The concept of a Future Commando Force has understandably drawn much interest and a degree of criticism, based on fears for the future of the RM, concern about Britain’s future amphibious capability, but also sometimes on misunderstandings about amphibious operations and the role of the RM, and even on opposition to change simply because it is change.

To start with the basics: what is amphibious warfare? Simply put, it is landing troops from ships on to land, whether for a raid or an invasion. It does not require that the troops be landed by boats or other specialist types of vessels. 

HMS Albion operating at night.

Picture this: a friendly government in East Africa is faced by a sudden revolt; the rebels seize an army base and the government appeals to Britain for military assistance. London agrees and orders a fast helicopter-carrying ship (with no dock) of the Royal Navy, deployed off Yemen, to carry an Royal Marines force to aid the beleaguered African government as fast as possible. Accompanied by a single escort, it does so. Arriving on the scene, the RN/RM force swings into action: the escort confuses the rebels by bombarding an uninhabited group of hills close to the rebel base while a company group of RM, complete with mortars and anti-tank missiles, is landed in a helicopter assault. An RM anti-tank missile knocks out the key rebel machine gun post, the marines storm the base, the rebellion collapses.

A scenario to justify the ‘Future Commando Force’?

No. A summary of what actually happened in what is now Tanzania – in 1964! The ship involved was the light fleet carrier HMS Centaur and, interestingly, for the operation it embarked two RAF Bristol Belvedere helicopters, then the biggest and most powerful helicopter type that Britain had. (1)   

The first heliborne assault by the RN/RM took place in 1956, during the Suez Crisis. The first wave of RM went ashore in the traditional way, in landing craft, with the heliborne assault being the second wave. But in 1961, during the first Iraq/Kuwait crisis, the heliborne assault (conducted in a sandstorm) was both the lead and main landing, deploying an entire Commando (battalion) and securing the airport, allowing further reinforcements to be flown in. Then there was the 1964 action in East Africa. At the end of 1968, the rear-guard covering the British evacuation from Aden was provided by the RM and this rear-guard was withdrawn by helicopter, not landing craft. 

In the 2003 Iraq War, the RM, working with the US Marine Corps (USMC), deployed overland or carried out a heliborne assault using USMC helicopters. The 1982 Falklands War, with its heavy dependence on landing craft, was a throwback, an aberration. Even so, troop carrying helicopters were of critical importance in that operation (2). 

These heliborne assaults (and withdrawals) were made using aircraft carriers which had been permanently converted (HMS Albion and Bulwark, referred to as Commando Carriers), or temporarily adapted, to carry RMs and their helicopters. These vessels had no ability to carry any landing craft (except less than a handful of the smallest category of these vessels, which could be handled by the ships’ davits). From the late 1950s to the late 1970s real-world amphibious warfare for the RN and RM normally meant heliborne assault from the sea. Prior to 1982, the dock landing ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid seem to have seen almost no real-world action (as distinct from NATO exercises) at all. 

However, to regain this capacity, used so frequently and successfully in the 1960s and 1970s, will require fast ships. The Albion, Bulwark and Centaur all had maximum speeds of nearly 30 knots.

This is why the RN was right to dispose of HMS Ocean: not only was she demanding in terms of crew complement (about 300), she was also slow (just 18 knots maximum speed). What the RN needs is a pair of fast, lean-crewed (about 150 each) ships capable to embarking a minimum of six Merlin, two Chinook and three or four small (Wildcat) helicopters, plus a self-contained company group of RM (250-300 personnel). Like the Commando Carriers, they should be built to merchant ship standards to reduce costs. They could be based on container ship designs, which can be fast (around 24 knots, which should be sufficiently fast for their role)(3).     

The RN’s current dock landing ships, named after the Commando Carriers, are also too demanding of personnel (the RN can keep only one in commission at a time) and are again too slow (18 knots)(4).

HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark.

They have good command facilities and their main use in recent years has been as flagships. But the arrival of the two new supercarriers has rendered that role redundant. As for being command ships for amphibious operations, two factors are undermining that. Firstly, the great advances in miniaturisation, modularisation and containerisation allow such command facilities to be placed in containers which can be moved around, including by helicopter, deployed where needed and quickly linked together to become operational.

All a ship needs to provide is a convenient deck handling system for the containers, deck locks, power connections, and a sufficient volume to accommodate them. Secondly, there is the reported restructuring of 3 Commando Brigade RM into two permanent “Commando Expeditionary Groups” (CEGs). By definition, these will each be self-contained with their own organic armour, artillery, engineer, intelligence, reconnaissance and logistical assets. In other words, the majority of the functions of the brigade HQ will be devolved down to the CEGs, leaving a much smaller brigade HQ (basically a task group HQ). 

It must not be forgotten that Britain cannot engage in “conventional” amphibious operations against peer enemies, except on isolated islands, but can undertake fast, heliborne strategic raids. Strategic raids can tie down large numbers of hostile troops (as they did in the Second World War). Helicopters would allow the ships to stay well offshore, move fast, and manoeuvre freely most of the time, making it much more difficult for enemies to locate and target them. Conventional amphibious ships have to come close inshore, move very slowly and cannot manoeuvre, making them sitting ducks for modern long-range missile systems.

As for modern air defence systems, these are indeed very formidable – except at very low altitudes, at which their sensor and weapons ranges are very short. And helicopters can fly at very low altitudes. Of course, traditional amphibious ships still have their uses, which is why the UK should retain the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Auxiliary Dock Landing Ships. But the RN/RM cannot emulate the US Navy/USMC, and indeed have never attempted to do so.

Of course, successful amphibious operations, whether by helicopters or landing craft, whether raids or aimed at securing territory, need fighter cover and, although this can sometimes be provided by land-based air forces, only the possession of aircraft carriers can guarantee the necessary air cover, especially regarding strategic raids.

And one last point. The RM are a naval asset, paid out of the RN’s budget. They are an instrument of maritime warfare, both tactical and strategical. They are not an instrument of terrestrial warfare. Fundamentally, they must serve naval ends, including achieving strategic results from the sea, which they have traditionally done, over centuries, by raiding operations, or short-term landing operations, interspersed, on rare occasions, by longer forays on land. The FCF firmly re-establishes the RM as a branch and asset of the RN.

