In a memorandum published by the Council on Geostrategy, defence analysts James Rogers and Dr Marc De Vore have called for the United Kingdom to regenerate a sub-strategic nuclear deterrent, warning that reliance on a single strategic system – Trident – may no longer be sufficient to meet the UK’s evolving security needs in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment.
The paper, titled The case for a British sub-strategic nuclear deterrent, is the fifteenth instalment in the Council’s Memorandum series and was published on 7 April 2025.
It argues that the UK must reintroduce a lower-yield, theatre-level nuclear option to respond proportionally to potential Russian nuclear coercion and to reassure European allies in the face of weakening US strategic guarantees.
“Due to its history and geography, Poland, above all others… will do everything in its power to prevent the growth of Russian power in Eastern Europe,” the authors write, noting that nations like Poland and Germany are already openly discussing the need for a European nuclear deterrent independent of the United States. “Absent British leadership,” they warn, “their only option would be to look to France… or begin development of their own nuclear weapons.”
Rogers and De Vore argue that Russia’s willingness to integrate nuclear weapons into its battlefield doctrine – in stark contrast to the UK’s tradition of using them strictly as a last resort – presents a clear escalation risk. “Russia may misinterpret [a low-yield Trident launch] as a strategic one aimed at its national centres of gravity, leading it to respond in kind,” they caution, highlighting the limitations of Britain’s current posture.
Unlike Russia, which possesses a broad spectrum of strategic and sub-strategic systems, the UK has relied solely on its Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) since the late 1990s, following the withdrawal of the WE.177 gravity bombs and depth charges. While current SSBNs can carry a limited number of single-warhead, low-yield Trident missiles, these are still delivered via strategic launch platforms—inviting miscalculation and potentially dangerous escalation.
Instead, the authors propose that Britain develop a genuinely sub-strategic capability, potentially involving new delivery mechanisms such as air-launched cruise missiles or reconstituted nuclear depth charges. One option would be to modify Trident warheads for use on platforms like the Storm Shadow missile. The memorandum stresses that sub-strategic capability is determined by delivery method, not yield, and that non-strategic systems offer much-needed flexibility and credibility.
Such a system, they argue, would offer three core advantages:
- Enhanced deterrence: A sub-strategic option would provide the UK with additional rungs on the escalation ladder, making it more difficult for adversaries to gamble on the UK’s willingness to use its full strategic arsenal.
- Strategic autonomy: By reducing dependence on the US for nuclear guarantees and Trident missile support, the UK would be better placed to resist external political pressure from Washington in future crises.
- Geopolitical leadership: A UK-led sub-strategic capability could offer reassurance to European allies like Poland, Germany, and Finland, potentially dissuading them from turning to France or pursuing their own nuclear programmes—moves which could fracture the European security architecture and undermine non-proliferation norms.
“Nothing deters (or reassures) like nuclear forces,” the authors argue. “While potentially highly disruptive, cyber attacks lack the aura of extreme violence… and conventional deep strike would not be enough to reassure nervous allies.”
The authors acknowledge that developing a new sub-strategic capability would not be inexpensive, but contend that the costs would be manageable—particularly if shared with interested allies. “The fastest route to delivery should be sought, not the most exquisite capability,” they write, emphasising urgency over perfection.
The memorandum concludes with a clear message: “To generate maximum flexibility in terms of escalation management and strategic advantage in terms of geopolitical control over European affairs, HM Government should begin looking at options to stand up a British sub-strategic deterrent, without delay.”
The full article can be read here: The case for a British sub-strategic nuclear deterrent.
Of all the things we could spend our very limited budget on, a new, hugely expensive capability that doesn’t deter conventional attack is not where I’d spend it. We should consider it when we are spending over 4% of GDP.
France has a second leg to it’s deterrent, with an air-launched cruise missile, despite spending less than us on defence, oh and having a larger military across the board. We should be able to have this kind of capability on the budget we currently have, but the budget is increasing over the next few years.
