Peter Watkins knows the inside of Britain’s defence establishment better than most. As a Director General at the Ministry of Defence from 2014 to 2018, he was responsible for strategic policy, deterrence and defence industrial policy matters.
So when he co-authors a report arguing that Britain’s nuclear posture needs refreshing, it is probably worth paying attention.
The report, Rebuilding the Ladder: Options for Boosting Britain’s Nuclear Posture, was published in late April by the Council on Geostrategy, where Watkins is an Honorary Fellow. He wrote it alongside William Freer, the Council’s Research Fellow in National Security. Its central argument is that the UK’s current deterrent posture, built around a single submarine on continuous patrol, was designed for a world that no longer exists, and that Britain is missing a critical “rung” on the escalatory ladder, potentially leaving decision-makers with starkly limited choices in an escalating crisis.
We sat down with Watkins to talk through what the report found and what he thinks needs to happen. The first thing he wanted to get on the record is that none of this is a dig at Trident. “We’re not decrying Trident in any way as a strategic deterrent,” he says. “It’s very formidable, and it’s credible in the current strategic circumstances as a deterrent against the most extreme threats.” The problem, as he sees it, is that the world has moved considerably since the key decisions underpinning the current posture were made in the 1980s and 1990s.
Before Britain retired its airborne sub-strategic nuclear capability in the late 1990s, “that was an announcement that was made when the then government said it wouldn’t replace our then airborne sub-strategic capability,” Watkins explains. The claim that Trident could cover that role has never really been tested, and he questions whether it holds up. “If you’re launching a ballistic missile, how is your adversary supposed to know whether it’s a strategic or a sub-strategic strike? You risk escalating a crisis in a way that you didn’t want to.” There is also the question of what using Trident in that way would do to its primary purpose. “It is our secure second-strike capability, and if we use it in a sub-strategic mode, we risk compromising its position so it becomes less credible in its primary role.”
What about conventional deep precision strike systems as an alternative sub-strategic capability? The report rebuts the idea, and Watkins explains why. He acknowledges that conventional weapons have proven devastating in recent conflicts, but notes that their use in both Ukraine and Iran were in situations where air defences had already been largely dismantled, which is a rather different proposition to facing Russia. “Deterrence depends upon your adversary believing that you can impose costs on him that are much greater than anything he’ll gain by an attack, and we’re not convinced that conventional systems, however sophisticated, could ever be able to impose that degree of damage.”
Russia is never far from the surface in this conversation. The Kremlin has updated its nuclear doctrine, expanded its sub-strategic arsenal to nearly 1,500 warheads, and shown a willingness to treat nuclear weapons as tools of warfighting in a way that Western nations have not. Watkins draws a pointed contrast between the two sides. “Our nuclear doctrine is very clear at the moment, we would only use nuclear weapons in the most extreme circumstances of self defence. If you look at Russian nuclear doctrine, they seem to envisage using nuclear weapons to bring about war termination on acceptable terms. They seem to see nuclear weapons as integrated in war fighting in a way that we traditionally have not done.” Beyond doctrine, he says, the investment tells its own story. “If you look at what they’ve invested in, a massive arsenal of non-strategic dual-capable systems, Kalibr, Iskander and so on, one is concerned that they may envisage using nuclear weapons in circumstances that we never would, and therefore we need to have the full capability to deter them from thinking that way.”
So what should Britain actually do? Watkins outlines a programme running across the short, medium and long term. In the near term, he points to deepening cooperation with France, noting that British officials were permitted to observe France’s “Poker” nuclear exercises for the first time in December 2025, and that there is considerably more that could be built on from there. He is realistic about the limits of what Paris will agree to given the sovereignty France attaches to its deterrent, but thinks the framework for progress is there. “Both the President and the Prime Minister signed the Northwood Declaration back in July, so I think the French are committed to working more closely with the UK. There are going to be some limits, but I think even within the constraints of both countries having sovereign capabilities and ultimately independent decision making, there is scope for closer coordination.”
He also wants to see Britain’s public-facing nuclear doctrine updated, something that has barely changed in thirty years, and better nuclear education across the MoD, which he describes as currently quite siloed. On the question of public engagement more broadly, he points to France as a model, where it has become standard practice for presidents to make periodic speeches on nuclear posture and doctrine. “The government here doesn’t talk very much about our nuclear capability. In France it’s become a practice that every president, about every four to five years, will make a speech about French nuclear capability, doctrine and capability. We think something like that would be good.” He is careful to add that this is not about rattling sabres. “We’re not arguing that we should move to a Russian type posture of celebrating nukes and making extreme statements about them, it’s just a higher profile than we’ve had so far.”
On F-35As, the report calls for up to 24 more aircraft in the nuclear-capable A variant beyond the 12 currently committed. Watkins pushes back on the idea that this is simply a call to spend more money. “We’re not necessarily arguing here for spending more money. What we’re saying is that of the UK’s total envisaged F-35 fleet of 75 aircraft committed, more should be in the A variant.” He adds that the current plan of a single double-hatted unit covering both nuclear strike and pilot training looks too limited.
The long-term centrepiece of the report is a recommendation to develop a sovereign air-launched sub-strategic nuclear weapon, something Britain has not had since the retirement of the WE.177 in the late 1990s. The report puts the cost at somewhere in the region of £11 to £14 billion over 20 years, though Watkins argues the figure could be brought down significantly by avoiding unnecessary complexity and adapting existing warhead designs rather than starting from scratch. The Atomic Weapons Establishment’s capacity to take on that additional burden is a real constraint, he acknowledges, but not an insurmountable one. “For the last umpteen years, AWE’s capacity has been sized around maintaining and developing one strategic warhead. They’re doing a huge amount of work down there. It is a challenge, but I would say it’s not an impossible challenge.”