Royal Marines whilst developing experimentation and innovation trials that underpin the Littoral Strike concept, the Future Commando Force vision and the Royal Navy’s Transformation strategy.

To sum up, the FCF concept assures the future of the Royal Marines. It will provide a capability of great value in both low intensity and high intensity contingencies. Coupled with suitable and fast ships, however it is structured it will provide the UK with a rapid reaction force that can be permanently forward deployed.

It is not, in fact, a plunge into a risky and uncertain future but basically a return to a proven, indeed highly successful, operating model from only a half-century or so ago. The fundamental mission will be the same now as it was then: to support and help protect friendly countries from both subversion and external attack, through deterrence and, when required, rapid action. 

NOTES

  1. David Hobbs The British Carrier Strike Fleet After 1945, Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, 2015 pp 295-299.
  2. Hobbs, ibid., pp 162-205, 285-294, 455-457; John Keegan The Iraq War, Hutchinson, London, 2004, pp 169-171.
  3. Roger Chesneau Aircraft Carriers of the World, 194 to the Present: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, Brockhampton Press, London, pp 140-146; Werner Globke Weyers Warships of the World 2013/2015, Bernard & Graefe, Bonn, pp 120-121; “Fuel Consumption by Containership Size and Speed”, https://transportgeography.org/?page_id=5955, accessed 30/08/2020. 
  4. Globke, ibid.

 

Rebecca Campbell
Rebecca Campbell
For the past two decades Rebecca has worked as a science and technology journalist for South Africa's leading business and technology journal. Her technology beats are aviation, defence, civil nuclear power, & space.

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67 COMMENTS

  2. So Rebecca your basically at the same conclusion as the RUSI paper a couple of years go:

    201911_op_requirements_for_the_uks_amphibious_forces_in_the_future_operating_environment_kaushal_watling_web.pdf (rusi.org)

    The Occasional Paper (link) from Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Requirements for the UK’s Amphibious Forces in the Future Operating Environment written by Sidharth Kaushal and Jack Watling

    The paper explored the very same issue and came up with very strong solutions. and includes other improvements!

    New ships aka Littoral Operation Vehicles (LOV) big enough for those helicopters you mention and a decent strike force of marines and so on.

    The new doctrine above, and wonderfully written is already out there… just not in front of the people that matter or with any vision.

    Just like Strike Brigades the much needed Amfib forces restructuring is more than welcome but it takes political will and engagement from MOD, and something called money.

    • The simple answer here is to replace Bulwark and Albion with 2 x LHDs. We need the ability to airlift marines in and back them up with heavy support vehicles if necessary.

      • Agreed. Something along the lines of the Aussie Canberra class LHDs. Plenty of room for helicopters, LCUs or LCAC. Could easily put a 1000 man battlegroup ashore. Get two to replace Ocean, Albion & Bulwark. Whatever we do we must not consider the QEs as commando platforms. If they are in that role then they aren’t doing what they were designed for, ie Fleet carriers.

        • Despite what you might read elsewhere, the QEs never have, and never will be actively considered as a stand in LPH in time of conflict.. At the moment with small numbers of F35Bs its been thrown out there that POW could operate in the LPH role – but only in a disaster relief zone for example. Once QE returns from her IOD she’ll need a period of maintenance, POW will have completed her trials with F35B and will step up as the active carrier.

        • I find this an intresting article, I have on several occasions said that we need two possibly three Canberra type or Dokdo type vessels for the RN. On many occasions I have been told fantisy fleet, money issues and some other comments not worth mentioning.
          I would like to see a mix of two Dokdo type ships (23 knots) and a Juan Carlos I (21 knots) due to cost. These three vessels would cost £1 billion it would mean that the Army could land one armoured battle group and two strike battle groups by air and sea. If we think and design the new T32s to the way I think using the Damen Crossover and T26 as the design base then each of these vessels could land via air and sea 120 Royal Marines each. With the T32 design having the forward of main mast T26 and aft of main mast Crossover these ships could act either independently as they would have 24 Sea Ceptors, 24 Mk41s a 5 inch gun one possibly two helicopters and could launch two LCVPs and a CB90 or three CB-90s with 120 Commando’s. Or as the escort for the Amphibs. The three LHDs could have a air wing mix of F35Bs, Apache’s and Merlins as well as LCAC’s LCVPs CB-90s etc. It could be possible to increase the speed of the LHDs but that would cost more money.
          Dokdo can carry upto to 700 men for a short period, 10 tanks, 10 trucks, a field battery two LCACs upto 15 aircraft a mix of helicopters and F35Bs at a cost of £220 million each. As for Canberra, she could carry an Armoured Battle Group, a 1000 men 14 tanks, 28 Warriors, 4 Scimitars, a field battery, Low level air defence section, Long range anti tank section and an eng/Sig detachment. This does not include a number of trucks etc. With the ability to carry LCM-E,LCAC, LCVP and 20 aircraft again mixed F35Bs and helicopters. Combine these three with my idea of the T32 you have an independent Assault group at 21/23 knots able to land 2800 men, 34 Challengers, three feild battery’s, 28 Warriors and numerious supprt vehiciles, with 14 F35Bs, 30 helicopters and a sea lift ability. Overall estimated cost of the three amphibs is £1 billion, and for five T32s £2.5 billion. As we are planing to have the T32 then I will assume that the money for this is in the extra allocation to the defence budget. So the extra money is for Albion type replacements, but they need to be replaced in the future anyway so it depends what do we want to do, what abilities do we want to have. If I could squeeze a bit more money out of the MoD I would convert Albion and Bulwark to UAV/ROV mother support ships and Technology development vessels.
          As for using the QEs as LPH it is completly stupid, first these carriers are not designed to operate in shallow waters. Second they are strike carriers not assault ships, third they would not be able to carry any heavy equipment that troops might need such as a tank. Finally even if they did carry heavy equipement it means that the hanger would be used thereby reducing the helicopter/fighter force carried.

  3. Without these forces, the UK can not participate in first strike land warfare from the sea, which would place the UK behind other major powers. The US DOD would possibly prefer a British capability than being dependant on others on such operations? What does not compute with me, is the capability of a carrier task group without a sea/land invasion component, which we currently possess? Our foreign policy would also be on shaky ground, if Britain can guarantee a carrier strike group, but not have the capability of a heavy ship to shore offensive ability.

