The 1966 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) were both initiated by Labour governments and witnessed first a lapse and then the reinstatement of big deck carriers in the Royal Navy.
This article was submitted to the UK Defence Journal by Kelvin Curnow. Kelvin’s particular area of interest is naval aircraft and aircraft carriers. He is a keen writer and over the past fifteen years he has had a number of articles published in different journals.
Under the Labour government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson the Defence Secretary Denis Healey led the 1966 Review. It came to the conclusion that Britain would no longer undertake unilateral military action and that while initially committing to maintaining a British presence in Malaysia and Singapore a consequent financial crisis led to a reversal of this decision.
A subsequent rundown of the RN’s strike carrier force saw three decommissioned; HMS VICTORIOUS (1968), HMS EAGLE (1972) and HMS ARK ROYAL (IV) (1978) while HMS HERMES was converted to a commando carrier at Devonport Dockyard between 1971-3. HERMES was subsequently refitted at Portsmouth from 1980 to June 1981, during which a 12° ski-jump and facilities for operating BAe FRS.1 Sea Harriers were incorporated.
Retired from service on 12 April 1984, at 28,000 tonnes HERMES could have been the last carrier of significant size to be operated by the RN. This was not to be, for the Blair government’s SDR led by then Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson set down a number of key decisions one of which was to replace the three Invincible class carriers with two ships which would be larger and more flexible than the earlier vessels.
This decision was based on the premise that the UK should be able to respond to a major international crisis requiring a large military effort while concurrently maintaining an overseas deployment on a smaller scale. On 25 July 2007 Defence Secretary Des Browne announced the order for two new Queen Elizabeth class (QEC) aircraft carriers. The two ships, HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (QE) and HMS PRINCE OF WALES (PoW), were commissioned on 7 December 2017 and 10 December 2019 respectively marking the end of a thirty year hiatus in the operation of large strike carriers by the RN.
The decisions which witnessed first the removal of strike carriers from the fleet and the current renewal of big deck carriers, together with combat experience which influenced the design of the QEC give important insights into current and future of carrier aviation.
HMS ARK ROYAL (IV) AND CARRIER AVIATION IN THE 1970s
For most of the 1970s ARK ROYAL (IV) symbolised British sea power, albeit one which was at best superficial. From 1970 she took to sea with the most formidable air-wing ever assembled on the decks of a RN carrier comprising: 12 McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG.1s; 14 Blackburn (Hawker Siddeley) Buccaneer S.2s; 4 Fairy Gannet AEW.3s; 6 Westland Sea King HAS.1s; 2 Westland Wessex HAR.1s; and, 1 Gannet COD.4. This was a balanced air wing capable of undertaking air defence (Phantom), long-range strike and reconnaissance (Buccaneer), airborne early warning (AEW – Gannet), anti-submarine warfare (ASW – Sea King) and carrier on-board delivery (COD – Gannet) missions. Approximating to just under half the size of United States Navy (USN) carrier air wings (CVWs) the ARK’s aircraft were nevertheless of equal capability until the appearance in 1974 of the Grumman F-14A Tomcat on American carriers.
The one aircraft which stood out in RN service was the Buccaneer which had a top speed of Mach 0.85 at sea level and a range of 2,300 miles. Originally designed to attack Soviet Sverdlov class cruisers with either nuclear or conventional weapons approaching under the ship’s radar horizon, it was a testament to the aircraft’s design that it finished its career in the first Gulf War laser spiking targets for Panavia Tornados using the Westinghouse AN/AVQ-23E Pave Spike laser designation pod. These missions would often end in the Buccaneers themselves self lasing targets before destroying them with their own Paveway II laser-guided bombs (LGBs).
If the Buccaneer was a success story ARK ROYAL itself, despite its imposing appearance, especially with its air-wing parked on deck, presented a far less happy picture. The ship spent half her service life of twenty-four years being modernised, refitted and repaired despite which she remained in very poor material condition throughout her career suffering many defects and mechanical failures. Comments by those who served on the ship painted a very bleak picture of the ship’s physical state, particularly towards the end of her service life.[1] If it had not been for the decision announced in the 1996 White Paper to cancel the CVA-01 carrier ARK ROYAL would have been retired in 1972. It is ironic that the RN’s most powerful air-wing put to sea on a carrier in such poor condition when a far better alternative was available. This was HMS EAGLE, sister ship to ARK ROYAL. Although both suffered from the fact their construction had begun in World War II (WWII) and consequently had extensive corrosion and obsolete power trains, at the time of her decommissioning EAGLE was considered to be in better material condition. The decision to retain ARK ROYAL was based on the fact that to modify EAGLE to permit Phantom operations would have cost £25–30 million. These were modifications which had already been carried out on ARK ROYAL and in February 1972 the Conservative Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, considered the overall manpower and cost requirements of operating both ships was beyond the UK’s resources, especially given that ARK ROYAL was expected to be available to the end of the 1970s with only two short refits.
