Big defence projects are usually late and over budget – here’s what we can learn from the build-up to WW2.
Matthew Powell, University of Portsmouth
UK defence minister Alex Chalk visited Rosyth shipyard in Fife, Scotland a few days ago to kick off construction on the second ship in a new class of frigates for the Royal Navy. The navy is buying five of these state-of-the-art Type 31 warships for active service by 2027.
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Yet while Chalk talked up the “world-class facilities” at Rosyth and selling more of these ships to other countries in future, doubts are simultaneously being raised about the frigates due after the Type 31s. The Type 32 programme, due to start completions by the early 2030s, may be cancelled in the prime minister’s March defence review due to a lack of funds. This threatens the government’s whole strategy for increasing the navy.
Defence spending has broadly declined as a percentage of GDP since the end of the cold war, so overspends on one project often require savings elsewhere. The Type 32 programme follows a long line of projects going over budget, missing delivery dates or both.
Among the worst examples is the British Army’s Ajax programme for new armoured tanks. Originally aiming to procure 589 vehicles for £3.5 billion by 2017, the tanks have been beset by technical problems. Only 26 have been delivered and even they are not considered deployable due to noise and vibration problems.
Meanwhile, the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers cost nearly double the original £3.9 billion estimate. Initially due in 2012, the first did not come into service until 2017, while the second was two years later. The budget for the navy’s Astute class of submarines also roughly doubled, while its six Type 45 destroyers cost 30% more than planned and were two years late.
Defence procurement is regularly reformed, but the same cost overruns and delays continue to occur. So what can be done?
Learning from the interwar era
The history of the UK aircraft industry between the first and second world wars is a useful comparison. Like today, the industry was wholly private (it was nationalised between the second world war and the 1980s). This meant the government’s military R&D and information on what was feasible was largely reliant on external contractors whose first priority was making a profit.
Also like today, the 1930s aircraft industry was attempting to use new technologies without knowing what was possible or how to do it. By contrast, there were far fewer technological changes to aircraft in, say, the 1950s or 1960s.
Manufacturers in the 1930s were having to rethink aircraft designs to include retractable undercarriages and new propellers, while mounting machine guns and cannons on wings for the first time. At the same time, they were moving from wooden to metal aircraft to allow greater airspeeds.
Firms were overconfident in what they said they could deliver. In the 1920s, they had told the Air Ministry that the move to metal aircraft would speed up manufacturing and lead to fewer delays, and yet delays got steadily worse in the 1930s. The ministry talked of adding at least six months to manufacturers’ estimates to make them realistic.
As rearmament took off in the 1930s, the government also changed many requirements. For instance, Supermarine S5s were racing aircraft that had to be modified over several years to become Spitfire fighter aircraft. All these things contributed to delays and cost overruns.
How it compares
Today, computer power continually pushes the boundaries of what is possible. Suppliers often don’t know whether a new technology will work and regularly over-promise – while the government is often unsure what it actually needs.
Projects often start with vague ambitions that become detailed during production, and spec changes are one major reason for delays and cost overruns. With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, for example, the take-off and landing mechanisms were changed on several occasions prior to full-scale production.
So what can interwar aircraft production tell us? Of course, they were unique times that required unique solutions, such as turning car plants into “shadow factories” for making more aircraft. But many of the policies introduced to get the air force ready for war could be applied again.
For example, the Air Ministry stated as early as 1925 that when new aircraft were being trialled, pilots should only highlight modifications required for safety and nothing more. Today’s planners could equally avoid big modifications or changes unless absolutely necessary.
Air Ministry procurement officials were often also kept in post for more than five years. Today it’s more like 18 months to two years. Make this longer and personnel would have to face the consequences of their decisions.
In the 1930s, budgets and accounting started being done on a multi-year basis. The RAF could then place orders over several years as opposed to one-year contracts, giving manufacturers greater certainty for hiring and training skilled labour and investing in additional capacity. This, too, could be done again.
Admittedly, there is a limit to what we can achieve. The tech issues show no signs of abating – and they’re a problem for all countries. This partly explains international collaboration in defence procurement, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft. It’s therefore more about managing these issues than eradicating them.
One solution is always to spend more money, but that looks unlikely. The government had been planning to increase defence spending from 2.2% to 3% of GDP by 2030, but many think this will be abandoned in the current financial climate.
It’s therefore vital to learn what lessons we can from the past. In short, this means being clever about budgets and postings, minimising spec changes and avoiding being hoodwinked by overly optimistic contractors. To maximise what can be afforded and cope with the complexities of technological change, it’s the only logical way forward.
Matthew Powell, Teaching Fellow in Strategic and Air Power Studies, University of Portsmouth
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
I’d add this to the above. When HM forces want a new bit of kit they put it out to tender and expect lots of competitive quotes / designs but what really happens is that for strategic and political reasons only the UK built options are acceptable. That means, because the UK defence sector has been consolidated into a few companies, that there really isn’t a choice. The Navy get Babcock or BAE ships, the Army get BAE or GKN armed vehicles and the RAF will always get a BAE/international cooperation fast jet. In other words, if you want to buy British, then you have to buy into whatever BAE are offering however promising or not the project is. We are really missing having competitive manufacturers like Supermarine, Hawker, Vickers, De Haviland, Swann Hunter, Alvis, etc, etc…
Sadly, we lost companies to bankruptcy, acquisition and forced mergers under the 1974-1979 government as part of the aircraft Shipbuilding Industries Act of 1977 to nationalise the industries which formed British Aerospace. Even if you do put it out to tender, you may only get a limited response.
GKN was bought by Vickers , which was then bought by Alvis ( this was the end of management having to do a year on the shop floor to properly understand the business working in different departments ). Then BAE bought Alvis Vickers !
BAE also swallowed up RO plc and VSEL. So from 5 national AFV manufacturers to just one – did no-one refer any of this to the Monopolies & Mergers Commission?
Having said that BAE has inherited ‘the DNA’ and make decent armoured vehicles – so why did we go to General Dynamics for the Ajax family!
Perhaps we should how ask how the AS21 went from idea in 2018 to prototype in October 2019 followed by three prototypes built for extensive testing for Australia 2020 -2021 . To full operational capability 2030’s!
Peter, you perhaps need to do a tiny bit more research. The AS21 Redback IFV for Australia is a modified version of South Korea’s K21 IFV – for which development started in 1999, 3 prototypes delivered in 2005, Production began 2009, fielded with Korean forces 2013-2016.
So the start point is 1999 and the end point is 2030s!
A very polite “burn” there Graham.
Yes the Ascod is much older with its Austrian concept 1982 and then dragged on to 1988 and then first prototype 1991. That explains why they soldiered on with outdated torsion bars which are more at home in a 432 than anything modern. K21 a more modern starting point so eaiser to develop.
ASCOD was probably a poor starting point for GDUK for their AJAX – and they developed it beyond what was reasonable, arguably.
CV90 Recce variant was a somewhat more modern vehicle (pity BAE did not get the contract).
K21 and the Redback spin-off for Australia seems to be good too but that is an IFV, rather than a recce vehicle. Totally different role.
What are the decent armored vehicles that BAE makes that originated from within BAE?
BV and CV90 are Swedish designs.
The ACV new vehicle for USMC marines is an Italian design.
