Category: Opinion

The UK has emerged as the most pessimistic country regarding its future peace prospects in a survey of 15 countries commissioned by the British Council and International Alert. 

The Peace Perceptions Poll 2018, conducted in partnership with global polling agency RIWI, found that people in the UK seem more negative about their country’s future peace and security than those living in conflict zones, including Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Pollsters say they asked more than 110,000 people about their perceptions of peace and conflict. The online survey included Brazil, Colombia, DRC, Hungary, India, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, with targeted polling additionally undertaken in Northern Ireland. 

The UK was the most worried about terrorism of all the countries surveyed. More than a quarter of Britons do not feel that the UK is a ‘peaceful and secure place to live in’.40% of UK respondents felt prospects for peace and security will get worse in the next five years.   

The report found people in the UK:

• are most concerned about terrorism and criminal violence.
• had some of the highest levels of perceptions of political exclusion: 41% of respondents felt less able to influence the political decisions affecting them, compared to five years ago. They blamed this on a lack of trustworthy information and corruption in politics.
• perceived some of the lowest levels of access to economic opportunities, with 40% saying they felt unable to improve their or their family’s economic situation.

Harriet Lamb, CEO of International Alert said:

“The poll’s findings point to the uncertainties facing the British public. The UK has to ensure that people have more equal access to economic opportunities and feel able to engage politically.”

Professor Jo Beall, Director Education and Society, British Council said:

“This poll seeks to understand people’s experience of conflict, and their aspirations for peace – whether in the UK or elsewhere in the world. We believe these findings will be useful for leaders and policy-makers facing up to the challenges of peacebuilding, wherever they are in the world.”

When asked about the most effective ways to build long-term peace internationally, a third of British respondents prioritised ‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’, followed by a fifth who emphasised ‘supporting societies and communities to resolve conflict peacefully’. 

When asked how the UK government should promote peace: 32% said it should ‘deal with the reasons why people fight in the first place’, followed by 25% who said it should ‘teach peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools’. 

They chose these over military interventions, which was amongst the least selected options.  

Harriet Lamb added:

“At a time when conflict is on the rise, the poll shows strong popular support for peacebuilding approaches, which focus on dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place. The public clearly understand what is needed to build peace. People have crisis fatigue – they want long-term solutions. Politicians should focus on how to break the cycle of violence by investing more in peacebuilding.” 

Key Global Findings:

• Those living in more peaceful countries tended to be more pessimistic about future prospects for peace. The UK, Brazil, the US and Hungary had the largest numbers thinking peace and security would get worse over the next five years.
• ‘Lack of jobs and ability to provide for one’s family’ was widely seen as the top reason that would drive people to violent action. This was followed by a ‘sense of injustice’ and a need to ‘improve one’s social status’.
• Globally, terrorism and criminal violence were people’s top security concerns.
• 83% of global respondents said having political influence was fundamental for peace and security, with 90% saying the same about access to economic opportunities.
• Globally, people said the two most important means of achieving long-term peace were establishing why conflicts start and supporting societies to deal with conflict peacefully.
• When asked where governments should spend more to promote peace, ‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ ranked first in 10 of the 15 countries, followed by ‘teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools’.
• The DRC and South Africa perceived the highest levels of political exclusion, with 50% and 44% of the population respectively saying they are less able to influence the political decisions that affect them, compared to 5 years ago. This was followed by the UK (41%), Hungary (40%) and the US (37%).
• Across the majority of countries polled, corruption in politics was cited as the number one reason why people felt they had less political influence. This was most strongly felt in South Africa, Ukraine and Nigeria.
• Those who thought they had more political influence attributed it extensively to social media and technology, which ranked top with 28% choosing it.   
• Those who felt most economically excluded generally lived in middle- to high-income countries, including Hungary, Ukraine, the UK, Lebanon, the US and South Africa. This shows that the perception of economic exclusion is as important as the reality.

In July, U.S. President Donald Trump made waves in Brussels by suggesting that the U.S. might “do its own thing” if NATO Alliance members don’t meet defence spending commitments.

This article was written by Owen Daniels, an associate director with the Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also an Assistant Managing Editor of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy’s Fellowship Program. Follow him on Twitter at @OJDaniels.

He left NATO leaders with “whiplash” by alternately berating and praising them. The U.S. defence establishment has worked hard to reassure allies about the American commitment to the Alliance even as the president’s comments sow uncertainty.

On the surface, then, recent reports that the U.S. is working with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan and other partners to establish an “Arab NATO” might seem surprising, given Trump’s apparent contempt for the original item.