I didn’t say we couldn’t, just that we shouldn’t. We are building ballistic submarines at the moment, finishing off the fleet of attack submarines, are increasing infrastructure to catch up with submarine maintenace, paying for dismantling piles of old nuclear subs, spending a lot on increasing facilities in Barrow and Derby in preparation for AUKUS, and are designing new warheads in preparation for replacing the ones we have. I believe we are spending around £12bn a year on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise. MOD stopped publishing the Defence Equipment Plan after 2023, so it’s a bit of a guesstimate. The last plan gave around 39% of our equipment spend to nuclear and 61% to conventional over the decade. I imagine that’s partly the result of previous delayed spending.
With all this going on, adding yet another nuclear capability into the mix might not only strain the budgets further, but the people who would otherwise do it may be a bit busy.
So with an extra couple of billion this year should we get tactical nuclear weapons, get ground-based air defences for homeland missile protection, increase recruitment and training, sort out services accommodation, stop the Royal Navy from needing to get rid of another eight or nine ships before the end of the decade (we currently have around forty >100 tons), harden multi-domain networked communications, plug the financial black hole, order a couple of Wedgetails, speed up production of Ajax and Boxer, or…? Well you get the point. There are lots of calls on a limited budget. For me tactical nukes is close to the bottom of the list. Let’s see what the SDR has to say.
Ukraine has been a wake up call if ever there was one. With many references from Moscow of their ability and preparedness to use tac nuclear we would be advised to have that capability wouldn’t we? I wouldn’t make such a strong case against it right now because it would leave our forces dangerously exposed and who wants that.
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Understand entirely that there are many priorities in completion for strictly limited funds. However, a relatively rapid, yet low cost option to satisfy this requirement may be RAF a acquisition of a limited number of F-35As. Would envision that some number between a squadron and wing would provide credible capability. F-35A is already certified (Oct. 2023) for carriage of nuclear weapons (i.e., B-61-12 & perhaps the B-61-13 at some point). RAF then has its own set of dual use aircraft, which should lessen competition w/ FAA over operational control of residual fleet.
Uncertain re reason why F-35B has not been certified for the mission; could be as
straightforward as simply funding integration testing. Anyone actually well versed in potential technical/programmatic issues? After IOC, presumably multiple paths to build out of full capability (e.g., ASN4G?, FC/ASW, etc., eventually, as a Block 4 add-on).
Personal assessment is that latest gen strategic bombers would be the ideal sol’n, however, that is probably a bridge too far for the RAF budget w/in the foreseeable future.
… priorities in competition…🙄
Of all the things the RAF should buy, F35A is near the bottom of the list. If we need fighters, buy British Typhoons. If we absolutely HAVE to buy American then it should be B’s so they can work of a carrier.
Dern,
While Typhoon is certified for nuclear weapon carriage, not certain of its survivability (Ps) vs. F-35A Ps in a contested environment.
If F-35B is capable of nuclear weapon carriage certification, it should be a candidate. Have not viewed any published articles to date on this specific topic, hence, the question posed in the post above. Have you? If so, would appreciate a reference.
I was very much in favour of the RAF getting a single squadron (74sqn) of 15 F-35A for all those weapons that will go onto the A, but not the B. However, since the Zelensky incident in the Oval Office, I have gone off all US purchases. Perhaps, in 4 years time, we may come back to the F-35, but not now.
From what is published, if F35A can carry it, so can F35B. The difference is the weapons bays. If a nuke can go internal on the A, but only external on the B, then the A’s have a big advantage. If both are external, then the difference is range. Certification is a peacetime pursuit (ask Ukraine). So they certify the A, then the C & then the B (if they see the need).
F35 with external stores – stealth suffers. Typhoon is faster. At what point does one outweigh the other?
For one, I think the article is arguing more for a low-yield air launced nuclear cruise missile capability than for free fall gravity bombs of the type cleared for F-35A. Think something akin to the French ASMP-A or a nuclear armed Storm Shadow or FC/ASW. Aside from that, I think there would be very little appetite for developing another Nuclear capability that can be in any way influenced by the United States (no offence). The proven unreliability of current and frankly future US administrations is the main cause of this renewed European interest in nuclear deterrence.
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Daniel,
Free fall gravity weapon carriage would be an interim capability, followed in due course by stand-off munitions. Agreed, weaps could/should be of a sovereign design and manufacture.