You have tailored the question very skilfully to make your point!
BAE has inherited Design Authority remit from many companies (VSEL, GKN, Alvis, RO plc, VDS) that designed and built good kit which is still in service today with the British Army. So BAE would be prime candidate to sell more, sell more modern versions or upgrade exisiting versions. An example is CR3 (in collab with Rheinmetall).
Whilst CV90 is indeed a Swedish design, if you want to buy a CV90 fleet today you go to BAE who market and manufacture it and provide after-sales service. So CV90 is today a BAE product, no matter its origin as a Hägglunds/Bofors equipment.
In a global world of multi-nationals and corporate takeovers does it matter in which country a design was crafted several years ago?
BAE also market, manufacture and support: M777 Howitzer, Bradley and its successor (OMFV), AMPV for US Army, Amphib Cbt Veh for USMC, Archer truck-mounted artillery, M88 Hercules ARV, BvS10 (as ou siad), Beowulf, M109A7 etc etc – all examples of pretty good kit, unlike that produced by a tiny spin-off of General Dynamics!
😀
Well i was just pointing out that BAE capacity to design from the start an AFV is still a question without an answer.
That is true, due to the lack of orders in the last 20 years for AFVs…and with other companies too.
We end up with the situation whereby a very complex vehicle, Ajax, is built by a brand new company, GDUK, that has no facilities so they quickly buy or rent space in the Linde fork lift truck factory, and then figure out how to design, develop, prototype, fix, manufacture, test etc an AFV when very few of the workforce in Merthyr Tydfil had probably ever even seen an AFV before!
Yeah, that is the main issue, know how is not retained so need again to learn basic foundational things in a context of increased complexity and an educational/cultural system that shuns simplicity.
“There were far fewer changes to aircraft in, say, the 1950s or 1960s” errr, no, incorrect, there were far greater advances in aviation in that period than any other.
Yes and we led the world and even sold aircraft to America!
Errr yes. The 1930s started with fabric and wood biplanes and ended with metal monoplanes carrying 4 times the armament at double or more the speed.
The 50s started with jet fighters and ended with… bigger and faster jet fighters. Don’t get me wrong, there were massive developments in the 50s, one of the big ones being guided missiles, but most of it was refinement of existing concepts rather than a big paradigm shift
You forgot about the Mosquito. Undoubtedly the best fabric & wood military plane ever constructed.
Until tax is increased there will be no funds for anything and the way the government has been dropping hints, there could even be some cuts to programs😎
Tax avoidance , offshore investments, shell companies etc. If we are 5th or 6th country in terms of wealth we should no pot holes !
Depends on who delegates and how efficient they are with the money. And unfortunately, councils and the government are involved. I doubt we are the only nation that has this problem. It took my local council nearly four months after being reported to fix a pothole that became as wide as a car and several inches deep. I still have the pics.
Really!? So you want even more UK Socialism…
Congrats your country will have even less growth.
Many times, I have said, more time should be taken at the start of a project, to decide if it is needed, if so how many, what spec? Take advice from everyone, including internet geeks like us. Then nail everything down into a tough contract. Huge penalties on the Treasury if it tries to cancel, cut numbers or spec. Huge penalties on industry if it fails to deliver a working product on time & budget.
More effort should be made at the beginning, not more time taken. You can’t wait to get all the information because it never comes.
The T32 won’t come out of concept phase for at least another year so they can “learn lessons” from the TACTICOS integration on T31 expected this time next year. What lessons? This a concept phase. In what way will the ship concept change depending if they choose to go back to the BAES CMS? Those lessons apply to the competition phase and the detail design phase, so why put a hold on the concept phase? It these kind of delays early on that cause the unnecessary and costly delays later on, because that wasted year should be spent on the later tough stages of ship design. That’s a lesson that should have been learned from the Type 26.
When I said time, I meant time to get more opinions & data. I fear concept is just a wrestle between capability & cost. Perhaps better to release a “consultation ” earlier with a low end, high end & middle option. Point out the capabilities, limitations & likely costs of each. Get genuine feedback from a greater number of people.
2 competitors to 5% (see my separate post) and set a spec and don’t change it as per T31.
Except the ongoing “conversation” as to whether T31 should get MK41. If that decision comes late, it could add greatly in time & cost. These sorts of decisions should be made at the start.
Hi John,
I would respectfully disagree regarding Mk41 and Type 31. There is space designed into the ship in order to allow the Mk41 silos to be ‘dropped’ in later if and when funds become available. All the wiring, plumbing, fixturing, etc., will be there already. This is known as ‘Fitted For But Not With’.
The only problem with ‘Fitted For But Not With’ is it usually means ‘Fitted For But NEVER With’.
That said, I have read that the RN is very keen to add the Mk41 silos. This paired with cross-decked NSM from retiring Type 23s would make the Type 31 a very nice platform indeed.
Thank you John.
I would seriously doubt if the Type 31 was FFBNW anything to enable fitting MK41 other than the space to put them in – it wasn’t in the spec.
The CDS did say that the wiring for the Mk41 was in place on the T31 when giving evidence to I believe it was the defence select committee .
We both may be right – Navy Lookout informs us that ‘foundation structural seats’ are to be built in for possible future fitment of 4 x 8 cell MK41 VLS,no mention of wiring or plumbing but a positive nonetheless.
When Babcock are at trade shows, they show export customers all sorts of options for Arrowhead 140. Perhaps the RN, when launching T31, should have put out for consultation, 3 versions of the design? High, medium, low. Perhaps better to have 4 fully armed & equipped than 5 FFBNW? I agree with you, that not with, is too often never with.
What do you want to put in the T31 MK41? If it is just Tomahawk, then fine, you can add MK41 later. If you wish to fit Standard SM3/6 or Patriot, then you are going to need a higher spec radar & the superstructure/mast changes to go with it. Better to do that from the start, than make expensive changes later.
Patriot is not a naval missile system (at least as far as I can remember). Mk41 supports a range of missiles & if you want to integrate more – LM are happy to talk. Aster fits but integration costs is another matter. Tomahawk works from the get go. There are other missiles already being considered for Mk41, such as JSM.
I agree on the radar etc. T31 is really a should have been could have been design. Poland & Indonesia variants of the A140 leave the T31 looking even more like the oversized an OPV.
At a recent trade show, Patriot PAC 3 MSE was shown coming out of MK41 naval vertical launcher. Naval Patriot is now a thing.
“The Type 32 programme follows a long line of projects going over budget, missing delivery dates or both”
How, when it is at concept stage and no serious money beyond a mere 11 million has been spent?
I was thinking the same thing, the navy has a better track record than the other services delivering the most difficult projects yet everything mentioned is a navy project over run including one that’s a concept.
You might have noticed in the media and online at the moment the charm offensive that all the army’s woes are due to others, the RN, Carriers, the RAF, or anything else. And nothing at all do to with their own indecision, inability to stick with a plan, or with the fact that the army has literally squandered tens of billions with a handful of vehicles to show for it for the last 18 years.
Squandered? Far to polite
Spaffed… its a far better descriptor!
Yes, I think there are a lot of tired tropes coming out of army HQ in the funding fight.
Remember when Typhoon was the enemy and RAF should have ordered Super Tucano’s for ground support: according to army?