In addition to its general better overall material condition EAGLE had a far superior sensor fit than any RN carrier. The primary sensor was the Type 984 3D S Band radar which had been developed by the Admiralty Signals Research Establishment (ASRE). The radar was mounted on a fully stabilized mechanically rotated platform revolving at 4.6 or 6 revolutions per minute. The most advanced radar of its type in the world at the time of its introduction, the Type 984 featured a large circular microwave lens. The radar measured the longitudinal position, latitudinal position and altitude of a target. It did this by employing five simultaneously scanning pencil beams fed by three cavity magnetrons with the top feed being a fixed horn for long-range search beam.[2]
A key component of the Type 984 system was the Comprehensive Display System (CDS), an electromechanical computer that developed aircraft tracks in a semi-automated mode. The system could track forty-eight aircraft while continuing to scan for new contacts. Additionally, the radar could perform the air-traffic control function.[3]
The Type 984’s detection range against a large high-flying aircraft was typically 210 mi (330 km) although against small low-flying aircraft this could fall to as low as 46 mi (74 km). ARK ROYAL possessed a very poor radar fit-out in comparison, relying on two Type 965R long-range radars with their two distinctive AKE ‘double bedstead’ arrays. The Type 965 was to prove disastrously inadequate in the Falklands War proving itself unable to detect low-flying Argentinian aircraft, a fact which contributed to the loss of both HMS SHEFFIELD and HMS COVENTRY.[4] It could be speculated that the Type 984 would have been effective in detecting Argentine attacks had it remained installed on HERMES and not removed in 1972.
TO THE FALKLANDS
With the demise of the RN’s strike carriers the responsibility to provide air cover to the task force sent south to retake the Falkland Islands from their Argentinian invaders fell to HERMES and HMS INVINCIBLE. In order to understand the decision to reinstate strike carriers as part of the RN’s order of battle, it is necessary to examine important lessons learnt as a result of the conflict. Of note is that there were three British built carriers which took part in the war, those of the RN and the Colossus class carrier ARA VEINTICINCO DE MAYO.
On 2 May 1982 the Argentine carrier attempted to launch a wave of Douglas A-4Q Skyhawk jets after her Grumman S-2 Trackers detected the RN task force. Prospectively, what would have been the first battle between aircraft carriers since WWII did not take place because the VEINTICINCO DE MAYO could not find sufficient wind over the deck. This was an important lesson arising out of the Falklands War. Aircraft carriers equipped with Catapult Assisted Take Off Barrier Assisted Recovery (CATOBAR) equipment as the means of launching and recovering aircraft were more constrained by weather in conducting operations than Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft operating off ski-jump equipped ships. The often argued contention that Phantoms flying from ARK ROYAL (had she been available) would have provided almost total air superiority over the Falklands belies the fact that weather conditions and sea states would have prevented their launch on many occasions.
The Sea Harriers were not bound by such conditions and could operate outside the parameters imposed by weather on aircraft flying from carriers equipped for CATOBAR operations.
The lack of adequate radar warning during the Falklands War is often discussed. Particular reference is made to the lack of an AEW aircraft and inevitably this leads to a discussion about the Gannet AEW.3. Arguments are made that this aircraft would have made a substantive difference to the air war in that it could have provided early warning of incoming raids and provided direction to the defending fighters. However, just as the Type 965P was a WWII design and was found to be lacking, the Gannet’s AN/APS-20A was of a similar vintage and suffered from several major shortcomings not the least of which it had poor performance against clutter. In conditions of a high sea state and over land the radar was blind. Lacking an on board processor the two observers on the Gannet were presented with a raw radar picture which required highly skilled interpretation to be of any use at all. The appalling weather conditions around the Falklands, the fact that the Argentinian attacks were carried out at extremely low level and that many were routed over West Falkland,[5] calls into question the efficacy of any deployment of the Gannet to the Falklands if indeed it had been possible. The initial response to provide organic AEW cover, the Sea King AEW.2, suffered from the same shortfalls as the Gannet. Equipped with the Thorn-EMI ARI 5980/3 Searchwater LAST (Low Altitude Surveillance Task) radar the Sea King’s usefulness was limited in that just as with the AN/APS-20A Searchwater could not detect targets either over land or in the littoral. Both were strictly ‘blue water’ radars.[6]
Without doubt the Sea Harrier was the greatest success of the Falklands campaign. They were able to generate an exceptional mission rate. A total of 1,335 combat sorties were flown during the 45 days of air combat operations beginning 1 May 1982. This is an average of 1.41 sorties per day. Together with an availability rate of over 90% they were able to provide a capability well above the numbers embarked. During the Falklands conflict twenty-eight Sea Harriers attained air superiority over the combined forces of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina (FAA – Argentine Air Force) and Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina (COAN – Argentine Naval Aviation) totalling some 130 aircraft.[7] Outnumbered ten to one the Sea Harriers shot down twenty-one Argentine aircraft for no loss. Without their presence many more personnel and ships would have been lost.
But despite its success shortcomings were recognised. On 28 August 1982 HMS ILLUSTRIOUS arrived in the South Atlantic with 809 NAS (Naval Air Squadron) on board. These aircraft had been modified to address the inadequacies in range by adding drop tanks of 190 gal capacity and in combat persistence by adding twin Sidewinder rails. The other major issue concerned the inability of the of the Blue Fox radar to look down, especially over land. This would be addressed with the advent of the Sea Harrier FA2 equipped with the Blue Vixen Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency (MPRF) pulse Doppler radar which possessed a true look-down/shoot-down capability. Hence, from the Falklands War the lessons learnt dictated that any Sea Harrier successor would need to combine range, combat persistence and excellent sensors to ensure air dominance.