DJ,
Indeed, weapon bay dimensions vary: 14′ for F-35A&C, 12’8″ for F-35B. B61-12 approximately 12′ long. Excellent deduction. Presume difference due to lift fan housing?
Basically solved the problem in one sentence: buy some of these missiles from the French and integrate with with our Typhoons.
Do the same with our F-35s and, once built – Tempests.
Or, if not that, then build small tactical nuclear warheads that can fit onto FC/ASW.
Why spend billions reinventing the wheel?
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Because that means asking the French accepting their nuclear secret to be shared with the us as the typhoon is using a Collins data sharing plateform. It Will never ever happen.
It is all being given to Mauritius for an island we already own.
So why does Poland want it then? Who is going to conveniently attack the UK.
No reason it should be that expensive. Nuclear warheads are pricey because they are a niche capability. If we produced them in larger numbers there’d be economies of scale. As I recall they were costing the US about $1 million each when they were in large scale production during the cold war. As for delivery systems- tactical warheads aren’t especially larger or otherwise more difficult to integrate into existing cruise missiles than any other type. It’s just something we’ve chosen not to do (unwisely in my view- for precisely the reasons given by the Council).
If France sees sense, then letting the UK buy 40 ASN4G for RAF Typhoons, would be the best option for Britain & Europe. The longer production run would also cut costs for France. The UK could modify its existing Trident MK4A warhead in either 90 kt or 7 kt versions. Failing that, the 7 kt version would probably fit in a Paveway IV body.
It’s not that easy to buy a nuclear vector.
Although the UK and France are close, we are not that close.
It’s possible, but it won’t be that easy.
I wish France and the UK were that close, but it’s going to be very difficult if you look back over the last 50 years.
In any case, this is probably the best time for the UK and France to start talking about these strategic issues.
ASN4G is just a delivery system for ordnance, like any other. The French happen to use it as a nuclear delivery system. Pretty much any delivery system is a ‘nuclear vector’ if you opt to stick a nuclear bomb on the end.
So, no problem giving a Trident to Russia or China?
What you say is only half of the story.
Because it’s a delivery system for a crucial element of defense, it’s not shared that easily.
And it’s not like ‘any other’; we would not easily share the ASMPA, let alone the ASN4G, which will be much more advanced and critical.
In the end that is why Europe will end up being eaten alive by other powers.. trump, Putin and Xi imagine a world in which there are 3 core powers each with its own area of influence.. South America, Africa, Europe and the none Chinese/russian bits all get divided up and essentially part of one of these powers fiefdoms.. unless Europe starts acting in a wider European security and foreign policy paradigm as a true potential superpower.. then it will become a victim, a wealth victim but a victim non the less.
That’s the easy part to say.
The truth is, trust is not something that builds up in a few months after decades, if not centuries, of mistrust.
The UK is reliable to a certain extent, but you are too close to the US and have a tendency to do what they ask you to do, blindly.
Would France be more open to selling 40 ASN4G to Britain, if the UK also bought 15 Rafale to launch them from?
Probably not.
The point is, it’s not about the plane.
It’s about talks that you and I cannot have.
It’s easy for us to see opportunities, but for politicians to satisfy everyone, it’s another game.
Because asn4g speaks with the plane and vice and versa. Unfortunately, typhoon has an us information sharing system so the French Will never ever agree to provide asn4g to uk unless you guys buy rafale or tempest is itar free (at least, no way the germans get French nuclear secrets).
Focus on having a credible conventional deterrent first,
we need more options than big nuke or small nuke.
True. uk is part of French « intérêts vitaux » anyway.
Tricky. If the threat of a Trident response to a non strategic nuclear attack on the UK doesn’t deter such an attack, why would the threat of a non strategic response? The whole theory of deterrence depends on credibility. Ability and willingness to respond is key.
The better question is whether the UK deterrent is sufficient to make an all out strategic nuclear attack unthinkable. To inflict commensurate levels of destruction on a much larger country really needs at least a parity in destructive power, perhaps more. At the very least, we should fill all launch tubes with the maximum number of warheads.