Now a favourite trope is QEC sucking in all the budgets. QEC only cost the same as AJAX and RN has the two bloody massive carriers to show for it that are the real deal. As opposed to 26 AJAX.
The F35B trope has gone a bit quiet recently but there again F35B is what is likely to be supporting Apache with overwatch and even army have probably twigged that it will make the battlefield a lot easier to control with that kind of synthesis.
Army have got a lot to answer for why army’s kit is in such a shocking state. They have been given big budgets to sort things out over the years and wasted an awfully high % of the money.
The greatest irony would be that T32 got hit when T31 looks to be on time/budget. That would be an exemplar for how not to reward those who make sound designs & purchase decisions and make stuff happen in the right way. Particularly if that budget line gets handed to army to waste away again.
I’m going to come out fighting in defence of my service here a bit. The Army actually hasn’t been fraught with indecision, it’s made some very bold and early decisions. The issue is really that the Levine framework has constantly made Army HQ rethink in order to balance its budget. My last meeting in Army HQ (I was a mere SO2) went something along the lines of:
“Ok, we need to come out of this with a balanced budget, so we need to save a billion quid by Christmas (It was August) otherwise we aren’t going to have any CAPEX next year. Right, cancel all non-operational training…. Ok how much more? “We need another £720 mil Sir” Ok, put everyone on block leave for 3 weeks instead of two over Christmas – how much more” That leaves £550 mil “I think we’re going to have to write the black holes in manning into the establishment….”
The general feeling was that the Navy and RAF were basically ignoring balancing their budget, but if we could do it we’d be rewarded. The main problem is that they made the services responsible for both CAPEX and OPEX and that meant they were borrowing from OPEX to pay for CAP or visa versa. And guess which way CGS was judged – was his OPEX in order…. That limits long term investment in capability.
The big difference in the services is that the Army had huge OPEX costs for most of the period between 2003 and 2014. In that time the Royal Navy could concentrate on what it wanted to be and how it wanted to operate in the future. We now see the rewards in that. The Army in contrast launched Op ENTIRETY where the actual main effort was campaign success on HERRICK. Everything from doctrine, training and procurement was in support of that.
I think Strategic Command should actually be in charge of how we fight and the procurement to deliver operational capability. Then we might have a balanced set of capabilities and not ridiculous comparison between the services
All of the services are coming up short. Some (ok, quite a lot) is due to the pollies & MoD), but poor decisions abound in the military itself. Everyone needs to pull their socks up. The Ajax situation is just one of far too many situations that should not be happening. A140 is a viable GP frigate, T31 is not. Wedgetail works, even USAF says so – but 3? You want to get funding & positive headlines – you need to sell the narrative. The public, in the end, pays the bills & elects the pollies. Public look at UK T31 & Poland A140. Why can’t we have what they are getting? You can sell just about anything if you can justify the cost. The military needs to get better at selling itself.
Whilst a serious issue especially during a time of rising costs and an acute shortage of money, I don’t think this is a just a British problem. Yes we could do better (including less micromanaging from Parliament) but as we go down the path of much more sophisticated weaponry we are going to suffer from delays be they internal , or external. Off the top of my head I can come up with other countries who have suffered similar regards their weapon aquation programs
Russia:
T14 Tank was supposed to have 100 by 2020. Supposed to be around 30 built so far as Moscow is/was having issues building them.
SU57 60 Aircraft by 2015, 21 built so far 10 of which are test aircraft.
India:
Arjun Tank, 21 years to get from design to first tank been delivered in 2004, in the 19 years since, 141 built.
HAL Tejas fighter jet. 31 years to design, introduced in 2015 and since then 40 built. But so underpowered, India had to purchase 99 General Electric F404 (as used in the F18) in Aug 2021
Europe:
A400: 4 years delay in the first delivery, in fact the situation got so bad, the entire program almost got cancelled. The only reason it was saved was prices were increased and numbers ordered cut.
Multinational:
F35…say no more.
I’m can’t name an example of any country delivering a big defence project that was not late and over budget.
Britain introducing Polaris in the 1960s. They put one good RN officer in charge & let him get on with it. The USN also gave him a lot of good advice from their adoption of Polaris.
I would also add the Jaguar upgrade. The RAF just added tried & tested, off the shelf bits & it came in at a fraction of the cost of the bespoke Tornado upgrade.
Just dug out my copy of the book “Modern Tanks and armoured fighting vehicles” Arjun . Developed from 1974, production only commenced in 1996, due to the tremendous challenges India faced. Strangely enough they have gone for a 120mm rifled gun. Also note 124 were ordered in 2000 and still failed desert testing in 2007
Farouk, you are right of course, I suspect that the writer has no experience of project management in large projects. The first question to ask is “is there a problem” this requires context. About 30 years ago I did my thesis on the subject. If you are dealing with advanced technology and everyone is over budget by 100% and 5 years, but you are over budget by 25% and 2 years, then there is little sense in beating yourself up! The problem with these discussions is that there is a plethora of ignorance and no context. Unfortunately context takes research and intelligence. And does tend to degrade MOD bashing. Technology, by its very nature is open to failure, does this mean that it is wrong to pursue the cutting edge? No, obviously not. Does it mean that better project management could improve outcomes? Obviously it would.
Every large government project – defence or otherwise – is late and over budget… My suspicion is most of them come in close to the time and budget everyone knew they would need, but the project would never get approval based on real numbers, so they are bid too cheap and too fast in the knowledge that after a few Bn it’ll get the extra time and money. Annoyingly it would have been faster and cheaper if the project hadn’t chased bull**** date and budget
Defence contracts, tend to go over time/budget restrictions, because the defence industry is unique in having continually developing threats to contend with. So design specifications have to be changed to cope with this, if the device/system is to remain effective.
All this costs money, especially if the design changes are radical: so contracts are hedged around with penalty clauses – companies are not charity organisations, they need to make a profit to survive.
And then of course, you have the vissitudes of government to contend with…….
Technology rapidly changes and big projects take so long to pull together the computing systems are outdated by the time the prototypes are being pressure tested. In a decade wage costs alone will have risen by a third.
Companies then need to make a profit and dividend.
Maybe stare enterprises would actually work, with exports being the “profit ” to be reinvested.
Army careers at the top don’t help
Each head of service wants to make their own mark.
A truck mounted howitzer is earning France exports. France and Italy make wheeled armoured vehicles in house, seemingly on time and cost. We can’t for some reason.
Do you have any proof of this? Or is it just romantic fiction, it’s always better on the continent. My experience of reading French military blogs suggests that romantic fiction is more likely.
There are 3 different approaches to this:
Always have 2 competitors
Always have 2 competitions to a 10% of final manufacture stage. So if it is we want 500 tanks, get the 2 competing bids to build 5% of each (25). Be it in UK or aboard (as long as follow on is 50%+ UK manufactured – creating competition and capacity).
If they are both good you could go with two types therefore never dependent on a single manufacturer. If one is bad then you have not gone hook line and sinker all the way with 1 manufacturer and have and option to use the other. Same for ships. Just see what creating capacity with BABCOCK has doen to BAE, they are suddenly building a frigate factory on their own dime (before was tied to T26 order, and theer are more options on who to do follow on orders.
