The Ministry of Defence is in advanced discussions with the US Government to procure the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II laser-guided rockets for the British Army Air Corps’ AH-64E Apache fleet.

Kevan Jones, Labour MP for North Durham, recently questioned the Secretary of State for Defence about potential plans to acquire cutting-edge weaponry for the Army Air Corps fleet of AH-64E Apaches.

Specifically, Jones sought information on whether the Ministry of Defence was considering the purchase of the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II laser-guided rocket system.

In response to Jones’ query, James Cartlidge, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, confirmed that the Department is indeed in advanced discussions with the United States Government. Cartlidge stated, “…the Department is holding advanced discussions with the US Government with a view to procuring the APKWS II laser-guided rocket system for the AH-64E.”

I recently reported that the US Government has greenlit a potential Foreign Military Sale of the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II (APKWS-II) to the United Kingdom, with an estimated value of $31.2 million.

US approves $31.2m APKWS-II rocket sale to Britain

The proposed deal encompasses up to 768 APKWS-II All Up Round (AURs) (Single Variant), alongside support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, transportation, and engineering, technical and logistical support services provided by the US Government and contractors.

George Allison
George has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University and has a keen interest in naval and cyber security matters and has appeared on national radio and television to discuss current events. George is on Twitter at @geoallison

51 COMMENTS

  1. Interested in whether there are any UK/European alternatives that have been snubbed in the way Brimstone was for JAGM? Is there something inherent in US designs that makes integration of non US tech too expensive?

    • The JAGM over Brimstone issue keeps getting brought up with most of the comments relating to British industry over US. Brimstone was initially the preferred option, it was where we initially wanted to go. However, during weapons integration trials it was glaringly obvious that MBDA hadn’t been able to meet the requirement, mainly in the max effective range area. What needs to be kept in mind is that Brimstone was designed and is optimised for launch from fast air and like most air launched weapons with a rocket motor relies on the forward momentum of the platform. The forward speed of AH when firing a missile is significantly slower than a fast jet as everyone knows.

      Brimstone does have a better effective range than legacy Hellfire that we had been using (K1/K1A and N) but a lesser range than JAGM/newer HF variants, in most cases between 4-6 km. BS1 was pitched at having a 12km range from rotary platforms and BS2 something around 35km, not even close in trials! Then there was a huge issue with integrating the launcher on to the aircraft, the cost would have spiralled ridiculously. There is still work ongoing to see if BS can be modified to fit the existing launcher, if so then that gives another option but the option to go with JAGM makes complete sense and was the direction that the Corps wanted to take post trials.

        • Grinch, no problem. I was a huge advocate of putting BS on Apache having used them in anger in Afghan. Unfortunately the results from integration trials was really disappointing.

          There was a lot of pressure from the higher echelons of those in blue uniforms to push ahead regardless. At the time there were too many in defence (Land and Air) who viewed AH as an air asset, mainly because of its role on Herrick where the bulk of its work was in essence providing CAS. This hangover lasted quite a few years post Afghan. Fortunately the Corps has re-cemented its position back where it belongs in the land environment. There was obviously a very heavy RAF presence during integration trials. GR4s and Typhoons were already operating BS (extremely effectively (sort of) and were looking ahead at later iterations of the weapon. Getting the army on board would save the Crabs money etc etc, and as the capability owners would have had a lot of influence over any future UK Attack Helicopter projects.

          • I really don’t get why we have effectively 3 procurement processes, effectively competing with each other. Neither service is capable of winning a war alone, the decisions should be made based on what is best for the overall miltiary need rather than what is best for one of the services over another, just seems stupid especially now that all 3 services are so small.

          • But that is why you would ideally have specialists within a common procurement structure, to ensure all the requirements for a specific platform are considered and not just those from one service, but equally the specifics of the 3 branches are fully considered.

          • Sorry Steve I’m not quite sure what you’re getting at. Are you suggesting that we work to integrate ‘a system’ for use across all 3 services or procure the ‘best system’ for that individual services requirement?

          • No, I’m saying any tool we buy needs to be procured to strengthen the overall armed forces and not just the needs of a single service. It feels like having 3 each service is buying for their own needs rather than considering the whole. If a war happens it’s not a single service going to war it’s the country as a whole.

          • But that is the issue. The three services have very different needs because their operating landscapes are obviously very different. There are certain/many options where ‘a system’ can be integrated to provide effect for all three services but undoubtedly won’t/can’t be optimised for all 3 so there will always be compromises. My personal opinion is that we should be optimising every ‘system’ to the individual users requirements rather than trying to come up with a ‘one size fits all’, which invariably never fits anyone well enough, and rarely saves money because the amount of work involved in developing it to the point of delivering a pan service but sub-optimal solution.