Towards the end of our conversation, Watkins is measured but pointed about timelines. The short-term steps he has described, deeper French cooperation, updated doctrine, better nuclear education within the MoD, are all things he says could be done relatively quickly and without significant cost. “None of that should cost a lot of money or be that complicated.” On F-35As, he thinks the government should look seriously at whether the delivery of the first nuclear-certified aircraft, currently planned for the early 2030s, could be brought forward. “I think it would be good if they could accelerate that, and it’s not obvious to me why they couldn’t.”
The Defence Investment Plan, he notes, will be the first real indication of whether any of this is actually going to happen. Given how long that document has been promised, the wait continues.
That’s the problem £11 to £14 billion, Only in the UK or USA could someone talk about putting a nuclear warhead on a cruise missile and quote a figure like that with a straight face.
We have the cruise missile in storm shadow, we have the warhead with Holbrook which can already be dialled to provide a tactical yield. Just do what Russia and China do and put the two together as an option on a dual use weapon like Iskander, DF26 or kalibre.
We need to get out of the bureaucratic mentality where as the author suggest we spend a decade and probably billion “updating our doctrine”
You don’t even need to actually build the weapon, if people think you have it the deterrent is already working, this is exactly what Russia does.
« Don’t put nuclear material on a conventional missile. It is way too risky for your self. » That’s the way we look at it in France. Besides, storm shadow do not always go through. A nuclear weapons must always go through. Otherways you may have ordonance in your line of operations.
ASMP-a is the French answer. Nobody in Russia has seen it in operations, little contermeasures. ASN4G is the way forward.
To the end: limited strikes from submarines are may be in question in 2030. S400, S500 will be all over the place by then. We must make sure their is no room for doubts in Russian minds. Hence new methods, long range strikes, and many more to come, to make sure we are credible. Take good care friends, and buy a balistic cover.
But it’s not the way Russia and China look at it.n
We are not fighting France
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Well said..uk has the industry and the know how to produce a missile and warhead from scratch..and if the political will was there it could be done reasonably quick..
The report does say “Design the future delivery system around existing warheads, either Holbrook or Astraea” so they’re with you there.
My main concern is the huge cost that a second weapon would entail- £11bn is a LOT (20,000) of Brakestop at £600k each or 3000 Stratus at £3M each or even 180 CPS missiles at £50M each plus programme costs to develop a conventional IRBM. It would also, to pluck examples out of the air, be able to pay for a decent chunk of the FADS programme or the whole of Atlantic Bastion plus change or a carrier CATOBAR conversion or an extra four SSN-AUKUS.
The second one is that the report suggests mixing half and half in the F35 fleet, which would cripple carrier strike and the ability to provide air cover in the Atlantic. If we’re spending £11M on second nuclear delivery route we can certainly shell out for some extra jets.
I agree, £11 billion is totally unacceptable for a simple project. It doesn’t need to be a hypersonic monster. Off the shelf technology is all that’s required.
The problem is the western consultant “expert mentality” and the main stream industrial contractors approach.
I am not an expert, but the cost of maintaining a nuclear infrastructure and warhead is very high. Putting some money to make sure you it makes it through defense is helping you keeping the number of fighters down and the number of warheads down. I think it is far more cost effective, but again, I may be wrong.
This is a decision asset, not one that you can casually throw out on the other side.
There’s certainly an argument to be made about what sub-strategic capability we go for. The current plan of just 12 F35As to support US/NATO freefall bombs is, frankly, a ridiculous waste offering no real capability. We could certainly go with the author’s suggestion of more F35As and eventually restoring sovereign capability, but as you say, that cripples carrier strike.
Logically, bin off the F35A. Design (or adapt a US design) a low-yield nuclear warhead to be deployed on Stratus/FCASW to enable both air- and sea-launched options; split the nuclear deterrent options across hundreds of platforms instead of a couple of dozen.
I don’t think dual role weapons are a good idea personally. The Russians use them because they hugely increase the threat posed by any of their platforms; even the tiny missile corvettes and SSKs are potentially capable of starting Armageddon and we simply don’t know if they are carrying weapons or not. But that confusion is a bad thing in a nuclear escalation scenario. We might want to send a message with a precision conventional strike, but if our Stratus can also carry nuclear weapons the significance of spotting one on a Russian radar screen increases massively and confusion could lead to an ‘unnecessary’ full nuclear exchange.
So in my view if we were going to have a second leg to our deterrent, it would have to come with a new delivery mechanism be it a shorter-range ballistic missile for surface or air launch or a dedicated glide bomb, rather than dual-role weapons.
How is it any different to if the Russians spot a squadron of F35s on a strike mission and have to ask themselves if they’re about to get Paveways or B61s?
That uncertainty is one of the contributing factors to not initiating conflict in the first place; when you can’t guarantee what you’re attacking isn’t nuclear-capable, you’re taking a huge risk by firing first.
A Mk41-compatible SRBM would also be a good choice of delivery system. Glide bombs, less so.
Cost could down to one billion, if you limit yourself to 25 tactical warheads & use an existing design. WE177A (10kt) or W76-2 (7kt).
Only academics can discuss a limited tactical nuclear exchange with a straight face and consider this a reasonable possibility. Nobody else would consider writing-off large areas of Europe as a ‘reasonable’ outcome. From what I’ve read, most of the theoretical war-gaming in the Cold War assumed that the Russian armour would overrun NATO and ‘nukes’ would be used firstly by ‘blue’ forces. Presumably, that’s still considered the scenario? If so, can you imagine Putin’s reaction to a UK F35A dropping a nuke somewhere in Belarus and/or Western Russia? He’s going to wipe Glasgow or Birmingham off the map. Then we retaliate with Trident and, it’s the end of Western Europe and perhaps life on earth gets a massive reset for 10,000 years. It’s MAD for a reason. But, thinking you can just toss a nuke or 2 into Easter Europe and that’ll be the end of the matter is just frighteningly naive.