Build UK capacity
The other is do what the government did with Navantia and with Rhinemetal and build manufacturing from global competitors to be on British soil. Then again you have competitor options as Rob has mentioned.”We are really missing having competitive manufacturers like Supermarine, Hawker, Vickers, De Haviland, Swann Hunter, Alvis, etc, etc…”
Steady drum beat / Trickle orders
By ordering say a 1/2/3/4 Merlins, or Wildcats per year every year you slowly refresh the wider population, you have the opportunity to try out modernization on smaller batches, you keep key skillset set in Yeovil up to date and then when you need to scale to big order you have a base from which to do so.
Similar for boats, a T31 every couple of years allows you to replenish the fleet over 10 years and you can sell the surplus on markets to other countries, or you keep capacity option to build for UK or others open.
Same for subs, same for Aircraft, Typhoon, Hawks, Poseidon etc etc. No more feast and famine. You need stability from a career perspective for all the people that are going to build these things and teach the next generation how.
It is not that difficult really. Will it happen?- Politicians will never look beyond 5 year terms, but the civil service/mod should structure their projects so they do.
If it’s not that difficult why has nobody done it? People with no experience always assume it’s easy. Try reading US military audit reports, actually try reading ANY military audits.
There are several issues in regards to UK defence procurement. Stop the gold plating is one obvious example we all agree with. We need much more oversight and parliamentary debate over the larger projects and to stop robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Projects such as the T32 when it’s supposed to really be the lesser crewed, unmanned vehicle launching version of the T31. It will go through the design phase and industry tender process that will add time and money to the project. When all that’s really required is just the unmanned modules for the T32, the vessels were designed this way to swap in and out different modules as requested.
In effect we need a large number of simple interchangable systems like aeralis aircraft, T31, boxer and the supercat family of vehicles. This way we take advantage of industry mass scale to drive down turn around times and increase numbers while extracting maximum value out of budgets available.
I’m sure the British army could do with thousands of boxers tracked and untracked with a dozens of different modules available to customise for the mission. Exactly same as supercat, could form the backbone of an advanced army for decades.
Royal navy needs look no further than the T31 for all it’s escorts you could swap out a module for say AA warfare, why spend hundreds of millions to billion building dedicated AA warships when you already got if at a very reasonable price and can have it by the dozen.
RAF should build around Aeralis to build up it’s numbers again in there modular system, again trailered to the requirements needed would be a relatively cheap option and could purchase several hundred over the next few years.
All of these are made in the UK, reinvesting in our industry creates jobs in deprived areas creating wealth and adding taxpayers to the nation. At the same time it invests in innovation keeping us in the game and insuring peace into the future.
Well observed. The QE class budget suffered from a plan to use jump jets, then a rethink involving cats and the ‘C’ variant, then another rethink to get us back to where we started- with expensive and long-drawn-out feasibility studies each time. Ajax has also suffered from the goal posts being constantly moved by what appeared to be ministerial whim. Another factor is the decision to deliberately delay projects, increasing overall cost in the process- purely to move the cost into the following budget cycle- which is only done because of a lack of joined-up thinking between HMT and the MOD.
It’s an interesting train of thought; there are plenty of other successful models as well: e.g. for decades then warship design was done in house by Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, these then being built in the royal dockyards or private yards
I’m confused by you saying that the UK aircraft Industry was nationalised between WW2 and the 1980s. Apart from a short period of RR nationalisation then I’m struggling to think of any other examples.
I think you’re also missing out that in the 20s and 30s we had the likes of RAE and NACA doing masses of research in house and then giving this IP away to the private sector. The few examples of private venture e.g. RR PV12, Power Jets, generally didn’t last long on pv funding before massive government funding took over
Pretty sure the aircraft and shipyard industry was nationalised under the Aircraft and Ship industries act of 1977 until privatised.
Cheers. I’d forgotten about those 3-4 years
AFV design was done by FVRDE/MVEE too – Industry just built the things.
As an ex engineer working in the defence industry I would suggest that the primary problem with defence contracts is too many inputs from those who know little or nothing about the subject and “red tape” of course. I could elaborate on this with examples but it would take all day.
Yes Boris Cross, as the analysis of the TSR2 debacle revealed. The interference of civil servants without the knowledge or capacity to effectively run projects to an effective standard. With some actions being actually bizarre. A clear point of responsibility, a clear objective and an ability to organise and focus the necessary talents for any project are required. The Civil Service tactic of shifting personal around to avoid the consequences of their actions should be terminated. the Ministry of Defence was in the crosshairs of Dominic Cummings for radical reform. Naturally he had to go! Power without true accountability is what the Civil Service wields in my perception.
Dear Mr Powell,
An interesting article highlighting problems within the halls of power in the British defence world. I would however take you to task on one small and seemingly irrelevant point. AJAX IS NOT A TANK!
kind regards
Ian M
Even General Barrons called Ajax a tank on Sky News the other day. I was shocked!
That nearly undelines the problem(s)?
Good subject and article Matthew. My threepennethworth is that the main lesson to learned from the inter-war years around arms and aircraft production in particular, is that Governments and most politicians can’t be relied upon. They are too-shorted sighted and have head-in-the-sand when it comes to the prospect of a war.
During the 1930s it was private individuals who saw the way the world was shaping up and how the UK was running out of time to prepare. So aircraft like the Spitfire, Mosquito and development of the jet engine, were done by people who could see something needed to be done in time. The film ‘ First of the Few’ is always a good watch for this point.
My own belief is that around ’37/’38 Chamberlin fully realised what was coming, and sacrificed his reputation to appease Hitler and stall for time whilst industry geared-up and Dowding was able to develop the RAF’s fighter command and control system. By the skin of our teeth we got through it.
My solution is to form a UK agency – external to the MoD – that is responsible for nurturing and developing indigenous key strategic capabilities, technologies, assets and resources. This to be funded by a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Also use small, continuous production method for MBT’s, Warships and Aircraft which would keep design teams and supply chains together and avoid single companies monopolising/extorting large payments for essential ‘stuff.’ Minimise purchasing from overseas so the money spent stays within the UK economy with wider benefit.
Defence of the realm is too important to be left to others, and can’t just be bought of-the-shelf.
This from Wiki on Chamberlain:
“By 1935, faced with a resurgent Germany under Hitler’s leadership, Chamberlain was convinced of the need for rearmament. He especially urged the strengthening of the Royal Air Force, realising that Britain’s historical bulwark, the English Channel, was no defence against air power.
During the 1935 general election campaign, deputy Labour leader Arthur Greenwood had attacked Chamberlain for spending money on rearmament, saying that the rearmament policy was “the merest scaremongering; disgraceful in a statesman of Mr Chamberlain’s responsible position, to suggest that more millions of money needed to be spent on armaments.”
Why he would need to stall for time when in 1937 the German army was much weaker?
Munich Agreement 30 Sep 1938 is the best example of Chamberlain stalling for time (and for which he has been derided as an appeaser).
Its always good to go into a 6-year world war against a ruthless (and re-arming tyrant) with another 12 months prep time. We managed to get Spitfires and Hurricanes built in large number for the Battle of Britain in summer 1940 – we may not have had enough if war had started for us in Sep 1938, instead of diplomacy.
German Army in 1937 was in a pitiful state.
