The British Army’s planned Initial Operating Capability date for the Challenger 3 main battle tank is under review, although no formal reapproval has yet taken place, the Ministry of Defence stated in written answers to parliamentary questions.
Responding to a written question from Conservative MP James Cartlidge on whether the Defence Secretary had authorised a change to the Initial Operating Capability for Challenger 3, Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard said the “Challenger 3 manufacture phase timing will be confirmed after the demonstration phase trials prove the performance of the tanks.”
He continued: “This complex programme has been impacted by some supply chain delays; the Initial Operating Capability and Full Operating Capability are under review but no formal reapproval has yet been undertaken.”
It would seem, therefore, that there is potential for a degree of slippage in the schedule for what is intended to be the British Army’s principal armoured fighting capability into the 2040s. Challenger 3 is being delivered by Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land, the joint venture established in 2019, under a contract awarded in 2021 to upgrade 148 Challenger 2 hulls to a new standard centred on a fully digital, fully stabilised turret mounting the 120mm L55A1 smoothbore gun.
The smoothbore main gun, replacing the rifled L30A1 carried by Challenger 2, allows the tank to fire NATO-standard ammunition and to use programmable rounds, and is one of several changes intended to bring the platform back into line with current Western main battle tank standards after a long period in which Challenger 2’s gun and ammunition stocks placed it on a divergent path from its allies.
In a separate written answer responding to Conservative MP Ben Obese-Jecty, Pollard addressed reports of unresolved turret gearbox issues affecting the programme. The minister said Challenger 3 remained in the demonstration phase and that “the design continues to be refined by the manufacturer to ensure the vehicle meets its required performance standards.” He added: “As design maturity has improved, the Prime Contractor has refined elements of the design, including the Turret Power Traverse Gearbox, to meet those requirements. This is normal engineering practice and is not assessed to impact the delivery timeline for the tanks.”
The Turret Power Traverse Gearbox is the mechanism that allows the turret to rotate under power, a fundamental function for any modern main battle tank and one with direct implications for target acquisition and engagement times. Refinements to gearbox design during demonstration trials are not unusual on armoured vehicle programmes, however.
The Initial Operating Capability for Challenger 3 is targeted for 2027, with Full Operating Capability planned for 2030. The MoD has not yet provided revised dates publicly, and Pollard’s answer indicates that timings will be set following completion of demonstration phase trials rather than reset in advance of them.












Is it certain that of the remaining hulls not up for conversion to Ch3 standard that they are all beyond help or in too bad a state to merit conversion?
Many were left to rot at Ashchurch in sheds with the rooves full of holes.
Hi Daniele, of all the information that MoD has it is perhaps the condition of equipment in storage (RN/Army/RAF) that is most hard to find out, unless you do another of your FOI requests!
When Cameron ‘mothballed’ 159 CR2 MBTs in 2010 (together with a large number of AS-90s, 62 or 63, I estimate), it was to save money in the wake of the global financial recession. The technical term we used was to transfer tanks from the active list (where each one has a role or purpose) to the inactive list (where none has). Equipment on the inactive list is no longer wanted and no funds or labour at all is expended on maintenance, hence a financial saving is made.
With limited (or none?) CFE at Ashchurch in 2010, such equipment would have rotted fast – as we know so many old sheds were usually not watertight. Plus, they were fair game for cannibalisation by the Equipment Support Manager. This sorry fleet has atrophied to 75 CR2s over the years, as actual scrapping took place with a gas axe or similar.
Thus we have 213 tanks in the active fleet split between: the armoured regiments; RBSL; possibly some in Store Equipment Fleet (Germany) in Ayrshire Barracks, Mönchengladbach; a number in Ashchurch split between the Repair Pool and the Attrition Reserve; the Trg Org (RAC and REME).
In an ideal world the condition of the 213 would be fair to good with an availability for use of about 70%.
The 75 tanks in the inactive list in Ashchurch, as mentioned, are bound to all be in a very bad condition.
The MoDs recent claim that we have 288 tanks is a poor joke – that is 213+75 and those 75 are off the books.
The other thing that we don’t know is what the Platform Presentation State is for consideration of a CR2 for conversion to CR3. In theory it might mean that a tank lacking much above the turret ring might still be considered a suitable candidate as it gets a new turret anyway.
Too many unknowns to say more than that.
Russia managed to reactivate ten thousand tanks from the 1960’s that had been sitting outside in Siberia with no cover for five decades.
I find it hard to believe that sitting in a leaky shed for ten years in the UK would put a vehicle as well manufactured as a challenger 2 in a state of repair that its hull was unrecoverable for conversion to a CH3 with a replacement turret, suspension system and engine.
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Makes you wonder. Although Russia’s operational requierments will no doubt be far lower than ours.
Regards the numbers, It’s standard mate, it is called “spin” and luckily we have enough informed posters and researchers to shout “bullsh**” when needed.
Question is how skilled are the people handling this, C2 is quite old and modifying the existing hulls creating this hybrid of new on top of old sounds not trivial
What is the point of this enterprise?
We’re getting a truly underwhelming amount of bespoke tanks, that are already showing problems during the development phase. They’re not enough to make a significant difference on the battlefield in comparison to those operated by our continental allies.
We’re not building new tanks either, so the skill-base in the UK isn’t being properly maintained either.
The BA needs to decide whether it wants to carry on having tanks, or if it can do without. If they pick the former, then invest in a MOTS design such as the modern Leopards, Black Panthers or Abrams and grow the fleet with the savings. If they don’t want tanks, scrap the current fleet and reallocate the resources.
A similarly frank conversations needs to be had with regards to the Apache fleet. What value is the BA gaining from operating Apaches as ‘drone motherships’, as opposed to simply operating the drones on their own, and scrapping a capability that is rapidly being discarded by modern ground forces? Both Japan and South Korea are already cancelling or reducing Apache orders in favour of UAVs. Poland is purchasing them, but then again, Poland is purchasing everything.
I think CH3 is a practical measure to wait and see what happens with tanks but I do very much agree on Apache. It’s a real pity the army spent billions replacing them just recently. Kind of shows why the Army is in such a state, spends billions replacing the wrong platform to keep up with the Jones in the USA to carry out its preferred colonial policing task while totally neglecting artillery, GBAD, Armour and drones.
I think Apache may be increasingly difficult to deploy and much of their utility will be better employed from cheaper UAV’s.
IOC and FOC have always been 2027 and 2030 respectively. It is said, but not in this article, that the MoD is so panicked by the thought of ‘another Ajax happening’ that they wish to avoid doing concurrent work in the CR3 programme and to make everything consecutive – ie don’t do process B until process A is signed off. This will extend the timeline without a shadow of doubt. I remember the last time a slow modernisation programme WCSP was impacted by another programme (Boxer) speeding up and it resulted in a financial collision and that WCSP was cancelled as a consequence hence the end of IFVs for the armoured Infantry. Hopefully no-one will throw a spanner in the works whilst the CR3 programme is slowed as seems inevitable.
It has to be said though that GDUK’s Ajax in my eyes was always an exceptionally high-risk programme and that CR3 is a relatively low risk programme which doesn’t really need being treated this way.
[Hard to believe that it is 10 years to the month that I was working for Rheinmetall on what was then called CR2 LEP]