THE 1990s and 2000s
Post the Falklands War and up until 2010 saw both a high point and its nadir in the number of carriers operated by the RN and the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) in general. Until her decommissioning on 3 August 2005 INVINCIBLE represented the lead ship in her class the others being HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and HMS ARK ROYAL (V). Each of the vessels was significantly modified and updated during their service lives and were capable light carriers. In addition to the three Invincible class carriers, from 1998 onwards the RN also possessed the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) HMS OCEAN giving the service access to a significant number of oceangoing aviation capable ships not seen since the 1960s. In 2000 the RN possessed a substantial force of forty-seven Sea Harrier FA2s, a mixture of new build and aircraft rebuilt from FRS.1s. In terms of capability, if not numbers, this was the most significant fighter force the RN had operated including the period it operated Phantoms.
In addition to the FA2s the Invincible class also put to sea with RAF BAE Harrier GR7s, with a mix of anything up to sixteen aircraft plus three helicopters deployed on a carrier. Operating RN and RAF aircraft together in a combined force was formalised on 1 April 2000 when the Royal Navy’s two Sea Harrier FA2 squadrons and the RAF’s four Harrier GR7/7A squadrons were placed under a single command structure within RAF Strike Command given the appellation Joint Force Harrier (JFH). In 2006 the Sea Harriers were retired and the number of Harrier squadrons was reduced to four including 800 NAS. On 19 October 2010, as part of the Cameron government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), it was announced that the Harrier squadrons would be disbanded and HMS ARK ROYAL (V) withdrawn from service, effectively ending Britain’s sea going airpower for a decade. At the beginning of the 2000s the RN possessed three light carriers, with two operational at any one time and the ability to put thirty-two front-line fighters as well as Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) helicopters to sea. A potent force, particularly considering that the RN also had thirty-two escort vessels available. The SDSR decimated the RN and unlike the earlier SDR did not into account the contemporary security environment; rather it was essentially a cost cutting exercise.[8]
NEW CARRIERS FOR A NEW ERA
A comparison with the RN’s previous largest carrier is telling indicating that QE weighs 17,000 tons more than ARK ROYAL (IV), is 104 ft (31,6 m) longer and has a beam that is 69 ft (21 m) wider. Despite the misconception that in its role as a strike carrier QE’s normal load out of twenty-four F-35Bs is inadequate, this compares favourably to that of ARK ROYAL (IV) which carried only an additional two fighter/strike aircraft. Moreover, while the Phantoms and Buccaneers were superb aircraft in their day the capabilities possessed by each do not in any way match those of the F-35B. As discussed below, the capabilities of the Leonardo Merlin HM2 Crowsnest ASaC helicopter will provide a capacity which exceeds that of any RN aircraft which has previously operated in that role. The QEC will additionally operate Boeing Apaches and Leonardo Wildcat HMA2s in the maritime attack helicopter role, Leonardo Merlin HM2s in the ASW role, Leonardo Merlin HC4/4A assault helicopters and Boeing Chinook transport helicopters. Together the CVW represents the most powerful naval aviation force the RN has ever operated.
The QEC programme experienced delays due to mismanagement and budgetary cutbacks. The situation was exacerbated with the decision by the Cameron led coalition government, announced in the 2010 SDSR, that PoW would be converted to CATOBAR configuration with QE placed into reserve for later conversion. The F-35C variant of the Lightning would be purchased in place of the F-35B. Spiralling costs meant that by 2012 the decision was reversed and both carriers would be completed in STOVL configuration. According to the Cameron government the two main advantages offered by a CATOBAR carrier were interoperability with the UK’s principal allies, the USA and France, and the prospect of buying and operating the Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye off the QEC.
Interoperability between allies is attractive; however it is not without its considerable difficulties. There are questions about operating the F-35C off the FS CHARLES DE GAULLE (CdG) given that she has two 246 ft (75 m) C13‑3 steam catapults, a shorter version of the 325 ft (99 m) C-13-1 catapults installed on American Nimitz class carriers. These may be of insufficient power stroke to launch the aircraft. Moreover, if Dassault Rafale Ms and F-35Cs were cross decked during an operation akin to that of Operation Odyssey Dawn over Libya in 2011, neither type could undertake operational sorties from the other nation’s aircraft carriers. British carriers would not hold a spares package or weapons to permit operations of Rafales and conversely CdG on the same basis could not operate F-35Cs. Additionally, different rules of engagement apply for each country, hence gaining permission to allow strike missions from the decks of each other’s aircraft carrier would be problematic.
If RN F-35Cs flew from United States Navy (USN) carriers a source of spares would not be an issue. Nevertheless, UK aircraft would be operating with a unique range of weapons not used by the USN. Moreover, the rules of engagement under which the British and American forces operate are dramatically different and in itself would again present a considerable hurdle. In theory interoperability and the ability to cross-deck are very attractive propositions. In reality, especially in a ‘hot war,’ there are no advantages.
It is often raised, that the QEC (especially on the twitter page of the UKDJ) are carriers without aircraft, hence they are of little value. This view fails to appreciate that if it were not for their untimely withdrawal 2010, the Harrier GR9/9As were due to continue in service until at least 2018 and be available for initial operations off QE until the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning entered service.
Operating both aircraft simultaneously is an approach used by both the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Marina Militare (Italian Navy). If the original timetable had been adhered to Harriers would have operated from the decks of QE and PoW providing an invaluable and fully amortised platform for operational and training purposes until the F-35B was available in sufficient numbers. One commentator has noted that the option to complete the QEC in STOVL configuration was partially driven by the decision to operate GR9/9As off the carriers.[9] It is of further interest to note that had there not been a significant slippage in the F-35 programme it was expected that the aircraft would replace the Sea Harrier from 2012 and Harriers from 2015 which coincided with the expected in-service dates of the two QEC carriers.[10]
Programme slippages coupled with poor political decision making ensured that none of these plans came to fruition, hence to deride the QEC class as ‘aircraft carriers with no aircraft’ is a naive misunderstanding of the reality, and does not appreciate that for government mismanagement their decks should have initially been lined with Harriers.