Even by 1940 when they invaded France their tanks were not better than the French ones or British ones. Their tank had a 37mm gun no better than the 2 Pdr. (Pz IVD with 75mm was a very low velocity gun so not for anti tank job)
Despite mediocre tanks in the Battle for France, the Germans finished the French off (and put the BEF to flight) in a mere 6 weeks.
In Sep 1939, Poland was defeated in a mere 19 days.
It wasn’t what they had, it was how they used it.
I am glad that we had another year to prepare for war – we needed it.
…much of what Germany was doing industrially with aircraft and tanks was hidden. The whole thrust of the Nazis and their campaign in Spain was domination in Europe. A few, not all, could see the need to re-arm Britain to counter this.
…ideed. Even earlier then.
I am struggling to understand why this article fails to acknowledge the biggest lesson that wasn’t learnt from the 20’s / 30’s and rearmament then, recently or now.
If you stop ordering or developing equipment then the ability to build it when you need it has to be rebuilt / expanded or completely re invented.
The best examples and direct analogies is Aircraft production because it wasn’t really a mature long term industry but still a hotchpotch of cottage industries or side lines of larger companies such as Vickers. It was rearmament and the Shadow Factories that really energised the industry.
IMHO A better example would be ship building. Post WW1 there was a massive contraction in the size of U.K. warship building capacity and probably more serious the supply chain including Guns, Torpedoes, Engines, Boilers, Valves, Pumps and munitions.
From the Admiralty and RN perspective they didn’t help by rationalising their equipment such as guns and munitions.
So when rearmament came the industry was crippled by lack of skilled workers, designers, craftsmen etc, etc.
As for the Navy logistics were a nightmare so for example poor management try these examples.
Naval guns in WW2 (not counting machine guns) and I’m doing this from memory.
20mm, 40mm Bofors, 40mm Pom Pom,3”,4”,4.5”,4.7”,5.25”,5.5”6”,7.5”,8”,9.2”,13.5”,14”,15”,16”, 18”.
OK some were coastal only but the rest were all in use and had to be supplied.
Contrast the USN.
1.1”,20mm,40mm,3”, 5”,6”,8”,14”,16”.
But the biggest issue is the gaps in orders caused solely by British Politicians who neither understand or care about industry.
The modern examples are:-
Astute cost doubled. Well the last Vanguard was launched in 1999 and Barrow had no orders and no designs being developed. So the workforce shrank from 13k to 3k so pretty well back to ground zero with a few surface builds.
Vanguard design was pretty well wrapped up by 1986 and work started on the next SSN design to be built to follow the Vanguards. SSN20 was cancelled in 1990 and no new design was started till 1997 so a 7 year gap.
The result was BAe had to rebuild its design and build ability practically from scratch and yep it needed help from Groton.
So the costs rocketed.
Queen Elizabeth and T45 cost overruns, again a gap between T23 and T45 didn’t help but changing the numbers from 12 to 8 to 6 increases the cost as the development costs, setup, recruitment, training are fixed by divided by fewer hulls. QE cost growth is simply down to HMG slowing the build down to spread the cost over more years (see T26 for more recent example).
Have we learnt anything from all of this ? I have to say MAYBE ! But we have to stick to the National Shipbuilding strategy and not let Politicians Bugger it up.
The Army well it’s a shambles and we actually need someone to assess what we want to do, what we need to do it and how we maintain that long term.
National Army Equipment Strategy please Mr Wallace.
The really daft thing is that if we decided on Force levels, planned them out over constant rolling replacement cycles we probably wouldn’t have needed a huge increase in budget.
Spent constantly and wisely I suspect 2.5% would have done quite nicely long term and also maintained some build / design capacity in U.K.
Steady drum beat / Trickle orders is definitely the way to keep skills in play, slowly replenish stock and try new design in small batches.
On top of the 3 suggestions I put above (separate chat) I would add the mix of quantity of low intensity item (drones etc) v’s smaller batches of complex high intensity item F35 etc. We should be able todo this as long as we have the industrial strategy for it like the national shipbuilding one which is a sensible one
We need tanks in batches of 56!
I agree. Based on a 25 year service life, we should have been replacing CVR(T) from 1996!, Warrior about 2012, AS90 about 2017, CR2 about 2020.
There is a MoD Land Industrial Strategy document out now, I believe – many years after the Naval equivalent. Its all a bit late to save the 5 independent AFV manufacturers we once had which would have given us choice of supply, all now swallowed up by BAE, who don’t even have a classic ‘tank factory’ anymore. BAE last made an AFV in 2002-4 (Trojan/Titan).
The problem is more the failure of governments to invest in our infrastructure
Which would be addressed better if industry can plan long term based on a known, agreed and reliable workload.
For instance and just a hypothetical example if you decided you needed a front line force of say 240 MBT plus a reserve of another 120 to serve 20 years.
You could split it into 2 batches of 180 to be built at 18 pa. By the end of 10 years you have 180 new MBT’s plus 60 upgraded older ones. In the 2nd decade you replace the 60 old ones with new ones until you get to to 240 and then filter out your oldest New ones to the reserve. At which point you just keep in rolling.
During the 1st decade your designers prepare upgrades to be applied to the 2nd batch and upgrades to the 1st Batch.
During the 2nd decade your designers design the next Tank and hopefully it is an improved version of what is already in service. (Just think Merkava).
Build your Tank Factory near existing compatible industry and with excellent Transport Links.
You do the same with other equipment as required by your force structure but you also buy selectively abroad to keep industry on its toes.
Daft thing is, that seems to be exactly what the RN is now doing. They just need to raise the force levels, slowly get up to them and then maintain at that level.
Japan showed how to do this in 2018 when they decided to increase their Submarine numbers from 19 to 22, they just continued to build on a slightly quicker drumbeat and with no gaps. They are now at 22 plus 2 others for training which are less than 20 years old.
They just boosted the tempo over 4 years to get them there and very slightly adjusted the tempo for the next 20 years to produce 22 rather than 10.
18 tanks p.a? It would take a little over 3 years to equip a single armoured regiment.
It is a Hypothetical Example not a proposal. The same idea of low volume new builds but over a long term guaranteed drum beats can be applied to SP guns, IFV etc etc.
The example given works best if you start at a constant rate and accept you will replace your fleet and reserves over a 20 year period and then roll straight into a new one.
Once up and running no more boom and bust and no Tank in service would be over 20 years old when replaced by a New one.
Which is far better than present the last CR2 is 21 years old and will be replaced when CR3 get IOC IN 2027. And if it lasts 20 years the base hull may be 50.
It is no different to the National Shipbuilding plan, which sets out a schedule in advance. The real result is it gives industry a fair profit, long term workforce training / skills and it incentivised BAe, BMT and Babcock to invest in infrastructure. Plus the Navy gets its ships on time and bit cheaper.
Of course our AFVs should get major upgrades during their life – a good time to do that is when the Base Inspection & Repair (formerly Base Overhaul) is done – roughly every 7 years or so but depends on mileage. We always used to do this – and to allocate a new Mark number if the mod/upgrade was substantial. if you take a look at theWiki entry for Chieftain you will see a large number of Mks.
I doubt an AFV manufacturer will keep a production line open for decades.
If there was a fundamental difference between a tank and its successor, we would not want the situation where an armoured regiment had a mixed fleet.
There is a different way to maintain a drumbeat – as I mentioned above, based on a 25 year service life, and 5 years production.