  4. Not only should the Commando force be retained, it should be expanded, I don’t understand any country reducing its best capabilities in the way the UK has.

    These guys really are elite and any other country would love to have this capability.

    Lets also not forget that the marines were also heavily utilised in Middle East rotations and for a force that is so small, they really do offer value for money.

    If the army was 50% as efficient as they lot, it wouldn’t be in such a mess. Well done to RN and RM seniors for having a plan and executing it

    • I agree. Agility and flexibility are keynote issues and elite formations are the way forward combined with highly specialised supporting forces. A small island nation, Britain’s major wars have always been fought with allies since the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-14; we have not since the 18th century fought a major war alone. A large standing army was alien to the Victorians. Our unique contribution to conflict in modern times has been placing small highly trained unconventional forces in the right place at the right time to carry out tactical missions or providing exploitation opportunities. The Second World War built on experience of total war in the First, but neither were at all typical of conflicts beforehand (hence ‘World’ in their nomenclature). Conflict centred on the European Continent and most colonial wars were finally settled by diplomacy. Our armed forces, essentially, the Royal Navy, often gained Great Britain diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The concept of Unconditional Surrender introduced by the western Allies in the latter part of the Second World War was unique in modern times and afterwards unrepeatable yet preparations for total war dominates defence thinking.

    • The RM battle groups, FAA helos, JF Harrier (RN pilots and ground crew) and RN on ground support ( Logs and Hospital etc) at one point was at around 9K people in Afghan. That whilst still maintaining ships at sea doing all the other regular stuff the RN did. Not bad with only 30K people on the books!.
      The RMs deployment cycle and rebuild post deployment was nearly twice as quick as the ARMY and was a major factor in the Army being able to stay there. Without the RM/RN contribution the army would have seriously struggled with getting and maintaining people in the theater. They where not at the time organised for a long tour cycle of train, deploy, refresh, train deploy ( repeat…) where as the RM and RN where.

      For a long time I lived in weymouth and Mrs Gunbuster used to talk to Army wives from Bovington or Blanford who lived near us. She was used to me doing 3,6 or 9 months away on a ship and despaired at the Army wives she met complaining that “in 15 years he has never been away from me for more than 3 months in a year… even on exercises in Germany he came home every other weekend!!”

      • couldn’t agree more Gunbuster, the RN and RM have done an exceptional job at force generation, often I fear at the personal costs of those who serve.

        Personally I would take the headcount the army can’t fill (if they haven’t been above 75k for 3 years they should lose 7k and give it to the RN.

        • Why? we just make an effort to recruit more Army. The way people are talking it seems people think the Army blokes are shite! The Army is lacking enablers, lots of them. The main difference is that the RN have looked after there people better, ie 3 Cdo Bde, and know how useful they are. While Army head sheds have been terrible at standing up for the Army, and the cap badge mafia have set things back years.

          • It is certainly not the people, but the leadership lurching from one self inflicted crisis to another.

            I could never understand why Nick Carter got the top job instead of the Royal Marine candidate and he is a big part of the problem.

            RAF have also done a good job and should be given the kudos they deserve.

            I am ex Army and believe the whole UK force should become one integrated force as its smaller than the USMC and just really inefficient.

            Better to know what you are and be good at it, than spread too thin, which is where we are at the moment.

            We have some very good areas of capability that I believe we can build upon, one of those is definitely the RM.

            Lastly, the army have had 3 years to get to 82k personnel, if they really can’t get there and if they really can’t generate the capability required, then heads should roll, but in the meantime the RAF and RN can do with more headcount and are proving successful at filling their quotas.

      • How many Main Battle tanks, IFVs, self-propelled artillery pieces etc. Does 3 commando have? Isn’t it a bit apples & pears? RM are a RRF more comparable to 16th air assault? Wouldn’t that be a fairer comparison?

  5. I guess we must wait and see on the composition of these new groups and their enablers before judgement, though her passage on structure is interesting –

    “restructuring of 3 Commando Brigade RM into two permanent “Commando Expeditionary Groups” (CEGs). By definition, these will each be self-contained with their own organic armour, artillery, engineer, intelligence, reconnaissance and logistical assets. In other words, the majority of the functions of the brigade HQ will be devolved down to the CEGs, leaving a much smaller brigade HQ” 

    This suggests that units like 24RE and 29RA will survive, encouraging as this has been a worry of mine.
    Most of those other functions in Bde HQ are part of 30 Cdo, and are at mere squadron strength, so interesting to see just how they are split into two high readiness groupings.

    “What the RN needs is a pair of fast, lean-crewed (about 150 each) ships capable to embarking a minimum of six Merlin, two Chinook and three or four small (Wildcat) helicopters, plus a self-contained company group of RM (250-300 personnel).”

    This sounds like the proposed 2 LSS that I thought had been binned as costs had gone ballistic. Could so few crew be possible with that sort of air group aboard?

    • Remember the RMs only got the commando role in 1942 alongside the Army commandos. Maybe if we were looking to expand the commando capability then we should consider creating one or more Army commando Btns to serve alongside the RMs.

      • I do wonder, given the importance of the Northern flank/arctic role whether these proposed Army Commando’s should take the role if the RM are moving to smaller persistently afloat/forward deployed groupings.
        I cannot see how they can continue to maintain that at any reasonable strength beyond a single Commando Group as at present.

    • I would also second expansion of RM Corps.
      I would suggest a force level of about 10,000, to allow a Brigade level deployment and operate the new strike force concept along side.

      A single slightly enlarged Commando of 850, outfitted for and split into these forward deployed Strike groups, would fill the roll.

      Re the LSS concept of 150 crew Daniele, I assume that’s purley for running of the vessel, the air element would be in addition to this.

      I would also concur that Albion and Bulwark need to be replaced by two 25,000 ton Helicopter Carriers, capable of operating and supporting 24 helos. A corresponding uplift in amphibious Helicopter assets would also be needed.

        • Good question Robert, just suggesting a hypothesis that would meet the requirements moving forward. I think the next 20 years will ‘belong’ to the Navy with regards to funding.