F35A to deliver tactical nukes is a waste of money better spent on conventional assets so that nobody in the East starts anything silly.
It’s not a tactical nuclear option they are talking about it’s a sub strategic option, nobody in the west is talking about throwing nuclear weapons into a conventional battle. The issue is Russia has an escalate to de escalate nuclear doctrine.. that means if Russia kicks off a war and ENATO ( +/- US) hands it its arse ( which it would) then Russia would attempt to terminate the conflict in its favour by dropping a nuclear weapon on something.. on the assumption that the enemy is not so stupid to use its strategic deterrent and trigger MAD.. essentially Russian doctrine works on the assumption that our ballistic missile submarines are not a deterrent against it using a single tactical or sub strategic strike.. because we would not end the world for one base, town or formation. What the author is essentially saying is that’s a big hole.. so the only way to counter and deter Russia escalate to deescalate doctrine is to have you own sub strategic response and deterrent.. because if we have the power to fire just one nuclear weapon in a measured response to Russia firing one at us it deters the insanity of Russia attempting an escalation to deescalate move.
Hi Jonathan. You’ve probably read some of my posts in the past advocating just this scenario, I’m just not convinced its as difficult as some make out or unnafordable.
The truth is the Geopolitical world is only just begining to realise the implications of the resurgence in US isolationist thinking and it isn’t just going to change when Tango Man departs. its a whole new political dogma.
The flip side of that is there are constraints on what individual countries can do and what they are willing ot do. NPT pretty well ensures that only UK and France will have a Western Europe Nucleart capacity, so I do think it is time for a rethink of how Non US NATO functions.
I also think that France and UK should have a long and frank discussion about a joint approach to what we build, how it is deployed and how it is funded. Its just plain wrong that to fund the Nuclear Element both countries have to cripple their conventional forces and then be expected to put our own necks on the block if we react to a Russian Tactical Strike on a NATO partner.
IMHO both need to grow a pair agree to develop a high end modern joint Tactical Delivery capabilty (Air Launched Cruise and Balistic missiles), to replace the present US supplied weapons for our own use and other NATO countries but still dual keyed and with NATO countries funding.
Who knows that way some of the attacking Aircraft may even stand a chance of getting home !
I rather suspect we may find we would be pushing at an open door with most of NATO (not all) and lets face it Trump is the best advert for this making sense.
Completely agree
Personally I think there needs to a joint development of the new air launched missile so it can be deployed on French and UK
Aircraft..and as you say then duel key and provide to the rest of E NATO.. every E nato nation should be contributing to the Nuclear envelope as well as housing part of the deterrent as this makes Russian targeting and decision making very difficult….
At present if Russia can hold the UK and French governments at individual risk it can create a massive issue.
Very naif, delusional or arrogant!!!!
France already have what you say they should have…what is ASMP>ASN4G ?
France are in the middle of a development programme to replace ASMP they don’t have the final product yet. It not arrogance or delusion to say Europe needs to start having a combined approach to its nuclear deterrence.. it’s arrogance and delusion to think otherwise….
Discussions are open between France and UK on nuclear capabilities. And it is nothing new nor that secret either, just not public. Otherways, UK would never had attended « Poker » mission, which even if some think it is training, it is a real war deterrent mission for us, just like the submarine nuclear patrol.
Some topics are discussed. UK has a sovereign policy, so do we, but cooperation exists.
I think that in reality if Europe is going to manage its own geostrategic security moving forward it needs a cohesive and homogenised defence policy and that needs to be a root and branch approach in all areas.
But for the nuclear there needs to be a cohesive 400 active warhead strategy deterrent that has a sub strategic option within that ( that allows for MAD with any two other nuclear powers).
That’s essentially aiming for 3 boats at sea ( between the 8 Uk and french boats) with 100 warheads per boat on patrol as well as 100 deployed air launched nuclear missiles.
I also think if essentially the UK and France are going to end up providing the European nuclear umbrella with all the cost and risk related to that then their needs to be a serious discussion with the other European nato nations about what that means and what risk and cost share is appropriate.. after all Italy has a far better set of frigates and destroyers than France and the UK ( and will have a better set of corvettes than france) with a faction of the naval budget.. because it does not have a naval nuclear program eating many billions.. and the reality is both the UK and France need numbers of surface combatants more than any other European nations because of our very large world wide footprints off EEZs).
That’s true. Italy has cards to play with it’ s mighty fleet. So does Germany. We badly need an early warning system and can’t afford it right now.
Yes for the missile force. Though in all honesty, a fleet of 5 submarines for UK and France would solve the issue once and for all, rendering the probability of fleet being compromised to a meer 2 hours within ten years, which is acceptable, while if we do nothing, risks will keep increasing.
Ground to ground strikes to depleet anti air defense over given areas of Russia would be extremely valuable. Warheads with manouvre capability is also needed to remain credible. And if UK get a better plane than Rafale to deliver a strike in 2035 / 2040, I would be delighted (Tempest?). Because we may run late.
Regarding long range communication, we simply need a bigger constellation, otherways, our constellation will be destroyed in a matter of days. These are very serious issues, that need solutions. And for sure cooperation is important. Damn deeply important.
Baltics states play smartly, Hope they keep doing things right. For the rest, Poland yes, Germany yes, Netherland yes, not too sure of the others.