      • Issue was integration was done on the Apache-D (which was a hybrid British-US tech) and Boeing wanted a fresh integration fee (of £70m) for integrating on the Apache-E (pure US), while MoD was arguing they shouldnt have to pay twice for integrating the same weapon on the same platform. Combine with an argument where the RAF and Army didnt want to share a common weapon pool as they thought it would result in fewer total being ordered as a cost saving. Brimstone is the better missile than JAGM, twice the range when fired from helicopters (12 miles vs 5 miles) and half the unit cost (£150k vs £250k).
        If your ordered a thousand rounds the integration fee at £70m would have been a 50% increase on the price of the ammunition at £150m (total £220m) so they decided to just purchase the JAGM which was around the same cost but lower risk and didnt reward Boeings money grabbing attempt.

        • The RAF very much wanted a common weapon pool and were pushing extremely hard for it. As I mentioned in an earlier comment, the RAF being the capability owners would have had huge influence over any future AH development, something the Corps was never going to entertain.

          Regarding weapon effective range, neither of the 2 options at the time could meet the Corps requirement, both fell short, however JAGM out-performed Brimstone both in range, which was quite a way short of MBDA’s claims and in hit success rates. I can’t remember the exact figures but JAGM obviously out performed the current (at the time) in service HF with an optimum engagement range increase of approx 2km. HF’s optimum engagement range was around 6km, 2 km short of its max effective range. JAGM was achieving same success at 8km which was also listed as its max effective range at that time (still significantly short of the Corps requirements). Bear in mind also that the MoD were already aware that JAGM MR was on its way.

          There was no real issue with the integration being done on D model because the M299 launcher has been retained for E model (unless this has changed and I wasn’t aware) and D could accept JAGM. BS would require a whole raft of changes that as you said would have cost a lot of money.

          • I wonder why Ukraine hasn’t been pushing for Western Attack helicopters? Or have these requests just not made the news like fast jets have.

          • Can ask if you think 8km is really an adequate max engagement range for air launched anti-tank? Just seems to be very short to me and quite risky. Are there any planes for an ER version?

          • The Corps requirement was for a significant increase in range. Neither JAGM or Brimstone could achieve it, however JAGM performed better which caught many off guard, especially with the ranges that MBDA had claimed. However JAGM-MR will be a significant step change. It goes back to the sensors and fire control system which have their limitations and not necessarily the capability of the weapon itself.

          • Thanks for the info in this and your previous post. I’ve not heard any of this before, and I’ll admit that I’m one of those vocally critical of the choice of JAGM over Brimstone.
            Disappointing that stated abilities of the missile don’t match reality, but fundamentally glad that we’re making wise procurement decisions.

          • The biggest persuaders in this decision actually came from the blokes in the AH transition team who were all very very experienced AH jockeys and tech’s, very switched on frontline operators who knew what was needed. It was quite a battle but good sense fortunately prevailed. As I mentioned previously BS was initially where everyone wanted to go (including and none more so than the RAF) but it turned out to be the least favourable of the 2 options for AH, epic piece of kit on a fast air platform and due to my previous I’m a massive fan but I think the right decision has definitely been made.

      • JAGM is an American Brimstone rip off!. The US expressed interest in purchasing Brimstone after witnessing its successful use.
        Congress blocked the sale. This comes as no surprise, as the lobbying system in the USA prevents US domestic suppliers losing business to foreign competitors.
        The key here, is, if the US control the platform and weapons integration and, if, for example there is a weapon system that is better than domestic US offerings, The US simply block integration of that weapon to their platform.

        They do this in a variety of ways 1. Cost of integration being prohibitive in which case the US offer their domestic weapon and stress the benefits of commonality, eased logistic chains, joint interoperability, existing integration etc. Think JAGM. 2. Delay integration while they rush to develop, test and integrate a US produced competitor> Think AIM260 F35. – METEOR was to be integrated by 2025. HMG have said now 2027 with probably further slippage. This now looks like 2032. by which time they will have AIM260 in service and offered to senior partners.
        This has two effects initially to stop exports of competitor products and eventually put them out of business, and secondly to ensure only US products are used on US platforms. It gives the US total control.

        • I think its a bit of a stretch to say that JAGM is a Brimstone rip-off. By that logic Brimstone 1 was a rip-off of Hellfire L. Strange how we referred to Brimstone as ‘UK Hellfire’. Also DMS Brimstone was released as a UOR (because of the ROE requirement to have a dude with eyes on the target) after the US raised the requirement for JAGM, so again it can’t be suggested that they ripped off a British system.

