation impact.

        • India has huge problems with competence and corruption.

          India could give it a go but it wouldn’t end well.

          The level of competence, maintenance and integration…..

          You can’t do that with people who have had someone else sit the tests for them…..most Indian service bods will, privately, tell you how bad it is.

        • I would not say India at present no, it’s carrier force is very limited its fixed wing aviation availability more so and old mig 29s of a ski jump are old soviet levels of aviation.. there is very little chance of an Indian carrier battle group deploying outside of its own region ( Indian Ocean).. I left Italy out because its carrier aviation is very small.. it will never be more than 1 squadron of 6- 10 f35 jets so although 5th generation its limited by number on its bitty carriers. China I included because it’s essentially moving beyond a few old soviet jets of a ski jump.

      • It will be interesting to see what Turkey comes up with over the next five to ten years. With 8 x 8,000 ton destroyers newly started building, and with submarines and a 60,000 ton strike carrier also newly under build, to join their 8 light frigates and 14 corvettes with building well underway, either they’ve vastly over-estimated their shipbuilding capabilities, or it’s going to be an impressive fleet.

  13. The most accurate description of the RN appeared in an article on the Thin Pinstriped Line website: ” part time blue water navy”..
    The author tends to be upbeat on most issues but in this case he is being absolutely accurate. The RN can generate an occasional CSG at distance from time to time and keep a warship or two forward deployed. But it’s support assets are now too limited- 1 FSS still out of action- to conduct operations at distance on a sustained basis.
    Arguing that the RN of the 1980s was a limited ASW fleet, equipped mainly to counter Russian submarines, misses the point. The only material threat at that time was the Russian submarine fleet. So the RN focus was entirely appropriate.
    But what are the threats in the 2020s and what assets does the RN need to counter them. Because of long procurement timescales, the RN now has 2 carriers intended to support expeditionary warfare as decided 27 years ago in SDR 1998. But other assets to support expeditionary warfare have been scrapped or disposed of. In part this is because after the obvious failure of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, the appetite for more has vanished. On the basis of too big( and expensive) to fail, we have kept the carriers even as the threat is now from the same source as in the 1980s – Russia, in particular its submarine fleet. But because of the glacial pace of building, our ASW fleet is pitifully weak with modern platforms years away from FOC. Meanwhile we are building 5 GP frigates intended to be forward deployed to replace OPVs( what extra ability they add, I’m unsure) with no ASW capability at all.
    The RN is, most agree, too small. But worse than that, it is illogical and unbalanced. A RN structured with a primary role of defending the UK, its offshore assets and undersea connectors, might look rather different.

    • You make a good point but the required support elements are already on order in the FSSS at present and with four state of the art Tide class in service. 7 support ships is plenty.

      The RN has no need to regularly deploy large assets like carriers outside of the Euro Atlantic area.

      Even when we controlled a quarter of the world and had 300 million people to look after in the Indo pacific we rarely deployed capital ships in the area. When we did we sent a large squadron of them normally once or twice a decade we have been doing the same thing since the 1920’s.

      Which is exactly what we are doing now and we did in 2021 and 2009 and so on.

      • The concern about the shrinking of the support fleet was the main thrust of the article I referred to. But you’re right to mention the new assets on order. Within 8/9 years the RN should be a better balanced fleet.
        You make a good point about how the fleet operated in peacetime in the days of empire. It is surprising to realise that in the 1880s, the RN had fewer than 60,000 personnel.

        • World population was a sixth of what it is now. To have the same proportionate effect it would be like us having 350,000 people in today’s Navy.

      • Thanks for sharing I did not know about the 60,000 figure. it’s also surprising to know that the Washington naval treaty capped the RN at 520,000 tonnes up to 1937 and today the fleet is 800,000 tonnes so the current RN is actually larger that what we had between 1922 and 1939.

        • The WNT limit was 520,000 tonnes of battleships and battlecruisers, not the entire fleet.
          If you included the historical equivalents of the RFA, all of the cruisers, etc. then it could probably have doubled the total.
          Interestingly we were also limited to 135,000 tonnes of aircraft carriers, which is about what we have today.

          • Also to get the RN to 800,000t you have to include the RFA, and I’m certain that neither WNT nor any of the LNT’s restricted the number of auxiliary ships.

