British flagship comes under ‘air attack’ off Egypt

With CEC there will be no need to fit T45 with Mk41 since T26 will have the cells and for high end CSG and amphibious group escort roles both ships will be in theater. While some favour Sylver instead of Mk41 for T26, my take is that Mk41 gives the RN far greater flexibility and insurance/risk mitigation on future weapons. So while we may start with nothing for Mk41, I suspect that if we stick with Aster then that will be the first family of missiles qualified with FC/ASW to follow, SM-6 and perhaps even SM-3 are future options, along with ASW and cruise missiles if the FC/ASW program doesn’t deliver all the options required.

As to T31. In its planned role, I don’t see the need for more than 12 CAMM as standard, as long as there is an ability to expand beyond that, which was my intended point. Remember we are part of NATO. In a peer conflict we will have other nations high end escorts in attendance too, we don’t have to do it all ourselves.

I don’t know if the arsenal ship concept goes anywhere. Its once again putting a lot of eggs in one basket if you lose the ship, versus spreading weapons across a manned (and in the USN case unmanned) fleet using CEC. In addition, once the USN upgrades ESSM and SM-2 to active seekers it is likely to be able to use existing missiles more effectively and efficiently. Reading between the lines, it seems that other navies are also pursuing a strategy of spreading weapons across a greater number of escorts, for example FTI, PPA and F110 which all only have 16 VLS cells. Either that or the cost of silos and missiles is capping what they fit, which also argues against fitting to auxiliaries, along with the bump in crew to support them, driving up costs.

The Albions and the Bays are another whole topic. They are increasingly vulnerable HVTs, particularly when used against against a peer adversary. Especially when “parked up” supporting slow ship-to-shore transfers. Regardless of what we put on a T31 we are unlikely to be able to defend against future hypersonic weapons without a high end escort. Rather than religiously sticking to the concept of docks and landing craft, we need a re-think on the role. IMO the UK might look at a higher end version of the USMC Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) concept, say 4-8k displacement, supporting direct beach landing and shore-to-shore transits, without the intermediate ship-to-shore vulnerability that complicates escorting and protecting amphibious ops.

As a summary of my position. Rather than arm up auxiliaries, re-model the fleet for more escorts, reduced risk and greater flexibility for peace and wartime ops. So in due course as they age out, the dedicated MCMV go, the Bays, Albions and Point class go. Instead we support MCM mission modules, flyable anywhere in the world within 24 hours, on T31, T26 (CSGs are threatened by mines too), UK LAW, commercial ship platforms and shore based ops. We replace most of the MCMV with T31, say 8x in addition to the 5x T31 we’ve already committed to. T31 might also support an ASW mission module role, or some might support a lower end ASW role vs T26, as the Absalons will be doing with their new role for the Danes. The UK LAW would be a low cost commercial platform supporting beach landing and RO-RO, say 10-15x of them, that in addition to the main amphibious role might support LSS, HADR and mission module roles beyond just MCM, such as casualty ship, amphibious ops headquarters command ship, even mission module based littoral ASW.

With the current financial climate and how poorly politicians see the military as an investment. I really don’t see the fleet expanding by much, if at all. But I do agree that an arsenal ship would be a very bad loss if it was sunk or damaged, which means the rest of the Fleet must increase its missile load if we don’t go down that route.

So I’m guessing that the current number of first line ships will actually go down in the near future, as some of the T23s will forgo their Lifex and be pensioned off earlier to “save money”! What this means for a carrier task group is that we will have to rob Peter to pay Paul. As some of our other commitments will have to slide if we are to make sure the carrier is fully protected.

I do agree with a pack of smaller amphibious vessels to replace the Bays. Something harkening back to the Round Table class, but clearly better protected. They had both bow doors and a stern ramp, plus two vehicle decks. But I do think we need to look at a LHD design to replace the Albions, as the through deck offers more flexibility and faster helicopter turnarounds.

Hypersonics are a contentious subject. On the face of it, they seem to offer a near impossible task of countering. However, the physics can also play against them. To fly hypersonically (Mach 5+) they need thin air, i.e. +35,000 ft in height due to atmospheric heating and drag. This will make them easier to detect by a ship based radar. The issue is that when they come down from height, they will slow down as they pass through increasingly thick atmosphere. How much they slow down is speculative, as missiles such as Brahmos 2 are still in the early stages of development and very little is known about this part of the performance envelope. It will then come to placing the air defence missile in the path of the other. Ideally a direct hit would be enough to obliterate a target a those closure speeds. But the practicality is that it may need to be proximity detonated. Whereby the timing of the detonation becomes critical, as the shrapnel cloud must be presented before the incoming missile to damage it.

