The offensive use of satellite tech is a sign of how conflict is increasingly moving into space.

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive got underway, there were credible reports of advances into territory previously occupied by Russian troops.

Each day brings news of small gains, a village liberated here and a village liberated there. But Ukraine’s military commander will know there are much tougher tests to come. Recently published satellite pictures reveal the extent of Russian defensive lines – which are considerable, the result of months of planning and preparation for the counteroffensive. The big question is whether their planners can take advantage of eyes in the sky to formulate a strategy.


This article was authored by Christopher Morris, Teaching Fellow, School of Strategy, Marketing and Innovation, University of Portsmouth

This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.


Ukraine possesses no satellites of their own, but nonetheless space technology has played a key role in supporting its operations. When the invasion began Ukraine was quick to call for assistance in tracking and targeting Russian troops. Several commercial satellite providers have since volunteered to provide help.

Ukraine’s ability to call on the assistance of commercial satellites is thought to have given them the edge over Russia’s array of purpose-built military satellites. Russian military satellites are made for battlefield applications and their cameras lack the resolution of those used for industrial purposes.

Russian equipment is also less effective when dealing with cloud cover and darkness. As a result, Russian forces can see less of the battlefield.

The use of space assets has many benefits, not least of which is being able to see what is happening. Ukrainian forces can benefit from high-resolution imagery of events on the ground, often in near real-time.

When on the defensive, this has allowed Ukraine to rapidly react to Russian actions, tracking their troop movements and allowing time to respond to any attempted advances.

Satellites have also helped expose Russian problems with logistics, as well as detect the construction of new military infrastructure.

Navigating Russia’s defences

Now that Ukrainian forces are advancing, satellite images can again play a pivotal role. As satellite images have revealed, Russia has built an extensive network of trenches, fortifications and minefields, reinforced around areas of particular strategic importance.

If Ukraine is to achieve its objective of severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea, it will have to contend with these formidable defences.

Publicly available images show how Russian defences are structured. Russian engineering represents a series of challenges that will be difficult to overcome.

But, just as importantly, satellites provide a picture of what is taking place behind the lines, permitting strikes against headquarters and logistic hubs. This was a key factor in the preparation for Ukraine’s successful counteroffensives last autumn.

Given the situation on the ground, a likely Ukrainian approach is to continue to leverage their information advantage, probing these defences with repeated feints and forcing Russian forces to respond. Having a clear picture of Russia’s defensive array will give Kyiv’s commanders in the field both important insights into Russia’s strategy and provide crucial real-time information about where and when to mount its attacks.

Satellite images also provide a range of other insights relevant to the conflict, and ultimately, its aftermath. Imagery available to the public has proved useful in addressing disinformation and shaping public perceptions of the conflict. These images will also furnish vital evidence of Russian war crimes when the conflict ends.

War in space

At the moment, Ukraine’s access to commercial satellites gives it an advantage over Russia – not only in terms of imagery, but also in other areas like communications and targeting. Naturally, Russia would like to address this advantage.

Russia has not only hacked into western satellites, but threatened to shoot them down. While it certainly has the capability to both disrupt and even destroy space-based assets, the situation is too complex for a direct approach.

Not only are the satellites in question commercial assets, but they do not belong to Ukraine. Any attack runs the risk of expanding the conflict.

Moscow has stressed that commercial satellites represent legitimate targets, but a physical attack against these assets would be unprecedented. It would open up Russian space infrastructure to attack in response. What is more, this would potentially place Russia on course for a direct conflict with the US and other nations.

But this in itself raises a key issue. Access to this sort of capability is expensive, and Ukraine must rely on partners such as the US to pay for its use of commercial space platforms. The Kremlin may hope it can continue in its strategy of attempting to degrade the relationship between Ukraine and its western allies.

Russia can additionally attempt to jam or disrupt satellites by electronic means, where possible. While Russia does have limitations, it is capable of adaptation, and satellite operators will need to remain vigilant.

Writing in the Financial Times newspaper late last year, former Nato secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, wrote:

“This is the first major conflict where both sides have been heavily reliant on space-based capabilities. It will not be the last.”

The use of satellites and GPS technology to pinpoint targets has shown how important this technology is. But it is also vulnerable, as anti-satellite action is being integrated into the tactical battlefield.

Working out how to manage, develop and safeguard space technology will be an increasing focus among military planners.The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

8 COMMENTS

  1. Whilst the article claims that Kyiv is having others purchase the lay of the land from above from civilian sources regards its occupied areas. I think it’s a given that it is also receiving info from Mil spec assets which are of a much higher quality and in a much shorter timeframe
    Yes, the Ukrainians will have something of a good HUMINT network across the land feeding back info, but the ability for the Ukraine to quickly target deployed Russian assets leads me to subscribe to the notion that a lot targeting intel work is been carried out by dedicated foreign teams who are simply doing the job they are paid to do.
    For example the other day the Ukraine aired a couple of videos showing the precision targeting by HIMARS or M270 of 5 separate strikes on 2S19 Msta-S , and when I say precision I am talking 1 shot one kill of military assets hidden in woods which work on the premise shoot and scoot (However I am talking about the current quality of Russian servicemen) yes Kyiv could have gleaned the movement info of these SPGs from people on the ground, counter battery or even a fly on the wall . But the fact they were taken out so quickly points to me, that somebody was watching them from above and passed on that info (including grid ref which has to be at least a 10 figure one) to those that need to know. This past weekend Storm shadow was used to take out at least 2 huge ammo dumps in the rear and something else took out 3 other targets and these strikes aren’t one off, they are a regular occurrence (such as the strike on that group of soldiers last week which took out around 100 and injured another 100 who were waiting for a pep talk by a Russian general who was going to tell them about how to keep safe.  The interesting thing here, is Moscow has its own network of spy satellites and yet its appears to be lagging far behind the Ukraine when it comes to taking out mission critical targets. 

    • JIMK wrote:

      “”In it he admitted that no one in Russia in 2014 or later foresaw much of what might happen, so no one thought to prepare Russia’s space industry and ISR capabilities.””

      7 Ps

  2. The conflict was expanding into space right from the start, those magnificent men in their flying machine (aka T series turrets)!!!!! 1 x 25 tonne turret, 1 x 122mm gun, 1 x auto loader, shed loads of unarmored rounds and 2 x nonce rapists. Now that’s how to get to space!

    • Airbourne wrote:
      “”those magnificent men in their flying machine””
      I actually had lunch with friends we were visiting at the cafe at Wycombe Air Park aka Booker airfield aka RAF Booker where they filmed that. Nice lunch as well.

  3. “Russian equipment is also less effective when dealing with cloud cover and darkness. As a result, Russian forces can see less of the battlefield.”

    Is there any actual evidence for such a statement delivered as fact? Does Russia publish the capablities of its military hardware??? The visible, UV, NIR, and other wavelength capabliities aren’t likely to be known by anyone except the Russians. Spy satellite tech is one of the most closely guarded secrets, and heavily-invested portions, of any space nation, so I’m somewhat sceptical that commercial tech bought off-the-shelf will outperform it. Sure it is possible to infer that, particularly given the Russian’s initial tactical ineptitude. But if this is a “fact”, can a reference please be provided?

    Mick

    • Yes it seems inconceivable Russia has spent all the cold war & since not developing & refining those capabilities.

  4. Hmmm…before we all high five each other re NATO asymmetrical ISR capabilities, perhaps we should remember that the scum-sucking, slimeball ChiComs will have taken copious notes, and are even now industriously devising counter-strategies. 🤔😳

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here