It’s sink or swim time for the EU on Russia

EU-Russia relations could only be described as walking a tightrope of which one slip could lead to certain death. We saw this play out in its extreme in 2014 when the war broke out in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.

Many saw that time as the lowest moment in the rollercoaster ride of EU-Russia relations since the fall of the Berlin wall. Yet with a potential invasion of Ukraine on the cards it’s clear that relations have hit a new low. So, how exactly will the EU react to the ever-increasing hostile acts of Russia? Will this be another unifying moment for the bloc? And if so, why exactly has the EU been soft on Russia till today?

This article was submitted to the UK Defence Journal by Kay Abdilahi. The author is a communications professional and MSc in Global Affairs with a focus on Russia and China.

This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines. 

Well, foremost EU failures in response to Russian action can be pinpointed to member state disunity and its institutional make-up. An organisation with 27 member states is bound to have different histories, concerns and interests. But no more so is this fragmentation put on display than in the case of when dealing with Russia.

Central to this split is the somewhat distinct relationships these countries have with Russia, whether that’s historical in the case of Germany and its Ostpolitik, economical in the case Italy whom along with Germany have a trading relationship worth billions with Russia, or strategic in the case of the Netherlands and its ties in the energy industry. These different experiences and views have further split with the push for greater action by Baltic states like Poland, who’ve felt the full weight of Soviet oppression. In turn, this drag on a unified approach has been exploited by the Russian state which has made its divide and conquer method ever more effective. Whether through playing up its bilateral relations and taking on countries one on one or in a more nefarious way with Maskirovka in the form of disinformation campaigns.

Secondly, the institutional makeup of the EU was not constructed for rapid decision making nor the implementation of robust responses in the face of aggression. For example, in the case of Skripal, the poisoning of a dissident, months of deliberation resulted in a mere few sanctions against those closely involved with the assassination. Whilst Russia’s support of Assad’s regime in Syria too took the form of numerous meetings resulting in dither and delay. Unlike Russia, Putin’s at the helm of its military, economic resources and institutions – the lack of hoops to go through in its decision-making means Russia is able to draw its pistol much quicker.

Just like the differences in relations with Russia, member states aren’t willing to place EU foreign policy above their own. Whilst, the EU has taken some steps to remedy this in the Lisbon reforms, via greater powers for the high representative, and the creation of a new EU foreign ministry, European External Action Service (EEAS).

In reality, the reforms haven’t gone far enough, the agency is still very much in its infancy and to make matters worse barriers continue to be upheld by individual member states own foreign policy heads as well as the commissions vigorously protecting its own grip on power. In any case with heads of states playing a more dominant role than foreign ministers, without more direct engagement from them in dealing with Putin, it appears the EU foreign policy machinery is doomed to be defunct.

However, for all the EU’s flaws, a clear unifying front is exactly what Russia got in reaction to the destabilising actions in Ukraine in 2014. The economic sanctions placed on Russia unanimously since then continues to be rolled over even today after Russia’s failure to comply with the Minsk agreement, showing the world the EU has some bite to its bark. Leveraging economic sanctions can once again be a powerful tool as Russian soldiers amass Ukraine’s borders. The recent EU aid package for Ukraine worth $1bn and talks of between EU and US on further economic sanctions targeting Russia’s banking sector could likely be another hit coming down the track.

And where the EU has fallen short in Russia, it’s somewhat made up for in making headways in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Poland, Moldova and Georgia along with other Baltic states have accomplished tremendous amount with the support of EU, from building a stronger economy, creating sturdy democratic foundations and making leaps and bounds in rule of law. Here the UK has an opportunity to carve out a bigger role for itself in the region both economically and in areas of strategic interest like tech. On the defence front, Britain already plays a leading role through NATO’s eFP (Enhanced Forward presence) and on the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), contributing to NATO deterrence and capability efforts in the Baltics.

In short, EU-Russia relations have once again turned frosty. The EU’s disunity and institutional quagmire remains a barrier to a robust response to Russia’s overreach.  Developing an effective foreign ministry and responding quicker is the only chance the EU has in coming out on top against an ever more confrontational Russia.