          It’s been disproportionately hit by the war on Terror and stripped to the bone. The only reason the Royal Marines survived in my opinion, is they were needed to fill places in those long, utterly pointless desert wars that achieved little.

          All that time spent as line infantry, meant Maritime skills we’re sacrificed and forgotten. They have literally had to rebuild core RM capability from scratch, post Afghanistan.

          Looking forward, both the RN and RM’s will come front and center, so if necessary, I would sacrifice capability elsewhere to build a capable maritime force, from Aircraft carriers to Marines.

          If I was forced to make a choice, it would be armour that would go, to pay for deployable assets….

          • Navy stripped of funding. Challenger 2 40 plus year old platform. Warrior AVF 30 year old platform. What item in the Navy or Air Force are that old.

          • Everyone has had to rebuild core skills since Afghan. And it’s not just basic skills but interoperability at every level. That has taken years and we are just about back where we should be. And as for getting rid of armour, I have to say I disagree. I have spent 29 years as light forces but let me assure you, to take and hold ground, you need armour, both medium and heavy. If we get rid of a capability, then history has shown it is damn nigh impossible to get it back. Cheers.

        • hi robert

          I have posted a proposal on uklandpower that details how the UK can achieve a 7 division standing force (+3 division reserve) by adopting a different approach, similar to the USMC MEU model.

          No matter what happens the land force needs a massive increase in spend, but can be modernised for £3bn pa over the next 10 years and then maintained at this level going forward.

          We have a lot of decent kit we can use today, but need clear plans on how and when we upgrade.

          What we can’t do is deliver an old style division of 25k people and maintain it. so we have to go smaller and more agile (fully mechanised).

          For me its about drumbeat, instead of famine or feast and organisational resilience. Sadly the Army is organisationally living in the past and could learn a lot from the Royal Marines, who seem to offer far more value for money given their size.

          • Pac man,, could you link that? No offence but I find that hard to believe (which maybe says more about the state of things than it should).

          • It’s mental. The ignorance of how land organisations actually generate and sustain themselves is staggering and it’s a grossly simplistic reallocation of 1000s of people with no comprehension of what they do and why they are there.

            The Army can and should have a lot of muck thrown at it for its thinking, but arbitrarily reassinginf blobs like that is just insane.

            Before venturing down that path, the author needs to join up and understand the commitment in people and resource to actually train and administer forces. Noting the RMs blister off the Army and RN to a huge extent (as they should, no sense duplicating capabilites and joint courses and so on builds networks and experience) so their “bang for buck” is really not that much different to the Army as all the supports are hidden.

    • “restructuring of 3 Commando Brigade RM into two permanent “Commando Expeditionary Groups” (CEGs). By definition, these will each be self-contained with their own organic armour, artillery, engineer, intelligence, reconnaissance and logistical assets”
      “What the RN needs is a pair of fast, lean-crewed (about 150 each) ships capable to embarking a minimum of six Merlin, two Chinook and three or four small (Wildcat) helicopters, plus a self-contained company group of RM (250-300 personnel)”
      These two seem like utterly different and actually conflicting roles and requirements to me. The first sounds like an MEU/multi ship taskforce centred around an LHD with a LSD in tow and the second like a…well, a raiding force with a lot of helicopters.
      I’m admittedly confused by both ideas. Where are the RM going to be forcing a beach, which is what the CEG seems to be built to do, or what are they going to be raiding to any effect in the second scenario? Maybe I’ve missed something but having reinforced companies bobbing about just seems like they’re looking to justify their cost 

  6. Something with the crew size of a Mistral ~160 mixed with the speed and utility of the Trieste makes ~25knts both powered by RR Trent GT, can carry ~600 marines and can accommodate ~12+ helicopters.

  7. Have we enough helicopters for this type of amphibious assault , as well as crows nest , training , ASW and maintenance
    Thanks Ian

    • The Merlin of the CHF are not Merlin HM2’s, but the ex RAF Merlins, which once numbered 28. ( 22 plus 6 taken from a Danish order! ) They do not undertake the ASW or Crowsnest role. you mention.

      We don’t have enough of them either! As we have lamented many times here. The HM1’s that could have helped here were cannibalised according to posters who know.

      Do we have enough for amphibious assault? Depends how big a lift we are talking of. By comparison, the helicopters they replaced, the Commando Sea King HC4’s of 845, 846, and 848 NAS once numbered 35 or so, so we are down already there. Also there is also the UKSF MCT commitment which requires some on standby in UK.

      We have to also bear in mind the RAF Chinooks which could be used.

      • Hi Daniele…… it seems to make this work we need to increase our helicopter numbers and increase the numbers of sailors and marines…… and the 2 fast assault ships…… let’s not hold our breath
        Thanks Ian

        • For a larger operation yes. If the LSS are more SF orientated vessels like the US versions on smaller scale but available then that is certainly doable. Most nations cannot even do that.

      • There is a solution that’s mutually beneficial for the RAF and RN Daniele, replace the Puma with a second batch of 25 Commando Merlin and give them a duel Airforce / Maritime tasking.

        We have to make sure we make all future orders of equipment as capable and multi roll as possible. That means helicopter orders fully marinised and amphibious.

        A total fleet of 50 Commando Merlin’s and Chinooks on call as needed, would be enough airlift for our needs for projected Helicopter Carriers and QE class deployment.

        One point re the Commando Merlin, athough it’s numbers are less than the Seaking HC4, it’s a far more capable platform, 5 Merlin’s can lift a Marine Company with its equipment…

        While we are discussing Merlin, restore it’s AAR capability and buy some wing pods for our C130J’s.

        In fact (going further down the rabbit hole), buy some bushmaster door cannon kits and hellfire launches for the J’s and make them highly capable, multi roll SF support platforms.

        I know we have a contact with Air tanker re tanking, but surely that can be sorted..

        • So John…another one up late!

          The J’s, there were rumours some years back DSF was looking at the USSOC Herc gunships.

          Agree on pods for Hercs and AAR for helis. Long suggested as another item on the DSF’s shopping list. The new Chinooks for the RAF have the probe I believe.

          Fair point on Merlin. Always the way though with new platforms. Far too few for the roles they are expected to carry out.