    • Actually, a reasonable degree of optimism is warranted. Current HMG has announced an increase in defence budget to 2.5% by 2027, permitting modest improvements across UK services. More significantly, rumors abound in the press re an increase in the goal of NATO-wide defence spending to 3.5% of GDP, by a date certain. This goal may be announced at the NATO Summit in June. An increase to 3.5% of GDP would undoubtedly permit the significant expansion of the capabilities of all UK services, albeit w/ variable lag times. The only issue at that point would be CRINK.intentions and actions during the interim period. The Donald just may have unintentionally performed a significant positive service for ENATO. 🤔🤞

  14. Agree this was a weak piece of work.

    In defence matters as in politics more generally if you don’t deliver reliably on the basics then you open yourself to easy criticism from detractors.

    The Fleet Solid Support Ship procurement. The fact that frigate replacement is now absolutely last minute. The drop in SSNs available because of delays in the Astute programme. The capability gap in AEW. The continued failure to hit recruitment targets. The impending crisis in fast jet trainer capability.

    These are all fundamental issues for defence capability. They have been badly handled. It makes it easy to criticise.

    We need to get back to boringly consistent basic competence, especially in procurement.

  15. That was an excellent well balanced and well judged piece of writing there Gearge and perfectly sums up where we are with the Royal Navy at this moment in time.
    Everyone would like to see more escort ships of course but we are where we are but once the new frigates arrive and the type 45s are sorted and upgraded as commented on here already it will be very well balanced fleet second only to USN in quality and expertise.

  16. The UK could at a pinch put together another carrier strike group, but perhaps not much more. From that point of view you can see why someone might say half the British Navy is off to the Pacific.

    Yes it would have spare T45 and T23;vessels but would it have sufficient crew and helicopters to do other tasks?

    As someone else said the truth falls between the stated points. The biggest shortfall isn’t necessarily in shops but in trained and exercised crew. I know what I’m going to suggest isn’t what has been done in the past but for every three ships of a class we ought to have three full crews plus two smaller crews to manage the vessels while in dock.

    One vessel fully active would have two full crews doing four months on and four months off with the vessel being anywhere in the world as has been the case for some OPVs for several years.

    The second vessel would have a full crew plus sufficient other crew to allow the vessel to operate from a UK based for a year or two with must have crew elements rotating as required so that it can be sent to sea quickly if required in day 72 hours.

    The third vessel would have a part crew enough to make sure that it can be reactivated at some time in the future. This could include longer maintenance periods and upgrades but it not required also cover extended rest periods alongside. During rest periods it ought to be possible to activate and set off to sea within say 14 days.

    For 3 vessels with a crew of 200 that represents a personnel requirement of over 800 trained sailors to achieve one fully active ship, a second within 72 hours and possibly a third in 14 days. To get to 800 trained personal I expect that well over 900 possibly even 1000 personal would be required.

    • “ Yes it would have spare T45 and T23;vessels but would it have sufficient crew and helicopters to do other tasks?”

      Currently we have more available Merlin’s than ships to put them on. Hence why one is on Maud(?) for CSG25.

      • Are you saying that Queen Elizabeth could embark the same number of Merlins as PoW and there still be spare. I did see one was on a Norwegian vessel but I thought it was the frigate not the supply ship.

  17. Here’s a serious question. Who actually thinks conflict with Russia, China or North Korea will actually be a conventional engagement? If you want to be stupid enough to get into an actual UK/NATO/The world against these three we all know exactly what will happen.

    It’s why MAD exists, we all die in that conflict. Forget your hull numbers and personnel and finances. Global powers (which the UK is although much diminished) get into conflict with each other and we all glow in the dark. All it takes is one and then the pebbles fall.

    • Yes it will be conventional.. Russia and the west were in an existential conflict for 45 years in which their forces were in almost constant conflict and they never dropped a nuclear weapon on each other.., nuclear weapons are existential weapons only… and war between the U.S. and china will be about influence in the western pacific and nether nation will fight to utter destruction…

    • Probably a conventional distant blockade against China is the most likely military scenario.

      Beyond blockade no other conventional military action against China is possible without Russia on our side.

      It’s too big and too isolated to invade or even bomb very well.