Good post ABC, I totally agree
Johnathon your take is absolutely spot on, Rob Cam is I’m afraid not understanding that very real scenario you carefully lay out. As far as I’m aware the old NATO scenario was that Russia (well the Soviets in reality) would make considerable early inroads into allied territory with NATO playing a defensive battle until it could build the forces to repel and push back, the early use of throwing a tactical nuke in their direction was not the remotely likely response at all. Indeed it’s often been leaked by US sources that the whole idea of the US using nukes even in response to a nuclear attack on Europe was almost unthinkable even if the option to do so existed to effectively prevent a Russian first strike of that nature. Clearly now that the US is an unreliable ally, even that nebulous threat has far reduced impact upon Russian tactical thinking. Thus it makes total sense that Europe (ie in reality UK and France) have this option in the way the article and yourself states. Otherwise it will be very difficult to successfully defend against a Russian incursion. Indeed to support this thinking, it’s relevant to note some two years ago Poland very publicly reset its own tactical plans in light of Russias threats to use nukes against Ukraine and indeed somewhat open to interpretation even NATO Countries if they supported Ukraine. They on a personal scale decided not change from that standard NATO philosophy of retreat and eventual retake to defending every inch of its land knowing that if Russia were allowed to take swathes of its land it would threaten tactical nuclear response to any attempt to retake its land. Thus the big Polish re-armament. Europe (with or without the US) itself is looking to do likewise in time. In the meantime and/or back up to this preferred philosophy tactical nuclear options would be a serious supportive measure in preventing Russia playing its one potential advantage on the battlefield and which just might encourage its strategists and delusional tactical fools (ie their versions of Hegseth) that it could actually win a conflict.
But that’s the very point. Putin knows full well that Starmer would never launch a Trident in response to a tactical nuke destroying, say, the UK battlegroup in Estonia. He just might lob a few tactical or sub-strategic nukes if he could persuade himself that the targets are strictly military and wouldn’t infringe anyone’s human rights.
There would have to be a e nato response to a tactical nuke from Russia. Uk does not have to cover every nuke scenario. Our 2nd strike response is the gold standard. Don’t think we need a policy update every 5 years particularly, it’s enough there is a boat always at sea, that does all the talking. Think tactical is dangerous to think it can be contained and assumed it will not escalate.
It’s called our “INDEPENDENT” nuclear deterrent for a reason. Like it or not Trident has a tactical role and has had since 1998.
Does he? Why hasn’t he done it then? Or carried out any of the many threats he had made against us?
What an absurd question.
It’s frightening you’re one of the few sane voices on here. It’s unbelievable some people think we can go slinging nuclear weapons around so long as they’re not strategic. 🤦🏻♂️
Spock 👍
Nobody said we can sling nuclear weapons around.. our nuclear weapons are deterrents.. Russia on the other hand does think it would sling nuclear weapons around unless its faces with a convincing deterrent.. but what we are saying is that strategic deterrents only deterrent strategic attack you need a sub strategic deterrent to deter a sub strategic attack.. because we will not end the world if Russia fires one nuclear weapon and Russia knows that.. but if Russia thinks we will fire one back it will act as a deterrent.
You failed to comprehend that by “we” I meant humanity. The nuclear weapons of today aren’t the small fission devices of WW2. Soon as anyone starts slinging any around we all lose, including those that launched them.
But you go on believing your ‘winnable nuclear war fantasy’, fortunately saner minds prevail.
You are blatantly refusing to listen to what I’m saying.. I’m not taking about a “winnable” nuclear war I’m taking about deterrent.. preventing a nation with a group of people who do believe in the winnable war from stepping onto that ladder.. DETERRENCE spock NOT using nuclear weapons in war.
I’m saying our DETERRENT is inadequate because once Russia steps onto that ladder because of an inadequate deterrent effect we either surrender or everything dies and that is not acceptable.
That is why I’m not taking about a battlefield/tactical weapon used to for nuclear attack on the battlefield I’m talking about a sub strategic DETERRENCE that is designed to make Russia realise that it cannot take the risk of dropping a nuclear weapon on Bristol to force us to capitulate.. because if pushed that is what its doctrine says it should do… take the risk we would not press the everyone dies button for one bomb and one small regional city… but if it knows it will lose st Petersburg as a sub strategic deterrent response it will not take the risk.. because Russian leaders are not idiots but they are risk takers if they think someone lacks resolve.
Oh how I’ve prattled on about how we withdrew WE.177 way too soon and optimistically. Even at the expense of the F35B programme there is surely value in a single F35A unit, but only so that the RAF can anticipate and rehearse a role for Tempest when it arrives with a sovereign – and by that I mean neither US nor French – nuclear weapon, be that a free fall bomb like the B61 or an air launched cruise or ballistic missile as part of greater deterrence in depth: not instead of Trident, but a complement to it.
And how do you intend to pay for it and how long do you want to wait. Its going to be 10 years or so before the new Trident warhead production is done. Even if you have billions lying around to expand production the machinery are long lead items that will take years to produce. Plugging into the existing NATO agreements is the only way realistically that tactical weapons will be available in 10 years.
I’m from a generation which doesn’t say ‘we can’t do it’ but ‘we must do it’. History – Our Island Story – is littered with feats we couldn’t do – but did. My comment pointed a way forward, some years hence: it will be many, many years before Tempest is operational – 10 years is the blink of an eye. The role I suggested for the F35A is to rehearse a future set of circumstances. In the meantime, of course it can fulfil a function with US or dual key systems. As for the money, let me speak only for what I currently know a little bit about. As my working life has greyed out, I’ve taken what’s available. I have been a welfare benefits advisor at times and opened the door to benefits for many people who will smile at me in the supermarket appreciatively. Still more recently I work with people with what we call nowadays ‘additional needs’. Did all those people I secured benefits for really need them? Are all the people I currently work with totally incapable of being economically active? Some are definitely incapable. Others…well. This is only the welfare bill: workers in other sectors could tell you where the fat is there, health, education, the civil service, local government, the environment and so on. The money could be there, it’s just how we choose to spend it. By the way, my working life will soon be through, but there’s no way I’ll defend the triple lock.