Comany A could have replaced CVR(T) from c.1996 – c.2001,
Company B could have replaced Warrior from c. 2012 – c.2017,
Company C could have replaced AS90 from c. 2017 – c. 2022,
Comany A could have replaced CR2 from 2023 – c. 2028.
Company B….etc etc
What are Company A, B, C? One could be RBSL or BAE, one could be WFEL, one could be GDUK.
Not ideal in your book, I am sure as Company A would not be building new equipment from 2002-2022, but they could be doing the BIR and upgrades.
Of course the timeline above is sub-optimal but forced by when those legacy equipments were fielded. It means that equipments that should have been supporting each other ie CR3 and Boxer IFV are out of fielding synch.
No solution is a good solution as regards army kit!
The RN seems to have learnt the lessons of boom and bust, the National Shipbuilding strategy is heading towards renewing the Frigates, re invigorating the industry and expanding it.
The Army needs to understand if you want home built Kit, manufacturers need a constant stream of work to survive.
it’s called Workflow Management.
Biggest flaw with your idea is Company A will not be building CR2 from 2023.
Because they went bust as they had no work between 2001 and 2023. It is now been demolished and 250 new Executive Houses and a Lidl has been built. The kid who would have been an apprentice worked as a labourer on the houses and now fills shelves.
As for your point regarding not having a mixed regiment, how did they re equip CR1 to CR2 ? Was it squadron by Squadron or Regiment by Regiment I’m curious.
The CR3 Turret is being built by Pearsons up on Tyneside, it used to build CR2 Tanks but not since 2022. And without investment and a guaranteed work stream it will probably never do so again.
If you want to build in the U.K with the numbers we require then you have to have a slow, steady, continuous drumbeat of work.
Or speak to Germany, US or Korea.
Company A could have been doing the overhauls and upgrades or making AFVs for export in that period…or heavy civilian vehicles. But it is an issue. It will get worse only building 148 tanks – tiny order. Hard to do a drumbeat of orders when you need 56 over a short space of time to equip a regiment.
I can’t recall how we fielded CR2, replacing CR1. Good question.
Pearsons made CR2s? Thought it was Vickers Defence Systems at their ‘new’ tank factories in Newcastle and Leeds.
Can you kindly reread my original post? It was how to build 360 and realistically re establish Tank building in the U.K.
The present number of CR2 to CR3 is 149. Which is an absurd number and IMHO completely pointless politically inspired placebo to placate some Army elements, the Press and tick a box.
And to describe it as a British Tank is a bit of a con, the bare hull is, the turret is but just about everything else isn’t.
After CR3 we will have 3 options and you have to bear in mind those CR3 hulls will be 50 years old.
A) Don’t bother if there is no threat, no money or Tanks are obsolete.
B) Buy abroad / collaborate.
C) Build new in U.K and to do that in a sustainable way you need a bigger fleet. Hence 240 front line and 120 reserves. So 360 total or even more.
Personally I’d start designing the next generation Tank right now in collaboration with someone else (US and or Israel).
And aim to start producing the new ones soon after all the 149 CR3’s are delivered. That way you can leverage on STS experience to assemble and outfit, hulls / turrets build elsewhere.
Then you can build your 1st new tanks for trials, Then fine tune and get the drum roll working at 18 pa (or more).Once you have 56 convert a Regiment or equip a new one.
Keep producing till you have 3/4 regiments, put the CR3 in reserve and then replace those as well.
As for Pearsons, they are actually in a small part of the huge former BAe Tank factory in Newcastle. It went due to no new Tanks, no upgrades so no business). They are now a fully owned part of Rafael Industries who build the Trophy defence system to go on them.
Why has this happened ? Because the MOD, HMG and the Army still think an Army marches on its stomach.
Nowadays it is iT, Technology, Logistics and a secure sustainable supply chain.
Thanks for the comment. I totally agree that 148 tanks is a ridiculously small number – sufficient to only equip two armoured regiments – but that is what is in the future army Orbat. The latter should be challenged – I would expect a single warfighting division to have three armoured brigades and so three tank regiments should be the absolute minimum.
Your Britishness point about CR3 is interesting – is the current Mini a British car? Perhaps we should call the Mini and the CR3 ‘Anglo-German’.
After CR3, we could not get away with further developing the in-service tank. The next tank would have to be revolutionary rather than evolutionary. We are an observor to the Franco-German project but that is unlikely to be revolutionary, or suited to the 2040s and 2050s – but it does paint a picture that we are alive to collaboration.
360 tanks is an interesting figure – a broadly similar number to the number of CR2s we bought (386) which was the number we needed for the post-Cold War army – but is more than most other European nations have now. ‘120 reserves’ – do you mean this is the Attrition Reserve or a number for the Army Reserve to have and to hold?
As the idea is novel, I find it hard to get my head around starting producing the new tanks soon after all CR3 are delivered (ie in 2030, or a bit earlier, if BW manages to accelerate the programme). It fits with the drumbeat approach of course. Concept work would have to start this year (only 7 years to 2030) – and design work soon after, focussed on a revolutionary design.
Collaboration with the US makes sense from a financial point of view – & with Israel is justified by the success of the Merkava series, but I would add Germany to the list (Leo2 is brilliant in nearly every way and an export success and they are already collaborating on CR3).
I enjoy your posts – great innovation. This is needed to sort the army out with kit and to re-establish a credible and worthy AFV design and manufacturing base.
I see 360 as a reasonable number and it is not just a number based on what we as Nation of our size should have. It is what a 20 year production rate would produce and give us a sustainable industry.
To get there you really have to realise that presently we are at Ground Zero, no production facilities, no design teams and no real collaboration into which we have input.
I’d like to use the CR3 rebuild as a stop gap for maybe 10 years, but start production right after the CR3.
We need to maintain the few bits of the industry we still have and those “New” CR3 will be based on a 30 year old hull.
As for a new revolutionary design to start production in 2030, why not ?
I’d start by borrowing a Merkava 4/5.
We have the 1st real live Laboratory right on our doorsteps. Go talk to the US and suggest a programme for the next generation MBT on an agreed collaborative basis. They are in the same boat as us and need a new Tank.
We design together, sort out who builds what and assemble to a common standard.
The model to do this is the F35 project we are the only Tier 1 Partner, we contributed to the design and the costs and we get real benefits.
Every single F35 contains at least 15% by value U.K. content and helps to support 20,000 U.K. jobs.
It can be done we just need the will.
That all makes sense to me. Bold action is required to recreate the AFV (design &) manufacturing industry (not just Assembly shops) and also to create a tank and AFV fleet that is fit for use for the next few decades. CR3 is a modified CR2 and should have been done years ago (CR2 LEP) – we need to llok beyond the CR3 era – the RN and RAF always thinks about the platform after the next one.
Unfortunately it will not happen.
1 round of common sense is seldom followed by a 2nd in U.K.
Imam either a Realist orcCynic but my theory is that Government and the Civil Service would be scared of it becoming a habit. ☹️🤣
We had this trouble with the MOD orders for years always over budget and never on time and if this government does make further cuts as we seem to think this will put us on the back burner with the US / and NATO and could bring the government down and could return another party but , its the government that decide what we can have and afford and how much more can we give to our friends in Ukraine a very bad state of affairs we are in after years of cuts
Ok I am a poacher turned gamekeeper or perhaps its the other way around…
Projects go over budget for many reasons.