The design of QEC reflects important lessons learnt from the Falklands War. Experience demonstrated that success was not reliant on the size of the CVW but on the number of sorties generated. The QEC will be capable of generating a maximum of 110 sorties per day and up to 420 sorties over five days, 33% more sorties per plane per day than the Nimitz class.[11] Another valuable understanding arising from the Falklands was that the availability rate of the Sea Harriers partially outweighed the size of the Argentine air forces. In Operation Lightning Strike, the RAF’s F-35B deployment to Cyprus in May 2019, a serviceability rate of 95% was attained.
The size of a flight deck gives maximum flexibility for the operation of the CVW was another lesson learnt from the Falklands War. With HERMES able to operate 16 Sea Harriers, 10 Harrier GR3s and 10 Westland Sea Kings she was able to prove herself more flexible and capable than the smaller INVINCIBLE which operated a maximum of 12 Sea Harriers and 10 Sea Kings. Initially the proposals for what was to become the QEC centred on designs of 40,000 tons. Any images published of the 42,500 tonne CdG demonstrate that thirty Rafales parked on the flight deck would make arming, fuelling, launching and recovery logistically very difficult. In comparison the flight deck of the QEC will have ample space, even with thirty-six F-35Bs aboard.
Questions remain about aerial refuelling the F-35Bs which have a range shortfall in comparison to the other F-35 variants. The USMC are going to address this situation by equipping their MV-22 Bell-Boeing Ospreys with the probe-and-drogue V-22 Aerial Refuelling System (VARS). Extending the operational radius of the F-35B using organic in-flight refuelling is no longer an expensive luxury, but has become an operational necessity. With the threat of longer ranging ant-ship missiles (AShMs), and long-range bombers launching cruise missiles against a carrier battle group (CBG), destroying the threat as early as possible is the pre-eminent means of survival. This was certainly the strategy employed by the RN using the ARK ROYAL’s Phantoms and Buccaneers. Since retiring Supermarine Scimitars and Buccaneers from the aerial refuelling role the RN has occasionally re-visited the possibility of an organic air-to-air refuelling capability. Post the Falklands War it was proposed that retired Harrier GR3s carry buddy refuelling stores.[12] In the brief period that the F-35C was being considered the RN enquired of Lockheed Martin if the fighter could be equipped with a buddy refuelling store.
Offsetting range problems with the F-35B can be partially achieved by the employment of the MBDA SPEAR 3 (Select Precision Effects At Range Capability 3) 87 mi (140 km) range land-attack and anti-ship air-launched lightweight cruise missile. Also compensating for the aircraft’s range deficiency is the MBDA Meteor air-to-air missile which possesses a range of 80 nmi (150 km) and a 32 nmi+ (60 km+) No Escape Zone. Lastly, it should be noted that despite the criticisms of the F-35B’s operational radius its radius of action is a full 115 nmi (213 km) greater than that of the USN’s principal strike fighter the Boeing F-18F Super Hornet, with both carrying maximum fuel and payload.
The Sea King ASaC7 was equipped with the Searchwater 2000 pulse Doppler radar which is being refitted to the Merlin HM2 using ten palletised systems, and can be employed by any of the thirty HM2s currently in service. The radar offers excellent clutter suppression and overland, air and surface tracking in a single sortie. Often denigrated in comparison to the performance of the Hawkeye the Merlin will nevertheless have potent capabilities. The radar can track 250 air and surface contacts simultaneously while the system can receive an additional 300 tracks via Link 11 and Link 16. It has a range of 85+nm (160+km). (Some reports put this as high as 199 nm [370 km].) With a range of 518 mi (833 km), endurance of 5 hours and service ceiling of 15,010 ft the Merlin has sufficient performance to be an effective ASaC aircraft capable of providing a comprehensive air picture.
THE FUTURE
A portent for the future came in the form of an online commentary written by General David H Berger USMC which questioned the service’s need for ‘Vehicles, aircraft, and systems that the service can neither afford to procure or afford to sustain over their anticipated lifespans’.[13] This could be taken to read that going into the future STOVL designs such as the F-35B and V-22 cannot be financially supported nor because of cost replaced. Given that the F-35B will possibly be the last STOVL fighter that will be built CATOBAR carrier operations will be the only option for the future. From the outset the QEC was built as an adaptable design able to be converted to CATOBAR operations at some point in the life of the ships. Lessons will need to be learnt from the misstep of 2010, particularly in respect to calculating the cost of converting both carriers to CATOBAR configuration. Despite the abandonment of the conversion of PoW for CATOBAR operations it remains that both carriers can have catapults and arrestor gear installed. The questionable arguments presented against the conversion centred on cost, and that the carriers had some empty spaces that could notionally be used to take Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) equipment but no detailed design work had ever been done regarding such a conversion. By 2012 the Ministry of Defence claimed price of the EMALS and AAG and related equipment had risen by more than £200M to £577M over two years.