Therefore, early detection is crucial, but so is the type and capability of the radar. A late model pulse doppler radar will have a number of range gates that are used to determine if a fast approaching object is a threat or not. A PESA radar improved this by increasing the number of range gates. An AESA radar like Sampson or NS-100 has pretty much an infinite number of range gates. AESA radars can get away with this due to the scan rate of the beam. An AESA can do a volume search of a sector in less than a second, thereby sweeping over an object and illuminating it, nearly every second or less. This means that objects travelling faster than 1.66 kilometres per second can be tracked in near real time, whereas a pulse doppler radar may miss it completely. There are other issues to contend with like the pulse repetition frequency, pulse length etc. It cannot be emphasised enough how much more capability an AESA radar has over their previous generations of radar. Which is why I’m surprised the T26 is sticking with Artisan and T31 is getting NS-100?

I am going to discount fitting Mk41/57 or Sylver being fitted to the amphibs, not only on cost grounds, but also because they are deck penetrating. SeaCeptor with its cold launch, is the answer for a plug-in air defence system. If we look at SkySabre where the launch tubes are mounted on a HZ77 truck. The HZ77 has a maximum payload of 15tons. So the vertical lift mechanism plus 12 missile tubes must weigh less than this. Granted these tubes are not enclosed in a hardened structure like those used on a ship. But the weight is quite light comparatively and does not need to penetrate any decks, especially if we consider using the Lockheed Martin ExLS solution. The cost of a SeaCeptor missile is I believe less than £2m each, so in theory it is relatively cheap to fit. There is an unanswered question of whether a SeaCeptor has not only the mass, but the explosive content to destroy a heavy weight anti-ship missile. Where it may actually require a couple to take out something like a Brahmos.

This where I believe the CEC combination of a T31 equipped with its NS-100 and the amphibs/supply ships with additional sets of ExLS launchers would be a practical solution in providing local air defence to a task group. That could either back up a T45 or operate with less risk on their own. I would still prefer the amphibs and supply ships to have a means of defending themselves when away from a frigate or destroyer. Which would means CMS installation and a radar upgrade. These vessels are high priority targets and therefore must have the means to protect themselves!

You might find the blog linked below of interest, modeling availability of T45, T26, T23, T31 and B1/B2 over the next ~20 years. I doubt we would let ASW frigate numbers fall as low as some of his out year estimates/modeling but it’s the best example I’ve seen for how it might play out. He includes a speculative 3x extra T31. My 8x extra T31 are supported by assuming no new dedicated MCMV platform. To clarify for anyone assuming this represents a reduction in MCM capability, I’d plan on 15-20 MCM mission module “teams” (perhaps 15x RN and 5x RNR) that are not constrained by platform. They might operate as a “squadron” somewhat like 815 NAS. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1229857912903872513.html

Ref amphibious platforms. I would be looking for a a smaller, faster (22-25kn) platform than Round Table class that is kept simple and low cost with low manning. Rather than sensor up and arm up the RFA vessels, which drives up their manning and cost, use the extra T31 as escorts and expand sensor/weapons fit on them as a platform designed for it.

I’m not convinced by LHD arguments, yet another HVT without the protections of a CSG, unless its part of one. We should stick to using the carriers for vertical lift, migrating over the long haul to using fast, long range assets from the Future Vertical Lift program to keep them well off shore. European NATO partners Italy, Spain, France and AsiaPac nations like Australia, Japan, ROK, as well as the US of course, have appropriate rotary focused platforms to complement our capabilities. We must IMO get away from a thought process where we have to do a little bit of everything ourselves, we have almost never operated just on our own.

Hypersonics are likely to be one of the easiest weapons to detect, potentially through their entire flight path, because of the heat bloom. Detected from LEO satellites (hypersonic detection is primary driver of US military LEO program), from F35 and other air assets, and finally from surface assets. Successful targeting though, as you state, is another matter. I do wonder if Artisan makes it into the latter batch(es) of T26, assuming it continues to be fitted to the first. I don’t think its an issue in a CSG, particularly if we used T31 or allied ships with AESA as pickets further out. In North Atlantic ASW patrols, we’re likely to have UK and allied P8 and other air assets in support. Singleton patrols might be more of an issue but perhaps that’s not how the RN plan to use them.

Pleasure bouncing ideas back and forth as always.

We as a country must always look to ourselves first and then if other Nations want to participate great. As a founding member of NATO we should not shirk our responsibilities, but then we shouldn’t ignore our other commitments either. I really don’t see how the military as a whole can manage its current commitments let alone any further ones.

The carrier task group is essential to the UK if we are to remain a global player. It will return to us a global reach and act as a deterrent in its own right. However, it seems that Governments past and present can only see the carriers, they have forgotten or chosen to ignore everything that either supports it or that is not part of the primary task group.