  18. Proud article was a bizarre piece of misrepresentation.. considering Russia has not been able to build a surface combatant larger that 5400 tonnes since the end of the Cold War.. with only 4 4000 ton ASW frigates and 3 5000 ton vessels since the 1990s and one finished off soviet ship in that time the RN built the entire T23 fleet as well as the 6 T45s…even with the massive pause.. the RN in the late 2020s and 2030s will have built and runs a large array of 6000-8000 ton surface combatants.. something Russia is incapable of building. Russia is unable to build a carrier the Uk has 2 70,000 ton carriers.. Russia SSNs is only area of success are still a generation behind the Astute.. with Russia only having 5 of these SSGNs.. the rest of its 19 SSGNs and SSNs are 30-38 year old vessels..

    As for the RN not being able to compete with Russia in the pacific. What was Proud even on about.. Russia is a Pacific power with pacific ports..clearly the RN are a European navy could never compete in the pacific against a pacific power. It was a ridiculous statement and article. I suspect it was highly politically motivated p.

  19. Some mention in all this should be the Chagos Archipelago. This British Overseas Territory stands on the cusp of being given to Mauritius an ex-colony who are close to China. Mauritius never owned The Chagos. We did; it is the largest Maritime Reserve in the World. The history is well documented. It is currently a US Base. Who pays what currently is not stated. In future it will cost the British Taxpayer a huge upfront sum payout to Mauritius and also a huge rent. Is this in fact some murky deal with the know links to politicians in the UK, past and present? The UK opposition should state categorically they will hold a review after the next election and wont accept its give away.
    This Defence Asset and Maritime reserve stands at the heart of the Indian Ocean and is on the route to Australia and the Pacific. Stategically its therefore a very important place. In WW2 the British Fleet used it as base and safe anchorage. To give it away is not in the interests of the British people or of the Commonwealth or indeed World peace and is therefore quite possibly treasonable. Know what I mean.
    There needs to be a stop on giving it away with benefits to Mauritius!

  20. This article by the Journal gives insufficient credit to Responsible Statecraft, The Quincy Institute in Washington and the book that is the focus of Ambassador Proud’s article written by the former UK Naval Attache to Moscow. Capt (Rtd) David Fields. As such there is no context, let alone the acknowledgements one would normally expect, to allow the reader of the Journal to know about what was being written in a Geo-politics article from someone who does not normally write defence articles.
    Ian Proud is a retired diplomat of significance, of Ambassadorial rank and one of the very few fluent Russian speakers at FCDO.

  21. Proud’s article is worth reading in full. I disagree with some of the same points as George raises above, but a lot of what is written is accurate and worth considering.

    Proud’s article relates to the rearmament of the Russian Navy. We’re yet to see what the defence review will propose for the future Royal Navy, but it is likely there won’t be rearmament on the same scale. And that is certainly worth highlighting. The RN is currently suffering from a lack of escort ships, and is right on the limit with support ships also. Capabilities have been going down, not up. Overall RN fleet numbers have been, and still are, going down, Russian Navy numbers are going up. That is impossible to argue with.

    Arguments can certainly be made about “leathality” or whatever. But regardless of quality/training, etc., one ship can’t be in two places at once, no matter how good it is. That is a point that certainly needs to be made. Can the RN maintain a serious presence on a global scale? Just. Will that be possible in future? Given the state of UK finances, and recent political priorities, let’s just say I have my doubts. I hope I’m wrong.

    Mick

  22. The RN is no longer a global force but a regional power with carriers. It’s been run down and with so few escorts we carry little threat beyond the Astutes. For a maritime power to nearly gap ASuW capabilities and to commission the building of a cheap frigate class which has negligible ASW capability (leaving the vessels barely dissimilar to the Bacchante Class) tells me we’re nowhere near the top table of maritime nations.