That magically makes nuclear qualified cnc machines available how? To actually have weapon thats deliverable in the 21st century means means an efficient 3 stage design thats light weight. That requires modern prescion engineering .
What that be the generation that produce nuclear weapons that could detonate and take out half of Lincolnshire if dropped from 3 feet. How about the nuclear capable Scimatar that had a 50% chance of killing the crew in a year Wittering on like Colnel Blimp doesn’t change facts you dont like
Which half of Lincolnshire?
In France we handle to do it with a smaller budget. Why wouldn’t UK with a larger military budget be able to do so? You have engineers, let them work… Trust them and let them rise to senior position. Put accountants and banker at their real place in the decision making process, and all of a sudden, situation will be extremely different.
The reality is our present and further warheads can act as a sub-strategic deterrent. The Mk4A warhead has a 1-100kt yield. The whole re-entry vehicle and warhead weighs about 200-210 Ibs.. that’s small enough to put in a sub strategic delivery vehicle.
So we don’t need a new warhead we just need to pop a very small number in a new delivery vehicle and I’m pretty sure the UK has the ability to do that.
We don’t even need to up our stockpile of warheads by much, we just need to do what France does and actually deploy them all.
Storm Shadow and/or Taurus. Why listen to a former MoD washout?
Storm Shadow has been out of production for years. Taurus isn’t even part British!
Storm Shadow is going back into production.
Really? I haven’t seen any suggestion of that. Can you tell me where you got that?
Announced last July and its on the .gov website. I tried to post a link but it was blocked. The production line is being restarted and upgraded.
Rob is correct, the demand has come from both Ukraine and the RAF, due to the number of weapons given to Ukraine.
Storm shadow is in production there is a UK production line for Ukraine.
Storm Shadow is as british as the Taurus spanish
Watkins sounds like someone out of Dr. Strangelove.
It is reasonable to question whether a single operational SSBN is still a credible deterrent. It is not reasonable to want a graduated escalatory capacity to play some carefully choreographed minuet with your enemy.
The real point about nuclear deterrence is to exclude any use of nuclear weapons by having devastating second strike capability. Making it easier to use a nuclear weapon risks undermining the whole point of deterrence.
A graduated response to aggression should consist of non nuclear precision weapons.
But that does not work if you enemy decides you won’t destroy human civilisation and your entire culture as a response to them dropping one calculated strike.. HMG is very unlikely to be going to end the UK, remove it from history and possibly destroy human civilisation in response to Russia dropping a random Tactical nuclear weapon on something painful…
If Russia decides this ( and it probably has because we are not governed by raging psychopaths) then our MAD is not a deterrent to one weapon.
100% correct, there are no rungs on a nuclear ladder, it’s an escalator and once you step on its difficult to stop being taken all the way to the end
That’s the whole point you deter your enemies from stepping on it.. once Russia uses a nuclear weapon we are in fucked city.. but Russia has a escalation to de escalation policy “if it can get away with it”.. the whole point of the sub-strategic deterrent is so Russia decides it will get a nuclear weapon back at it if it tries escalate to de escalate..we don’t have a strategic deterrent so we don’t use it so why the hell would anyone think we would have a sub strategic deterrent to use it for any other purpose than deterrent. I think people often confuse the concept of sub strategic deterrent with tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons.. we don’t want tactical nuclear weapons as you would have to be bonkers to use them against another nuclear power.. but if an apposed nuclear power has tactical nuclear weapons we need a sub strategic deterrent to show them in the post powerful and Graphic way possible why stepping to the ladder is not going to work for them.
We’re missing a rung with virtually every aspect of defence. We certainly do not need more nuclear weapons. Even the £1.5 billion’s worth of F35A trainers we’re now buying .
First sensible post you’ve ever made, absolutely right on this one.
Likewise. Well done.
are we thinking we can win or manage a nuclear exchange of course always for deterrence
Nobody will ever win a nuclear war so we can only deter. Four Dreadnoughts is ample. We are far better off spending money, if there is any, on conventiional forces. They are also a deterrent.
It’s not that we need more it’s that we don’t have an effective deterrent for a specific type of strike that Russia has as part of it doctrine.. we have an every dies button.. that everyone knows we would only press if someone decided to kill our nation.. therefore it does not deter from Putin firing one nuclear weapon to put us back on our heels and to the peace table to surrender.. its escalation to de escalation.. the only deterrent to Russia doing this is to be able to show you could respond with a calibrated response that you may realistically use back.. so fire one weapon back. Because a deterrent one of the 3 Cs of deterrent is credibility.. it must be credible that you would use your capability.. and there is no credibility to the UK ending human history in response to Russia flattening Bristol by firing a ballistic missile submarine load at Russia.. and you cannot just fire one.. because you will kill your deterrent in doing so.
I remain sceptical Jonathan. Sub Strategic is still like launcing a Hiroshims size warhead. We have three options of doing so. 1) Trident with a single warhead. (2) Cruise and (3) the F35A. Putin has said that any ballistic missile attack could be interpreted as a strategic attack on Russia and lead to a full exchange.. I do of course accept that is what he would say but? Cruise? One missile, two, three? How many? That leaves the F35. With a range of around 750 miles depending on the attack mode it cannot reach Moscow and it has to have that range for an attack on the main Russin infrastructure.. Any thing else is tactical and that could mean dropping nuclear warheads on Germany or Poland. Are we really ever likely to do that? It makes more sense to spend on conventional weapons in my book.