This was at odds with information provided by US Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Sean J Stackley to the then Defence Procurement Minister Peter Luff stating that the price of the was equipment £458 million, furthermore promising the US would underwrite any further cost risk.[14] Beyond cost, speculation surrounds BAE’s interest in keeping the carrier as a STOVL design because both it and Rolls Royce have a greater investment in the F-35B than in any other version of the fighter. When a replacement is eventually considered the possibility of the BAE Tempest being converted for carrier operations is miniscule. There is a greater possibility, if for no other reason on the grounds of cost, that the Tempest programme will be merged with the Dassault/Airbus Future Combat Air System (FCAS) also under development as a sixth generation fighter. In this respect it is of note that a variant of the FCAS will be manufactured for operation from the CdG and its replacement. CATOBAR operations may therefore be the only way ahead for the RN and the foresightedness in specifying an adaptable design for the QEC will have proven to be the right decision.
CONCLUSION
After concerns about both the cost and whether or not one of the QEC would be either mothballed or sold, these have now been allayed. The prospects for the vessels now look bright, depending of course on the upcoming defence review. With the considerable outlays involved both with respect to the carriers and the aircraft they carry, the prospective fifty year life for the former will more than outweigh the substantial resources expended on the project. Big deck carriers have an intrinsic quality and usefulness not applicable to smaller ships. To the question ‘would ARK ROYAL (IV) have made a difference in the Falklands?’ the answer is a resounding no. Obversely the presence of a QEC aircraft carrier would have proven to be an invaluable and overwhelming war-winning asset.
References
[1] Oliver Stewart, Could keeping HMS Ark Royal have prevented the Falklands War? https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/hms-ark-royal-strategic-rather-just-tactical-asset-falklands-war/ In the comments section salient observations are made by those who served on the carrier.
[2] https://marconiradarhistory.pbworks.com/w/page/54057317/Naval%20Radars
[3] Richard Harding (ed.), The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation and Defence (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.256.
[4] Norman Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet: Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2016). In this book the author provides valuable insights into British radar developments and notes that in the 1960s these were far more sophisticated than their American counterparts.
[5] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/DWF.htm
[6] David Hobbs, ‘The Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) Sea King Mk 7’, The Navy, Vol. 67 No. 1 (Jan-March 2005), pp. 22-5. At: http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/The-Navy-Vol_67_No_1-Jan-2005.pdf
[7] Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), p.26.
[8] Natasha Marhia and Chloe Davies, ‘A Force for Good’, National, European and Human Security: From co-existence to convergence (London: Routledge, 2013), p.73.
[9] https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2019/11/surpassing-goals-of-the-ford-aircraft-carrier-using-uk-carriers.html
[10] https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/779/77908.htm
[11] https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2019/11/surpassing-goals-of-the-ford-aircraft-carrier-using-uk-carriers.html
[12] Peter E. Davies and Anthony M. Thornborough, The Harrier Story (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1996), p.115
[13] https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/notes-on-designing-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/
[14] https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/cats-traps-and-claptrap-why-the-royal-navys-new-aircraft-carriers-operate-vstol-aircraft/
Typo in the headline
The “adaptable design” of the QEC is something of a red herring. As part of the design iterations from 2003 – 2008, the adaptable “A” design was evolved to the eventual “D” design, with adaptable features largely removed to save cost as the ships were “optimised” for STOVL. Hence why the 2010-12 studies identified such a large cost to retrofit cats and traps
Consider also that by the time the F35B eventually goes out of service these will be aging ships with 30 years service behind them, and it seems more likely that new carriers would be preferred for any switch-over to CATOBAR operation, of a future “Sea Tempest” or similar.
Any design needs a large amount of work carried out on them to change the config. Most features not included were things like armour etc. Alpha is nigh on identical to Delta and they do have the same amount of decks too. The QR class do however, how much development possibilities. But yes if no changes are made after 20-25 years of service like armour included, change catapults and arrestor and even the hull lenghtneing possibilites, the new future design will be of a higher importance. DNC’s years ago would pull there hair out in seeing old ships kept when new ones should have replaced them.
What a fantastic article. Detailed, concise, well reasoned and appropriate judgements. Congratulations on a job ‘well done’. Keep up the great work. Stay safe!
On Eagle, the cost to modify to Phantoms was far less than 30million. Ark got the nod to save jobs at devonport dock yard. As it was David Owen seat he was the then foreign secretary and itwas itwas labour but marginal. The Conservatives when they came to power did not reverse the decision to scrap Eagle.
The wasted money in the 1970s was converting Tiger and Blake, Centaur to a ASW carrier and refitting Albion.
Unfortunately waste is nothing new in the MOD or public sector as a whole.
Centaur was never converted into an ASW carrier. I think you mean Bulwark?
Sorry meant to say Centaur should have been converted to asw and kept and Tiger and Blake not. Yes Bulwark was brought back in an asw role when Ark was withdrawn.
My childhood memories were of Eagle at Plymouth Navy Days
Yes, Centaur as an ASW hel carrier would have been far more capable than the two cruiser conversions. However, she had paid off for the last time in ’65 and had then been used as an accommodation ship, and I understand that by 1970 she was in a pretty bad state. So it might not have been economically viable…..
Eagle was cannibalized to keep the Ark going. I was on Eagle in drydock in Guz after decommissioning, Arks crew were coming round for parts. And said they were scrapping the wrong carrier.
I don’t agree with all of the assertions highlighted here, but overall a very good read. Kudos to the author. On the subject of poorly managed programs, looks as there’s some progress in one of our biggest…
https://news.usni.org/2020/06/01/uss-gerald-ford-done-proving-it-can-launch-planes-ready-to-tackle-warfighting-operations
Cheer!