          I’d be quite happy with more Merlin myself as a Puma replacement though I think the RAF themselves were not keen on Merlin and would just jump at more Chinooks. And would you create extra Merlin NAS’s in the CHF for these extras? If so, you’d need to disband 33 and 230 Sqns from the RAF SHF and transfer the headcount to the FAA. Doubt the RAF would be happy.

          Maybe they will go for a future type, GHF has detailed them extensively here. Or more likely just delete Puma! Certainly hope not as the RAF should have a medium lift helicopter.

          • Yep another late one mate!
            My main issue, with a proposed seperate medium support buy to replace Puma is we end up with small fleets of limited use, but with a disproportionately high seperate support cost.

            Simply replacing with a second batch of 25 Commando Merlin, enhances lift, uses the same support network and backs UK industry.

            As you rightly say, probably just withdrawn without replacement though….

          • Merlin was a pain in the arse as a battlefield helo, the RAF was happy to get rid for more Chinnys. Too complicated to maintain, too difficult to repair. Compared to Puma2 in hot and high the latter wins out anyway.
            The FAA got a single fleet albeit relatively little actual cross over benefit, but availability remains poor and really that goes to the base of the design.

            The tragedy of Obama’s VH71 cancellation was that investment would have fixed the platform (hence the astronomical costs!) and the UK could have benefited massively from that and further buys would have made sense. As it is, another lame duck of British industry. Wrt the pingers, good when they work but in my experience we saw the sub through binos from the bridge before the Merlin found it…

            As for armed C130Js, that’s some strong stuff and a world away from reality. The DSF ideas largely died against our Hercs being “anglicised” C130J: so loads of differences (of course we couldnt just buy them off the shelf, that would be far too easy!) that made putting MC/AC130 kit on them impractical, and that they are shagged out and need either retiring or a complete recapitalisation through upgrade and life extension at a cost approaching buying new. Expect the former when/if the review comes out. The latter sadly being a political no go given the money spent on A400 which still fails to deliver and probably never will although notably even the French and Germans have given up with it and bought C130s for special taskings.

          • Thanks for the lowdown, allow a man to dream though!

            The fact remains, we need to replace the 20 plus Pumas before long and would you agree a medium type is needed and further a Maritime enabled platform would make sense?

            If the answer is yes, then surely the only logical answer is an additional buy of Commando Merlin, so we don’t introduce yet another fleet to support.

            I fear we will replace the Puma with 10 additional CH47’s, or just retired without replacement….

            Re the C130J’s, I thought Bushmaster had developed a cannon system that was self contained and palletised to replace the rear right door with a wing mounted targeting sensor on any J model…

            You would think these kits and indeed our J models would be plug and play enabled??

          • Hey, dreaming is cool !

            I’ve a fantasy force with allsorts in it 🙂

            For Puma, I suspect absorbed into Chinook force, there is talk of a order to retire old airframes so covered within that as part of a better fleet availability and usability. Yes Puma does things a Chinny cant, as Harrier did things a Tornado couldnt, but Tornado was a larger fleet in better condition with “must have” capabilities as is Chinook in comparison. This UKism of having so many types in small numbers is a massive logistical and training burden. Ideally yes add some more Merlins/Wildcats as offert, although not sure if Merlin is even in prodcution now and Wildcat, well, less said the better!

            As for the bushmaster gun, why? Do we use Hercs in that way? Are they armoured and protected tonthe standard we would want from the threats that role would entail (preditctable flying over a target)? Do our Rules of Engagement permit firing an unstabilised cannon from 1000s of feet above something and does it do something that we’ve no other means to attack? Do we have the scope to train and keep people current on that? How do we keep it all zeroed? What are the sustainment costs for a gun/ammo we dont otherwise use? What does firing that do to the airframe? Does the wing sensor turret need wiring through to and displays in the fuselage (noting we only added wing pylons for tanks and they are of marginal use). Can the aircraft beam those images to a command centre where the authority to engage sits (as a RPAS can). We have a different palletised system to Js as to save money we recycled the K system. It is rubbish and we expend vast man hours on it. But replacing it now would be insane cost wise for the recertification and mods to everything else that goes in there. Also the doors and vicinity may not be available on “special missions” so this is a very one-trick aircraft fit.

            Suddenly this isn’t bolt on at all and drives a huge amount of work and cost, and for a requirement nobody has ever given a 2nd thought to. Sorry!

            All in all, whenever I consider UK helo and transport fleets, with 3 types in each doing basically the job of 2 – I get stuck at “well I wouldnt start from here!!”

            How you solve Herc-A400-C17 I dont know. Herc offers unparalleld special tactical capability, C17 strategic. A400 the redundant one but is brand new.

            Likewise helos, Puma is good for what it does but ancient, Merlin is big and expensive to operate but marinised(ish) and relatively new, Chinook superlative but sometimes too big.

            It’s hard to argue with the US solution/ H60/H47 and C130/C17 splits…

  8. The MOD and HMG give us a new lesson in the art of brevity. ‘Future Commando Force’ is just waffle for ‘cuts’.

  9. Raiding role is all part and parcel of the RMs job. However lets not pretend its about capability and a new “role”. Its about cost, and reducing the heavier (costlier) assets, and therefore saving money. The RM needs to have the ability to land, fight and move off the “beachead”. This requires decent kinetic fighting power but also with a sustainable logistic and resupply, a set of “enablers” and OS support, all delivered by the correct flaoting platforms! They need the ability to depoy attached armoured forces if required. We dont want 3Cdo to go the way of 16 Bde. 16 is a shell of a Bde, and both Bdes require funding to get them back to a fully deployable and operational status.

    • We think alike. This is my No1 concern too with this whole business. Enablers. Enablers. Enablers. That means firepower, artillery, signals, logistics, ISTAR, and the means to put them where needed. Ships. Helicopters. Landing craft. Boats.

      Till then the fancy uniforms are just window dressing, however useful for the guys wearing them.

      Both brigades seem to be moving to enlarged versions of UKSFSG rather than actual deployable brigades with the full range of supporting assets from the CS & CSS units.

      I remain hopeful that things will change for the better.