Given that a non nuclear attack is much more likely, a higher priority should be ensuring that we can deter and counter that threat with long range, non nuclear, highly accurate weapons.. FCASW ?
Any Buccaneers left airworthy 🙂
Typhoon with conformation tanks has a similar range.
NATO had tactical nuclear weapons when we faced the massed armies of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility that their massed armour would prove unstopping rolling across Europe.
Now we face a much diminished enemy who could even reach Kyiv from Belorus. Unless we see PLAN units lining up on the Polish border it’s pretty clear NATO can contain and repel a Russian attack: even eNATO with US involvement.
Would Putin ever use tactical nuclear weapons. Probably only if NATO armies had begun to cross the border into Russia. If we were at war, after expelling Russian forces, there would be far easier ways to defeat Russia without having to fight our way to Moscow.
We had tactical nuclear weapons back in the early 60,s to late 70,s. Believe it was the US ‘Honest John’ mobile system with a variable yield (up to 20 kt) warhead. So it’ wouldn’t be unheard of if we did aquire some form of system. But as @Jon says, it’s paying for it.
Yes but back then we faced the masses of the Warsaw Pact and NATO doctrine was to use tactical nukes if overwhelmed by their conventional forces.
Today we face a run-down Russian that’s fielding T-54 and T-55 tanks donated from museums and film-companies.
Not strictly speaking correct fella. Putin hasn’t committed all of his tier 1 forces to his UKR adventure, They are severely depleted granted, but, if you can conscript another 1.5 million as we are lead to believe, and Strike deals with other actors, which he has, if push comes to shove, we(NATO) still have a dilemma. Nothing has really changed with numbers, quantity counts despite what people want to believe.
We did Deep and those of us serving in BAOR at the time were under no illusions about what would come next when our conventional forces were vaporised in Germany if it went nuclear!There would have been no option other to threaten Moscow etc and I think we all know how that would go!
Also how would Central European nations respond with their countries being turned into a radioactive wasteland?
With you on this mate, while we could use Trident in a Tactical role, a SSBN launch would look just like a Strategic launch and quickly escalate. The question is do we need a tactical deterant or not?
No easy answer, if our conventional forces and those of NATO were strong enough with the political will, then I suspect not. Unfortunately don’t believe we are there in any shape or form, so, interesting times ahead.
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In the 1980’s the US deployed land based Tomahawk cruise missiles, based out of Greenham Common.. Is there a significant technical issue with adding nuclear warheads to our existing SSN TLAM capability?
It’s more an operational issue. If we were to launch aone or more tomahawks at russia, they’d have no way of telling if it /they were nuclear or not and might not want to wait for it/them to strike and find out before launching a nuclear response.
And Molesworth!
FC/ASW – TN Could have sub, surface and air launch options. Redundancy and flexibility. not immediate need but add to conveyor belt post conventional versions go operational.
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So what stops tactical nuke engagement becoming a full nuclear exchange? Prefer the uk stance.
Negotiation does. Whilst authorising a 25kt strike would be a sobering task for the PM, it pales versus the full Trident option. We can show we are resolute and won’t allow Russia to cow us with their substrategic nukes
Hmm – a 25 kt strike on London/Paris/Berlin/Rome/Moscow. Hiroshima bomb was around 15 kt, Nagasaki was around 25 kt. The nuke card is a dangerous card to play, even if you win (or should that be loose the least)?
It’s terribly expensive and I don’t think our country doesn’t have enough money for that, if at the same time it wants more SSNs, more SSBNs, more tanks, more planes, more ships…
It’s heartening to see this being discussed at last. Getting rid of the WE.177 gravity bombs might have seemed sensible in the 1990s but in retrospect it was a terrible move. Especially as the UK ended up gutting its conventional forces as well.
Indeed. Although the WE.177 design could be modernised and put on the end of a Storm Shadow or MLRS. The UK has enough weapons grade to do that. We have the missile and we have a potential warhead. As a tactical weapon it would be extremely useful. If memory serves the Lance missile was in a similar role.
It is more the loss of the nuclear depth charge option that we miss.
With Russian subs being the threat the presence of WE177 shaped their operating strategy.
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