Also:
https://news.usni.org/2020/06/01/chinas-newest-aircraft-carrier-now-conducting-sea-trials
Yep, saw that one along with Taiwan bidding to buy shore based Harpoon. China have also released a press statement saying that within the next couple of months they plan on sailing both carriers through the straights between China and Taiwan.
The USN is busy with some new concepts in dealing with the PLAN.
https://news.usni.org/2020/05/29/report-to-congress-on-navy-light-amphibious-warship
Cheers
Great article, but I would take issue with the statement that fears about the mothballing or sale of one ship have now been allayed. Post Covid, the government will effectively be bankrupt, and the “no deal” Brexit we seem headed for will simply make things worse. Against this economic background, I am deeply pessimistic for the future of these ships.
No, the Government will not be bankrupt!
Some investors are willing to pay the Government to borrow money from them. There are now very low yields on government debt.
That is a different issue. I am perfectly aware that a country cannot go bankrupt in the conventional sense, but covid (and a no deal brexit) will lead to huge pressure on government spending and thus huge pressure on thr defence budget. There are reports today of a 4 bn hole. Against this background, only an ostrich would be optimistic.
We aren’t heading for a no deal brexit, the press are doing what they did before brexit and now trying to stir everyone up into a frenzy about no deal, if it was not for Covid they would have nothing else but that to get totally worked up about.
If you want to believe that, its your right to do so. But ignoring the facts and the evidence is never a good thing.
CTOL Ark Royal with its Phantoms was a deterrent. Argentina did not invade the Falklands while it was in service. They waited until it was retired. Buccaneers had a far greater strike radius than the F-35B. Perception is sometimes more important than reality.
FAA F-35B need a heavy stand off weapon. I wonder if the Israeli Spice 1000 would fit the weapons bay? 2nd hand USMC MV-22 might provide limited AAR.
EMALS & AAG were troubled in 2010-12, but are more or less sorted now.
If Tempest became a common stealthy airframe with Typhoon tranche 3+ bits for the UK, & SuperHornet block III bits for the USN, then said aircraft would be carrier capable.
Hi John,
No chance that you could bolt different bits from diferrent aircraft and expect to have a usable aircraft – they simply would not ‘fit’ together. I’m guessing that is not entirely what you were suggesting but aircraft are horribly sensitive to design changes. To explain what I mean allow me to highlight what killed TSR 2 – bare with me.
TSR2 was a fantastic aircraft in the air and would, had it entered service, likely served in to the ’90’s with updates. However, it had a significant design flaw. The undercarriage was mounted on the corner of the square sectioned fuselage and folded back into the airframe. This is very much like the later SEPECAT Jaguar. However, the TSR2 shock absorbers were mounted along the undercarriage main leg which obviously was at an angle. This meant that the wheels did NOT move straight up and down, but had a side ways component to their movement. This meant that the aircraft was VERY difficult to land safely, especially in cross wind conditions. It bounced sideways with anything less than a perfectly even landing – a vertual impossibility especially as I say above in cross wind conditions. As such it needed the undercarriage to be completely redesigned to allow the shock absorders to be mounted vertically. This meant that the whole of the central fuselage needed to be redsigned to create the space and allow for changes to the undercarriage’s complex moving mechanism. Given that everything is hung off the central fuselage, that basically means the aircraft would have to be completely redesigned to make it safe for frontline squadrons (this was the test pilots view – not mine!).
Now how does this relate to carrier capable land based designs? Simple. Carrier landings are basically crash landings in the sense that you do not flare out on landing because you cannnot risk ‘floating’ down the deck without hooking on to the arrester. You basicaaly fly straight into the deck! As this video shows:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37oVOEwE_QU
If you did that in a conventional aircraft too often you’d end up sliding along the runaway on your belly. So you need a much bigger, heavier, and stronger undercarriage which, as the TSR2 experience (and the French experience with Rafeal M) tells us is very expense because it means you end up redesigning much of the aircraft. I suspect that many of the considerable differences with the variants of the F-35 are down to this type of issue.
I would think about treating air platforms as a system of systems. There are the engines, the airframe, flight control and mission systems, taking and overly simplified approach. The mission systems are often the some of the most expensive bits and are the bits that the military get excited about, especially in the case of the F-35. The airframe engine combination are heavily impacted by the differences between land / sea based operations, so I would take the mission systems stuff from Tempest and consider developing a new airframe, perhaps and fully unmanned platform based on lessons learnt from Tempest.
The Typhoon & SuperHornet are not that different in size & capability. If you look at the automotive industry, the cost of developing a platform was too high for one company. So 2 or more companies shared development. The final cars would look different in their outer panels & interior trim, but would have the same key bits underneath. If Boeing & BAE decided on joint development, they could share where it is an advantage & differ on detail where they need to.
Re TSR-2. I have an old VHS documentary that said they solved the undercarriage problem just before it was cancelled.
Just watched that TSR-2 VHS again. Test flight 5 had the serious undercarriage problem that could have lost the prototype. After that, they set up cameras on the plane to watch the undercarriage on take offs & landings. They got the runway covered in foam, so they could compare wet & dry conditions. All of the niggles were sorted by flight 20.
Not quite John,
They sorted the initial vibration issues via adding an additional strut, this would unfortunately not have sorted the issues related to lateral movement landing in high crosswinds under load.
A re design would have been required, not easy, as the prototypes were built on production jigs…
Well the chief test pilot thought it was sorted, but he did say you had to get the approach right. He was diplomatic about another pilot who was filmed getting it wrong.