      • Quite right. We have, in the last 35 years, gone from a country that could deploy a Corps, to a division, then Brigades and now Battle Groups. Now even a British BG is quite formidable but in these days of great power competition we need to get back to Bdes & Divs to stay in the game.

        • Would be nice. I think however RN RAF SF ISTAR areas will be priority from now on.
          A doctrine I’ve always supported personally.

        • Our ability to deploy a Corps was hollow. Look how denuded of equipment and supplies BAOR was to put a 2 Brigade Division in the Gulf in 1991.

          Equally with a Division- look at what we had in the Orbat to deploy a 1 heavy Brigade Div in 2003, and how again how denuded the rest was of equipment (war standard) and supplies to achieve that and then sustain the Brigade level deployments.

          So where we are now is a bit more realistic but not actually that much different from the past. We may have had hundreds of bits of kit but most wasnt at fighting standard nor could it be. That is a lot more visible when you replace it.

  11. First of all many thanks for writing the article & this has been a subject I feel needs discussion. However, although I see the need for some elements of FCF unfortunately, couldn’t disagree more with it on its being the best future for RM or the RN or the UK. Especially considering the supposed ambition of global Britain and if we have a true desire/need to influence & be involved on the world stage. I am not against FCF just some of the premise of the article.

    The article doesn’t take in to account we have just invested in 2 “super” carriers and that in reality as in the land domain, the real power of a CSG does not come from the temporary presence of a force such as a Carrier or attack helicopters, it comes from persistent forces that can actually influence the land domain by taking & holding ground.
    The fact the carrier can support and protect a significant land force in an amphibious landing is actually where the real power lies.

    This especially true with only 2 aircraft carriers, as whilst a carrier can be available 365 military ops cannot effectively be sustained 365 with 2. Therefore any potential enemy knows they simply have hunker down until the carrier leaves.

    It is also not just what you can do, but what you can threaten to do i.e. just having empty amphibious shipping even if not deployed is worth it (ok a politician or member of the treasury won’t understand that but IMO it’s a truth just as the nuclear deterent).

    Therefore the carriers without amphibious shipping are not the political tools of that of the USN as they have been sold to the UK government by the RN & IMO the investment is greatly diminished.

    All the things mentioned in the article could have been done by cheaper, lighter aircraft carriers or LPH’s. So why bother with huge carriers where we could have had a smaller balanced ARG & CSG with smaller quicker vessels?

    Also if FCF goes too light the argument could be that airborne forces with V22s, supported by air transport could negate the need for any costly shipping at all. Limiting to raids etc. makes the Royal Marines militarily insignificant for anything other than peace time operations. Virtually turning them in to a maritime police force or a coastguard type service.

    Against this Australia, China France & Italy plus others invest in LPHs & other amphibious shipping.

    “Britain cannot engage conventional warfare against peers near peers” not with FCF as the only plan! which would make that absolutely clear and final. If we can’t, why bother with large carriers?

    We do not have to emulate the USMC! (we didn’t need to emulate the USN carriers) what we IMO need to ensure that FCF/RM doesn’t lose the UK the ability to engage in kick down the door amphibious operations which is where my concern with it is.

    We also need to ensure we don’t lose our amphibious shipping. If we manage this & make small changes by 2030-2035 we would actually be in be in the situation for the first time since Suez where we could actually mount a significant sovereign (or dual national operation with the French ref Lancaster House agreement). Consider our potential naval ORBAT at this time would consist of 2 Aircraft Carriers, 2 LPDs, 3 LSDs, 4 large Ro-Ro’s well as possibly 2 LSS & also not forgetting (as the maritime blinkered author) 2 relatively easy to deploy Army Strike Brigades. Add to this a potentially a larger more capable escort fleet T26,T45, T31,T32. We could actually engage in peer to peer & the carriers a Royal Navy will have truly come of age.

    However, if FCF becomes the only naval “land force” option & the full focus of the navy losing the ability to deploy 3 commando or at least a full battalion amphibious entry force is lost along with amphibious shipping then we have actually set the narrative of your statement & IMO squandered the investment in that ORBAT

    The author also overlooks IMO a difference between C2 on board the carriers & the complexity of C2 for amphibious land operations (even raids BTW not always best carried out by noisy non-stealthy helicopters or very small boats) – reference the Falklands task force command came from the carrier, land command from LPD. For starters land forces have a different language than naval forces e.g. gunnery or deploying from a land craft.

    Also glossed over is the fact LSDs can only fit 1 LCU & a limited amount of raiding craft also that they are absolutely huge with a massive silhouette & radar signature to go with them. Add to that they are built more towards commercial standards they will be useless until a secure bay can be obtained, hence the role of logistic vessels not LPDs.

    The other factor not mentioned is one of the primary strategic role of 3 commando which is helping to secure the northern flank which I believe is very pertinent in the current climate. I cannot see how small raiding parties would a actually provide a) meaningful defence & b) appear to allies that we are committed to trying to do so. So are the RMs dropping this important commitment & is the army to pick it up?

    The Royal Navy are there to serve the UK & to be honest I couldn’t give a dam if the RM are going to their naval routes! this is a service not a strategic concern. The RN is simply trying to get the force active to justify its existence.

    Saying all this I am not against FCF as we need some more of this capability & some of the maritime focus, but to pretend that this gives the UK some kind of new “magic force” (which we have coped without for sometime) when we already have Special Forces & (I am afraid I am going to upset interservice rivalry) airborne forces that can deploy a multitude times quicker than any ship based force no matter how forward deployed (there’s a lot of ocean out there!) is simply spin IMO.

    If FCF results in n overall weaker formation & deprives the UK of an effective amphibious force it’s not worth the cost.

    I apologise if this appears ranty or harsh but it’s my honest opinion.

    • “The other factor not mentioned is one of the primary strategic role of 3 commando which is helping to secure the northern flank which I believe is very pertinent in the current climate. I cannot see how small raiding parties would a actually provide a) meaningful defence & b) appear to allies that we are committed to trying to do so. So are the RMs dropping this important commitment & is the army to pick it up?”

      Agree. I’m worried by this too.