The point of having a strategic nuclear weapon is that nobody will ever use a nuclear weapon. The point of having a tactical nuclear weapon is so that people will safe in using a nuclear weapon, because they believe the response will be proportionate.
Let the French and the Americans have that tactical response. We should remain MAD.
The question is does Putin believe we would trigger MAD if he say destroyed an RAF base with a sub strategic strike..
If he believes it’s worth the gamble he may take it.. if on the other hand he knows we have a sub strategic strike option that could take out a key Russian asset without compromising our strategic deterrence hes not going to make that call..
MAD deters MAD not a calculated sub strategic strike.
That you think you know how Putin thinks shows how out of touch you are. Putin gambled on getting the FSB to blow-up apartment blocks in Russia so that he could start a war against Chechnya, in the hope that winning that would propel him into the presidency. He gambled on not getting caught for mass murder and on winning the resulting war – despite Russia having lost the first war with Chechnya.
There is nothing that Putin will do, regardless of the cost to Russia and the Russian people, if it served his purpose. So no, a sub-strategic or tactical nuke will not deter him from using them himself.
I asked a question, you have given a definitive. I think you don’t know.. I think deterrence is always possible that it will fail, but if you don’t have it it’s more likely to fail than if you have it.
I have given a response based on Putin’s history, that he won’t be deterred from taking any action that he regards as advantageous to him, unless the threat is to him personally.
So it’s pointless spending money on a deterrence that’s unlikely to work, when that money could be spent on conventional forces that have the same probability of working as a deterrent BUT having the advantage of actually being useful/ usable.
Yes to him… how long do you think it would be before a bullet enters Putins brain if he managed to cause a nuclear strike on Russia. He’s not a stupid man, he will push but if he knows he’s getting pushed back harder he will think it through. He and the Russian leadership have a zero sum mentality, you have to show them the zero and it has to be a no win position for them.
Putin will always look for weakness to push.. is your economy energy resilient and can you strike back economically is your political system resilient, are your conventional forces robust and able to hurt Russia back, are your sub strategic nuclear forces able to strike back, will your strategic forces cause a functional MAD exchange..
He will explore and exploit anti perception of weakness.
So naive, zero chance of anyone putting a bullet into Putin’s head. You clearly don’t understand the apparatus he has built over the last 30 years.
He had 300 Russians murdered in their beds and started a war that killed thousands more, at a time when his grip was far more tenuous, and nobody lifted a finger.
Its insanity to even think about a strike with ‘sub strategic nukes’ because the response with by strategic.
Sheer waste of money, better to invest in conventional forces that can both deter and stop, rather than in an accelerator for all-out Armageddon.
That’s funny, as every Russian leader may or many not get a bullet in the head, the reason they are so brutal is for that very reason.. Putin is only safe while he is strong, if he ever became weak he would be dead. That means he is not on purpose going to push where he knows he’s not able to win.. that’s why he cannot give up in Ukraine, he made a massive strategic misstep because he saw a weakness… if leave what looks like strategic weakness he will bite mistake or not….
It’s hilarious that you’re putting Putin in the same league as Yeltsin or even the Chairman of the USSR when it comes to power. What part of ‘dictator’ don’t you understand?
Wow thanks for stating the bleeding obvious about Ukraine.
FFS spock how many dictators have ended up dead. As soon as they show weakness or those below them feel it’s in their interests to remove them they get moved against.
And it’s not just Putin.. escalate to de escalate is evidenced Russian doctrine.
The last Russian leader who had a grip on the country as tight as Putin was his hero Stalin. I don’t recall him dying from any bullet.
Most dictators are dead, humans don’t live forever. A stupid comment.
In the early modern and modern age about 8 Russian leaders have been murdered
Even Lenin had 3 assassination attempts, the second left him bleeding to death with massive neck trauma and it was a miracle he did not die.
And then Leon Trotsky was the heir apparent when Lenin fell ill and had his power stripped in from 1922 onward by internal plotting and by 1924 when Lenin finally died Stalin took power as he had had suborned the leavers of power due to Lenin’s weakness in those two years and was essentially running the country. Trotsky the heir apparent ended up exiled and died with ice axe to the head.
Stalin had about 4 documented plots on his life..
The life of a Russian dictator is one of dodging bullets and many of the failed to dodge.
What is capital M “Mad” is that there’s is still seems bugger all GBAD in the UK to even protect the bases and assets from which any defence of the UK and from where any fight back would be launched. You don’t need to wait to be hit either, its not boxing. If you want to throw big stuff over the proverbial fence have a helmet on. Why hasn’t the Typhoon ever been cleared for this role especially the later versions? And assuming the GCAP will be too? Why no talk on getting SAMP/T and Aster or Aquila even CAMM-MR?
What is capital M “Mad” is that there’s is still seems bugger all GBAD in the UK to even protect the bases and assets from which any defence of the UK and from where any fight back would be launched. You don’t need to wait to be hit either, its not boxing. If you want to throw big stuff over the proverbial fence have a helmet on. Why hasn’t the Typhoon ever been cleared for this role especially the later versions? And assuming the GCAP will be too? Why no talk on getting SAMP/T and Aster or Aquila even CAMM-MR?
That’s not the calculation. We could simply fire a single strategic missile in response from Faslane (or Loch Long or equivalent). Of course if even a single Trident missile is fired, it could trigger MAD, depending on the Russian response. Might we chance that nevertheless? That’s the question that would need to be in Putin’s mind, not will we *try* to trigger MAD. Of course we wouldn’t do that. It would be an escalation and a dangerous one, two steps up the ladder, although disproportionate only in the method of delivery. UK warheads have selectable effects, so the actual explosion could be calibrated.