I’m sure they would have eventually sorted the issue once and for all by redesigning the undercarriage within the space offered by the wheel wells, an extremely difficult task, but they were brilliant British engineers…
Some relaxation of the rough field capability would have given the engineers more avenues to explore and produce a stiffer main undercarriage arrangement, though this would have meant reducing both rough field and rate of decent landing capabilities specified as part of OR339.
Interestingly XR119 only flew with the prototype, non retracting stiffening modified strut, while XR220 has the production retracting strut fitted, this interesting addition can be studied on XR220 at Cosford.
I don’t want to get stuck in a TSR2 loop. I will just say that the UK was mad to develop it. The RAF should have just bought Buccaneers. However, by the time they got to flight 24, they should have built the 150 for RAF service. I don’t think they saved money cancelling it. First they had to write off the £200 million spent on developing TSR2. Then waste time & money on the 50 proposed F-111K before they were cancelled. Then buy Buccaneers. Then develop & buy the Tornado. Add that all up & I bet its no cheaper than sticking with the TSR2.
Very true John, it was a complex silver bullet….
A fantastic aircraft, technically advanced and deeply flawed in its management structure.
The manufacturing technology and materials used went to good use in Concorde and on to the Tornado program … How I would dearly love to have seen one fly!
I’ve been following J&Js comments, and I’m not gonna add to the ”eternal” what if arguments.
However, John C…”How I would dearly love to have seen one fly!”… Right there with you.
The only time I’ve seen a ”real” TSR2 was at Cosford…
Boy, was there ever a more bird of prey looking aircraft?
A really interesting article.
Was pretty surprised by the combat range comparison vs the F18.
The cross decking argument is a little one sided though, as we are relying on the US cross decking their F35b with our platform, which means the QE will need to carry US weapons/spares to ensure that this is effective. No reason why the French could not have done the same in a real war situation.
The Bucs where retired to early in my opinion, a Superb aircraft and world beater going by what the former Bucs pilots described it as.
Warload radius of Buccaneer with 2000 lb bombs is 600 miles. Warload radius of F-35B with 1000 lb bombs is 390 miles. They claim 450, but that is ideal conditions, so 390 more likely.
Great article. More like this please.
Great article! Some random thoughts- I remember as a teenager being angry and dissapointed at the Labour governments devastation of our Armed Forces and Aircraft Industry in the mid sixties-TSR2, the supersonic Harrier(which would have evolved into one of the worlds greatest aircraft)new Transport aircraft and of course the two new Carriers. Things were ironically reversed decades later with Gordon Brown giving the QEC Class the go ahead and Cameron destroying the RN. The Tory government tried desperately to speed up TSR2 and the Supersonic Harrier to make it more difficult for Wilson to cancel them but to no avail. The Supersonic Harrier was in fact already in production when the axe fell with at least 8 in build from memory. The Tory mantra was “Two carriers East of Suez” basically representing a last and ultimately doomed clinging to the idea of Britain as a stand alone global player. The Invincible Class carriers were originally billed as ‘through deck cruisers’. If the word Aircaft Carrier had been used to describe them then Wilson would have cancelled and what a different world we would be in today. The Falklands would almost certainly have been lost. To me it is laughable that such a simple and transparent ploy worked!! The Bucaneer was considered the best low level fighter in the world at the time but did not achieve commercial success. South Africa ordered 32. The first batch of 16 were delivered with one being lost en route but Batch 2 were cancelled due to sanctions. They did not operate in the marine environment from memory but took part in the bush war in Namibia/Angola and as such were the only Bucaneers ever to see action. The QEC and F35B-brilliant combination. Many of the naysayers have criticised the B and the lack of cats and traps on QEC but the other advantages of STOVL and far simpler operating procedures of the ski ramp setup I think compensate for the shorter range/payload of the B
RAF Buccaneers operated in the first Gulf war did they not?
You are correct Will. I thought the SAAF were the only unit that had used the type in a combat situation. I have learnt something although at one stage SA held that distinction for some years with her deployments in the then SW Africa finishing in the 1980’s. The SAAF also lost a number of this type to various mishaps and at the end of its service life there remained but a handful to retire. Cheers
Lets be realistic about one thing with Brown, he was very keen on the carriers as they provided an awful lot of work for ‘his’ people, if it was not for this incentive I very much doubt they would have got past a discussion phase with him.
True James although I will say that “New” Labour was certainly a better friend of the UK’s Armed Forces than previous administrations such as Wilson’s
I think having the CTOL Ark in service during the Falklands may have made a quite an operational difference, if we also still had Hermes and Invincible along as well. If all three ships were available it would make for a very comprehensive task group. By the time the Falklands kicked off, the Junta was on their last legs and I think the invasion would have gone ahead regardless of Ark still being in service. They were desperate men trying to hold on to power at any cost. This was their literal last throw of the dice.
The Ark’s task group would have made a difference. Perhaps it is the Buccaneer being the real ace in the pack though, as it would have given you the option of hitting Argentina directly. Even though the Gannet by that time was nearing obsolescence, it would have still proven useful. Granted it’s radar was blind over land and had trouble making out moving targets at sea level. It would have still been able to see aircraft at lowish to high altitude. Thereby reducing the Argentinians ability to use its Canberra and Falcons for long range reconnaissance, especially when a pair of Phantoms were operating as the stand-off interceptors near the edge of the total exclusion zone. It would also mean that the Argentinian aircraft would have had to fly most of their sortie at low level if they wanted to remain undetected, eating up fuel and reducing their weapons load. The Sea Harriers would still be operating as close in CAP and operating when the Phantoms couldn’t, giving a really impressive multi-layered defence.