      • Daniele,
        That used to be the remit for ACE Mobile Force (Land) better known as AMFL which was pronounced Anfil. It was disbanded in 2002, after the Uk removed its contingent (The largest component) in which to concentrate on the upcoming invasion of Iraq and nobody else stood up to the plate. Apparently its been replaced by the NATO Response Force. But to be honest, I’ve not heard much of them

        • That’s right Farouk. 1 Infantry Brigade I recall. I’d read they could. theoretically, have been deployed from Turkey to Denmark to Norway. NATO flanks.

          Did any of the army units of this force have the same quality of arctic training of the RM? Considering we’ve talked on here recently of the possibility of the army taking the role.

  12. Interesting article. I agree with a number of points, but while the RM might be limited to light strike and vehicles capable of air lift such as Viking (and perhaps in future JLTV if not too heavy), we should probably also assume we need to land heavier equipment up to at least Ajax/Boxer levels to support larger army operations. We can’t assume we will adequately deter a peer adversary from expeditionary adventures with just a light strike capability.

    An example scenario might be the ability to reinforce northern Norway by sea if the limited land routes heading north have been interdicted. However, as the article (and many others) observe, LPDs and LSDs have become very vulnerable when operated close in shore, either halted or at slow speed for an extended duration in order to support slow ship-to-shore transfers. Faster landing craft only partially mitigate this.

    What we need are faster, smaller ships, in greater numbers, that support rapid equipment and stores offload across beaches, since ports can’t be guaranteed to be available or safe. Smaller, more affordable ships, build to commercial standard, also enable increased numbers, spreading the risk of mission kill damage or loss of personnel and equipment, also with the option to be in more places at the same time if needed.

    The Littoral Strike Ship concept gets us part of the way there in terms of smaller size and faster speed along with a large flight deck, but its still tied to landing craft and port facilities for offload. Conversely something like the Damen Landing Ship Transport 120 would provide the direct beach landing but its too small and much too slow, with no flight deck. So perhaps a hybrid of the two would provide the flexibility the RN needs to scale from RM light strike operations, through to full medium armour and associated forces and logistics deployment.

    Such ships would replace both Albion- and Bay-class vessels but in greater numbers. They might also provide Argus functionality, especially for casualty evacuation, using container based hospital capabilities on the vehicle deck. But it doesn’t stop there. The large deck, storage, and ability to deploy unmanned sub-surface, surface and air assets enables a great deal more. Such ships might operate as motherships for the MCM mission modules the RN is adopting. Or might be used to support unmanned surface and sub-surface littoral ASW capability, perhaps not least in defence of littoral amphibious ops.

    And finally, because no defence asset is complete without mentioning it, such a vessel would be ideal for HADR operations when events like hurricanes might delay or deny port access, when its most critical to rapidly deploy assets to save lives.

    As a reminder, here is the LSS concept https://www.navylookout.com/a-closer-look-at-the-littoral-strike-ship-concept/

    • Oh and as long as we’re consolidating the disparate ship classes in the RN and RFA we might also use the same basic design to replace the Echo class vessels in due course.

      Point-class might be another candidate for replacement, perhaps eliminating the PFI since we would then have much more flexible role vessels that can be more fully uilized under RFA operation, depending on how we expect that capability to operate in future. We might rarely need the large Point-class cargo in peacetime, and in war their ro-ro port operating constraint might not make them practical for anything other than the most benign of environments.

  13. Good Morning gents. You guys have said most of what needs saying so- good article from Rebecca in ‘Suid Afrika’ and as an historic footnote, it is worth noting that the original Kommandos were the Boer irregulars from the 1899-1901 Anglo-Boer War. These were brave, hardy men of steel,expert marksmen who perfected the art of guerilla warfare and earned the praise of American and British generals in the conflicts of later years when they deployed with their English speaking compatriots as the South African Army. The Royal Marines still retain ‘Sarie Marais” as a Regimental March in tribute to those courageous men. That is not to detract from the fighting skills of the “Khakis” who battled them in that sad conflict but as with some of the History of the British Army this was one war where the old saying”Lions led by Donkeys” aptly applied! The War was continued by a group of Boers known as the”Bittereinders” for another year until 1902 but they eventually capitulated. Two of their leading Generals-Louis Botha and Jan Smuts came over to the British side and defeated the Germans in South West Africa with the brilliant Jan Smuts becoming the first Field Marshall outside of the UK in the British Empire. That of course caused a huge split in Afrikaner ranks but that is a story for another day. Suffice it to say that the old animosities that persisted between some sections of English and Afrikaans South Africans until well into the late 20th Century(we were Souties, they were Hairybacks) have evaporated in the face of the evnts that have followed since the first democratic election of 1994.
    “Oh bring my t’rug na die Ou Transvaal
    Daar waar my Sarie woon..”

      • Hi Daniele. Hope you well and that the weather is improving in your neck of the Northern Hemisphere! Yes-fascinating country is South Africa with an amazing history. Another thing about the name. The old South African Army prior to 1994 had what was known as The Commandos which was an all volunteer Reserve Force similar to your old Territorials which backed up the Army and Police. Probably also similar to the US National Guard. Now done away with.
        Keep Safe!

  14. As someone who spent a very enjoyable 3 years on an LPD doing amphibiosity a number of points are valid but equally a number are not.

    As the RM raison d’etre moves to raiding it cannot all be achieved by air assault. The need for shore connectors will remain. If RM is told to assault a SAM missile battery to allow for instance a evacuation flight into an area to rescue civilian staff you are not going to do it in a helo right up to the SAM battery’s front door (for obvious reasons) . Chances are that if the battery is near the coast LC or LCAC type shore connectors would be used to land the party along the coast well away from any threat and then RMs would use vehicles to move to the battery to assault it. The same premise could be applied to Helo insertion. Land well away from the threat and then use vehicles to maneuver to assault.
    It is a fallacy that the LPD needs to come in close to shore. They can stand off a couple of hundred miles away and the LCUs can travel the distance. being close to shore improves the cycle times for ship to shore connection meaning the LCU spends less time in transit from ashore to the ship . For small unit raids this is not an issue.

    When moving vehicles the issue with the current Helos, Merlin and Chinook, is the load capacity. For something like a fully loaded Jackal it needs to go underslung, one at a time under a Chinook or pretty much empty with no kit in it under a Merlin.
    Land rovers can be used and do fit internally on both helos. For the RM Bvs they are again limited to underslung on a Merlin. The up armoured and more modern equivalents are heavy and would need breaking down into Tractor and trailer components for moving which is far from ideal.

