UK should ‘reconsider’ plans to scrap C-130

Andy Netherwood, a former C-130 and C-17 aircraft commander, has urged the Ministry of Defence to reconsider the early retirement of the C-130J Hercules fleet.

In written evidence submitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee here, that air mobility is a vital component of both hard and soft power and is essential to realise the ‘Global Britain’ ambition set out by the Integrated Review.

“It is required to support, sustain and recover the ‘persistently engaged force’ envisaged by the Review and this applies to every aspect of it. For example, even the HMS Queen Elizabeth-led Carrier Strike Group required multiple air mobility missions to support CSG21, and the enhanced forward presence in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would not be possible without sufficient air mobility to sustain it. 

It is needed to conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation operations, as we saw during Op PITTING and is the means by which the UK can support allies and influence the course of conflicts without direct military intervention, as we saw with the movement of equipment and supplies for Ukraine. It also contributes to UK soft power by allowing humanitarian supplies to be moved quickly anywhere in the world to support disaster relief. Finally, it is an essential pillar of national resilience as we saw during the covid pandemic when air mobility aircraft were used to transport vaccines, patients and essential personnel. In short, air mobility is woven through every thread of the Integrated Review.”

Air Mobility and the C-130J

“The C-130J is the backbone of the AMF.  It entered service in 1999, just two years before the C-17 and is a capable tactical airlifter in use with, and still being acquired by, many air forces around the world. It is not a ‘legacy platform’ by any reasonable definition.  The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review retained 14 C-130J from the original fleet and funded a £110M centre wing box replacement programme to extend their life to at least 2035. Shortly after this work was completed the Defence Command Paper announced that the aircraft would be retired early, leaving service by 2023. 

The decision to retire the C-130J in 2023 is incoherent with the Integrated Review and leaves insufficient air mobility capacity or capability to meet UK requirements without considerable risk.

In terms of capacity, the loss of C-130J equates to almost one-third of the RAF’s tactical air transport aircraft. Whilst the A400M can carry more cargo than the C-130J (37T compared to 19T), it cannot be in two places at once or transport cargo simultaneously to different destinations.  The currency of air mobility is ‘task lines’ and the loss of C-130J will result in a substantial reduction in those available.

In terms of capability, an effective air mobility force requires aircraft of various sizes in much the same way that a supermarket needs small vans as well as articulated lorries.  This allows a task to be assigned to the most suitable platform and avoids aircraft flying with most of their cargo compartment empty. The loss of C-130J means there will be nothing in the UK inventory between a Chinook (max payload 10T) and an A400M (max payload 37T). Any load slightly too heavy, large or urgent for a Chinook will need to go by A400M.  This gap is exacerbated by the decision to replace the 4 BAe 146 with 2 Dassault Falcons. Whereas the former could be used to fly relatively small, but urgent items of cargo (and the BAe 146 Mk3 had a cargo door for the purpose) the latter is a business jet not capable of this role. As well as picking up C-130J tasks, the A400M will therefore have to cover BAe 146 cargo tasks too. Not only is this inefficient but it also adds further pressure on the reduced force and its limited task lines.

Finally, the A400M’s size makes it unsuitable for some niche C-130J roles, including those supporting Special Forces. Whilst the A400M is a capable aircraft, and the RAF has worked hard to migrate capabilities across from the C-130J, some issues are an unresolvable matter of physics. For example, the A400M is a larger aircraft (10m longer, 3m higher & 2m greater wingspan than a C-130J) with a larger radar cross-section and ground footprint.  This makes it more easily detectable by enemy air defence or fighter radars and reduces the number of airstrips it can use or the number of aircraft that can use an airfield at any given time.  This latter factor (known as ‘MOG’ or Maximum on Ground) is often limiting as military operations see airfields handling volumes of traffic considerably in excess of their peacetime norms. For these reasons other A400M operators like France and Germany also operate a fleet of C-130Js.”

In summary, Andy adds:

“The early retirement of C-130J will leave Defence without sufficient capacity or capability to meet the ‘Global Britain’ ambition of the Integrated Review. The Ministry of Defence should reconsider this decision or propose an alternative remedy to the air mobility shortfall that is effective from the C-130J’s out of service date.”