But concepts very similar to the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), as Arab NATO would be known officially, have been bandied about by previous U.S. administrations as counterbalances to Iran and to decrease U.S. security commitments. In the past, the Arab NATO concept faced stumbling blocks based on the capabilities of potential member militaries, as well as the unwillingness of involved states to work toward greater military interoperability or intelligence sharing. Many of these problems remain, and political fractiousness, especially in the Gulf, poses a major hurdle for any potential military bloc.

With these thoughts in mind, here are several key questions that the MESA states (the GCC, Egypt, and Jordan) and Trump administration will likely need to answer.

What’s new?

At a glance, there isn’t much that appears to distinguish MESA from previous attempts to unify some of the Arab states against the threat from Iran.

Given their comparatively stable politics position in Iran’s shadow, the GCC states have long drawn U.S. policymakers’ gazes as the foundation of a counterbalance to Tehran. In 2012, the Obama administration launched the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, a foreign-defence ministerial intended to encourage collective action on regional security issues on the part of the Gulf states with U.S. support. It tried to build on the forum in 2015 and 2016 with U.S.-GCC summits at Camp David and in Riyadh, resulting in joint working groups on missile defence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, illicit finance, and maritime security, among other areas.

But the revelation of the U.S.’s secret nuclear negotiations with Iran created mistrust with Gulf partners and limited the impact of the working groups. Obama faced difficulty attracting leaders to the summit given the nuclear talks and his public comments about the Gulf states and Iran sharing the region; GCC heads of state sent deputies in their places.

These past efforts to build a counter-Iran alliance, or even improve Gulf military and intelligence coordination, failed due to a lack of urgency and unity within the GCC and, eventually, mistrust of U.S. intentions toward Iran. The GCC is not a political monolith, and its members have different approaches to and relations with Iran. If MESA is to succeed, its backers will be counting on a couple of new dynamics.

One factor is the apparent impetus from the region. Saudi leadership proposed the idea of a security pact to counter Iran when Trump visited Riyadh last year. While the U.S. hasn’t provided an ironclad security commitment should Iran attack Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states, the Saudis and Emiratis view the Iranian threat as compelling enough to take action themselves, and the Trump administration appears willing to help them.

New leadership is another factor that could make a major difference. From the outset, the Trump administration has focused on Iran’s destabilising regional role and the inadequacy of the JCPOA. Secretary Mattis’ positions on the Islamic Republic’s role in the region align more closely with the potential MESA members, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears intent on securing Saudi military leadership in the Gulf. Despite differences in their Yemen policies, Saudi and the UAE remain closely aligned in their Iran concerns and appear willing to try to take their GCC allies with them.

Closer alignment between the U.S. and Gulf partners may increase the potential for this proposed alliance to get off the ground, but MESA members still face significant political hurdles to military cooperation.

How will the alliance navigate political hurdles?

One of the most blatant potential stumbling blocks to progress toward MESA is the Gulf crisis, which has torn the GCC asunder. The crisis began in May 2017, when fake news about Qatar’s emir precipitated a total blockade of the peninsular state by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, along with Egypt. The 2017 developments marked an escalation of longstanding tensions over Qatar’s foreign policy, including its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and warmer relations with Iran.

Qatar and its blockaders appear at a deadlock in normalising relations – Saudi Arabia was rumoured to be considering building a moat to separate Qatar from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, and Qatar has taken the UAE to international courts over the blockade. Committing to MESA could certainly go a long way toward repairing Qatar’s relations with its neighbours, but it’s difficult to imagine any near-term possibility for cooperation.

Qatar’s differences with the Saudis and Emiratis are a more extreme example of the political differences that have impeded the GCC security coordination. Although Bahrain traditionally cooperates with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and especially Oman take less bellicose political stances toward Iran for reasons of geography and history. Even Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been slow to coordinate on joint command centres for counterterrorism and other issues.

In military terms, political differences have translated into a reticence to share sensitive details on capabilities and intelligence necessary to work toward goals like integrated missile defence. Iran’s ballistic missile program is one of its primary threats to the Gulf, and integrating the GCC’s various U.S.-made missile defence systems requires sensors and other technologies to be placed in one country for the benefit of all; otherwise, there are gaps in the system, rendering it ineffective without GCC-wide buy-in.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s willingness to blockade Qatar for its divergent policies may spook Kuwait into falling in line with their broad policy goals, though Oman has been especially vocal in the past about avoiding shared military commitments like MESA. Clearing such political hurdles will be critical if the alliance is to break new ground.

What’s Israel’s stance?

Improved Gulf-Israel relations due to shared Iran concerns have been one of the most significant regional political developments over the last decade or so; Israel has workable, if not necessarily cordial, political and security relations with Jordan and Egypt. It’s close to unthinkable to imagine that the Trump administration would try to advance an Arab alliance along Israel’s eastern and southern borders without consulting Jerusalem, warmer relations or no. Washington still maintains the Qualitative Military Edge (QME) policy, which ensures the U.S. conduct regional weapons sales that threaten Israel’s military superiority.