          I agree in part to some of what you say in your second paragraph, however you need to remember that Brimstone has been trialled on AH. The decision to choose JAGM was nothing to do with the US not allowing BS to be integrated on to the platform. The two main drivers were firstly cost, yes the Septics would have charged an astronomical amount to integrate it. The launchers would require a complete redesign (worth mentioning here that JAGM allows for all other variants of Hellfire to still be used, Brimstone would have removed this capability). Secondly, JAGM performed far better in trials than Brimstone. We can keep hammering the if’s and buts but as I mentioned in an earlier post JAGM became the preferred option of those who were ultimately going to use it.

          • I have no access to trials data now so will have to accept what you say! Congress blocking US purchase of Brimstone was a reality. (and in actuality any missile not manufactured by the US even should there be an MoU in place!).
            I have worked in UK defence manufacturing for forty years and have witnessed US protectionism first hand.
            Where we develop good systems/weapons the US will often feign purchase interest in order to gain as much data as possible.

            We need to ensure ITAR free/ Congressional approval free UK/European systems. We have the capability and need to keep it.

            Delaying integration of foreign weapons to US platforms is just one way of blocking UK weapons sales.

            Personally, I query the huge sum being spent on AH64E and associated weapons (my godson was an AH64 pilot) Particularly given the pace of change in UCAV/drone/loitering munitions market. The E is eye wateringly expensive. There is an argument for buying more wildcat.

            Likewise, Ajax. We destroyed our A vehicle manufacturing to give a US firm a contract! Bizarrely, whether due to collusion/corruption or other more mundane issues. A contract for development and production was placed with no Parent company guarantees, no ESCROW account, No break to show completion of development milestones prior to production contract award. GDLS are laughing all the way to the bank – they have HMG over a barrel and know it. I worked on VERDI 2 – we could have had that in service 15 years ago on a chassis recognised as world class – and many of the Ajax capabilities. All this even though DSTL warned (absolutely correctly) of the vibration problems. Ajax is too big, too heavy too noisy and suffers too much vibration which will drive reliability issues and early subsystem failure. It has no APS or remote drone buddy and can’t be air deployed.

            GD’s performance on MORPHEUS will make Ajax look good I predict!

            Rant over!!

  2. An excellent piece of kit to have in the arsenal. Once intigrated, we can leverage on Uncle Sam’s stocks when needed too.

    Common sense procurement..

    • Agreed, also means that a much cheaper and lower yield munition can be used on lighter armoured targets rather than lumping a very expensive missile in to them. far more bang for buck on a congested battlefield.

        • I think around $25k per unit (around 80% of that cost is the guidance module). Looking at the numbers being procured it will be coming with a substantial support package.

    • Disagree John Brimstone stocks are widespread and used by allies. Introduction of another weapon complications logistics and increases costs We damage our sovereign capability for US gain – after all JAGM was only developed because congress blocked purchase of Brimstone. We are a hostage to the US on AH64 weapons integration which is rapidly becoming a ludicrously expensive platform. We would be better using a domestic platform.

    • I have concerns about that concept. Look what happened with war in Ukraine. Huge quantities of 155mm ammunition were gifted to Ukraine. NATO and allied stocks have been run down. US manufacturing cannot replace those stocks within a 3-5 year timeframe.
      Imagine a major conflict with China with allied countries like Russia, North Korea, Iran and possibly some African countries.
      I can’t imagine we would get APKWS 2s from the USA under those circumstances. Ergo we should have ordered a large war contingent stockpile and requested UK production facilities.
      Seems HMG have done their usual minimum commitment. It’s all a smoke screen. HMG declare Apache is fully armed. Reality is it’s fully armed for a few sorties then runs out of ammo.

      • I see your point and agree with your hypothesis Mr Bell.

        I would say that everything these days is being sized for policing and nothing larger than limited interventions (size and timescale) amphibians operations with Carrier strike, or Army Brigade level ops, outside of an emergency surge to light division.

        I don’t agree with the general thrust, but that seems to be where we are lowering our capabilities to these days.

        The limited number of rockets procured is probably enough, with rolling orders for replacement.

        I would have thought that our current somewhat limited force structure is probably causing some concerns as to our ability to provide enduring capability to NATO if called for.