  23. If you assume that ‘half the fleet’ means half the ‘available at a few hours’ notice’ major surface combatants then it’s just about a credible statement (assuming 2 out of every 3 ships are in refit, training etc at any given time). But as stated it’s (I suspect deliberately) misleading. Russia has been focusing on building missile corvettes with limited endurance and refurbishing obsolete Soviet platforms because they have apparently lost the engineering capability to build major surface platforms

  24. I whole heartedly disagree with this article. The Royal Navy’s “power” lies solely with what it can put to sea and engage with an enemy. Be it global, regional or local. It doesn’t matter how many hulls you have on paper, if they cannot put to sea or do not have any firepower to engage with an enemy, they do not project power. The Royal Navy as it is today would struggle to successfully engage anyone locally or regionally let alone globally. And, to add insult to injury we have to borrow hulls from other Navy’s to be able to project our prized asset on it’s current mission. Yes, we have some good ships and crews, and they would be an asset to any allied endeavor, but by itself?

    • Yes but the very important question is actually what hull can your enemy put out and deploy.. everything is in context and the enemy of the RN is the Russian northern fleet and Mediterranean fleet… so what can they actually deploy.. and the answer is not a lot.

  25. Something not mentioned is Russia’s advantage in long-range bombers and SSGNs, neither of which England possesses.

    • Umm Russia does not really have a significant and reliable long range navel aviation strike force and if it put that against an Elizabeth’s fifth generation air wing it would have zero long range strike capability after the first engagement. As for its SSNs SSGNs it has 5 modern boats split between the Atlantic and pacific.. compared to the RNs 7 concentrated in the North Atlantic.. the rest of Russia’s boats are 30-40 years old and generations behind the astutes.. even the five modern SSGNs are warmed up soviet programs and so a generation behind astute.. the are still sailing in victor 3s for goodness sake… essentially an SSN that is closer in capability to the old valiant and permit class SSNs.

      Russia knows very well it does not have the mass of good modern SSNs and SSGNs to take the fight to the RN and is planning very much to hide its eggs in its northern bastions and use them to throw cruise missiles at nato infrastructure.

      The present Russian northern fleet SSNs and SSGNs are

      2 Oscar’s from 1990
      2 sierras from 1990
      2 victor 3s from 1990
      2 mid-late 1990s akulas
      3 modern Yansen ( but from a soviet design and a generation behind Asute)

      That’s it 8 rotting 30-35 year old subs that would have struggled against the Churchill class when new ( essentially all 2-4 generations behind astute) and 3 new yansen that are still essentially subs designed in the 1980s with building starting in 1990…
      On a good day Russia could deploy 1 ok SSN into the Euro Atlantic and 1-2 death traps.

      • That’s one thought. Another thought is that just a couple of SSGNs and a half-dozen bombers could launch 100+ long-range range antiship missiles. Not exactly a trivial threat. And, the F-35B has half the range of many of those missiles, meaning they could be launched and the bombers flying back to base before they were even detected.

        As for age, your Type 23’s are long in the tooth and 32 CAMMs is barely good enough for self-defense much less defend a carrier.

        • How pray tell does a long range high flying none stealth bomber..find detect get a kill chain and launch a long range strike on a moving carrier without being detected..and yes the F35 has a greater range than the bombers air launched weapon.. the f35 is not going to sit above the carrier it’s going to move and intercept the bomber force.. remember any carrier battle group in the high north will be covered by high flying long range AEW aircraft. It’s not getting snuck up on by Tu-22M3s. As for the T22m3 force.. every one of those airframes and engines are at least 30 years old with only 1 so far being modernised..they cannot build them or even build new engines. They have probably at best 30 jets covering both the Atlantic and pacific, Europe and Asia with l believe 2 squadrons…

          As for your view of the CAMM how pray tell do you consider the most modern medium range air defence missile as barely good enough..32 CAMMs are a better air defence than most ASW frigates have.

      • I wouldn’t talk down the Yansens.
        Only one of the class was being built during the Soviet era, and the others differ hugely from it in important aspects.
        For example ships from #2 on have conformal bow arrays, whereas #1 has a cylindrical array and all Soviet-era subs have spherical sonar domes.

        • It’s not so much talking it down as being realistic where the Russian tec base is at.. essentially the Yasens were peers of the Trafalgar class..no one ever said the Trafalgar class are poor SSNs but they are a generation behind Astute and more importantly the northern fleet has only 3 of them..and in reality the mass ( remaining 8) are all SSNs from another age.

          • According to the Americans the Yasen sits between their latest designs and the Astute. Something similar to the 688i.