Better behind-the-scenes ties between Israel and especially the Gulf states have made the prospect of an Arab alliance that puts Iran in the crosshairs viable, but formal participation in a potential pact is still a bridge too far. The administration and its Arab partners have discussed that Israel could quietly cooperate with MESA via coordination with the U.S., and the Saudis and Emiratis seem willing to combine intelligence capabilities. But recent controversy in Saudi over linkages between MBS and the Trump administration’s alleged peace plan have exposed the limits of Arab-Israeli cooperation. The U.S. will play an important role in ensuring that diplomatic backchannels remain open between the alliance members and Israel.

Will there be an Article 5?

One of the cornerstones of the NATO Alliance is its collective defence clause, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 codifies allies’ commitment that an attack on one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” and that member states will work together or individually to aid the attacked by “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” There is flexibility as to whether Article 5 requires every member of the alliance to participate in a collective response to adversary action, but, in practical terms, a coalition of willing member states would likely undertake a response. Article 5 was only invoked once, on behalf of the U.S. after September 11, 2001.

Real the full article courtesy of RealClearDefense here.

The strategic location of the British Indian Ocean Territory  makes it into the perfect facility for long range operations.

The tiny islands were charted by the famous Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama, the first European to reach India by sea, in the early sixteenth century. However, the archipelago was only claimed two centuries later by France as a possession of the French territory of Mauritius and settled in the 1790s. Soon France established a coconut plantation using slave labour. During the Napoleonic Wars, Mauritius was captured by Britain, and with the first defeat of Napoleon in 1814, the colony was amongst those ceded to the British in the Treaty of Paris of 1814.

Hereafter, the Chagos Archipelago would be part of the British Colony of Mauritius until the British Government detached the archipelago and the islands of Desroches, Farquhar and Aldabra from Seychelles in 1965 for their inclusion in the newly formed British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The main objective was to allow the construction of a new complex of military facilities for the benefit of the UK and the United States. On June 1976, the three islands mentioned above once part of Seychelles were returned to the colony as it was on the verge of being granted independence. As a result, the six main islands groups of the Chagos Archipelago constitute the BIOT.

The Chagos is an archipelago composed of more than 50 islands totalling a land area of 60 km² or 23 square miles. The largest and most relevant island is Diego Garcia, accounting for almost half of the territory’s total land area and being home of its only airport and inhabitants. Historically, its geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean, south of India and halfway between Africa and Indonesia, enabled the tiny Diego Garcia to play a significant role for Britain’s interests in the area and beyond.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, when the British Empire established a global network of coaling stations to supply its fleet, Diego Garcia briefly based two coaling stations for the Royal Navy’s steamships crossing the Indian Ocean. In the 1880s the island witnessed an increasing movement of trading and warships, symbols of Britain’s imperial century.

In 1914, during the first weeks of the First World War, the German light cruiser SMS Emden visited Diego Garcia after several raids throughout the region. The British garrison at the islands had not yet received the information about the state of war between Britain and Germany and thus treated the Germans to a warm reception. After a fortnight the light cruiser left Diego Garcia to continue its attacks against vessels and coastal towns of the Entente. The Emden would face her final battle one month later when she encountered the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney.

Diego Garcia was used more intensely by Britain during the Second World War. In 1942, Britain opened an air base named RAF Station Diego Garcia and created an advanced flying boat unit. It was home of squadrons No 205 and 240, originally stationed on Ceylon. Aircraft such as the British flying boat patrol bomber ‘Sunderland’ and the American flying boat and amphibious aircraft ‘Catalina’ were flown during the war in search of German and Japanese surface raider and submarines. The island also received a Royal Marines detachment to protect the Royal Navy base and Royal Air Force station from Japanese attacks. Following the end of the war, the British station was closed in April 1946.

In the 1960s, while Britain was planning its military withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, the British Government allowed the United States to establish a naval communication station on one of the British territories in the region. The main island of the Chagos Archipelago soon emerged as a suitable location. In November 1965, envisaging the creation of one new administrative territory, the British Government purchased the Archipelago from the self-governing colony of Mauritius. However, since the 1980s Mauritius has contested the British control of the Chagos Archipelago. Recently, in 2017, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of referring the dispute between Britain and Mauritius to the International Court of Justice in order to clarify the status of the archipelago.

On 30 December 1966, Britain and the United States established an agreement which enables the Americans to use the newly formed British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes for 50 years – until December 2016 – followed by a 20-year extension as long as neither party declares its intention of terminating the agreement. The United States made no direct payment to the UK as part of the 1966 agreement or its subsequent amendments. Nevertheless, Britain received a discount from the American Government on the acquisition of the submarine-launched ballistic missile system (SLBM), the Polaris missiles.

