The fall of Singapore: An avoidable catastrophe?

The Fall of Singapore represented the collapse of British influence in South East Asia, and severely diminished the British Empire’s Asia-Pacific clout.

The Fall of Singapore was the climax to the Malayan campaign in the Far-East which lasted from the 8th December 1941 – 31 January 1942.

For the purposes of this article I will refer to British and Dominion forces, notably Australian, and also Indian divisions as ‘British Empire’ forces. The main protagonists in this campaign was the Imperial Japanese Forces, fighting the ‘British Empire’, as Malaya was part of the British Empire, and see as prime real estate, and a strategic location for the Japanese to consolidate their expansionist plans.

The Imperial Japanese Army Command was very keen on making gains in Southeast Asia for the Empire of Japan to extract resources for the war effort, which put it at odds with the old European Imperial Powers including the British but also Dutch and French possessions. However, for the purpose of this article let’s focus upon the Malayan campaign and outline the main strategic failures upon the British High Command.

The British High Command left Singapore vulnerable, with a lack of equipment including tanks and aircraft, without proper kit to be worn by troops in a jungle environment. General Percival who was in charge of the defence of the Malayan peninsula had been severely handicapped by poor strategic planning, a racial arrogance on the part of the British High Command, who did not take the Japanese threat seriously, and used Empire soldiers in the form of cannon fodder. This may seem a very critical and radical statement on the British effort in the Battle for Singapore, but to some this would fit the analysis given.

This is not to say that I say that the British Empire were not motivated in the form of self-defence, but it fundamentally underestimated an enemy, and formulated a strategy based upon misconceptions and misunderstandings of the true Japanese military might. Even more interesting, while the Royal Engineers were focused upon destroying bridges, which is based on conventional military thinking based upon not allowing the enemy freedom of movement, they underestimated and didn’t conceive of the Japanese using bicycles to overcome obstacles.

This general lack of awareness and knowledge of fighting in the jungle was a handicap for the British and its Empire forces. In a sense, the Japanese was using a combination of insurgency asymmetrical warfare, in combination with more conventional means of achieving battlefield domination.

For those of you who are interested in military commitment, the sheer scale of logistics, and the mismatch of capabilities between the Imperial Japanese and the British Empire for the Malayan campaign could not be starker. The Japanese were equipped with over 200 tanks, and 500 modern combat aircraft. While the British Empire forces had a depleted force of only 23 tanks from the (100th Light Tank Squadron of the Indian Army). This meant on the onset the British Empire could not fight adequately in an armoured warfare setting.

Furthermore, the British Empire airpower was outmatched 2 – 1 in favour of the Japanese, with that total going down further, as half of all air units were destroyed by the Japanese in the first few days of the battle.  While the Japanese had modern tanks which consisted of the Type 95, Type 97, Type 98, the British Empire had obsolete MK VI light tanks. The odds were already in the Japanese favour. While some British Empire planners would have preferred more capacity, the primary aims of British grand strategy was to bolster its forces fighting Nazi Germany and Italy. In effect, the South East Asia campaign was neglected by High Command.

The British Empire forces were taken by surprise by the tenacity, technological sophistication and strength of the Japanese Imperial Army. Churchill ordered the Battleships HMS Prince of Wales and the cruiser HMS Repulse to the peninsula without proper air cover, because the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable fell short of reaching Singapore, and left the warships vulnerable to Japanese air attack.

Both ships were later destroyed by Japanese bombers as they did not have appropriate air cover and demonstrated how aircraft could destroy large naval surface ships. The so called belief that Singapore was an impregnable fortress, could not be further from the truth. The Japanese were able to utilise its air, land and light tank units in combination to launch pincer attacks cutting off British Empire forces, and destroying them. The British High Command did not expect the Japanese to utilise armour in this way, and were ill prepared for this kind of warfare. If the British were able to predict the Japanese use of both air power and light tanks, then maybe countermeasures could have been brought in, and a more defensive strategy based upon counterattacks and protecting flanks through use of combined air, naval and land assets may have ameliorated the crisis.

The British Empire’s air, naval, and ground forces which were needed to protect the Malayan peninsula were inadequate from the start, and the failure of General Percival to counter the pincer movements of the Japanese led to the withdrawal of British Empire forces to Singapore. The uniforms which the British Empire forces wore were more cumbersome than their Japanese opponents. Plus, the soldiers were not trained or equipped to deal with conditions in the Malayan jungle. Rather than being proactive in its strategy, the British High Command all too often was more reactive to the situation at hand, and the belief that withdrawal to the ‘Fortress’ of Singapore was the only strategically viable option at the end. Military strategy and thinking is based upon consolidation in order to counterattack in defensive warfare. However, once the British Empire forces withdrew to Singapore, they did not prepare adequately for the inevitable amphibious assault from the Imperial Japanese forces.

From an international military perspective, the political leadership of British Prime Minister Churchill was under increasing pressure from both at home and from his American allies to been seen to be doing something to fight the Japanese. The Japanese overwhelmed the British Empire forces and fought their way down with sophisticated armour, aircraft using pincer movements to destroy Allied forces. British Prime Minister Churchill, feeling the credibility and honour of the British Empire at stake forbade any withdrawing or surrendering. While the remaining Empire forces could have left the fortress city, and retreated, they were ordered by Churchill through a letter sent to General Percival to “stand their ground to the last man standing”.

This led to an unnecessary loss of life, and was a testament to politics overriding military judgement.  However there is a wider issue here – one of a broader strategic picture.

There was a catalogue of strategic failures on the part of the British High Command which can be attributed to of imperial arrogance of the part of the British High Command which needs to be discussed. The British High Command should have supplied more modern fighter aircraft including the Spitfire to replace the aging biplanes which were tasked with providing air defence of the Malayan peninsula. In addition the Royal Navy should have deployed battleships sooner with adequate anti-aircraft defence systems to prepare for the battle of Singapore. The tragedy of the Empire’s defeat in Singapore, and massive loss of life may have all been avoided. But we will never know for certain.

The main difficulty with any military planning, is that you have to respect your adversary’s ability to wage war upon you, and prepare for any contingency that may arise, otherwise military planning would not be able to deal with the situations which may evolve. Due to the fact the British high Command viewed the Japanese as an unworthy adversary who did not possess the capabilities, technical knowledge or ability to fight their European adversaries was a tremendous failing.

On February 13th 1942, Japanese forces destroyed the massive fifteen inch coastal guns and on the 15th General Percival entered talks with General Yamashita for the unconditional surrender of Empire forces. The General along with 80,000 Empire forces including Indians, British and Australians were taken and many suffered brutality at the hands of the Japanese in the POW camps.  More than half never returned home.

On a wider strategic level, the fall of Singapore was symbolic of the fall of the British Empire in the Far East, and one where the British could never recover its position militarily, or strategically. It was a testament to how the British Empire could not adequately plan to fight a war on multiple fronts, and while they were able to understand German tactics and strategies, were totally ignorant of how the Japanese waged war.

This lack of understanding in my opinion, led to inadequate planning and a failed strategy which led to an extremely high cost in both manpower, and material. For the Japanese this was a tremendous victory and also a testament to a narrative that an Asian power can defeat a European Imperial power in a military campaign.

It emboldened the Japanese to carry on pursuing their war aims, and to consolidate their gains.