            I haven’t seen anyone claim the Yasen is worse that the Astute. If anything it’s quite a bit quieter, but maybe not as well run.

          • Your very much underselling the astute, it is considered at least as good as a Virginia and many consider it probably a better ASW platform than a Virginia, an astute is a completely different beast to an 688i and a generation ahead.. so yes a Yasen is probably a peer of a 688i but a 688i is not a peer of an Asute..

            It’s crude but you can pretty much chart SSNs as follows ( I’m leaving the French out to simplify)

            Virginia, Astute ( 21c fourth generation western submarines, the two most advanced and deadly submarines ever built)
            Seawolf
            688i, Trafalgar, Yasen ( with the Yasen being the latest sub started in the early 1990s)
            688, swiftsure,
            Permit, Churchill, Akula, Oscar, sierra
            Skipjack, valiant, victors
            Skate, dreadnought, Novembers

  26. What it comes down to is awful public perception, which the Govt have absolutely no desire to improve; and the fact that we just don’t have enough ships (or planes, or soldiers) and nobody is doing anything about it. I can’t remember the last govt that had any interest whatsoever in defending this country; it even seems as if bashing Britain is now in vogue, to the point that ordering anything would invite claims that we are warmongering!

    If we lose even a single ship, that is a disastrous loss of strength which would take years to replace, if it ever was. I’m sure future ships are going to be so big, so expensive and so multi-role we’ll only have two in our entire inventory. Meanwhile our enemies are massively multiplying their forces and can absorb losses that would break us instantly.

    • But they literally are doing stuff about it and have been since 2021.

      Budgets have been steadily increased since Borris Johnson and the defence budget is seeing its biggest sustained increase since the cod war.

      It may surprise people to know but the government is not stupid. Despite the hyperbole we are not actually under attack and our security position is very very strong even with out the USA.

      HMG along with all of our Allie’s is now reacting with significant amounts of resources to counter a potentially rearming Russia in the 2030’s and potentially dangerous China in the 2040’s.

  27. Meanwhile this week CSG25 will probably be featuring on the largest screens in all the Naval Ops Rooms on the planet as it passes through the southern Red Sea. It could be an event that may mark the move from theory to practice of a huge change in naval warfare and tactics with near shore AShM coming of age, or not. The RN is perhaps typical of many modern navies and many of them will be interested in how CSG25 fares.

    Over the past few weeks we have seen the USN in the Red Sea being rather risk averse, pulling back when needed, keeping both its carriers as far as possible out of harms way. Yet now we have Admiral Radakin and PM Starmer seemingly throwing caution to the wind and risking a full baptism of fire.

    The USN are doing everything in their power to help by stationing a carrier task group at either end. This operation is without doubt in my mind the reason the USS Truman had its stay extended for a week, the USS Eisenhower was moved from the Far East and the IAF just beat the stuffing out of the Houtis. We should expect more RAF Typhoon strikes as diversions.

    The efforts that the USN has had to make against the Houtis seems to show that they have some military capability so there must be a chance that they have been storing up munitions in anticipation for they will regard as the juiciest target possible off their coast.

    Hopefully it will come to nothing with CSG25 cruising safely south but unlike the French we are regarded as an enemy equal to the US. If it is attacked and the proverbial missile gets through what happens then? Almost nothing has been heard of the operation in the press/TV since leaving Portsmouth so imagine if, effectively out of the blue, a UK warship is hit. Starmer would be sunk, pun intended.

  28. What Proud did not go into is actually what is the RNs opposition and that’s the Northern fleet and I’m sorry we go on about the T23s being old.. but apart from a tiny number of surface combatants the Russians northern fleet is scrap metal

    The northern fleet has exactly 3 modern major surface combatants THREE yes THREE these are 5500 ton ASuW AAW frigates..

    Then it has
    3 udaloy class ASW destroyers that are 40-45 years old
    1 Sovremenny AAW destroyer that’s 35 years old
    1 Slavs class cruiser 45 year old death trap
    1 unmodernised Kirov class cruiser 30 years old and for the chop..

    Is nuclear submarine fleet is 8 antiques that are 30-35 years old and contemporary to first and second generation UK SSNs essentially death traps against modern western AAW.
    and THREE new builds that started life as 1980 soviet designs and if your being generous would be a generation behind astute..but at least able to hold their own..