The Crowsnest’s Searchwater radar has come a long way since its introduction on Nimrod. Being initially designed for spotting sub’s periscopes, this legacy has carried forward to today’s 2000 version. Because it required a higher frequency radar for this function, it’s range when fitted to a helicopter will always be limited due to the limited amount of available electrical power. It’s range is also limited by the size (area) of the current antenna. Although it could be increased with a larger antenna, if they used the same method as the Russian Ka-31P with its E-801M OKO radar, by folding the planar antenna flat underneath the airframe.
The E2D Hawkeye equipped with the AN/APY-9 AESA UKF radar will always have a greater range than the Merlin’s Crowsnest. For starters, due to the UHF wavelength it uses, you require a significantly larger antenna which can therefore handle more power and have more sensitive reception. But also, lower frequency radars are more transmission efficient than higher frequency ones due to atmospheric absorption. Therefore for the same transmitter power, the lower frequency radar will transmit further. The E2D relies heavily on target back-scattering and resonance to detect small and stealthy targets. Whilst Crownset has the ability to determine what the target is by its return doppler signature. However, E2D will have at least double if not triple the detection range of Crowsnest on certain targets. But again it is significantly reliant on the material specification of the target. A stealthy cruise missile made from a composite material with lots of RAM material to hide the internals may sneak past it. The Crowsnest may detect it if the missile has been configured for suppression of resonance. Although it could quite easily be the reverse, as RAM is more effective against higher frequencies. Most tier 1 AAW ships combine a lower frequency search radar with a higher frequency tracking radar, much like the US SPY-6 which combines a S band and X band. This is still the best option for giving you a greater chance of detecting radar stealthy targets. Could an AEW aircraft be equipped with both a low and high frequency radar, definitely yes. Could it transmit simultaneously? Probably yes, by compromising on the power given to the lower frequency radar to make sure the higher frequency radar has sufficient range, but it’s definitely doable. Could a helicopter, such as a Merlin, operate two long range search radars concurrently, doubtful without significantly upgrading its electrical generation.
Think he did mention the Phantom and therefore the Buccaneer would have struggled to take off due to the weather.
I agree, but that’s not the point I was making. If the conditions allowed, having the Ark would have made a big difference to how the conflict was conducted.
We should not be ‘merging’ our Tempest program with any other program. How bloody tragic is it that we haven’t learned the lessons from Typhoon.
It’s about time we stopped accepting the sheer lack of funding our Government gives to such amazing projects for British industry, research and aerospace. We have £160 billion for a bloody railway, but just 2 for a fighter jet that will keep us safe from Russian or Chinese aggression??
No, no, no!
I think the issue with Tempest is who would actually buy it when you take US anti competitive strategies into account. Also similar issues from France and Germany, especially post full favoured Brexit.
True Bigman, sadly all too true.
However, post Pandemic and Brexit, this country must learn to stand up again for British industry.
Have to pull you up on this, the cost of ‘Phantomising’ Ark Royal was £32million and three years (in late 60s prices). Bringing Eagle up to the same standard was estimated to be £5million and six months. It was planned as part of her 1968 refit. All that was required was fitting four DAX II arrestor wires (she got one for trials), and fitting water cooled jet blast deflectors and bridle catchers to the catapults. She already had a fully angled deck and two BS5 steam catapults and her air group was the same as Ark’s, other than she operated Sea Vixens instead of Phantoms. The RN Phantom shipboard trials were carried out aboard Eagle in the summer of 69 whilst Ark was still in refit.
Under the original CVA replacement plan, CVA-01 was to replace HMS Victorious in 1972, CVA-02 was to replace Ark Royal in 1978 and CVA-03 to replace Eagle in 1984. Efforts were made to offer Hermes to Australia in 1968, though they fell through. The intention had been to retain the two Commando Carriers Albion and Bulwark until the early 80s, adding their third sister Centaur to the force, but this was cancelled in the defence cuts of 67 (which also axed Victorious early, cut Eagle’s Phantomisation, and the conversion of HMS Lion to a helicopter cruiser).
Fascinating article….well researched, well worded and very well put together. I’m pleased that the author had a pop at both main political parties for their utter stupidity and short sighted approach over the years to defending our Country and our interests abroad.
What’s also sad is the fact that numerous very senior military commanders have signed off and put their names to the madness that is a strategic defence review. You can pick out Mr Cameron and his unbelievably stupid idea of binning all of our small fleet Carriers and their aircraft before the QE Class flat tops and the F-35 were anywhere near ready and……. there’s more… also, the Labour decision slashing a large number of escort ships so they’re just as guilty.
A good article. But the writer should have left politics out of it. Obviously a Labour Party supporter. A party that has done so much damage to the armed forces the UK over the years
I think this goes to show what fantastic assets we have in the two QEC class carriers, what we can achieve.
What we need to do now is utilise them to their full potential. In the article it describes how the USMC are looking to procure a number of V22 Ospreys converted into refuelling tankers. We should go down the same route. I also believe that a better alternative to the Crows Eye in Merlins would be an AEW version of the V22. This is something that doesn’t yet exist but has been proposed.
For 12-18 airframes (including OCU & spares) we could quite comfortably put 3 refuelling and 3 AEW Ospreys, gets over the whole range issue with the carriers and planes being STOVL, and would massively reduce limitations on our capability.