If we fired one missile with one warhead (and numerous decoys) and told the Russians that’s what it was, would the Russians intercept if they could? Would they believe us? If they let it go, that would be an end to the exchange. Politically devastating in Russia though. We took a tactical hit, they took a “strategic” one. If they intercepted it, might we escalate, to ensure one got through? Would that trigger MAD?
We need to invest in hypersonic nuclear missile technology. The Russians are way ahead of any country in this delivery system. We should also have something like the b1b lancer to give a much greater punch and capability.
In France, we don’t have tactical nukes. The ASMP-A warhead is 300Kt. So 1 ASMP is half the yield of a M51 (6 TNO with 100Kt). And about 15 times the power of a B61.
ASMP and ASN4G are intended to deliver a single last warning before armagedon. We don’t believe in the tactical nuke fantasy.
ASMP is intended to warn of where we are all heading to, in order to leave a last room for sanity, saying we are entering a totaly different level.
B61 is intended to strike a battle corp entering someone else territory. It is a weapons you use on your own soil. Something like « I cut my arm to destroy your army ».
We never believed in B61 and never will. The doctrine is flawed. But I let our allies believe in it of they want to.
Yes I think a lot of people completely miss understand what a sub strategic deterrent is.. it’s not a tactical or battlefield option.. it’s a true DETERRENT and only that. It allows you to provide deterrent against a sub MAD attack or other existential attack by providing you the “ everyone is going to die” warning shot option. if Russian knows you have that it stops the viability of the Russian Escalation for de Escalation paradigm .
But that’s the very point. Putin knows full well that Starmer would never launch a Trident in response to a tactical nuke destroying, say, the UK battlegroup in Estonia. He just might lob a few tactical or sub-strategic nukes if he could persuade himself that the targets are strictly military and wouldn’t infringe anyone’s human rights.
Nobody would fire a trident from our deterrent submarine in response to a tactical or sub strategic strike, because is a stupid idea on many levels.
1) it gives away where are strategic deterrent is and that could lead to our strategic deterrent being counterforced at the exact moment if highest risk..
2) a trident is a strategic warhead and can carry 12warheads and penetration aids . the way the world is going each one of these should be loaded for MAD not as a sub strategic deterrent.
The trident’s are there to prevent Someone undertaking a strike of destruction due to MAD.
I agree, they should be, but they aren’t. At least, not all of them are. Patrols are now normally carried out with just 8 D-5s, I believe and those carry no more than three or four warheads. Some of those warheads are low yield for the sub and tactical roles, but it’s a silly idea.
It was always the plan during the Cold War to have a second ballistic missile submarine available in times of war to ensure that sufficient damage could be done. If possible, it would join the first out to sea. If not it would fire from West Coast Scotland. You might wonder if we could still do that. I have no clue, but it’s hardly beyond the bounds of possibility and has to figure in Pres. Putin’s thinking.
But it still has the same issue if you can get it submerged and in the Ogin why would you compromise that second Sub by launching a single missile from it….
I can understand if it’s stuck against the wall and I do know that it was considered as part of keeping Polaris viable that they surge a second sub and then looked at the viability of setting up a system to have the third loaded sub essentially fire tied to the wall.
Would the USA allow us to drop a UK nuke off the F35?
We have a land based ballistic missile in development, that should be adequate.
The IRBM is a joint project with Germany, so it’s not going to be nuclear capable. If there were a UK tactical nuke available I’m sure the US would allow us to pay them for integration, but it would be waaaaaay down their priority list. I wouldn’t hold your breath.
I do understand why the UK could not put it’s own warhead on that missile.
As for the F35, it is not relevant for a UK warhead for the reason you stated.
“Of the 75 committed F35, more should be the A variant.”
Carrier Strike says hi! We spent a fortune on the capability, don’t hamstring it further.
A is fine once there are enough B. 75 B plus A, not part of.
Completely agree, there needs to be 3 F35b squadrons and that’s about 70ish aircraft.
Basically its half As half B2 of the 138 or make it 144.
Are squadrons in 12s or 24s? So 6 x12 for 72? I thought its the former?
Hope this all means a quicker integration of pending UK weapons on Bs then the As. If the F35As has nuclear strike capabilities will the GCAP have it also?
Hi Quentin.. interestingly RAF squadrons used to have more than 12 aircraft, if you look at the typhoon allocation in 2015 it was about 13-15 aircraft ( there is an FOI for that year that gives the tail numbers of each aircraft allocated to each squadron ).
But beyond that the RAF also run a sustainment fleet.. essentially so they can balance the airframe flight hours across the fleet during its lifetime and extend the life of the fleet. If you only have the squadron allocation you will burn the life of your aircraft.
So for the RAF even 12 aircraft squadrons with 3 front line squadrons you need the following
3 squadrons of 12-15 aircraft
1 OCU squadron of 12-15 aircraft
1 test and evaluation squadron 3-6 aircraft
So for 3 frontline squadrons you need a minimum of 51 aircraft but a few more is better ( give your squadrons a spare or 2)
Finally if you running a fleet for 25 years and not just burning it out you want to add in a sustainment fleet or 30% so that’s 15-20 aircraft on top so really for 3 front line squadrons with a 25 year life you want 75 aircraft.
Exactly, that throwaway comment undermines the whole of his analysis because there is no way we should throw away carrier strike in order to spend a further £10B on nuclear weapons. Get huge conventional deterrence, we can still make ourselves not worth the while with a fraction of that money; have a look at the very rough costings I did above.
The thousands of Stratus, Breakstop, and so on?
Yes, already read and agree. A WE177 replacement is good to have, but I’d not be spending conventional money on it.
God almighty….the conventional kitty is threadbare as it is.