    Finally 2 coastal attack electric submarines both 40 years old and 1 modern electric submarine

    So against best effort UK carrier battle group in the high north ( say an Elizabeth with 24+ F35s, 12 Merlins, 12 wildcats, 2 T45, 3 T23, 2-3 Asutes what could Russia bring

    One 30-40 year old AAW ASuW cruiser on a good day, with air defence that is known to have failed again 2 harpoon generation ASMs. 1 40 year old ASW destroyer that was designed to fight 1-2 generation western SSNs, 1 modern AsuW frigate, 1 modern but 1 generation behind an asute SSN and 2-3 40 years old death trap SSNs and 1 electric submarine.. probably 40 years old.

    So that’s a 6 ship modern 5th generation carrier battle group ( with the best ASW frigate and likely best ASW destroyer on the planet) again a 3 ship surface action group with only 1 modern ship.. then under the sea 3 modern SSNs vs one SSN a generation behind and 2 old 3-4 generation behind soviet SSNs + 1 electric boat that’s not going to ever catch a carrier battle group ..

    If anyone things the Russian northern fleet is winning that match I have a bridge to sell…

    Then once the new build T26 and T31s come on it gets even more unbalanced…

    • thanks Jonathan, that’s a great summation. I wanted to look at the details of the northern fleet for a while but had not gotten a chance to research it. Its even worse than I thought.

      Best not let the Treasury know or we will be getting cuts to the budget not an increase 🙂

    • Umm and your point on that one is ? Nation around the 10th of the size of the U.S. has navy a 10th of the size of the US ?

  29. Wonderful article George. Because of my schedule I always come to the debate late and when it is pretty muchall commented out. My only chirp to add is my agreement with the comment that shipbuiling times for the RN are beyong glacial and make no sense. OK as I have said one cannot expect us to match Spitfires and destroyers delivered in days and weeks in the modern era but from cutting first steel to operational service times aprroaching a decade, makes no sense! With the lightning pace of modern tech innovation, there is a very real possibility of ships becoming obsolete before they raise the White Ensign!

  30. As much as the cited article understates the capabilities of RN, I agree, this article overstates the comparison to other navies. French navy also operates nuclear ballistic submarines, and Italian Navy is also able to operate a CSG with either Trieste or Cavour (albeit all F35B) as recently done in Asia, supported by own destroyers and some 10 FREMM frigates and some 8 PPA which are effectively frigates

  31. It’s a little hard to take this seriously when it was blatantly written by ChatGPT. Thank you for the link to the article in RS though.

  32. One thing which we often forget is that it’s not what the members of this forum or our professional military or our politicians think that matters but what the aggressor in most scenarios Vladimir Putin in 2025 thinks he can get away with.

    We need to convince him to not start another fight be making sure he understands that he will loose. I’m not a military person but I fear that we often talk up our defenses too much, or talk them down too much both of which are not a good idea. When Putin says to his admirals can you blockade Europe there needs to be no hesitation when they say no. We need greater operational numbers and demonstrable superior quality to do that. Both matter you can’t get away with only one.

    Our biggest current weakness isn’t lack of ships but lack of crews able to operate at close to 100% efficiency 365 days per year.

  33. The premature and with immediate effect resignation of the 1st Sea Lord just before publication of the Strategic Defence Review is not a good sign! Press speculation is that he is very unhappy with the current underfunded state of the RN and the failure of the draft SDR to adequately address the key problems, and he is not prepared to toe the line and publicly and privately pretend to be delighted with its recommendations and defend the strategy from the criticism that is going to come from all directions. The government has set expectations for SDR 2025 far too high for the limited extra money that it has made available.

  34. And the f35 can drop bombs but that doesn’t make it a ground attack or close air support platform.

    Sailing around the world means nothing and doesn’t make us a global power. It exposes our weakness.

    • The f35 is a strike aircraft, its very purpose is to attack targets and yes organising, commanding and sailing a multinational carrier battle group around the world, with key engagement in that process from nations across Europe, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific is one of the things that very much does make you a global power, the very nature of the act proves that…your essentially saying just because a car drives at 70mph down a motorway does not mean it’s a car that can drive at 70mph..

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