    The use of the larger LCU’s as floating bases for raiders is already well practised. They can deploy hundreds of miles away from the LPD and acting as a mothership to refuel, supply and deploy raiding craft. This increases the principle of uncertainty for the enemy and opens up huge swathes of coastline to assault, little of which can be adequately guarded. they are equally as adept at carrying out riverinne work on waterways inland from the coast.

    Regarding LPD operations the cost of using them is not in manpower. The manpower is there either on the ship or ashore and is going to be paid no matter what. LPDs are pretty economical being HV electrical vessels. The crew is not dissimilar in size from that of say the old T22 B2. The reason for not having two in service is down to requirement. You simply don’t need 2 LPDs running around burning fuel and running up a maintenance bill. Unless its a time of crisis , one is enough. Command and control onboard is exceptional. They have the ability to communicate to individual squads ashore via radio and satcom and back to HQs in the UK via HF or Satcom. They also carry a strike cell dedicated to coordinating air, gunnery and missile strikes against targets in support of any landed forces something raiding teams will be happy with if they need aditional support to allow them to get out of Dodge!

    The ideal replacement would be an LHD type platform that combines a dock with an airfield. Will one be forthcoming anytime soon? Doubtful. LPDs will continue on because they are flexible and provide sustainment to any landing force big or small. Aircraft sustainability is an issue without a hanger but there is little that can be done about it in the short to medium term.
    The LPD magazines are very large and can carry anything in the RM inventory. Size wise You use forklifts inside the Mags to move stuff around, not as individual boxes but as pallets.During a deployment with an LPD, LPH and a Bay, nearly 33% of the UKs ready use infantry munitions for small arms and mortars was deployed afloat, split across the vessels. That is a lot of Bang!
    They Storerooms are large allowing supplies to be moved from ship to ashore forces to feed and maintain them
    Potable Water production and storage capacity is again large.

    there are a lot more things to cover but some of us have to work , so its back to fixing grey painted War Canoes now!

    • Awesome post. The author does seem ignorant of the reality of logistics and rather “San Carlos” fixated in terms of LPD and LCU usage. The idea that everything can go by air is absurd unless you ignore everything but the actual marine, and the examples in the piece contraict that position very clearly.

      The LPDs are great platforms although the stupidity of cutting the hangar deck out of the design to save a few pennies of its lifetime cost is the massive achillies heel.

      An LHD replacement of 20-25k tons would be perfect, built to warship standards as the Author’s comment on “built to civillian as per the commando carriers” is not only completely wrong (the commando carriers were built as per HMS Hermes – described as a “bloody great steel fort” !) but is a cheap cost saving device that never does anything but kill people and for the asset, reduces its service life (see Ocean wrt physical condition). Military ops are arduous and the ships need to be built to endure that.

      • Ocean was built to commercial standards and the MOD spent more bringing it up to milspec than they would have if they had just milspeced it from scratch. I worked on her in Guz a few times when I was in the Mob and again later when I started working for a living as a civvy when she visited the Gulf. She was on her last legs then and it was a exercise in just keeping her running. Towards the end the obsolescence issues where huge.

        The USN is looking at light carriers (Again!) but possibly using the America as a template. The issue they have is its an LHD without the dock but the same hull as if it did have a dock . It simply cannot do the speeds required unless there is a fundamental redesign of the hull.

        Having a dock means big flat sides and a flat bottom which limits speed. Any LHD is going to need careful design to mary higher speeds with the hull and to also still be able to deploy stuff out of the back such as LCUs, Hovercraft and Unmanned drones.

        • I’m not fussed on the speed, the author is wrong on that too and the USN has found to enormous cost how pointless it was for LCS. An amphib at 20kts is as strategically and operationally deployable as one that can nominally do 30 but cant because even all our tankers couldnt support that, and which comes at heavy cost in constraining more important parts of the design.

          In the days where a few knots made the difference between outrunning another ship then yes its worth optimising for that, in the days where the threat is near or above supersonic then ship speed is irrelevent.

          Obseolesence is a massive issue as equipment stays in service long after it should have. We spend a fortune paying companies for very small reruns of things otherwise out of production – as an example an avionics box that cost 100k for the handful we want and would cost >1M if we tried to recertify with something new (which wouldnt work probwbly as the rest of the systems would he different in generation) and >100M (more probably!) to redo the aircraft to modern standard. Yet we arent allowed to buy in bulk as then a lot sit on the shelves which is assigned as a cost (and storing stuff is a cost of course), so we are forced to buy penny packets which cost far more each time than a single bulk buy plus storage.

  15. Post Falklands, the replacement for the Atlantic conveyor was meant to be a vessel capable of being fitted with containerised weapons systems and carrying a significant number of vehicles and troops. Post Brexit, government financial support to British shipping companies that operate such vessels, would provide a welcome boost to amphibious warfare.

  16. Part of me still misses Engadine, Tiger & Blake. I like the idea of a couple of RN Destroyers/Frigates, fitted with a hangar big enough for 4 helicopters & a flight deck big enough for 2.

  17. This makes a lot of sense. The United States Navy, with vastly greater resources, has an increased focus on littoral operations. A huge proportion of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of the coast. The original commando concept was raiding, which, as accurately pointed out, ties up a disproportionate amount of enemy resource. FCF seems to me to be about getting back to the original concept. The Marines are not meant to be a conventional land brigade.

    Given the increasingly hostile posture of China in the South China Sea, we also need to consider how a military threat from China could be contained. You only need to look at the map to see that China is very dependent on sea lanes and that these pass through very narrow choke points, which is precisely why China is trying to annex the South China Sea, to avoid “containment”. Future commando activities could include operating from merchant vessels, and include interdiction of merchant ships carrying cargoes bound for China in the event of a hot conflict.

    The subsuming of the role of Commandant General of the Royal Marines, and the recent suicide of Major General Holmes, risks being a serious blow to the future commando force. The Royal Marines are an excellent national asset and their combat effectiveness must be maintained at all costs. The future commando force does this.

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