Exactly, we should worry more about buying ships and aircraft to enable conventional warfare rather than nuclear
Leaving this here, from a ‘LinkedIn to English’ translator:
Peter Watkins spent years as a Ministry of Defence suit, so he knows exactly how the sausage is made. Now he’s co-authored a report basically saying Britain’s nuclear strategy is a relic of the 90s and we’re screwed if things actually kick off.
The report, “Rebuilding the Ladder,” argues that relying on a single submarine is a joke in the current climate. We’re missing the middle ground between “do nothing” and “end the world,” which leaves us with zero good options in a crisis.
I talked to Watkins, and he’s not trying to trash the Trident program—it’s fine for what it is—but the world has changed and our strategy hasn’t. We ditched our smaller, “sub-strategic” nukes in the 90s, and the idea that Trident can just fill that gap is a total fantasy. If you fire a massive ballistic missile, the other guy isn’t going to stop and ask if it’s a “small” nuke or the big one; they’re just going to fire everything back. Plus, using our main deterrent for small stuff makes it look weak.
Some people think fancy conventional missiles are the answer, but Watkins isn’t buying it. Sure, they work against countries with no air defenses, but Russia is a different beast. You can’t scare a superpower with conventional weapons when they know you can’t actually hurt them enough to matter.
Russia is the elephant in the room. They’ve got 1,500 small nukes and a doctrine that basically says “we’ll use nukes to win a regular war.” We, on the other hand, only plan to use them if we’re about to be wiped out. They’re investing in a massive arsenal while we’re sitting on our hands, and Watkins thinks we need to catch up before they get any bright ideas.
So, what’s the plan?
1. Short term: Beg the French for help. We’re finally watching their nuclear drills, and while they’re obsessed with “sovereignty,” there’s room to actually coordinate so we aren’t both doing our own thing.
2. Update the manual: Our nuclear doctrine hasn’t been touched in 30 years. We need to stop being so quiet about it. France’s presidents actually talk to their people about nukes; our government acts like they don’t exist.
3. Buy better planes: We need more F-35As that can actually carry nukes. The current plan to have one tiny unit doing both training and nuclear strikes is a joke.
4. The big one: Build our own air-launched nuke again. It’ll cost £14 billion and take 20 years, but Watkins thinks we can do it cheaper if we stop overcomplicating things. The people at the Atomic Weapons Establishment are already slammed, but he thinks they can handle it if they have to.
Watkins is being polite, but he’s clearly annoyed by the timelines. We could fix the doctrine and the French cooperation tomorrow for basically zero dollars. He also thinks we should stop dragging our feet on the F-35s.
We’re all waiting for the “Defence Investment Plan” to see if the government actually gives a **** or if this is all just more talk. Don’t hold your breath.
Planning to use this a lot more to poke fun at MoD speak, so they have been warned.
If theres gojng to be more buying of F35As it would be nice for some reciprocal movement on getting faster UK integration of UK sovereign weapons otherwise its just more US of everything.
Jeeze, maybe the UK should have try to sell the AH140/T31 for their light frigate program. They kind of look identical! Or even the T26?
UK deterent is a big bluff, AWE is a mainly yuanks corps assembling US shells, RR assembling s9G copy, UK buys the w93 heads at a very dearer cost, UK nevah mastered the H bomb, all UK deterent is lincenced in the US of A, even test repair etc… its a long way to be able to be equal to Russia of France when you aren’t suvereign on R&D of what the white house allows you to use!
One thing I do partly question is the comment about Russia would be a whole different prospect to Iran or Ukraine. Yes that does have some validity accepted, it’s a tougher nut, but seems to ignore that Ukraine, even with its limited options is continually making deep strikes into Russia, a number of strikes on a refinery a long way from Ukraine over a week. To the point indeed Putin had to ask America to persuade them to hold a one day ceasefire because even Moscow could not guarantee to be defended.
Seriously I don’t lose sleep on this scenario. Conventional forces are more the issue fkr Uk now. Re sub strategic response I’d wait fir Tempest and resurrect WE177 ( as cheap), before that F35A – we’ve got to use them for something!
if anyone watched house of dynamite, the yanks have a huge amount of assets to monitor incoming ballistic launches, track trajectories, even attempt interceptions 40+missles only can attempt intercepts. plus the nuclear bunkers / 747’s flying chain of command all ready to take over after usa has been nuked. then of course the offensive nuke capability land , sea & air. where do we stop if we go down this route?
I do not think we should use a US dual key system. We should have a Sovereign tactical weapons. We should have F35 or GCAP capability. A stand-off delivery.. Stratus-LO possibly…
you are for 70 years under a dual key system, this is called the “special relationship”, you gov makes efforts to gaslighting the souvereign deterent, which its a bluff, without the US clearance nothing would be launched from your leaky copies of Ohio class
You need some history… in WW2 the UK was developing the bomb as a national project under project Tube Alloys. The UK and the US then combined their research under the Manhattan Project. After the US got the bomb it cut the UK off as they wanted a nuclear monopoly. The UK went on to build a sovereign A Bomb and H Bomb as a sovereign project. Russia then got the bomb and the US discovered it was not the only nuke power.. the UK developed its own air delivered nuke capability (V Bombers). Later the UK bought Polaris missiles from the US and after that Trident. However the delivery system and the warheads were always designed and built in the UK. They are targeted by the UK and NO US authority is needed for their launch it is not DUAL KEY. The UK detergent is available to NATO but is controlled by the Uk. Do you honestly think we spent billions to build a sovereign H Bomb only to go to a US controled system – that is just nonsense. For your information the special relationship is about nuclear technology sharing but it mainly stems out of intelligence sharing in WW2 when the UK shared Enigma intelligence the US since then the NSA and GCHQ work closely together. So no the Special Relationship is not about the US having vetos. As for our SSBNs at least ours have not been tracked by the Russians…