      • So we need to remember that these are in addition to other warhead types such as PD and Flechette. Again we in the UK tend to be over cautious in regards to flying hours and time-ex of ammunition. I cannot see that we would be carrying full launchers of 19 rockets, we’ve generally always mixed PD and Flechette (and MPSM before we got rid of them). Weapon loads obviously change dependent on mission. I can’t remember exactly the zone layout on the launchers but I would expect maybe 3 of these rockets per pod with the remainder being either PD or Flechette or a mix of both. Again they’re precision guided as opposed to the other rocket types so i wouldn’t expect initial inventory numbers to be in the thousands, especially as we’re not currently deployed on operations.

  3. To anyones knowledge has apkws 2 been adapted to the 5 inch zuni or 130mm rockets and could that form of laser guidance work in a mist or sea fog kind of environment at say sea level?
    Apologies for the novice question but its had me thinking about it for awhile now

  4. Pardon my ignorance on this but the JAGM’s 8km (?) range seems woefully short to me. Shouldn’t it be more double to triple this or at least to12km? I think Greece has gone for the Spike NLOS which is up to 25km on their Apache’s. Happy to be corrected on any of this and limits of helo systems capabilities.

    • Current Spike NLOS (6 Gen) is 50km range from helicopter. 30km from land.
      If JAGM range is 8km it do not make sense, that is Hellfire range and not good enough.

      • Thanks Alex, I could be completely out of whack here. If Spike NLOS 6 gen is 50km why the hell are we using JAGM? Is it just cost? Why expose our limited helos to unnecessary risk? Sounds pretty bloody stupid! Time for JAGM – ER – NLOS!

        • I tried editing my last response but it wouldn’t allow me.
          You mentioned earlier about the systems on the aircraft which is a good point. If I start with Hellfire. When we run a range we require a certain distance (I won’t say what that is) which is significantly more than the stated 8km max range, because the weapon is capable of travelling further, however the sensors and fire control system are effectively ‘maxed out’ at the 8km range. And to go back to one of my previous comments, optimum range was 6 km, so shorter again. I’ll caveat that by saying that was for D model Apache, E being a very different beast.

        • Because British Army is a bit old fashioned and in UK things have too many rules. BA often appears more as a bureaucratic/credentialist organization than a military one.

          US Army have Spike NLOS and Greece just bought a big order for their Apaches and small boats. Note this do not deny the need for JAGM you can have 4 JAGM for 2 Spike NLOS so an Apache can take 16 JAGM or 8 Spike NLOS for same performance.

        • Size difference on those two rounds is pretty significant- if you Google photos of the Apache test firing Spike. More space = more fuel = more range.

    • So bear in mind NLOS (Non Line of Sight). Our (UK) ROE in a lot of instances requires an eye on the target the whole way through the engagement process, either by the firing ‘planting his eye on a tube’ or continually observing via another method (EO sensor, targeting pod etc). This is the reason that Brimstone 1 couldn’t be used in Afghan and subsequently was upgraded with a dual mode seeker (all Brimstome engagements were laser guided).

      In order to use Spike-NLOS with these constraints applied, the aircraft would have to be within the engagement range of comparable weapons such as JAGM or HF. Now there is definite utility in having a system such as S-NLOS when not constrained by those types of ROE but again we start going down the path of having to integrate different launchers (role changes are a huge engineering burden at the best of times, having to do this on warfighting operations would be horrendous, as would the logistical burden of moving that role equipment around the battlefield. And we don’t have the platform numbers to dedicate to different weapon types. Then there is the cost issue again of the integration and the weapon itself.

      I would always be wary of what is claimed to be a max or effective weapon range. I have seen some weapons effectively engage targets way beyond stated max range, others hit their max range but only under absolutely perfect and well controlled conditions which would almost never be achievable on the battlefield; and then others that where nowhere near what was claimed.

        • Quentin D63 No worries. I have to be slightly obscure with what I write sometimes as I’m still involved to a degree but hopefully I can give enough to paint a picture without compromising anything.

          Something worth mentioning is the lack of collaboration between industry players, when for example the munition is produced by Company X but the launcher is produced by Company Y and the targeting system by Company Z.
          I’m working on an EW project at the moment which has 3 main suppliers who provide different key components to the common system (not even including the number of providers who supply smaller but no less essential parts). This project was supposed to be completed March this year but will likely over run by 2 years because they will not speak to each other.

          • All fascinating stuff. Good read. Thank you. I’ll try not to suffer from “extended range envy” again…as I have with Harpoon, CAMM and JAGM…lol.

          • I’ll ask an innocently, why? (won’t they speak to each other). A response might be obvious to the insiders, and / or a can of worms anyway, so it might not be the right platform. Nevertheless, I’d appreciate your feedback, even if bleeding obvious from your perspective.