Poor contract parameters.
Poorly defined spec
Not freezing the spec.
Owner changes to spec.
Unforeseen Growth
These are just some of the reasons.
Projects, even fixed price, that I work on have a ready use contingency built in for the unexpected and growth.
I as a PM for the contractor on repair projects I don’t know what the contingency is (😉) because that is only known to the owners contract manager who has to approve unforeseen and growth work spends.
I will always push to get any contingency spent because that’s more work and margin for me and my company. The owners contract manager is trying to stop me using it by not approving growth, restricting spec changes or arguing about contract definition and interpretation. Usually we meet at a happy point in the middle and settle, but it is an interesting dance to be part of when it happens !
The fun really starts when the contingency gets legitimately blown on growth and project changes and you need to get more funds to cover it. No contractor is going to allow themselves to lose money to help out an owner. They may reduce the margin on growth because of goodwill and future work commitments but ultimately someone has to pay. Working out how that happens is up to the owner. Delays to their other projects, cancelling work, stretching the work into the next financial year…
The solution?
Improve on the planning and definition phase and get it iron clad.
Do detailed surveys and investigations before writing a spec.
Include an allowance for growth in the contract. If its not used and the project remains within the schedule its kept by the contractor. Its a good incentive.
Don’t let the owner have good ideas…stick with whats specified. If the owner wants a change then do it later as an upgrade at a different period in time when its a different budget.
As the owner DONT GOLD PLATE!
Do what you need to do to deliver the baseline capability.
Improvements to capability come as updates and upgrades later on…from a different budget and holder.
Spiral in upgrades. Dont save them up and do in one big lot…do them when you can even if its in stages over a time period.
Right that’s my ten-pen’eth.
Time to look at a spec and work out where I can find some growth work…which I may add is getting harder and harder because owners are getting better and better at this stuff but still not better enough…
Excellent, informative post Mr GB, ta.
The iterative project management process works well with software updates. Not so well industrially, where the waterfall method continues to reign. As there’s too many steps that need lining up before your product can be released, especially if your are reliant on sub-contractors to deliver parts that are outside of your Country. I have been trying to get a more agile approach to how we do things in the Company I now work for. But unless success can be measured, it’s a very slow process.
That’s not to say agile (prefer over the scrum approach) cannot be used. If it’s stated in the contract, that you product is to be released in block updates every day 3 to 5 years. Where you can uplift modifications/improvements in each block release. This I believe is better not only for the customer but also the “manufacturer”.
By using this approach modifications etc can be more easily planned into the contract’s scope. So there’s less arguing and increased costs over contract amendments. How many times in DE&S did I hear: “Sorry that’s out of scope and requires a contract amendment!” An agile approach does work, it needs buy-in from all parties. As it will deliver continuous improvements.
Mate, hope you haven’t run out of Rum where the sun is always hot and the sea is full of sharks?
No Nobbys here. ..except sand sharks…
Rum, Gin, beer etc in plentiful supplies despite being next door to the biggest dry country around…
Agile works and I would love it. However the owners don’t do it. We are improving our processes but the owners and customers are still stuck in there “we have always done it this way” mindset.
Agile works but can have limitations, start building a house agile then decide you need a garage, you use all the plot so that feature will need so major rework of what has been delivered. Ultimately you still.need a good idea of what you want to end up with for agile to be effective, so it’s back to good quality requirements capture.
For agile to be successful convincing the product owner to invest in the core or backbone is key, the architecture needs to be open, sounds like IT speak.but its applying that to any product.
Then you have something that can be enhanced through further deliveries
So taking our house example no walls are structural so i can add or alter as needed easily.But to do this I need to invest more in engineering upfront.
.
Agree completely with Gunbuster – post contract signing change, compounded by subsequent multiple indecision are most significant reasons for delay and cost over-run.
What isn’t fully clear is why there are such horrendous design and construction failures, seriously impacting reliability or usefulness in numerous naval plus armoured military vehicles. So wasteful and seriously impacts saleability in international markets.
Perhaps UK should stick to innovation and development with production by Germans who clearly excel.
Maybe once but how is their Puma IFV doing ? And let’s not even talk about their recent surface ships.
I also suspect that Germany along with Switzerland may well be about to see a massive downturn in their exports.
You cannot expect orders for weapons from other countries if you then tell them “sorry but you can’t use them or re export them to a war zone as we are a neutral country or just plain scared”.
The German Political backsliding may just be the spur to more U.K. production or collaboration with more reasonable partners.
This trend is not imaginary it is real, Poland couldn’t get more Leopards from Germany due to their Shenanigans.
Result was 250 extra Abrams, upgrades to their existing ones, 96 Apaches and a simply colossal arms and technology transfer agreement with South Korea.
And we seem to be doing pretty well when it comes to Naval building, exports, collaborations and developments. T26, T31, AUKUS, RR marine power, CAMMS, BMT and RR designs.
Hell we may even be getting our Mojo back.
Early days.
If only someone could see if Sir John Parker would like to have a look at a National Army Equipment Building Strategy ? But find him an able and younger assistant (he is 80).
Tell that to the Germans that built Berlin Airport!
I think you should add another cause for delay – that the R&D is often not mature for cutting-edge projects.
As for the gold plating, that is a difficult one. Due to the small size of our forces, the equipment has to be exceptional in capability and reliability terms. Our tanks literally have to be 5 to 10 times better than the opposition.
Although I agree with most of what you say, your penultimate paragraph might literally be the F35 blueprint, look at how that has gone. As a former major projects risk manager, my two pence worth is that the most efficient predictor of project “failure” is experience. Having had oversight of numerous multi billion dollar projects, an experienced project team and project lead will deliver 9 out of 10 times on time and budget. As others have said project spec creep mitigates against success.
A lot of problems are from Lack of end user trails before hand or end user engagement. Look at the current PPE its not bad nor is it good especially when looking at the wide market there’s better for less.
Ajax is a mess top too bottom and probably will be wrote off in the next review it’s one of the most expensive platforms ever made and thats including aircraft 26 wagons for over 3 billion madness. I think only the F35 program is/has cost Defence more per unit
In terms of time in post 18 months/2 years isn’t long enough.Especially now with such long process in R+D etc,5 years would be great to hold the person to account that’s failed on the project.
My last point is when in defence procurement it should be made illegal to go work the companies that you have just signed massive contracts with. Or at lest have a time out course for a few years so it stops the temptation of it happening.
Ajax problems were caused from taking a winning contender and then trying to make it what it wasn’t. TOP BRASS wanted it to do what it was never designed for. main issues with Ajax and its problems is it needed a redesign internally due to the chassis needed bracing. and the kit was all designed to fit the space. which now didn’t exist
It is because the UK government is loath to force defence contractors “going to the wall” by applying penalty clauses. Noone would ever bid. What gets me is they reward these charlatans by giving them further contracts! Also, if you DID apply penalty clauses, even with contractural obligations, the penalties may very well do what i have already suggested. They ought to put in a clause that prevents a firm from bidding for further contracts IF they do not deliver on budget and on time! NO EXCUSES!
