UK ‘may be out of tank game’ within next ten years

The war in Ukraine has led to challenges to many of the prevailing main battle tank (MBT) design, philosophy, and doctrine orthodoxies.

In particular, the near impossibility of adopting the Western manoeuvre warfare approach to armoured warfare without air parity, if not air superiority, has been plainly demonstrated. 

Of special note has been the impact of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones on the battlefield. These grew into a “threat vacuum” in which they initially had few natural predators, although it is now being filled rapidly by anti-drone countermeasures. Nevertheless, their introduction has posed some uncomfortable questions.

At the same time, western MBTs—Challenger 2 and 3, Leopard 2, and M1A2 Abrams—have become highly sophisticated and increasingly expensive, to the extent that they are much less numerous in their respective armies than we might wish. With a ballpark price of $15-$20 million per tank, few countries have the means to procure large fleets of them. 

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So, with MBTs now ever more complex and sophisticated and expensive, and therefore procured in smaller numbers, is the West in danger of putting all its eggs in one basket, as it were? 

Traditionally, MBT design has been based on the triad of firepower, mobility, and protection  (plus reliability and availability if you want to extend the parameters). Nations have given differing emphases to these attributes depending on their perceptions of lessons learned from previous conflicts, primarily the Second World War.

Britain, for example, reflecting on its tanks having proven to be inferior in firepower and protection to their German counterparts, majored in those attributes at the expense of mobility, as exemplified by Centurion and Chieftain. Germany, on the other hand, having been overwhelmed and outmanoeuvred by larger numbers of Soviet T-34s and US-built Shermans, went for mobility in their Leopard 1 and 2 models at the expense of protection. 

Protection, however, has usually been focussed on the frontal arc of MBTs, where historically, direct-fire anti-tank weapons have been most likely to impact. The experience from Ukraine, however, and before that, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suggests that this may no longer be the case. MBTs are vulnerable to attack from 360 degrees from smart weapons and also from above and below. In effect, the threat spectrum is a sphere around the vehicle.

Now, the historical practices of anti-mine techniques and the proliferation of active protection systems (APS) and counter-UAV defences have provided increased levels of protection against these threats, but perhaps it is time for a more fundamental reassessment of how MBTs might be protected. Does it make sense anymore to have the heaviest armour in the frontal arc? Should it not be spread evenly across the vehicle?

Tank-versus-tank encounters have been rare in the Ukraine war, and most losses are attributable to the aforementioned drones, smart missiles, artillery rounds, and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), which can arrive from virtually any direction, especially in urban combat. This surely calls for equal and all-around protection, with the high-velocity tank round threat at a lesser level.

At the same time, the widespread adoption of autoloaders for future designs and the likelihood that they will follow the Russian T-14 Armata innovation of a fully automated remotely controlled turret with the crew housed in an armoured ‘capsule’ in the hull presents other possibilities. In addition to weight reduction it also allows for a lowering of the tank’s profile. But it does not reduce the tank’s vulnerability to attack from above (or below, for that matter). And I do realise that currently remote turrets are not cheap.

Weight reduction is important. Ukrainian crews of western MBTs in the current conflict have commonly complained that their NATO-sourced tanks are too heavy, weighing 65-80 tonnes in the theatre. This affects their strategic and operational mobility, where transportation infrastructure like bridges cannot support them, and battlefield and tactical mobility, where they routinely bog down in the softer terrain, unlike their Russian-designed equivalents.

Accordingly, I believe there is an argument to be made for a paradigm shift in Western designs towards smaller, less expensive, and more numerous MBTs in the 40-45 tonne category featuring remotely controlled turrets, crews in heavily protected compartments in the hull away from ammunition storage, a more even distribution of armour to counter the 360-degree threat, and extensive use of APS and counter UAV systems. 

Might it be possible to procure, say, three or four such smaller, less-sophisticated MBTs for the same cost (purchase or lease) as one current/near-future Western design? This would help avoid the “eggs all in one basket” criticism and ensure basic redundancy and resilience in the likelihood of combat attrition, plus, of course, enhanced crew survivability.

The next obvious step might be to look at further developments taking advantage of AI and automation. A future generation of tank design could incorporate a “mother ship and loyal wingmen” concept whereby one crewed vehicle might control, say, up to half a dozen uncrewed semi-autonomous surface vehicles (USVs) or subordinate tanks. This idea is a familiar one in future aircraft design already.

This arrangement would probably, initially at least, embed the “man-in-the-loop” facility that modern Western sensibilities might demand but clearly have the potential to reduce the possibility of human casualties in the West’s modern casualty-averse mentality. 

All of which leads to further questions; does the “mother ship” require a tank gun at all, or will self-defence weapons suffice? Indeed, does it have to be a tank in the first place, and does it actually have to be physically on the battlefield? Could the “loyal wingmen” be controlled from a container at some army camp in Germany or the UK, far away from the dangers of the frontline? It already happens with aerial drones so why not with their ground-based cousins?

The answer is, of course, that it’s not quite the same thing. Seeing everything from the air is one thing; doing the same thing at ground level is quite another. Anyone who has ever tried to direct a tank through unfamiliar territory whilst closed down will know what I mean. The loss of situational awareness is, and would be, immense. That’s why tank commanders of all nations have usually operated with the commander’s hatch open, and also why so many become casualties. There’s no substitute for head out, not that I’m aware of anyway.

So, where does that leave us? My hypothesis is that modern Western MBTs are too big, too heavy, too expensive, and too vulnerable to attack from any direction for modern armoured warfare. They are akin to putting all your goods in the shop window, and you’ll never be able to afford enough of them or to replace the losses that will inevitably occur.

The future might see larger numbers of smaller, less sophisticated (perhaps), less expensive, and lighter tanks with built-in redundancy and resilience to casualties. Should they be semi-autonomous or remotely controlled, so much the better. A concomitant reduction in human losses will make us less casualty-averse and able to sustain operations properly.

Will we see this in the near future? The probable answer is no. Britain’s sclerotic equipment procurement environment suggests otherwise. In any case, the way things are going, the UK may well be out of the MBT game altogether within the next ten years unless the government and MoD sharpen up their ideas. 

I hope not, but I wouldn’t bet my house on it not being so.