For the United States, the main island, Diego Garcia, was the ideal territory for setting up a foreign military base. Firstly, it was owned and administered by Britain its closest ally. Secondly, the island was distant from any potential threats. Thirdly, it was a place not sought by other nations as it had no economic interest. Lastly and most controversial, it had a small population. Its inhabitants were Europeans who managed the coconut plantations and contract workers of Indian, African and Malay ancestry, known as Chagossians, who had worked and lived on the plantations for several generations. The Chagossians would be removed from Diego Garcia so the base could be constructed. Between 1967 and 1973, the inhabitants were relocated primarily to Mauritius and Seychelles.

The relatively small Naval Communications Station (NAVCOMMSTA) was completed in early 1973. However, the size and scope of the Anglo-American base would face a significant enlargement due to geopolitical changes. In the early 1970s, the military capabilities of the United States in the region was going through several new setbacks including the victory of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Fall of Saigon, the closure of the listening posts of Peshawar Air Station in Pakistan and Kagnew Station in Eritrea, the Mayaguez incident, the growing Soviet naval presence in Aden and a new Soviet airbase in Somalia. These setbacks caused the American Government to request Britain permission to expand the facilities in Diego Garcia. Receiving Britain’s approval, the United States Naval Construction Battalions (‘Seebees’ or C.B.) initiated the enlargement of the airfield and construction of a fleet anchorage.

Subsequently to the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979-1980, the United States and the UK became more concerned with the security of the oil flow from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, once more, the United States asked Britain for permission to expand the military complex on Diego Garcia. The new plans for the base involved the construction of two parallel 3,700 m (12,000 foot-long) runways, larger parking aprons – the area where aircraft are parked, refuelled, loaded or boarded – for heavy bombers, twenty new anchorages, a deep-water pier, new port facilities for the largest ships in the American or British navies, aircraft hangars, an air terminal, maintenance buildings, a fuel storage area and living quarters and messing facilities for thousands of personnel. Thereby, the 1970s witnessed the BIOT be transformed into a world-class military base for joint UK-US operations.

Following the end of the Cold War, Diego Garcia continued to be an important military base. The territory played a key role in the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the War in Afghanistan as the United States Armed Forces extensively used the facilities during its operations in the Gulf War of 1991, Afghanistan and Iraq. During the War in Afghanistan and Iraq other allied militaries were based on the island including Australian, South Korean and Japanese forces.

Moreover, Diego Garcia host one of four ‘dedicated ground antennas’, the others are on the British island of Ascension, Kwajalein – part of the Marshall Islands – and at Cape Canaveral, Florida, that assists in the operation of the famous navigation system, the Global Positioning System (GPS). The USAF also manages a telescope array on the Island as part of the ‘Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System’ (GEODSS) for tracking debris and lists Diego Garcia as one of the 33 emergency landing sites worldwide for the NASA Space Shuttle programme.

Beyond that, the territory is seen as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ and regarded as the ‘Malta of the Indian Ocean’ by the American Government aiding to explain the reasons behind the continued military presence on the islands and its position as one of the most relevant military bases in the Asia-Pacific region for the United States and Britain. It is worth mentioning that neither the United States nor Britain recognises Diego Garcia – or the BIOT as a whole – as being subject to the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, which lists the BIOT as covered by the treaty.

Currently, the United States military complex on Diego Garcia is formally known as Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia or ‘Camp Thunder Cove’. The UK’s term for the facilities is Permanent Join Operating Base (PJOB) Diego Garcia, and the British personnel is officially represented by the ‘British Forces British Indian Ocean Territories’ (BFBIOT). As Britain has full and continual access to the facilities and is responsible for the administration of the territory, the BFBIOT has approximately 40-50 British military personnel permanently posted on Diego Garcia, most from the Naval Party 1002, having as their primary duty to carry out the bureaucratic administration of the British Indian Ocean Territory. The American presence accounts for roughly 2,500 military personnel. However, due to the extensive usage of Diego Garcia by the United States, the numbers usually go beyond 5,000 military personnel; these numbers do not consider civilian contract workers.

Therefore, the long history of the BIOT shows its importance to Britain since the nineteenth century and to the United States since the early years of the Cold War. In spite of the controversies involving the Chagossians, the geostrategic position puts the tiny islands amongst Britain’s most relevant Overseas Territories. Alongside Gibraltar, the Sovereign Bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Ascension Island and the Falkland Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory plays a central role in the expeditionary capabilities and overseas interests of Britain and her allies.

Diego Garcia is one of the last British footholds ‘East of Suez’ and the last British possession in the Indian Ocean. While Britain prepares herself for a more ‘global’ role and desires to be an indispensable ally for the Americans, the relevance of the BIOT and other British Overseas Territories shall not be disregarded by any present or future British Government.