          • On major programmes it’s normal to have many projects with many suppliers. The programme management office and the vendor management team are responsible for the the project charter, deliverables and roles & responsibilities, supported by legal. The R&R will set out what is expected including reporting, escalation and general communication. Protection of Intellectual Property rights may be covered. Obviously Defence contactors will have additional Security compliance requirements too.

            On Crossrail there were more than 300 contracts serviced by different suppliers some joint ventures. This was so that the £16Bn budget was never at risk by the failure of one supplier. As one of the suppliers who delivered on time to budget and quality it was disappointing that some did not. Is revenging legacy infrastructure hard and unpredictable, yes it is. In the end nobody could have predicted the Pandemic and it’s many impacts. It was correct to apply an abundance of caution to public transport innovation,, even if that’s a couple of £Bn.

          • Good question and I can only really give you an opinion based on what I see.
            If I use one of my current projects as an example. Our main supplier has been providing the current requirement for a long time and have generally done a decent job. I’d estimate that they are solely responsible for about 65% of what goes in to this particular system but rely on other suppliers to provide the other areas, so there is a degree of crossover between these suppliers in relation to integration of system parts. Over time the ‘lesser’ of the suppliers get better and become able to supply more of any potential future system, to the point where we are approaching obsolescence and require this new system and these previous ‘lesser’ suppliers are now competing harder to win the contract, however, they now require input from the supplier who is currently providing the requirement and who have had their nose put out of joint because the long standing contract that they are providing may be drying up. It’s competition pure and simple.

      • So bear in mind NLOS (Non Line of Sight). Our (UK) ROE in a lot of instances requires an eye on the target the whole way through the engagement process, either by the firing ‘planting his eye on a tube’ or continually observing via another method (EO sensor, targeting pod etc). This is the reason that Brimstone 1 couldn’t be used in Afghan and subsequently was upgraded with a dual mode seeker (all Brimstome engagements were laser guided).

        Makes no sense, how do RAF can fire a Storm Shadow then?
        or even more prosaic BA : artillery?

        With Spike NLOS you can always divert the flight.

        US Army is integrating the Spike NLOS is their Apaches it gives a great benefit to be able to fire behind a mountain.

        • Because Storm Shadow is a completely different concept as a strategic effect (a cruise missile with target data pre-loaded). The crabs don’t just cut around the sky firing Storm Shadow at anything that pops up. The use of SS is usually cleared at Ministerial level. Each target goes through a targeting board. AH engagements (referred to as a combat engagement) generally occur at the tactical level, at relatively short range, in a very short decision making period, and where the ROE is held in the cockpit. An AH crew will always try and identify ‘an off target safe area’ to dump the weapon if something changes in the target area.
          We can also fire from behind cover but the target will be designated by another sensor. I’m not 100% on how JAGM operates. Again you have to consider US v UK ROE profiles, we have significantly more constraints, which isn’t always a bad thing.

          • Still do not not make any sense, any missile have more precision than a dumb artillery round/MRLS rocket and those are used tactically and some are much more destructive than a missile in Spike category.

          • When GMLRS and ‘dumb artillery’ is used tactically it is always controlled by an FST observer or FOO party in old money, so an observer who either has eyes on the target or is observing the target using another sensor ie. UAS or fast air using it’s targetting pod in a Non-traditional ISR role. Again, the theatre ROE and acceptable TLE, that is the Target Location Error will dictate what munitions and level of control is required to prosecute a target. level of destruction has nothing to do with whether we can see the target or not, that is to do with acceptable levels of collateral damage.

            In a previous life I was a Coy (FST) JTAC, TACP JTAC in a BG and BDE Fires cell and a TF Targeting cell. It isn’t just a case of whacking a ‘precision munition into a target and all is well.

            In the case of SPIKE-NLOS, we’ve had it for years, EXACTOR, it was based in one of the patrol bases that I had the misfortune to be be holed up in. There’s a reason why we referred to it as ‘Exaggerator and Approximator. absolutely useless in supporting troops in contact because of the process the operators had to go through before firing live. 3 x dry runs on to a target using a computer simulator before actually firing the missile. From the point of a fire mission being called it was regularly taking 15-20 minutes to fire a missile and the hit rate was awful.

            If you want an idea of what is involved have a look through JSP 900 or NATO AJP-3.9. It is far from just having what we assume to be an amazing weapon system or munition, that’s the easy bit. The difficult bit is the constraints that the targeting and engagement process puts on us.

  5. Just one for the UKDJ admins.

    AH operates in the land domain (Army) but I notice that articles always land in your ‘AIR’ area. I get that it comes across as a bit pedantic but this is a genuine battle that has been going on with the 2 services for a few years. All a case of C2 and the AAC sits firmly within Land C2 and not Air.

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