NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has declared a significant step forward for the Alliance as Defence Ministers agreed a new set of capability targets, paving the way for major investment decisions at the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month.
“We agreed on an ambitious new set of capability targets,” said Rutte at NATO Headquarters on Thursday. “These targets describe exactly what capabilities Allies need to invest in over the coming years: air defence, fighter jets, tanks, drones, personnel, logistics and so much more. All of this is needed to keep our deterrence and defence strong and our one billion people safe.”
Speaking to the press after the final ministerial session, Rutte outlined what he called a “vital first step” towards reshaping NATO’s collective defences.
“I will propose an overall investment plan that would total 5% of GDP in defence investment,” he explained. “That includes 3.5% of GDP for core defence spending, and 1.5% for defence- and security-related investment like infrastructure and industry.”
“Prepare for war, spend more”
The new targets were described by several officials as a generational shift in how NATO plans to equip itself against mounting global threats. Fielding questions from attending journalists, Rutte did not shy away from the scale of what lies ahead.
“To prepare for war, spend more,” he said. “And when you are really prepared for war, you will not be attacked.”
Among the capabilities prioritised in the new targets: “air defence systems, long-range missiles, manoeuvrable land formations, and command and control systems.”
He stressed the need to address investment imbalances within the Alliance: “By doing this, we will also equalise what we are spending with what the United States is spending. We know this is important, because we want a fair NATO where all Allies spend the same.”
Ukraine support and defence production
There was also sustained focus on Ukraine across the two-day ministerial. NATO’s work with Kyiv was the subject of multiple sessions and off-record briefings, including a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council and the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, co-chaired by the UK and Germany.
“Minister Umerov highlighted the challenges on the battlefield, Russia’s continued attacks on civilian targets, and Ukraine’s ongoing pursuit of a negotiated peace,” said Rutte. “We all want to see this war brought to an end with a just and lasting peace. And we fully support President Trump’s urgent efforts to stop the bloodshed.”
He confirmed that Allies had pledged more than €20 billion in additional support to Ukraine this year alone.
The Secretary General was also pressed on industrial readiness. He acknowledged that increases in defence spending must be matched by an uptick in defence production capacity: “This is needed so that our militaries have the critical capabilities they need. This is good for our security, and by the way, also good for our economies.”
Ahead to the Hague
The decisions taken this week form the basis of a forthcoming NATO investment plan to be agreed at the Hague Summit.
“Sometimes people think The Hague will discuss a percentage of GDP spent on defence as if it’s something plucked from the air,” he told reporters. “That is not true. What we will decide in The Hague is rooted in the capability targets agreed today.”
Having just left NATO HQ after the press conference, it was clear there was a shared sense among those present — reporters, analysts and staff alike — that the stakes have rarely been higher for the cohesion and credibility of the Alliance.
Rutte concluded with a firm message: “NATO’s deterrence is strong today. And through the decisions we have taken at this Ministerial, we are making sure it remains strong for tomorrow.”
The press conference ended on a personal note as Rutte led Defence Ministers in bidding farewell to General Christopher Cavoli, the outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe, whose successor, General Alex Grynkewich, was confirmed by the North Atlantic Council this week.
“We are happy he will still be with us for the next few weeks,” said Rutte, before taking a final round of questions.
So, does this mean the UK government will HAVE to go to 3.5% by 2032?
I’d imagine it will be to meet a 3.5% mix by 32. We could do 3% direct, 0.4% defence/infrastructure related and 0.1% foreign military aid maybe?
I’d hope the 3% on own defence is the minimum by 2032 or we’ll slip back to 2.5%, fill in lots of potholes and do some very dodgy accounting with Ukraine and non-NATO aid.
By Presidential decree, “NATO” will now be called NATOG.
An official US government spokeswoman (Anna Gram) for Donald Trump was heard to say, “You know when you’ve been TANGO’d”.
(Any young persons here might like to “do a google” where all will be explained).
Starmer is going to love this. NATO proposal just a tad better than 3% by 2034 maybe,/if/perhaps and when we can.
Unfortunately, require some additional political and perhaps historical context re NATO rearmament process. Certainly understand the perspective of the political and informed citizenry classes of the frontline states (i.e., Baltic states, Greece, Poland, probably the Nordic countries), which will undoubtedly meet or exceed the revised NATO investment goals due to a conviction that at least the Russians are a clear and present existential danger. Then there is a group of ENATO countries which may reluctantly eventually meet the revised goals, though perhaps not on the proposed schedule (e.g., France, Germany, Turkiye, United Kingdom, etc.). Finally, there is a third grouping of countries which though they will endorse the revised goals, apparently/probably have no intention of ever fulfilling an agreed commitment (e.g., Canada, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.) Given this diversity of perspectives, which admittedly may be a consequence of geography and/or national history, how will ENATO function as a whole during mortal combat, when infinitely more than some coin of the realm is at stake? Especially, if the US is preoccupied by war in the I-P? What is the candid perspective of the frontline states toward the possible commitment/performance of the rest of NATO during a possible conflict? Will the frontline states demand a sovereign tactical nuclear response capability ultimately? Dunno, but certainly curious re the general topic…🤔
It is changing indeed: for the first Time since its creation, it’s headed by a child who miles to break toys.