Mainly if the force them to the wall, they are all taxpayers and voters. leveling up in areas that have no prospects
There are 2 basic approaches to the production of military equipment: rely mainly on the private sector and trust that real competition will deliver effectively on time and budget. Or maintain state ownership and control of arms design and manufacture. The USA has chosen the first approach, but declining numbers and spiralling development costs have led to mergers and consolidation, leaving only a handful of players. The UK moved to this in the 1980/90s with both privatisation and forced or market driven mergers or takeovers. With a much smaller market, this removed any real competition in key sectors such as combat aircraft and the loss of manufacturing sites when orders were not forthcoming. Other countries of similar size to the UK, France and Italy, rely much more on state ownership, outright or participatory, which generally seems to sustain capabilities through lean years.
So UK is buying large numbers of machine guns from FN a Belgian state company, NSM from Kongsberg, a state owned Norwegian military manufacturer, and 3 solid supply ships from a consortium led by state owned Navantia.
In terms of retaining sovereign capabilities, the UK policy has been disastrous. Combat vehicle manufacture is almost wholly foreign owned; there is no capacity to mass produce firearms and once the 115mm naval gun goes out of service, RN ships will be armed only with guns designed and made abroad.
Whilst military de industrialization has hurt UK particularly, procurement of cutting edge equipment elsewhere has been beset by problems. Despite its much bigger defence industrial base, the USA has had serious setbacks. The LCS, Zumwalt and even Ford classes have been late, way over budget and in 2 cases failures. The F35 is also years late and continues to require vast funding just to get closer to what the project promised. The US army has wasted tens of billions on failed projects from Comanche to Bradley replacement.
Meanwhile, F15,16,18 with origins in the 1970s continue to be incrementally improved as do the Arleigh Burke destroyers and the continuously upgraded 1970s designed Abrams.
The lessons seem obvious. If you really need a sovereign capability, don’t rely solely on the private sector.Do not become so enamoured of the possibilities of new technology that you have to spend vastly more for fewer and fewer platforms. If something works well, keep making it.
Great post. We used to do the cutting edge R&D in house, such as for military vehicles at FVRDE/MVEE/RARDE/DRA/DERA Chertsey – and they did the design work for a full vehicle – and retain Design Authority – and get one of 5 AFV manufacturers to build them. The manufacturers built coherent families of vehicles, quickly and at reasonable cost. We then upgraded them regularly.
How times change.
What a mess we now have. Dstl has a fraction of the capability and facilities that Chertsey had. Upgrades hardly ever happen. We haven’t built an AFV (that has been accepted) in over 20 years. We don’t have true tank factories with, just a few assembly halls. GDUK has an American parent, has modest facilities, inexperienced staff and has made a mess of Ajax. BAE no longer get AFV/artillery system contracts due to ‘politics.’ WFEL is producing an expensive, wheeled vehicle of old design (possibly) without a cannon to replace Warrior.
I do despair.
Exactly!
I would just also just add that any money spent on non-UK industry is money leaving the wider UK economy, and so of little benefit to the UK.
True. One of the main reasons defence expenditure in France is supported by most political parties is that equipment is largely French designed and built. For land systems and warships the suppliers are almost all state owned.
In the case of the carriers, Gordon Brown continually kicked the can up the road in terms of actually giving the green light. That meant that the ability to build them had to be maintained even while nothing was actually being built. Don’t blame industry or the MOD for that one. The fault rested in Downing Street.
Currently we are on the cusp of immense technological change. Thus flexibility is paramount in arms procurement. Obsolescence can occur quickly. Thus planning is fraught with challenges. The British Army seems to come in for some criticism.
I wonder if anyone has considered the vulnerability of a multi million pound battle tank to a powerful beam weapon such as a developed DRAGONFIRE system. A laser with sufficient power could be a slashing weapon, a photonic knife! What use is a battle tank or a medium armoured vehicle if a beam of light energy can simply slice through and chop off its gun barrel? Plus of course the gun barrels of the mounted machine guns.
Indeed and there are micro drones carrying explosive which when mated with A.I. could swarm a vehicle, attach themselves to the gun barrel or even fly into it and detonate. Or perhaps attach to a track and explode. No gun barrel and no functioning track. Ergo tank useless. The ever more sophisticated drone in swarms EMP resilient is a weapon to take seriously. As are assassin drones seeking out commanders and important personnel. I wonder if any of you have seen a movie of some time ago called ‘SCREAMERS’ where advanced robotics became deadly killing machines. An imaginative pointer. The technology is maturing.
You can imagine lasers slashing the masts off warships…taking out their surveillance antenna and slicing off their gun barrels. Detonating their ordnance. All that whilst undersea, surface and airborne drone swarms attack them too. An undersea drone which attaches to a ships rudder and blows it off. Or destroys the propellors.
Sacrificial drones which can penetrate all manner of materials by sequential attacks until a breach is made.
As for the beam weapons they are a game changer. They will undoubtedly mature further with more exotic specifications such as X-Ray lasers. The weapon will favour defence. The cost per laser burst will be circa $2 per shot which is phenomenally less than the cost of defensive missiles and even ammunition. That certainly favours a defender. Plus the huge reduction in logistic necessities in supplying missile and ammunition rounds. Not to mention storage space. Yes the ‘HELL WHIPS’ are coming.
A game changer in a wider sense too. As China becomes an industrially productive behemoth, it will like the USA in WW2 be able to supply it’s armed forces with a huge quantity of assets on an overwhelming scale. That is the danger of China. Anyone familiar with WW2 statistics will realise the real reason for Allied victory. Productive capacity.
Having ENOUGH beam weapons of sufficient power removes the advantage of the larger adversary which in the past could use that advantage to grind down opponents materially and economically. Thus just at a point where an adversary may have calculated that a decadent West is ripe for the taking, technological developments throw a spanner!
Having spent many years working in MOD procurement I think the issues are more deeply rooted. You may wish to consider the following doses of reality.
I could go on about other detrimental practices – the misuse of bonuses, the political desire to rework old equipment because they believe it is cheaper than buying new, the lack of professional training and business acumen and so on, but this would mean a long article. UKDJ readers should appreciate that it is a miracle that much gets procured at all and that is because a small minority of civil servants actually care and work very hard too carry the burden of rotten management, incompetent leadership and lazy colleagues who have no real interest in what they are doing. The idea that The UK will suddenly reform procurement and start doing it properly is a non-starter.
Like Most public sectors, 50% of the Staff work hard and know what they are doing in there work.
Other 50% have no idea what there job is about, but they couldn’t do there last job so got promoted out of that role.
and now spend all there time doing the white fluffy rubbage that has no use in there workplace.
Fair enough, but bear in mind that our civil servants are the worst, until you meet the civil servants of other countries!
Its Very Simple, to protect the Public Purse we have to follow the Procurement process which is a paperwork exercise.
Local MPs and trade Unions will demand this work is then done in Local Plants that don’t exist yet. AKA AJAX.
after many many years of work out what the actually desire is they will then go out to tender for a new army pen knife.
contract and lowest bidder who meets the paperwork exercise wins.
AND THEN The Top Brass want this Pen Knife to Fly, and do multiply things because it would be handy.
3 years later and £50m development budget and that pen knife, no longer fits in your hand, wont open and is 50% more expensive.
Cheaper Option is to buy the best option of the shelf and build under license in a factory that exist. every other country can do this why not the UK.