I would not expect a amphibious task group to operate without carrier support in a future conflict, unless we have completely lost our senses and forgotten everything the Falklands taught us? The problem would be, the days leading up to a major clash. A ship like the Albion may be flying the flag visiting countries around the South China Sea for example. If the flag goes up, she’ll be on her own, with perhaps a set of Phalanx as her sole air defence and nothing to guard her against subs etc. Mind you having a T31 in attendance would on the face of it would have nothing to detect a sub with anyway! If they had Artisan, CMS and SeaCeptor equipped ExLS. They might at least stand a chance against number of anti-ship missiles etc.

Getting troops to either contested or uncontested shores needs to be further investigated. It is a key strategic and tactical method of changing the direction of a conflict. I think both the Bay and Albion classes have had their day, as have the standard LCU/LCVPs etc. They are altogether too slow and the aviation facilities suck. I do like the idea of an updated Round Table class. A RORO ship that can not only carry heavy equipment but drop it straight to shore. It must also have a helipad, but could probably get away without a hangar. So basically a modernised LST much like the Damen LST 120 which is nice but slow. The Sea Transport Stern Landing Vessel again is in the right direct, but again it is too slow to keep up with a carrier task group. Not only that, at some point the ship has to do a 180 and then reverse onto a beach. This not only slows the whole process down, but because it will be reversing it will be slow and therefore an easy target.

The Albions and Bays do have one redeeming feature with the well deck. However to be safe, they need to operate beyond the horizon. Therefore, the ship to shore transportation requires a rethink. The current LCTs are way too slow. The USN LCAC is far too expensive, so something like the French EDAR catamaran could be what’s required. But why does the transport need to be above the surface, what about a semi-submersible?

The through deck design of a helicopter carrier will always trump those with a large structure in the way, such as an Albion. The through deck means a helicopter can land on deck without over flying another, I am looking at you Mr Chinook. This means the turnaround times are much faster, as your not waiting for an aircraft to move out of the way. I think the Navy have finally realised that the carriers would be too operationally restricted if they had to do both air defence and offense, whilst providing a platform for helicopter assault plus accommodating the necessary troops. Therefore the question would be is it better just to have a pure helicopter carrier or a LHD with a well deck?

The OSD of Puma is 2025, but will probably be extended to 2030 much like the Merlin. This is about the same time that the US Army’s future medium lift program goes into production. There has been no news from the MoD on a replacement and nothing from Leonardo on a future Merlin update. So I can only guess they are waiting on who wins the competition. Either the Valor or the Defiant versions would be a good replacement for the Puma/Merlin, although the Merlin is a lot bigger. The additional 100kt speed advantage will mean transit times will be a lot quicker. In this respect, the version of the Valor that Bell have promoted for the USMC would be the ideal candidate. As it has a higher cruise speed (300kts) but a much further unrefuelled range. Thereby enabling the ships to operate beyond the horizon.

I agree with most of that.

I’d differ on the standard armaments aspect though, whether we’re talking T31, LPDs, RFA vessels or something else. We will always be able to come up with corner cases where a ship would benefit from more weaponry and capability because of a potential attack. However, if countries decide to attack vessels before a formal conflict starts, then pretty much anything will be vulnerable to surprise attack. That’s where the political and intelligence services assessments are key to determine and try to avoid those situations. Arming up ‘just in case’ makes the whole fleet much more expensive, because even an Arleigh Burke or T45 is vulnerable in the Gulf if Iran decided to sink one. The reason its unlikely is the political, military and economic fall out that would result. China would be different, but even for them the economic fallout alone would risk domestic unrest, the greatest fear for authoritarian regimes.

On an updated Round Table, we need to watch the complexity and cost if we add more decks, front and rear ramps, internal ramp, hanger and boost size etc but I agree it must have the speed to keep up with a carrier group. The fitting of davits and crane, as shown in the Damen LST concepts, would also make the ship practical for MCMV and ASW mission module based operations as an alternative capability to its primary role. I’m in favour of losing the dedicated MCMV and instead having platforms with far greater utility across a number of roles including MCM ops, whether that’s a T31 doing MCM, or platforms like we are discussing, or both.

The reason I am negative on the future of well deck based platforms is that even over the horizon positioning isn’t going to make them much safer in future. Stopped in the water during operations makes them much more vulnerable to submarine and air/ground launched missile attack in a world of increasing and increasingly pervasive surveillance.

I wouldn’t argue that carrier based vertical lift ops are optimal, clearly a dedicated platform is, but the size of the QEC class makes them better suited to support combined air defence, offense and vertical lift assault than the Wasp or America class. So in the absence of any spare funds, I think the RN can do without a LHD or LPH.